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ABSTRACT 
 
Drawing on new archival sources, official publications, and oral histories, I challenge the 
self-portrayal of socialist civilizations as scientific, secular, and the “other” of everything 
religious. Between 1948 and 1989, the Romanian communist regime sought to disenchant 
believers with a scientific, materialist worldview. Yet, it likewise strove to imbue citizens’ lives 
with socialist sacred meaning. My work demonstrates that we cannot understand late socialism’s 
contradictory drive for rationalization and re-enchantment without examining how elites 
produced knowledge about atheism and lived religion. 
This dissertation analyzes elite interactions with believers and the Central Committee 
from 1948, when transforming religiosity emerged as a party priority, to the end of the socialist 
era. My chapters focus on science popularizers, preservationists, sociologists, and folklorists in 
institutions of cultural administration and research newly created to manage socialist beliefs and 
behavior. These elites shaped the place of religion and atheism in Romanian society while 
competing for resources within the centralized structure of the Party-State. Their voices mattered 
because they engaged believers for whom national and religious belonging coincided. Elites also 
provided specialized knowledge for party organs committed to achieve convergence between 
ideology and citizens’ subjectivity.  
This dissertation combines approaches from cultural history, anthropology, and sociology 
to reveal key sites of conceptual labor and expert power within purportedly monolithic party-
states. I also historicize the re-composition of lived religion by examining how religious 
majorities and minorities engaged with a socialist ideology that competed to provide overarching 
meaning to individual and collective life. On a broader scale, my work provides a comparative 
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history of atheism in Eastern Europe by de-centering the Soviet Union and illuminates the 
socialist experiment as part of a global modernity, inherently defined by a tense yet 
interdependent relationship between disenchantment and sacralization.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Orthodox Archbishop of Suceava and Rădăuți Pimen Zainea has recently shared 
some curious memories about Romanian socialism in the national media. In 1966, Zainea was 
hegumen at the monastery of Putna – the necropolis of Moldova’s medieval ruler, long-revered 
folk saint, and national hero Stephen the Great (1457-1504).1  The same year a Central 
Committee delegation headed by the party leader Nicolae Ceaușescu visited the monastery. 
Recalling the events on television between 2010 and 2013, Zainea recalled that Ceaușescu “was 
overcome with emotion at the grave of Stephen the Great” and, when seeing the map of medieval 
Moldova in the monastery’s museum, he evoked the “national” territories lost to the Soviet 
Union after 1944.2 Following the first secretary’s visit monasteries emerged as sites of socialist 
tourism, patriotic education, and national memory according to the archbishop. “During that 
period of the communist-atheist regime, especially after Nicolae Ceaușescu’s visit at Putna on 
May 22, 1966 […], the number of tourist groups increased by a lot. On Sundays over thirty buses 
would arrive, especially with youth, pupils and students.”3  
References to anti-Sovietism and state atheism, to the cult of the nation and its leader 
present a recognizable picture of late socialism in Romania. Yet, Zainea’s narrative also throws 
the less familiar into relief. Although not unheard of, ceremonial visits of Central Committees to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The Romanian Orthodox Church canonized Stephen the Great only in 1992. However, the ruler had been 
unofficially respected for centuries as a saint-king because his Christian religious stance and victories against the 
Ottoman Empire had earned him the title “Athleta Cristi” from Pope Sixtus IV. 
2 “Doi președinți români s-au închinat ieri la mormântul lui Ștefan cel Mare,” Ziarul de Iași, 28 April 2010, at 
www.ziaruldeiasi.ro/regional/suceava/doi-presedinti-romani-s-au-inchinat-ieri-la-mormantul-lui-stefan-cel-
mare~ni6b72 (last accessed 1 October 2013). “ÎPS Pimen despre vizita lui Nicolae Ceaușescu la Putna,” 
Intermedia TV, 14 May 2013, at www.intermediatv.ro/2013/05/14/ips-pimen-despre-vizita-lui-nicolae-ceausescu-
la-putna/ (last accessed 1 October 2013). 
3  Pimen Zainea, “De veghe la mormântul Sfântului Ștefan,” Cuvinte către tineri 5 (2012), 2-3.  
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famous religious locations were rare in the communist bloc. This remains true even in a country 
that is often held up as a radical example for the close relationship between the majority church 
and the party. Zainea’s allusion to the officially-endorsed patriotic reverence of Stephen the 
Great, of all places at Putna, invite additional scrutiny. After all, the socialist reach for the mixed 
register of a historical figure – one who absorbed secular meanings in the modern era but who 
was already enmeshed in religious symbolism – raises questions about the party’s commitment 
to the atheist endeavor.   
The above recollections bring out the main predicament that constitutes the theme of this 
dissertation: the entanglement between socialist modernity and the sacred.  Ontological theories 
in the tradition of Rudolf Otto and Mircea Eliade understand the sacred in terms of fundamental 
structures within the human personality or the cosmos itself. I define the sacred, both in its 
religious and secular guise, rather as historically specific cultural structures that entail normative 
constructions of social reality and moral community from which the individual self and everyday 
life are expected to derive meaning.4 This understanding can illuminate how the “socialist 
sacred” emerged in Ceaușescu’s Romania at the intersection of patterns of discourse, official 
symbols, spaces, moral and affective regimes, and ritual practices. By adopting such a 
historically and culturally situated approach to the sacred, this dissertation reframes scholarly 
narratives of the relationship between atheism and religion, Marxism and spirituality, while 
historicizing the relationship between socialist modernity and (dis)enchantment.   
There were a series of underlying contradictions at the heart of the Romanian socialist 
project. First, by the time the Second World War ended, the Romanian Orthodox Church had 
acquired unprecedented national prestige and such credentials were precisely what communists 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Gordon Lynch, The Sacred in the Modern World: A Cultural Sociological Approach (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 1-8. 
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in Romania lacked during their underground years and for much of the early socialist period.5 
Thus while, on the ideological level, the utopian drive towards communism was predicated on 
the eradication of religion, the prospects of acquiring social control and political legitimacy 
hinged significantly on Romanian party leaders’ willingness to extend liberties to the Orthodox 
community. The pressures in this direction increased especially once Soviet de-Stalinization 
convinced them of the need to chart an independent course in the socialist world. The 
contradiction between the ideological and political imperatives of the Romanian socialist regime 
was compounded by a second, even profounder one that official ideology inherited from 
Marxism.  The Romanian party elite laid out a materialist cosmology on the surface, yet it 
simultaneously sought to imbue socialism with spiritual values for the this-worldly salvation of 
humanity. This underlying tension between the disenchanting and sacralizing aspects of atheism 
became a constitutive paradox of late socialist culture. This dissertation tells the story of how the 
Romanian party-state grappled with these underlying contradictions and, in the process, provided 
the opportunity for a more fruitful, interpretively dense thinking about the fraught relationship 
between socialism and the sacred.  
 
Socialism and The Sacred 
The desire to banish gods and all shred of irrational belief as part of a top-down attempt 
to create a secular, atheist society was paradigmatic to all socialist states, including Romania. 
Nonetheless, this effort at societal disenchantment had deep moorings in the (post)Enlightenment 
imagination – particularly, in the definition of religion as a residual phenomenon explicable by 
and surmountable through modern rationalization. Recent histories of science, religion, and mass 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Vladimir Tismãneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons: A Political History of Romanian Communism (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2003), 26-27. 
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culture have naturally called into question notions that modernity entails the inevitable loss of the 
overarching meanings and have captured instead the image of a “messy modernity” inherently 
defined by an antinomial yet interdependent relationship between rationalization and 
sacralization, disenchantment and enchantment.6 This broader framework of a messy modernity 
reveals a great deal about the inherited, fundamentally incongruous nature of socialism. It also 
invites an investigation of the historical junctures that threw underlying contradictions particular 
to socialism in Romania into dramatic relief during the Ceaușescu period. 
 Historical and philosophical criticism has long dismantled the neat socialism-religion 
dichotomy. Socialist states claimed Marxism-Leninism as a scientific mantle and spent 
considerable effort to establish “religion” as the other of everything “socialist,” modern and 
rational. Despite – but perhaps because of – these efforts, Soviet studies underscored the extent 
to which revolutionary ideology and ceremonial culture domesticated religious concepts – 
transcendence, immortality, salvation – and forms of ritual practice, whether seasonal or life-
cycle rites, in order to “transfer sacrality” onto the socialist project.7 The programmatic denial of 
this link did not eradicate socialism’s ambivalent relationship to religion, which often resurfaced  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 For a review of the scholarly literature that regards these opposing forces – reason and the irrational – as existing in 
a tense harmony with a potential for rich analysis of modernity see, Michael Saler, “Modernity and Enchantment: 
A Historiographic Review,” American Historical Review 111, no. 3 (June 2006): 692-716. Walter D. Mignolo, 
“The Enduring Enchantment: (Or the Epistemic Privilege of Modernity and Where to Go From There),” South 
Atlantic Quarterly 101, no. 4 (Fall 2002): 927-954. Richard Jenkins, “Disenchantment, Enchantment and Re-
Enchantment: Max Weber at the Millenium,” Max Weber Studies 1 (2000): 11-32; Jane Bennett, “The Enchanted 
World of Modernity: Paracelsus, Kant, and Deleuze,” Cultural Values 1, no. 1 (1997): 1-28. 
7 Malte Rolf, Soviet Mass Festivals, 1917-1991 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2013), 76-77.  Catherine 
Wanner, Communities of the Converted: Ukrainians and Global Evangelicalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2007), 8 and 31. 
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in the mentalities or practices of revolutionaries, party members, and common workers.8 To be 
sure, when the questioning of humanism was at its peak in the 1960s, socialist regimes faced 
powerful critique. Anti-humanist atheists, in particular, chided communist parties for 
participating in the Stalinist purges despite their abiding proclamations about the divinity of man. 
Such violence in the name of human emancipation, the argument went, was made possible 
precisely because Judeo-Christian thought lay at the root of foundationalist ideas of the New 
Man.9  
Following Marx, numerous thinkers were deeply preoccupied with imbuing individual 
life with sacred non-theistic meaning and sought not only the socio-economic liberation of man 
but also his spiritual fulfillment. Yet, the story of Marxist spirituality in socialism has become 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The classic bibliography on religious terminology and symbols in official and popular revolutionary discourse 
includes: Richard Stites, Revolutionary Dreams: Utopian Vision and Experimental Life in the Russian Revolution 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Orlando Figes and Boris Kolonitskii, Interpreting the Russian 
Revolution: the Language and Symbols of 1917 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999); Igal Halfin, From 
Darkness to Light: Class Consciousness, and Salvation in Revolutionary Russia (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2000); Oleg Kharkhordin, The Collective and the Individual: A Study of Practices (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1999); Mark Steinberg, The Proletarian Imagination: Self, Modernity and the 
Sacred, 1910-1925 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002); Jochen Hellbeck, Revolution on My Mind: Writing a 
Diary under Stalin (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006); R. L. Hernandez, “The Confessions of Semen 
Kanatchikov: A Bolshevik Memoir as Spiritual Autobiography,” The Russian Review 60, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 13-
35; Glennys Young, Power and the Sacred in Revolutionary Russia: Religious Activists in the Village (University 
Park: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); Daniel Peris, Storming the Heavens: The Soviet League of the 
Militant Godless (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). For the absorption of religious symbols and practices in 
Soviet mass festivals, political ceremonies and life-cycle rituals see James von Geldern, Bolshevik Festivals, 
1917-1920 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Nina Tumarkin, Lenin Lives! The Lenin Cult in 
Soviet Russia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997); Katerina Clark in Petersburg, Crucible of Cultural 
Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), and Karen Petrone, Life Has Become More Joyous, 
Comrades: Celebrations in the Time of Stalin (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000); Christel Lane, The 
Rites of Rulers: Ritual in Industrial Society: The Soviet Case (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). On 
the attraction of the political left to religious idealism ranging from Christianity to theosophical esotericism and 
the occult see, Nicolas Zernov, The Russian Religious Renaissance of the Twentieth Century (London: Darton, 
Longman, and Todd, 1963); Maria Carlson, “No Religion Higher than Truth”: A History of the Theosophical 
Movement in Russia, 1875-1922 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal, ed. 
The Occult in Russian and Soviet Culture (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997); Victoria Frede, Doubt, 
Atheism, and the Nineteenth-Century Russian Intelligentsia (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011). 
9 This was essentially the critique articulated by Alexandre Kojève, Georges Bataille, Jean-Paul Sartre, and others 
who emerged as the official faces of French thought and were foundational for the phenomenological and (post-
)structuralist critique of Marxism. See, Stefanos Geroulanos, An Atheism That Is Not Humanist Emerges in 
French Thought (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 114. 
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marginalized in scholarly literature. This is largely because the objective scientific rationalism 
that underwrote orthodox Marxism since the Second International and increasingly under Stalin, 
led to the loss of this humanist emancipatory dimension. It also helped de-legitimize the 
communist vision of the future to a significant degree.10  
Numerous studies continue to follow the suit of these historical and intellectual trends, 
overwhelmingly emphasizing the instrumentalist motivation of party-states to compete with and 
supplant religion without engaging the existential ideals that atheist spirituality strove to provide 
instead. The tendency to consider such ideals meaningless except in terms of states’ projection of 
power is especially pronounced in studies that apply the concept of “political religion” to 
socialism. These works also tend to overstate parallels between socialism and religious 
fanaticism to underscore the totalitarian aspects of such regimes.11 By comparison, the early 
historiography of atheism and religion dwelled on the repressive, coarse efforts of Bolshevik 
officials before and during the Stalinist years and examined why the scientific-materialism of  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 M.S. Kagan, “On Spirit and Spirituality” in Benjamin Page, ed. Marxism and Spirituality: An International 
Anthology (Westport: Bergin&Garvey, 1993), 111-114. See also, Boris Majer, “Marxism, Transcendence, and 
Spirituality,” 125-126 in the same volume. Arnold R. Farr, Critical Theory and Democratic Vision: Herbert 
Marcuse and Recent Liberation Theories (New York: Lexington, 2009), 16-17. 
11 Vladimir Tismãneanu, The Devil in History: Communism, Fascism, and Some Lessons of the Twentieth Century 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), esp. 1-17, and f. 9 on p. 235. Klaus-Goerg Riegel, “Marxism 
Leninism as Political Religion,” Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 6, no. 1 (2005): 97-126. Michail 
Ryklin, Kommunismus als Religion – Die Intellektuellen und die Oktoberrevolution trans. Dirk and Elena 
Uffelmann (Berlin: Verlag der Weltreligionen, 2008). Emilio Gentile, Politics as Religion trans. George Staunton 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 44, 62-4. For a critical review, see David D. Roberts, “’Political 
Religion’ and the Totalitarian Departures of Inter-war Europe: On the Uses and Disadvantages of an Analytical 
Category,” Contemporary European History 18, no. 4 (November 2009): 381-414. That the communist leadership 
exhibited doubt, uncertainty, and varied levels of militancy regarding its mission in history and therefore cannot 
be simply described as fanatical was addressed by Alfred G. Meyer, Leninism (New York: Praeger, 1962) and 
Moshe Lewin, The Making of the Soviet System: Essays in the Social History of Interwar Russia (New York: New 
Press, 1985).  
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Marxist-Leninist ideology proved unpopular with believers.12  More recent works have moved 
away from these paradigms of “repression” and “failure.” These studies examine instead the re-
composition that both the atheist project and religious life underwent in the post-Stalinist period 
largely because of interaction with each other.13 Yet, while this research analyzes the degree to 
which atheists made the spiritual lives of citizens a matter of party-state concern, no one has 
examined how the return to spiritual questions after Stalin echoed broader trends in Marxist 
thought or led to new entanglements between socialism and the sacred.14  
This lacuna becomes especially pronounced when viewed against the paramount number 
of works that approach the history of religion from the narrow perspective of politics and a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12  Paul Froese, The Plot to Kill God: Findings from the Soviet Experiment in Secularization (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2008); Shoshana Keller, To Moscow, not Mecca: The Soviet Campaign against Islam in 
Central Asia, 1917-1941 (Westport: Praeger, 2001); Eren Murat Tasar, Soviet and Muslim: the Institutionalization 
of Islam in Central Asia, 1943-1991 (Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 2010); William B. Husband, 
“Godless Communists”: Atheism and Society in Soviet Russia, 1917-1932 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University 
Press, 2000); Daniel Peris, Storming the Heavens: The Soviet League of the Militant Godless (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1998); Glennys Young, Power and the Sacred in Revolutionary Russia: Religious Activists in 
the Village (University Park: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997); John Anderson, Religion, State, and 
Politics in the Soviet Union and Successor States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Dimitry V. 
Pospielovsky, A History of Marxist-Leninist Atheism and Soviet Antireligious Policies (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1987); James Thrower, Marxist-Leninist "Scientific Atheism" and the Study of Religion and Atheism in 
the USSR (New York: de Gruyter Mouton, 1983); David E. Powell, Antireligious Propaganda in the Soviet 
Union: A Study of Mass Persuasion (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1975).  
13 Victoria Smolkin, “‘A Sacred Space Is Never Empty’: Soviet Atheism, 1954-1971” (PhD Dissertation, University 
of California at Berkeley, 2010). Miriam Dobson, “The Social Scientist Meets the ‘Believer’: Discussions of God, 
the Afterlife, and Communism in the Mid-1960s,” Slavic Review 74, no. 1 (Spring 2015): 79-103; Katherine 
Wanner, ed. State Secularism and Lived Religion in Soviet Russia and Ukraine (Cambridge: Oxford University 
Press, 2012); Esther Pepperkamp and Malgorzata Rajtar, eds. Religion and the Secular in Eastern Germany, 1945 
to the Present (Leiden: Brill, 2007). Sonja Luehrmann, Secularization Soviet Style: Teaching Atheism and 
Religion in a Volga Republic (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011); Heléna Tóth, “‘It Must Not Look 
Like Expropriation’: The Cemetery Regulations of 1970 in Communist Hungary and the Spatial Aspects of the 
‘Battle between the Religious and the Materialist World View” in Cityscapes in History: Creating the Urban 
Experience eds. Katrina Gulliver and Heléna Tóth (Burlington: Ashgate, 2014), 197-214. 
14 Gail Kligman authored two seminal works on spiritual questions in Ceaușescu’s Romania in which she noted the 
state-endorsed secularization of folkloric religious-magical rituals, both life-cycle and seasonal, arguing that this 
reflected official attempts to promote a “new religion” for a New Man.  However, her analysis does not address 
the problems of atheism or the transformations in Marxist thought after the early 1950s. Gail Kligman, Wedding 
of the Dead: Ritual, Poetics, and Popular Culture in Transylvania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1988), esp. 257-259. Cãluș: Symbolic Transformation in Romanian Ritual (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1981). The quote is from p. 149. 
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monolithic “regime.” The importance of religious organizations in Cold War competition, 
popular dissent, and post-socialist politics made it particularly seductive to focus on church-state 
relations. 15 This angle, in turn, also entailed a glossing over of distinctions between the various 
elites – leading party members, state officials, and scholars – whose conceptual labor shaped 
official approaches to the religious question in quintessential ways.16 In Romanian scholarship 
especially, the notion that the regime acted as one has led to the general consensus that the 
accommodation between the Romanian Communist Party and the Orthodox Church largely  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Scholarship on church-state relations is by far the most extensive. For brevity, I will cite the Romanian 
scholarship under footnote 18. On the centrality of religious organizations of superpower politics, see T. Jeremy 
Gunn, Spiritual Weapons and the Forging of an American National Religion (Westport: Praeger, 2009); Jonathan 
P. Herzog, The Spiritual-Industrial Complex: America’s Religious Battle against Communism in the Early Cold 
War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Diane Kirby, ed. Religion and the Cold War (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2003); Philip E. Muehlenbeck, Religion and the Cold War: A Global Perspective (Nashville: Vanderbilt 
University Press, 2012). Lucian Leuștean, ed. Eastern Christianity and the Cold War, 1945-1991 (New York: 
Routledge, 2010). On churches and dissent see, Jan Kubik, The Power of Symbols against the Symbols of Power: 
The Rise of Solidarity and the Fall of State Socialism in Poland (University Park: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1994); David Doellinger, Turning Prayers into Protests: Religious-Based Activism and its Challenge to 
State Power in Socialist Slovakia and East Germany (New York: CEU Press, 2013); Emily Baran, Dissent on the 
Margins: How Jehowah’s Witnesses Defied Communism and Lived to Preach About It (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014). In Romanian historiography, numerous works made the argument that the churches 
provided alternative values to socialist ideology and that religion revived because of popular opposition to the 
regime. Trond Gilberg, “Religion and Nationalism in Romania” in Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and East 
European Politics ed. Pedro Ramet (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989), 346; Ioan Marius Bucur, “Church 
and State Relations under the Communist Regime. The Case of Romania” in Religion and Political Change in 
Europe: Past and Present ed. Ausma Cimdina (Pisa: PLUS, 2003), 172.  For the controversial roles that churches 
play in post-socialist politics and in dealing with the communist past see, Lucian Turcescu and Lavinia Stan, 
Religion and Politics in Post-Communist Romania (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).  Sabrina P. Ramet, 
ed. Religion and Politics in Post-Socialist Central and Southeastern Europe: Challenges since 1989 (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2014). 
16 There are a few partial exceptions. John Anderson, Religion, State and Politics in the Soviet Union and Successor 
States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 69-81. Tatiana A. Chumachenko, Church and State in 
Soviet Russia: Russian Orthodoxy from World War II to the Khrushchev Years ed. and trans. Edward E. Roslof 
(New York: Armonk, 2002). Anca Maria Șincan, “Of Middlemen and Intermediaries: Negotiating the State-
Church Relationship in Communist Romania” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Central European University, Budapest, 2011). 
Victoria Smolkin, “‘A Sacred Space Is Never Empty’.” 
9 	  
	  	  
explains how the relationship between religion and communism evolved.17 This particular bias 
also sheds light on the following paradox: while the atheism of the Romanian regime is taken to 
be an old chestnut, until now the ideological arm of the anti-religious endeavor has received no 
attention in scholarship.18  
Yet after Stalin, professional atheists – propagandists, historians, sociologists, 
psychologists and philosophers – transformed the struggle against religion into a struggle for a 
socialist spiritual life. Historian Victoria Smolkin demonstrated that Soviet atheists gradually 
veered away from anticlerical campaigns and enlightenment measures; instead they strove to 
develop a “positive atheism,” a set of beliefs and practices imbued with spirituality. What drove 
this qualitative transformation in atheist thought was the recognition that religion was strong not 
because it constituted a set of intellectual beliefs but because it had individual and experiential 
components – aesthetic, emotional, psychological, moral, communal and ritual - that provided 
answers to the ultimate questions of human existence.19  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 On the relations between various churches and the Romanian socialist state see Lucian Leustean, Orthodoxy and 
the Cold War: Religion and Political Power in Romania, 1947-1965 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); 
Cristian Vasile, Biserica Ortodoxă Română în primul deceniu communist, 1945-1959 (Bucharest: Curtea Veche, 
2005) and Între Vatican și Kremlin: Între Vatican și Kremlin: Biserica Greco-Catolică în timpul regimului 
comunist (Bucharest: Humanitas, 2003); George Enache and Adrian Nicolau Petcu, Patriarhul Justinian și 
Biserica Ortodoxă Română în anii 1948-1964 (Galați: Editura Partener, 2009), Vasilică Croitor, Răscumpărarea 
Memoriei: Cultul Penticostal în perioada comunistă (Medgidia: Succeed Publishing, 2010); Adrian Nicolae 
Petcu, ed. Partidul, Securitatea și Cultele (Bucharest: Nemira, 2005).István Tőkés, A romániai magyar 
református egyház élete, 1945-1989 (Budapest: Magyarságkutató Intézet, 1990); Péter Sas, Az erdélyi római 
katolikus egyház, 1900–1948 (Budapest: Mundus, 2008); Ulrich Andreas, Kirchenleitung über dem Abgrund: 
Bischof Friedrich Müller vor den Herausforderungen durch Minderheitenexistenz, Nationalsozialismus und 
Kommunismus (Cologne: Böhlau, 1998). 
18 There is only one exception. Writing on cremation in modern Romania, historian Marius Rotar addressed atheism 
very briefly. See, Eternitate prin cenușă: O istorie a crematoriilor și incinerărilor umane în România secolelor 
XIX-XXI (Iași: Institutul European, 2011), 378. Marxist-Leninist atheism has received surprisingly little attention 
in studies of state socialism in Eastern Europe overall, a fact that is reflected in the works cited above. 
19 Victoria Smolkin, “‘A Sacred Space Is Never Empty’: Soviet Atheism, 1954-1971” (Ph.D. Dissertation, 
University of California at Berkeley, 2010). 
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However, besides the recognition that religion remained relevant to human life, a series 
of processes converged in the 1950s and 1960s to make atheism and the spiritual world of 
socialist citizens key policy concerns for socialist states. Khrushchev’s initial denunciation of 
Stalin in 1956 was followed the Soviet suppression of liberalizing forces in Hungary and the 
subsequent wave of re-Stalinization in the socialist camp. These rapid reversals rattled the myth 
of party infallibility and raised questions about Marxism’s ability “to provide meaningful 
answers to the problem of human life.”20 Crucially, the possibility to cultivate a strong 
philological relationship with the works of the “early” humanist Marx convinced many theorists 
at the time that Stalinist ideology led to the extensive pauperization of the Marxist vision.  
Indeed, the discovery of young Marx’s emphasis on democracy, ethics, individual inner 
fulfillment, and the self-creation of humanity in history revealed an emancipatory, transcendental 
vision of society. Such a vision stood in stark contrast with the orthodox Marxist insistence on 
materialism and the historical determinism of the political-economic structure. The revisionist 
claim that Stalinism produced a spiritual void in Marxism justified the push for politically 
liberating changes in Eastern Europe from party and unofficial quarters alike. At the same time, 
the rejuvenation of Marxist humanist thought influential before the Second International also 
opened a global dialogue between religion and Marxism. It inspired the Vatican’s re-articulation 
of Christian humanism and the emergence of liberation theology in Latin America while also  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 The quote is from Miklós Tomka, “Életfordulók ünneplése a szocialista országokban” in Márta D. Hoffman and 
Szilágyi Erzsébet, eds. Ünnepek a mai magyar társadalomban: az ünnep szociológiai és szociálpszihológiai 
szempontból (Budapest: Tömegkomunkációs Kutatóközpont, 1982), 165.  
11 	  
	  	  
contributing to the intellectual consolidation of anti-humanist atheism in French thought.21 
Revisionism naturally had important repercussions for socialists in the anti-colonial movements 
at their peak after the mid-1950s. As Léopold Senghor famously stated, “the philosophy of 
humanism, rather than economics, is the basic character and contribution of Marxist thought.”22 
Tied to this was the growing popular familiarity with the colonial and imperial injustices of 
western countries and the culture of social awareness that the movements of the 1960s inspired.23  
Due to all of these factors, Marxism’s ethical and humanist dimension was the subject of 
unprecedented debates around a globe. This conjuncture explains why the spirituality of 
individual citizens began to preoccupy socialist states in the 1960s and the 1970s across the 
Soviet bloc. The reanimation of the academic study of religion and reliance on professional 
expertise in atheist policy in the region can also be understood as an answer to these larger 
processes.24  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Paul Mojzes, Christian-Marxist Dialogue in Eastern Europe (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1981). 
A. J. Van der Bent, The Christian Marxist Dialogue: An Annotated Bibliography (Geneva: World Council of 
Churches, 1969). Stefanos Geroulanos, An Atheism That Is Not Humanist Emerges in French Thought (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2010), 258-286. The debates that peaked around Marxist humanism in the late 1950s 
and 1960s were part of a broader questioning of humanism after the two world wars.  See, Thomas Baldwin, ”The 
Humanism Debate,” in The Oxford Handbook of Continental Philosophy eds. Brian Leiter and Michael Rosen 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 671-711. In Romania, discussion around the Marxist conception of man 
resulted, among others, in anthro-philosophical works like C. I. Gulian, Problematica omului: eseu de 
antropologie filozofică (Bucharest: Editura Politică, 1966). 
22 Léopold Senghor, ”Socialism Is a Humanism” in Socialist Humanism: An International Symposium ed. Erich 
Fromm (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966), 57.  
23 Introduction to Michael J. Thompson, ed. Constructing Marxist Ethics: Critique, Normativity, Praxis (Leiden: 
Brill, 2015), 4. 
24 For the Soviet Union, see Smolkin’s dissertation, although she does not contextualize the evolution of Soviet 
atheism within the broader crisis of Marxist humanism after 1956. The connection between Marxist revisionism 
and the revival of the academic study of religion see, Patrick Hyder Patterson, “The Shepherds' Calling, the 
Engineers' Project, and the Scientists' Problem: Scientific Knowledge and the Care of Souls in Communist Eastern 
Europe” in Science, Religion, and Communism in Cold War Europe ed. Paul Betts and Stephen A. Smith 
(London: Palgrave, 2016), 55-76. For other studies see articles on Czechoslovakia and Poland in the volume Iva 
Dolezalová, Luther H. Martin, and Dalibor Papoušek, The Academic Study of Religion during the Cold War: East 
and West (New York: Peter Lang, 2001), 95-154.  
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By situating the history of the socialist sacred in Ceauşescu’s Romania in the context of 
the broader transformations in Marxist thought, this dissertation also examines the impact of 
nationalism on official approaches to religious belief and atheist education. The regime’s need 
for political legitimacy and its endeavor to centralize cultural life, especially from the 1970s 
onward, reinforced intellectual competition around national symbols. In Katherine Verdery’s 
words, “The monolithic party-state produced a monolithic nation.”25 The relative openness to 
revisionist Marxism during Ceauşescu’s thaw spurred the re-evaluation of religion from less 
dogmatic positions and, like elsewhere in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, Romanian 
atheist experts articulated the need to endow socialist culture with a spiritual dimension. Yet, 
such reformist positions could not achieve cultural authority with intellectual and popular 
audiences that were deeply attached to national values. Nor could they secure long-term support 
from a regime that was historically inclined towards Stalinist centralization precisely because of 
its tenuous hold on public support.  By the 1980s then, Marxist humanism underwent both an 
indigenization and a Stalinization, a process most emblematically evidenced in the 1980s by the 
cultivation of “Romanian spirituality” in the framework of a mass folkloric festival.  In effect, 
this development meant that the official form of the socialist sacred was emptied of humanist 
transcendental values, a process that reflected the particular course of Marxism’s rupture in 
Ceauşescu’s Romania. 
The Ceaușescu regime’s engagement with atheism, religion, and spirituality reveals the 
tangled history of socialist modernity and the sacred. The extensive ideological discussions in the 
party-state and scholarly establishment provide insight into how a heterogeneous elite grappled 
with conflicting objectives and the broader ramifications these had for the management of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Katherine Verdery, National Ideology Under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceauşescu’s Romania 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 315. 
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socialist culture. To historicize the tense interdependence between state-endorsed secularizing 
and sacralizing efforts, I examine printed sources from the press and scholarly journals alongside 
the archival records of institutions involved in managing socialist beliefs and behavior.26 These 
sources provide a possibility to de-center the regime by revealing how the elites that populate the 
forthcoming pages – party-state officials, atheist cadres, preservationists, sociologists, and 
ethnologists – shaped the sacred in socialism. This dissertation investigates the conversations 
that took place in institutions responsible for making socialist citizens into Romanian atheists 
and thus explores the multiple and shifting locations of decision-making in a purportedly 
“monolithic” party-state. It analyzes the ideological elite’s construction of meaning around 
religion and atheism, their encounter with the underlying contradictions in the regime’s project, 
the actions they took to address them, and the broader implications all of these had for the 
relationship between socialist culture and (dis)enchantment as well as post-socialism and 
religiosity.       
 
Religion, Nation and Modernity in Romania 
The historical shifts leading up to Ceaușescu’s “golden epoch” are instrumental for 
drawing out the contours of Romanian socialism. Since the emergence of modern institutions of 
culture, education and government during the 1800s, the prospective place of religion in national 
modernity has been a contentious issue in the Romanian political and intellectual sphere. By the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 The main archival records I rely on belong to the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, the 
Society for the Dissemination of Science and Culture, the Department of [Religious] Cults, the Committee for 
Historical Monuments, the Ministry of Culture, the Secret Service, and the various public and restricted 
publications of institutions involved in researching atheism, religion, and folklore (the Center for the Study of 
Youth Problems, the Center for Sociology, the Academy of Socio-Political Sciences, and the Institute of Research 
in Ethnology and Dialectology in Bucharest). For a full bibliography of archival records and printed sources see 
the bibliography at the end. The archives of the Department of Cults, the Committee of Historical Monuments and 
the Ministry of Culture were not inventoried and fully accessible for research, as a result of which this dissertation 
cannot attempt to represent the voices of clergy members.  
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time the nation-state came into its own in 1878, elite positions fell across a rich spectrum from 
religious to secular or atheist in a way that a classification by broad groups – traditionalists, 
Europeanists, and early socialist – cannot address with adequate sensitivity here. In particular, 
the few intellectuals who embraced atheism were of scientistic, philosophical, or Marxian 
inspiration and they offered their respective systems of thought to replace religion in modern 
Romania.27 Although atheists rejected divine entities, by virtue of linking the meaning of 
existence to some earthly principle as a means for human completeness and self-transcendence, 
they preserved a space for the sacred in individual and public life.  
With extended borders, Romania emerged triumphant from the First World War but the 
experience of communal devastation and violence ushered in a disillusionment with rational 
modernity and unsettled belief in a righteous Western humanism. The sense of existential crisis 
after the Great War made intellectual views about the divinity of human society increasingly 
difficult to sustain. In the broader social arena, the religious and ethnic diversity of Greater 
Romania presented both opportunities and unprecedented challenges for nation-building in the 
newly acquired territories of Bukovina, Bessarabia, and Transylvania. It was these twinned 
factors – competing nationalisms and the feelings of existential malaise – that lent such virulent 
force to religion in the interwar years and pushed both atheists and secularists on the various 
margins of the national debate. On the mainstream, Romanian elites were swayed by notions of 
“Romanian spirituality” that certain thinkers formulated by variously fusing together ideas about 
Eastern Christianity, the rural world, and Asian or Western mysticism in order to provide the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Simion Ghiță and Dumitru Ghișe, “Filozofie și cultură în evoluția culturii românești,” in Filozofie și religie în 
evoluția culturii române moderne: studii și antologie vol. I, ed. Simion Ghiță and Dumitru Ghișe (Bucharest: 
Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1984), 21-58.  
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collective and the individual self with new existential purpose.28 Comparable trends were 
observable among the German and Hungarian elites, in whose case Western Christianity was a 
main source of inspiration. Among the post-imperial nation-states of Eastern Europe, interwar 
Romania exemplified then the culmination of a long-term nineteenth century process that 
involved both “the nationalization of religion and the [religious] sacralization of the nation.”29 
This mutual imprint entailed, on the one hand, a rapprochement of confessions to nationalism 
and believers’ adoption of national values and, on the other, the appropriation of religious 
functions and modes of expressions by national ideology. As historian Maria Bucur’s work 
indicates, this intertwining of the religious and the secular sacred surfaced especially in the 
commemorative public rituals around World War I that sought to reinterpret individual death as a 
necessary sacrifice for the nobler, collective cause of the nation protected and guided by a 
national God.30   
With the advent of communist take-over in 1947-1948, the Dej regime called an end to 
such imaginings of the “sacred nation” and heralded a cultural revolution instead. Under the 
influence of the Stalinist interpretations of Marxism, Romanian communist leaders believed that 
mass consciousness in post-war Romania was defined by a socio-economic environment that 
hegemonic groups such as the nobility, bourgeoisie, and the churches controlled. The implication 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Keith Hitchins, Rumania, 1866-1947 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 298-319. 
29 Martin Schulze Wessel, ed. Die Nationalisierung der Religion und die Sakralisierung der Nation im östlichen 
Europa (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2006), 7. Hans Christian Maner, Multikonfessionalität und neue Staatlichkeit : 
orthodoxe, griechisch-katholische und römisch-katholische Kirche in Siebenbürgen und Altrumänien zwischen 
den Weltkriegen, 1918-1940 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2007). Hans Christian Maner and Martin Schulze Wessel, eds. 
Religion im Nationalstaat zwischen den Weltkriegen 1918-1939: Polen, Tschechoslowakei, Ungarn, Rumänien 
(Stuttgart: Steiner, 2002). Mainstream Czech secular conceptualizations of the nation are noted as an exception in 
the latter volume. 
30 Maria Bucur, Heroes and Victims: Remembering War in Twentieth Century Romania (Bloomington: University of 
Indiana Press, 2010), 37, 98-145.  
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of such deterministic views was that aligning citizens’ beliefs Marxist-Leninist ideals would be 
achieved through the mechanistic rearrangement of property structures, social and institutional 
hierarchies, public space, and cultural life executed under the banner of “class war.” 
Accordingly, in order to restrict religious life “within church walls,” the party-state availed itself 
of expropriations, the repression of church dignitaries, and a host of legislative measures.  The 
Society for the Dissemination of Science and Culture (SDSC), an institution modelled on the 
late-Stalinist Znanie Society, was similarly called to arms beginning 1949. The emphasis on 
materialism in its publications and in its nationwide lectures of political, cultural, and scientific 
enlightenment were expected to banish faith from the hearts and minds of every citizen as a 
matter of course. The Dej regime likewise adopted Bolshevik functional replacements for 
religious rites: political ceremonies, mass festivals, a calendar of red-letter holidays, and life-
cycle rituals.31 Through these anti-religious measures and the new ritual culture they adopted, 
party-state officials cultivated their own socialist sacred – a series of transcendental ideals that 
exalted internationalism, scientific rationalism, and the mass socio-economic emancipation of the 
masses.  
However, as regime differentiation set in after Stalin’s death in 1953, Soviet models 
underwent increasing domestication. This process was unmistakable, first, in the party-state’s 
relations with Romanian Orthodoxy and, second, in the regime’s retreat from scientific-atheist 
education. Interwar religious nationalism had propelled the institutional expansion and financial 
growth of the Orthodox Church in Greater Romania, a process not entirely interrupted by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Sonja Luehrmann suggests that initial Bolshevik rituals fell out of favor by the late 1920s because Soviet cultural 
planners acted out of such a mechanistic “logic of replacement.” Luehrmann, Secularism Soviet Style, 6-7. 
Importantly, these were the kinds of rituals that Eastern European regimes borrowed in the early 1950s. 
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communist take-over.32 While the forced unification of the Greek-Catholic Church with the 
Orthodox Church was inspired by Stalin and applied elsewhere in Eastern Europe, in Romania 
this re-unification showed a meeting of interests between the party-state and the interwar 
aspirations of Orthodox nationalists. The nationalization of land and the education system in 
1948 along with the anti-clerical campaigns hit the church hard.33 But although it was heavily 
regulated during the entire socialist period, the privileged status of Orthodoxy can be made 
evident by several facts: no Orthodox bishops were imprisoned; the religious and economic life 
of Orthodox monasteries revived in the 1950s; above all, the church was the only religious 
organization that canonized saints (1955) and published some of the most important religious 
and liturgical works in the socialist camp.34     
Due to their tenuous national credentials, Romanian party elites resisted Nikita 
Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization efforts after 1956. In the early 1960s Soviet plans to reduce 
Romania to an agricultural hinterland for the more industrialized socialist countries aggravated 
inter-party relations further. In consequence, the Dej regime issued a declaration of independence 
from Moscow in April 1964. As the Romanian party elite embarked on de-Sovietization instead 
of de-Stalinization, foreign and domestic policy priorities shifted and the official stance towards 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale [Central National Historical Archives, henceforth ANIC], Fond C.C. al 
P.C.R., Secția Administrativ-Politică, File 76/1949, f. 6. In a report, the head of the Department of Cults Stanciu 
Stoian indicated that in the 1947-1948 financial year, before the strongest wave of anti-religious repression (1948-
1952), 80 percent of all Orthodox clerics received over 502 million lei in salaries from the state budget. This 
arrangement reflected the legacy of the interwar period. I have not come across sources giving exact numbers 
about the extent to which the payment of clergy salaries was maintained. But in stark contrast to the Soviet Union, 
the Romanian communist state paid salaries to numerous hierarchs – Orthodox or otherwise – largely as a 
measure of control. 
33 Ibid. According to the Department of Cults, in 1948 the Orthodox Church owned about 2,800 square kilometers of 
land, most of which was nationalized over the course of 1948-1962. In 1962, monasteries still owned 18.23 square 
kilometers of land (over 10 percent of their previous holdings), out of which only 2 sq km were to be handed over 
to the state.  ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Administrativ-Politică, File 14/1966, vol. I., f. 57-62. 
34 Leuștean, Orthodoxy and the Cold War, 93-95, 163. 
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religion relaxed further. After the campaign against Orthodox monasteries in 1958-1961, the Dej 
regime reached a pact with Patriarch Justinian. The external relations of the Orthodox Church 
and the higher clergy proved particularly instrumental in repairing diplomatic relations with the 
west and in obtaining funds for socialist industrialization from outside of the Soviet camp. The 
retreat from the ideological battle against religion was evident in 1963 when the Soviet-inspired 
SDSC was reduced to small department within the Ministry of Culture. This institutional erosion 
had prohibitive effects on science popularization, the promotion of alternative socialist rituals, 
and the professionalization of atheist work in the late Dej era. Meanwhile, party-state attempts to 
reconcile with Romanian citizens both on the religious and national front prepared the way for 
the symbolic re-appreciation of cultic buildings. By the late 1960s, in fact, the Ceaușescu regime 
had cast a number of churches as carriers of national memory and socialist identity based on their 
historical and aesthetic value. It encouraged citizens to sightsee and care for these vestiges of the 
past so that they could take ownership of their integration into the socialist nation.  
A fundamental question regarding religion and ideology in late socialist Romania is why 
the regime became invested in atheism at the height of the thaw in the late 1960s when it had 
practically abandoned this enterprise a couple of years earlier. Certainly, during the first atheist 
campaigns during Ceaușescu (1966 and 1969), it became clear that the relaxation in anti-
religious measures along with other aspects of the thaw – the amelioration of postal and press 
censorship, the opening of borders to western tourists, or the 1964 amnesty of political prisoners, 
including priests – animated religious life across the country. The thaw also produced confusion 
among the lower party ranks. The renewed commitment to atheist work was likewise fuelled by 
the Central Committee’s anxiety over maintaining the ideological reins. Having sided with China 
in the Sino-Soviet split and condemned the Warsaw pact invasion of Czechoslovakia (1968), 
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Ceaușescu was at the height of his isolation in the socialist camp. In this climate, the possibility 
of Soviet invasion seemed real enough to warrant calls for the re-establishment of ideological 
unity around party and leader. Importantly, however, the dynamism of the religious landscape 
and the preoccupation with ideological control during the thaw coincided with the regime’s 
much invoked departure from “dogmatic” Stalinist hyper-rationalism and its relative openness to 
revisionist Marxism. When taken together, these factors soon led to the consensus that Marxist-
Leninist atheism needed revision. It did not give an accurate picture of popular religiosity, the 
argument went, explain its persistence in socialism or provide directions for how to disenchant 
society.   
Indeed, after 1965, the Central Committee invested unparalleled amounts of resources 
and professional expertise to transform the spiritual lives of socialist citizens – their worldview, 
morality, and feelings. Instead of being the “stepchild” of the regime’s ideological program, by 
the 1970s the mission of creating atheist beliefs and practices turned into a “permanent aspect” 
of building socialism and became a prerequisite for the communist future. As a result, atheist 
education became the subject of repeated party plenums and resolutions; inspired the creation of 
specialized research laboratories; and helped revive psychology, ethnography, and the sociology 
of religion. It also led to the emergence of a new generation of specialized cadres – professional 
atheists and scholars of religion. Meanwhile, religiosity went from being dismissed as a 
“remnant” of “retrograde societies,” in the orthodox Marxist parlance, to being recognized as a 
“complex phenomenon” that needed to be discovered empirically and understood scientifically. 
As the individual and experiential components of religiosity came into focus, cadres provided 
further impetus for developing a “positive atheism” – one that did not simply negate belief but 
was expected to replace religion’s psychological, emotional, and aesthetic functions in daily life. 
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By the late 1970s, these preoccupations coalesced into efforts to produce a socialist spiritual 
culture that could provide citizens with the experience of a socialist transcendent. Experts’ call 
for ritual reform culminated after 1976 in the biannual “Song for Romania” Festival, a vast 
cultural-artistic event that popularized new life-cycle and seasonal rituals inspired by folklore.  
Most importantly, by imbuing positive atheism with national values, the regime offered its 
citizens a so-called “Romanian spirituality” as a path for self-fulfillment and transcendence.  
By examining religion and state atheism under the broad rubric of the sacred, this 
dissertation investigates the relationship between socialist modernity and (dis)enchantment, 
while historicizing the entanglement between Marxism and spirituality. The chapters that follow 
integrate a chronological with a problem-centered exposition. Each privileges a domain of 
socialist culture where the socialist elite grappled with rationalization and the sacred. My 
chapters focus on science popularization, cultural heritage, atheist education, and socialist rituals, 
although these themes re-surface and intersect throughout this work.  
Chapter One focuses on the rise and demise of the Society for the Dissemination of 
Science and Culture in order to examine the evolution of scientific-materialist enlightenment in 
the early socialist years. I demonstrate that, in contrast to Khruschev’s Soviet Union where a 
renewed assault on religion coincided with the interrogation of Stalinist ideology, the scientific 
atheist endeavor was abandoned in Dej’s Romania by the beginning of the 1960s as the regime 
reconciled with the Orthodox Church and embarked on its independent course. Chapter Two 
describes how medieval monasteries became endowed with secular transcendent values derived 
from nationalism and were incorporated into the rituals of patriotic education and tourism as the 
late Dej period gave way to the Ceaușescu era. This approach to the museification of religion 
buttressed the legitimacy of the late socialist regime in front of both domestic and international 
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audiences. Yet, petitions also reveal that everyday citizens kept the ideological boundary 
between the religious and the secular sacred porous challenging the party-state to carefully police 
the inclusion of additional cultic buildings into socialist heritage. Chapter Three analyzes 
Ceaușescu’s Thaw as a crucible for the revival of atheism and presents this shift as an outcome 
of Central Committee concerns to manage the course of “autochthonous” socialism. Chapter 
Four investigates the ramifications that Marxist revisionism and the sociological mapping of 
popular belief had for the transcendental in atheist education and socialist culture. I argue that 
atheist experts identified spirituality and cultural tradition as the main reasons for why religion 
persisted, even thrived, in the inhospitable conditions of socialism. Attempts to imbue atheism 
with the same values peaked in the folkloric rituals of the “Song for Romania” Festival. Yet, 
staged for the re-production of “Romanian spirituality,” this mass cultural-artistic event also 
revealed the indigenization and Stalinization that revisionist atheism underwent in the 1980s. 
The re-composition of atheism during the liberal phase of Ceaușescu’s “golden epoch” 
demonstrates that the emancipatory ideals of revisionist Marxism reverberated in late socialist 
ideology, yet did not cancel out specificities that made Romania “different” in the socialist camp. 
Specifically, both the articulation of the atheist project in the register of a “Romanian 
spirituality” and the undertaking of socialist ritual reform in the frame of a mass festival 
constituted the trademarks of a national Stalinist regime. Without doubt, Marxist-Leninist 
atheism under Ceaușescu has its own story in several respects. In contrast to reformed 
communist states, Romanian atheists never gained the political status or resources that their 
Soviet or Eastern European colleagues enjoyed. Nor did the rhetoric of spirituality in Romania 
entail the regime’s move away from Stalinist principles in the interest of private, individual 
happiness. Instead, the enchantment of socialist culture with “Romanian spirituality” reflected 
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party-state attempts to contain and even divert innovational influences in the socialist camp. 
Thus, reformist initiatives were cast into pre-emptive structures that referenced a new language 
on the surface but revealed Stalinist and national values on a closer look.  
This dissertation tells the story of the socialist sacred in communist Romania. By 
investigating the re-composition of religion and atheism from 1948 to 1989, I deepen 
understandings of Marxism’s particular course of rupture in a socio-political terrain that has 
proved inhospitable to its projects since the nineteenth century. I also elucidate why today’s 
religious nationalism constitutes the spiritual legacy of socialism and cannot be understood either 
in terms of an interrupted continuity with the interwar years or as a function of contemporary 
politics.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
SCIENCE FOR THE MASSES: 
THE SOCIETY FOR THE DISSEMINATION OF SCIENCE AND CULTURE, 1949-1963 
 
 
Founded on 26 May 1949 through a Politburo resolution, the Society for the 
Dissemination of Science and Culture (SDSC) was modeled on the Soviet All-Union Society for 
the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge (later the Znanie Society). The SDSC’s 
key objective in the early Dej era was to forge a vanguard of intellectuals who could serve as the 
beacons of political, cultural and scientific enlightenment. Under the supervision of the Central 
Committee’s Department of Agitation and Propaganda, it was to re-educate and assimilate “the 
large intellectual circles of the R.P.R” that it had inherited from the monarchy. This objective 
reflected the new regime’s dual desire to ideologically discipline and to extend limited 
concessions to the “old” intelligentsia, upon whose expertise it depended in cultural affairs, the 
industry and state administration. Yet, the state harbored a deep mistrust towards this group and 
perceived its pragmatic compromises with such “fellow-travelers” as ethereal. Therefore, one of 
the Society’s long-term responsibilities became to mold “workers and working peasants with 
high political, ideological, cultural and professional consciousness” into a new socialist 
intelligentsia, one of healthy social origins and revolutionary commitment.41 As a corollary to 
such a task, the SDSC was to develop into a mass organization of intellectuals and take its place 
in a network of party institutions established for other social categories – the youth, women, 
workers and nationalities.   
More importantly, however, the Society’s broader mission was to lift the ideological 
darkness and cultural backwardness that the exploiting classes had purportedly cast on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Cancelarie, inv. 2348, File 54/1949, f. 6-7.  
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proletariat and the peasantry. As its first statute stipulated, the Society’s principal calling was “to 
propagate scientific and political knowledge among the masses, to fight against obscurantism, 
mysticism, superstitions, [and] combat all inimical ideological influences,” including nationalist 
and religious beliefs.42 Naturally, the young socialist regimes insisted that this kind of mass 
enlightenment, infused as it was with the discourse of class war, was part of a radical rupture 
with the past. Yet, state-socialist fervor to enlighten and humanize the masses was, in many 
ways, just another manifestation of deep-seated post-Enlightenment aspirations that political and 
intellectual elites shared broadly. Creating a cultured, orderly and productive labor force was, 
after all, quintessential to reshaping society in the age of western industrial modernity.43 
Entrusted with the task of mass enlightenment, the SDSC – much like its institutional forefather, 
the Znanie Society – emerged as the foremost establishment in charge of fashioning new socialist 
citizens. Until its dissolution in 1963, it also remained the largest institution of experts in 
Romanian society tasked with the coordination of scientific, cultural and political education on 
the ground.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Statutul Societății pentru Răspândirea Științei și Culturii (Bucharest: S.R.S.C., 1949), 7.   
43 David Hoffman, Stalinist Values: The Cultural Norms of Soviet Modernity, 1917-1941 (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2003), 14-16; See also, Kate Transchel, Under the Influence: Working Class Drinking, Temperance and 
Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1895-1932 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006), 4. The RWP was 
also heir to the educational campaigns of liberal and socialist intellectuals. In particular, it inherited two liberal 
interwar institutions involved in mass enlightenment: the Romanian Athaeneum Literary Society (Societatea 
Literară Ateneul Român) founded in 1865 by academicians Constanting Esarcu, Vasile Alexandrescu Urechea and 
Nicolae Kretzulescu, and the Ioan I. Dalles Foundation established in Bucharest in the early 1930s following the 
donations of Elena Dalles to the Romanian Academy of Sciences. On the popularization of science in Romania, 
see also Maria Bucur, Eugenics and Modernization in Romania (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2002), 
189. Marius Rotar, “Propagandă și acțiuni anti-alcoolice în România interbelică” in Apulum. Acta Musei 
Apulensis XLV (2008), 259-281. Irina Livezeanu, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania, 31-35. Simona M. 
Antonescu, Literatura de popularizare a științei în a doua jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea și începutul secolului 
XX în România (Bucharest: Ars Docendi, 2007). Additionally, Romanian communists were also heirs to the 
educational campaigns of socialist intellectuals which the latter expanded, particularly in 1905-1921. I thank Anca 
Mândru, my colleague at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign for this point. 
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By examining the ideological considerations and bureaucratic structure governing the 
Society for the Dissemination of Science and Culture, this chapter explores the conceptual and 
institutional impediments party ideologists encountered as they struggled to translate socialist 
ideology from state intention to popular conviction. Without doubt, this dedication to social 
engineering was simultaneously informed by the regime’s ambition for total control and by its 
utopian commitment to the social and spiritual emancipation of the working classes. For a weak 
party that was simultaneously building itself and administering the revolutionary transformation 
of an unsympathetic Romanian society, these competing ideological objectives were sufficient to 
cause considerable strain. However, as this chapter will show, the challenges were far more 
significant. Under the aegis of Agitprop, the SDSC’s work suffered from the parallelisms of the 
dual party-state structure, the ideological incongruities inherent in the Soviet blueprint, cadre 
problems, and the ideological revisions of the post-Stalinist years. As a result, for much of the 
1950’s, success in transmitting a coherent approach on the place of nation and religion under 
socialism remained an aspiration rather than a triumph.  
In their ambition to usher in an alternative modernity, socialist regimes engaged both 
national ideology and religion in official ideology and political practice. Nevertheless, few 
histories studied party-states’ concerns with overlapping ethno-religious identities or examined 
how the relationship between nationality and religious policy evolved. Meanwhile, scholarship 
on enforced secularization and the promotion of a new kind of patriotism towards a “socialist 
fatherland” have run on separate tracks.44 For example, studies of the socialist nation have 
explored the reliance of socialist parties on ethnic constructions of nationhood for the purposes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 See, Pedro Ramet, ed. Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and East European Politics (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1989) and Steven M. Miner, Stalin’s Holy War: Religion, Nationalism and Alliance Politics, 1941-1945 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2003). 
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of political legitimacy and examined how ethnographers, historians, and other experts re-
imagined the body politic while struggling over cultural capital.45 By comparison, analyses of 
religion under socialism have centered on the political history of church-state relations or on 
Soviet “scientific-atheism,” particularly its misrecognition of religion as modernity’s temporal 
“other,” its institutional shortcomings and its lack of appeal to intended audiences.46 By 
comparison, the Party’s efforts to rewrite the historical, cultural and affective ties forged between 
the nation-state and religion have thus far remained unexamined. Nor have works explored how 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 On national ideology under socialism, see Katherine Verdery, National Ideology under Socialism; Lucian Boia, 
History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness (New York: Central European University Press, 2001); Yannis 
Sygkelos, Nationalism from the Left: the Bulgarian Communist Party during the Second World War and the Early 
Post-War Years (Leiden: Brill, 2011); Martin Mevius, Agents of Moscow: The Hungarian Communist Party and 
the Origins of Socialist Patriotism, 1941-1953 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Jan Palmowski, 
Inventing A Socialist Nation: Heimat and the Politics of Everyday  Life in the GDR, 1945-1990 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009); Francine Hirsch,  Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the 
Making of the Soviet Union (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005);  Terry Martin, Affirmative Action Empire: 
Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001); David 
Brandenberger, National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian National 
Identity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002). 
46 On church-state relations see, Lucian Leustean, Orthodoxy and the Cold War: Religion and Political Power in 
Romania, 1947-1965 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) and Cristian Vasile, Între Vatican și Kremlin: 
Biserica Greco-Catolică în timpul regimului comunist (Bucharest: Humanitas, 2003); Sabrina Ramet, Nihil 
Obstat: Religion, Politics and Social Change in East-Central Europe and Russia (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1998); Tatiana Chumachenko, Church and State in Soviet Russia: Russian Orthodoxy from World War II to 
the Khrushchev Years, ed. and trans. by Edward Roslof (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2002). For works on 
secularization and Marxist-Leninist atheism see, Bohdan R. Bociurkiw and John W. Strong, eds. Religion and 
Atheism in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975); Esther Peperkamp and 
Malgorzata Rajtar, Religion and the Secular in Eastern Germany, 1945 to the Present (Leiden: Brill, 2007); 
Thomas Schmidt Lux, Wissenschaft als Religion: Szientismus im Ostdeutschen Säkularisierungsprozess 
(Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2008); the works of Dimitry V. Pospielovsky, in particular A History of Marxist-
Leninist Atheism and Soviet Antireligious Policies (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987); David E. Powell, 
Antireligious Propaganda in the Soviet Union: A Study of Mass Persuasion (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1975); 
Glennys Young, Power and the Sacred in Revolutionary Russia: Religious Activists in the Village (University 
Park: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997); William B. Husband, Godless Communists: Atheism and Society in 
Soviet Russia, 1917-1932 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2000); Daniel Peris, Storming the Heavens: 
The Soviet League of the Militant Godless (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Paul Froese, The Plot to Kill 
God: Findings from the Soviet Experiment in Secularization  (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008); 
Victoria Smolkin, “‘A Sacred Space Never Remains Empty:’ Soviet Atheism, 1954-1971” (PhD Dissertation, 
University of California Berkeley, 2010); Shoshana Keller, To Moscow, not Mecca: The Soviet Campaign against 
Islam in Central Asia, 1917-1941 (Westport: Praeger, 2001); and Eren Murat Tasar, Soviet and Muslim: the 
Institutionalization of Islam in Central Asia, 1943-1991 (Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 2010). On post-
Soviet societies, Sonja Luehrmann, Secularization Soviet Style: Teaching Atheism and Religion in a Volga 
Republic (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011). 
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the socialist project strove to make citizens’ lives meaningful through a socialist national way of 
life that was atheist at heart. This lack of a genuine analysis of how state socialisms, in their 
aspiration towards an alternative modernity, engaged ethno-religious subjectivities on the ground 
is all the more surprising because nationalism and Marxism-Leninism have both been compared 
to religion.47 
Socialists of all stamps grappled with the imaginaries of the “sacred nation” that emerged 
in the late nineteenth century with Christian nationalism and that manifested with such potency 
in interwar Eastern Europe.48 Like their counterparts elsewhere, early Romanian socialists often 
confronted charges of being anti-patriotic and anti-national. In 1910, for instance, Panait Zosin 
observed as follows:  
 
Whenever there’s talk in our circles about … the withdrawal of state support from a state 
religion, [and] especially about the freedom of conscience, the misunderstanding 
commonly occurs that the restriction of a people’s religion also implies the destruction of 
its nationality. In other words, it is shown that there is a correspondence between our 
nationality and the religion of our people, the negation of one implying the negation of 
the other - from where the deduction [is made] that our free thinkers are anti-nationalists 
and antipatriotic, to say the least.49  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 For studies that initially adopted the religious studies approach to nationalism and Marxism-Leninism in 
scholarship on the nation and state-socialism, see Cartlon Hayes, Nationalism: A Religion (New York: Macmillan, 
1960); James Thrower, Marxism-Leninism as the Civil Religion of Soviet Society (Lewiston: de Gruyter Mouton, 
1992). 
48 For instance, see the Austro-Marxist Otto Bauer’s discussion on the role of religion in the historical development 
of nations in his Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie (Vienna: Verlag der Wiener 
Volksbuchhandlung Ignaz Brand, 1907), 130-131. On Christian nationalism in interwar Romania, see Hans 
Christian Maner, Multikonfessionalität und neue Staatlichkeit: orthodoxe, griechisch-katholische und römisch-
katholische Kirche in Siebenbürgen und Altrumänien zwischen den Weltkriegen, 1918-1940 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 
2007). For scholarship that cautions against modernist assumptions regarding the inevitability of national 
subjectivities, see James Bjork, Neither German nor Pole: Catholicism and National Indifference in a Central 
European Borderland (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 2008). Jeremy King, Budweisers into Czechs and 
Germans (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), Ines Koeltzsch, Geteilte Kulturen: Eine Geschichte der 
tschechisch-jüdisch-deutschen Beziehungen in Prag, 1918-1938 (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2012).  
49	  Panait Zosin, Câteva considerațiuni pentru libertatea de cugetare, privind religiunea față de naționalitate, 
știință, morală, și filozofie (Iași, 1910).   
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Until Stalin’s consolidation of power in the 1930s, Bolsheviks, in particular, repudiated 
both “bourgeois” national sentiment and religious belief as symptomatic of capitalist class 
structure. Despite pragmatic political concessions, they expected both to wither as a result of 
socialist construction. In fact, as historian Terry Martin argued, Soviet patronage of national 
consciousness entailed both socialist nation-building and an offensive against “traditional 
national beliefs and practices, above all, religion.” The ultimate goal was, after all, to render the 
above-class appeal of nationalism meaningless.50 Lenin and Stalin had some important 
differences regarding the life-time of socialist nations under communism. Nevertheless, both 
demanded a breaking away from imaginings of the “sacred nation” inherited from tsarist official 
nationality policy and Russian conservative nationalism in the 19th century.51 
In following Soviet footsteps, Romanian communists were left to see whether it was 
imminent for socialist ideology to transform the enthusiasm and beliefs that had been effectively 
harnessed by Christian nationalism in interwar Greater Romania. While the Romanian Worker’s 
Party embraced Marxism-Leninism as a science that disproved both the primordial, eternal 
existence of nations and the metaphysical essence of the world, Romanian communists faced 
daunting questions on how to transpose Soviet ideology into Romanian social reality. How 
would Stalinist approaches to nation and religion be adapted and implemented? In a bid to 
overcome their feeble political legitimacy, how far could party leaders venture with their radical 
mission to transform mass consciousness?  
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Juxtaposing the regime’s public rhetoric on the inevitable triumph of mass enlightenment 
against a far more troubled account of obstacles encountered on the ground, this chapter 
develops a preliminary institutional history of the Society for the Dissemination of Science and 
Culture. It investigates the Romanian party-state’s attempt to propagate the values of socialist 
patriotism and scientific-materialism at the expense of the “mystifying” ideologies of 
nationalism and religion. Such an analysis will show that, despite the substantial resources the 
party expended, bureaucratic contingencies and shifting ideological priorities converged by the 
early 1960s to ensure that mass education yielded discouraging results. By showcasing the 
Party’s struggle to translate revolutionary culture from state intention to popular conviction, I 
argue that this breakdown in the SDSC’s ideological and bureaucratic apparatus contributed to 
the gradual renunciation of Soviet models of culture. Additionally, I propose that the 1950s and 
early 1960s constituted a formative experience for the state. Once atheism and cultural reform 
became the subject of a nationwide campaign of revitalization after Ceausescu’s advent to power 
(1965), the experience of the 1950s helped shape the rhetorical devices and institutional 
mechanisms with which the new regime embarked on the invention of a socialist nation, 
distinctly Romanian and atheist. 
 
Cultural Revolution and the Inception of Mass Enlightenment 
In March 1948, Iosif Chișinevschi, the secretary of the Department of Agitation and 
Propaganda agreed with the newly established State Committee for Culture and the Arts that “the 
advancement toward socialism necessitated the commencement of the cultural revolution.”52 In a 
programmatic article in the June issue of the RWP’s theoretical journal Lupta de clasă (“Class 	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War”), the chief party historian Mihail Roller conformed to this desire by listing the Party’s three 
objectives in the creation of a new socialist culture. Besides a critical reconsideration of cultural 
heritage through the lens of Marxism-Leninism, Roller informed, the cultural revolution was to 
entail the socialist organization of public education and the formation of a new intelligentsia. 
Most importantly, however, it was to propel the communist education of the working masses. 
This cultural uplifting of the people, Roller explained, was predicated on the obliteration of 
capitalist remnants in mass consciousness and the inculcation of a new attitude towards work, 
collective property and the state apparatus.53  
As scholars of state socialism have explained, the cultural revolution involved “class 
warfare” – a destructive process targeting the inversion of social hierarchy primarily through 
state terror – and a productive utopian project aimed simultaneously inward, at the 
transformation of the inner self, and outward, at mass enlightenment.54 Militant calls for the 
disenfranchisement and marginalization of old elites in the socialist press, not to mention the 
purges decimating their ranks, left no doubt about the worker-state’s commitment to class 
struggle.55 Yet, in the process of toppling the “bourgeoisie and feudal classes,” the socialist press 
also promised ideological and social emancipation by making “culture, science, literature and art 
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an asset of the working people.”56 At the first Congress of Intellectuals in 1949, the spokesman 
of the Bucharest worker’s delegation Iorgu Dumitrescu stated to this effect as follows: “The 
Great October Socialist Revolution and the triumph of socialism in the Soviet Union have proved 
that it is possible to build a society […] where all human genius and thought are placed at the 
service, not of exploitation, but of the free development of the people.”57 
The new socialist regime understood the production and dissemination of knowledge as a 
strict function of class relations. Therefore, it denounced the bourgeois-feudal culture of the 
Romanian monarchy and claimed that only a new culture of and for the masses could guarantee 
liberation from social injustice and cultivate an authentic sense of patriotism. By virtue of its 
language of class struggle, the party-state’s analysis of society easily lent itself to a dichotomous 
vision that set the exploiting classes against the working proletarian and peasantry.  Devoted to 
serving “the culture of the west,” the argument went, the ruling elite “tore science, literature and 
art away from the working people.”58 According to the secretary of the Central Committee Iosif 
Chișinevschi, the bourgeoisie and the big landowners had promoted an “anti-scientific, anti-
patriotic and anti-social” cultural policy that thrived on “the cobweb of obscurantism, intrigues, 
venality and national treason.” This policy dragged the masses “into the darkness of ignorance in 
order to maintain the regime of exploitation and oppression.”59 Ultimately, as an article from the 
journal Contemporanul added, the false sense of patriotism which the Romanian far right and the 
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“historical” parties embraced had disastrous results: “the selling of our independence and 
sovereignty, the economic deprivation of Romania and its enslavement to Hitler’s Germany, 
[and] the deployment of our people into an unjust and disastrous war […].”60 Consequently, the 
old elites were to be stripped of all political, social and human rights and deprived of their 
previous social positions. Workers and peasants, on the other hand, would inherit “the 
progressive traditions of the culture of the past” and become the legitimate beneficiaries of 
socialist construction.  As newly empowered citizens, it was them that the socialist regime called 
upon to bring the progressive aspects of Romanian culture to “new peaks of flourishing” and to 
become the carriers of a new, socialist patriotism.61    
The promise of social emancipation was pivotal to the socialist regime’s heroic self-
conception of being the architect of new times (timpuri noi). This discourse was also profoundly 
saturated with new claims about political legitimacy. Indeed, party ideologues often emphasized 
their struggles for workers’ and nationalities’ rights, their preoccupation with the peasant 
question, and their commitment mass enlightenment during the underground years in Greater 
Romania.62 Emulating Stalin’s speeches, such narratives also circulated rosy projections about a 
happy socialist future. 63  More importantly, however, to indicate that blissful utopia was already 
within the reach of socialist citizens, the regime repeatedly called attention to its performance in 
cultivating the masses, invoking its myriad literacy campaigns, sanitation drives and public 	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lectures. In propaganda posters it often amplified this message juxtaposing statistical 
representations of the inter-war and post-war developments in cultural life in order to set itself 
apart from the monarchy. 
 
Socialist Patriotism and the Society 
By 1948, the new regime declared a break with the political status-quo ante and the “anti-
social” ideologies it had wielded for the reproduction of power and social control.  Instead of 
ethnic and confessional affiliations, the party-state began mobilizing everyday citizens around 
the imaginary of “the socialist fatherland.” According to the Chief of the Romanian General 
Staff Leontin Sălăjan, the new socialist patriotism entailed an attachment to “the revolutionary 
traditions of our people” exemplified by Romanian rulers fight against “the Turkish yoke,” anti-
Habsburg peasant uprisings, the 1848 revolutions, and the heroic struggles of the working class 
in the interwar period.64 As the first secretary of the Union of Communist Youth Gheorghe 
Florescu argued, it also necessitated the cultivation of “an ardent devotion towards the RWP and 
its leaders,” a love of work and a spirit of conscientiousness and firm discipline in production, 
not to mention a familiarity with “the culture and numerous beauties of our country” and “the 
magnificent achievements of socialist construction.”65 In their attempt to define socialist 
patriotism in positive terms, party ideologues often highlighted its constructive aspects in 
contrast to the destructive features of its bourgeois counterpart. What made socialist patriotism 
progressive, they argued, was its rootedness in international working class solidarity and in the 
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principle of the Friendship of Peoples.66 A classic Stalinist metaphor of socialist unity and class 
militancy, the latter was adopted by party leaders to signal the equitable relationship between the 
formerly nationalizing Romanian majority and its “co-habiting nationalities,” particularly the 
Hungarian one.67 The position of the elder brother was naturally reserved to the Soviet Union. As 
some ideologues argued, namely, “the love of the Great Land of Socialism, the invincible bastion 
and leader of the proletariat everywhere” was the ultimate bedrock of both proletarian 
internationalism and socialist patriotism.68 
Rejecting any above-class belongings, Romanian party leaders advanced a socialist 
patriotism that intermixed respect for “progressive national traditions” with scientific-
materialism, international working class solidarity and a devotion to socialist construction and 
Soviet civilization. Indeed, the socialist regime appropriated the symbolic capital of space and 
time to reshape both the inner and civic lives of socialist citizens. By adopting a litany of Soviet 
political rituals, party leaders reformed the calendar of national and religious holidays in order to 
restructure the symbolic organization of public life and the political loyalties it engendered.  For 
instance, in 1948 Romanian leaders changed the Holiday of National Heroes from Jesus’s 
Ascension Day to May 9. They also organized red carols (colinde) and New Year’s greetings 
(sorcova) on December 30, the Day of the Republic, to offset religious rituals and traditions 
centered on Christmas and New Year’s Eve. Party cadres likewise experimented with life-cycle 
rituals such as “octoberings”, “communist youth weddings” (nunte uteciste) and “red funerals” in 	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an attempt to order the private world and morality of the new “homo sovieticus.” Last but not 
least, in the attempt to restructure historical memory and promote the alignment of citizen’s 
selves with Marxist-Leninism, the regime transformed the material infrastructure of people’s 
lives. It adopted the cult of Soviet heroes, erected socialist monuments, and re-designed and re-
named urban space.69 
Beyond the symbolic reconstitution of time and public space, however, the Party-state 
assigned the task of mass enlightenment and the cultivation of socialist patriotism to a host of 
newly established institutions of state administration and mass organizations. The cultural 
departments of local people’s councils executed ideological imperatives in theatres, museums, 
houses of culture, libraries and cinemas under the supervision of the Committee of Cultural 
Institutions (Comitetul pentru Așezămintele Culturale) and the Committee of Cinematography 
(Comitetul pentru Cinematografie). In factories similar tasks befell to the cultural sections of the 
General Confederation of Labor (Confederația Generală a Muncii), and after 1955, the General 
Council of Trade Unions. On collectivized state farms, by comparison, responsibility belonged to 
the Ministry of Agriculture, in particular the cultural activists of the Miciurin Society for 
Agricultural Sciences (Societatea Miciurin pentru Științele Agriculturii) and the agricultural 
departments of the local people’s councils, both of which were overseen by the ministry.  Within 
this expansive institutional framework, the full coordination of mass cultural enlightenment was 
entrusted to the SDSC.  Thus, while for other organs the function of transforming mass 
consciousness was one among others, the propagation of mass enlightenment, more specifically 
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socialist patriotism and scientific materialism, in particular, was the SDSC’s primary reason for 
existence.70  
As a result, the Society fulfilled crucial duties in the mobilization for mass cultural 
enlightenment in the 1950s. Based on a centralized plan, it commissioned members to prepare 
conferences and it coordinated their nationwide presentation. Initially at least, half of the 
conferences dealt with political and social topics, another 30 percent aiming at the popularization 
of science.71 The topics for the remaining public addresses were to be generated locally in 
accordance with the problems and interests specific to its diverse constituency in the region.72 
Although the public address system constituted the Society’s main method of mass 
enlightenment, engaging the masses aurally and visually in the context of high illiteracy rates 
was of paramount importance especially in the Romanian countryside. Therefore, the SDSC 
broadcast a number of its conferences, instructing its branches to organize collective auditions.73 
Confident in the efficiency of experiential learning, it set up a series of permanent and traveling 
exhibits on evolutionary theory, on the Soviet and Romanian achievements of socialism, or on  
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the history and eography of the fatherland.74 It also screened Soviet lantern slides alongside 
documentary and artistic films, which it borrowed from Sovromfilm, and commissioned 
additional ones to be produced by the film studios “Alexandru Sahia” and “Ion Creangă.”75 
To complete this system of public lectures and exhibits, the Society popularized political 
and scientific education through the printed media. Next to the annual “Almanah of the S.D.S.C. 
(Almanahul S.D.S.C), publications intended for the broadest possible audience included the 
popular journals “Science and Technology” (Știință și Tehnologie) and “Science and Culture” 
(Știință și Cultură). Already the most widely circulated periodical given its high publication 
figures (50,000), the latter became the Society’s chief journal following the institutional reforms 
undertaken during Dej’s half-hearted thaw in the mid-1950s.76 While it published articles in 
periodicals with national circulation, the SDSC also printed its most popular conferences in a 
brochure format, distributing the series “the SDSC’s Collection” (Colecția S.R.S.C.), “Science  
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for Everyone” (Știința pentru toți) and “Science Wins” (Știința învinge).77   
 Beyond its responsibilities of producing, coordinating and disseminating political and 
scientific education, the Society’s cardinal task was to train highly qualified cultural activists, 
who could successfully engage the interest of the public and could, in turn, train local cadres. For 
this purpose, it established its own three-month School of the Society for the Dissemination of 
Science and Culture in 1953.78 In selecting students, the SDSC followed the practices of other 
party schools, recruiting mainly from top party organs and its branches at the regional and 
district level. The Department of Agitation and Propaganda and the Ministry of Education 
prepared the School’s course plan jointly. After graduation, students were expected to enhance 
the SDSC’s work on the grassroots level.  
To enhance the training of activists, the Society also published methodological guides 
and other training materials in various printed venues. Cadres and intellectuals could acquire 
ideological and practical guidance by consulting the Central Committee’s bimonthly theoretical 
journal “Class Struggle” (Lupta de clasă) and its official organ “The Spark” (Scânteia). Relevant 
articles also appeared in the weekly of the Ministry of Culture called “Our Age” 
(Contemporanul), and the monthly of the State Committee for the Houses of Culture entitled 
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“The Cultural Guide” (Îndrumătorul Cultural).79 Finally, cadres and intellectuals also had access 
to Soviet political writings and scientific scholarship through the publications of “the Russian 
Book” (Cartea Rusă), the Political Publishing House (Editura Politică) and through 
methodological brochures issued in the collection “For the assistance of the S.D.S.C.’s lecturers” 
(Colecția “În ajutorul conferențiarilor S.R.S.C.”).80  
In order to perform all of its duties, the Society’s central branch in Bucharest was allotted 
ninety-nine employees by 1951. This staff transferred presumably from Party organs, the state 
bureaucracy and institutions of public education.81 At the local level, a series of regional and 
district branches (filiale regionale and subfiliale raionale) helped execute the SDSC’s central 
plan. These branches coordinated conferences, monitored popular responses, and researched 
problems assigned from above.82 According to its founding statute of 1949, the role of 
bureaucratic oversight was allotted to an Executive Council and a Presidium, both of which  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 The latter was also published by the same title in German (Kultureller Wegweiser) and in Hungarian (Művelődési 
Útmutató) until 1956 and then under the titles “People and Culture” (Volk und Kultur) and “Enculturation” 
(Művelődés).  
80 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Despre religie (Bucharest: ESLP, 1956); G.A. Gurev, Despre credința în 
dumnezeu: de vorbă cu credincioșii (Bucharest: ESLP, 1956); M.P. Baskin, Materialismul și religia (Bucharest: 
ESLP, 1958). Stalin’s foundational works on the nationality question were published somewhat earlier. See, Iosif 
Stalin, Marxismul și chestiunea națională (Bucharest: Editura P.M.R., 1949), Problema națională și leninismul: 
răspuns tovarășilor Mescov, Covalciuc si altora (Bucharest: Editura P.M.R., 1949).  
81 ANIC, Fond S.R.S.C, File 7/1950, f. 24-26. According to its organizational diagram, the Society’s headquarters 
included the following administrative organs: the Secretariat, the Administrative and Financial Division and the 
Personnel Office. Headquarters had sections producing and supervising political and scientific education such as 
the Organizational Division with an Office of Instructors and the Division for Political and Scientific Education, 
which had a library and separate departments for the natural sciences, technology and politics, society and 
economy. The counselors, reviewers and instructors employed in the latter two divisions were transferred from 
academic and research institutions and party schools.  
82 An executive committee ran each regional base, directing a staff of activists assigned to various scientific 
departments, district branches, urban and rural readerships and “red corners.”  
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comprised the who’s who of the regime’s cultural and scientific establishment.83  Yet, besides 
these academicians, writers and physicians, the presence of secretary Leonte Răutu and his 
deputies Ofelia Manole and Mihail Roller in the Society’s governing bodies confirmed that the 
actual reins of control lay in the figurative hands of the CC’s Agitprop.  
Two years after its establishment, the Society trumpeted numerical evidence in the 
socialist press on its expanding institutional infrastructure, growing membership base, and the 
successful proliferation of public lectures. Based on such numbers, it claimed that its rapid 
societal penetration was thrust forward by a mass thirst for enlightenment and for emancipation 
from the shackles of past ideologies.84 Intended for a mass audience, this public account of 
triumph was overshadowed however by a second account – one much more disconcerted about 
challenges on the ground and much less convinced about the prospects of inevitable success. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Appointed directly by the Council of Ministers, the first Executive Council included members of the Academy of 
Sciences who also fulfilled leading positions in ministries and institutions of higher education and research: 
Traian Săvulescu, President of the Academy of Sciences; Petre Constantinescu-Iași, Director of the Institute of 
History “Nicolae Iorga”; Vasile Mârza, the Minister of Health, Grigore C. Moisil, President of the Society of 
Mathematical and Physical Sciences, Ripan Raluca, Dean of the Department of Chemistry at the “Victor Babeș” 
University in Cluj,  Mihail Roller, Deputy Director of the Institute of Party History. Additionally, the Council also 
had representatives from the main party newspaper Scânteia (the journalists Horia Liman and Alexandru Buican), 
the Writer’s Union (the president Zaharia Stancu and the writer Geo Bogza), the C.C. of the U.T.M. (Paul 
Cornea), the Romanian Army (Valter Roman, Chief of Staff) as well as members of the Department of Agitation 
and Propaganda (the secretary Leonte Răutu, his deputy Ofelia Manole and the already mentioned Mihail Roller). 
The other appointees were Ernest Ungureanu, medic and professor at the Department of Medicine and 
Pharmaceutics at the University of Iași, Prof. Ion Rădulescu, Prof. Simion Pop, Ion Părvu, engineer, Vanda 
Nicolschi, prof. Ion Murgulescu, Dumitru Mihalache, Ion Gh. Maurer, prof. Victor Malinschi, prof. Ion Livescu, 
Dr. Constantin Dumitriu, Sergiu Brătescu, assistant professor Ion Banu and prof. Ilie Ardeleanu. See Statutul 
S.R.S.C., op. cit. In 1949 the SDSC’s Executive Council elected Traian Săvulescu for the position of director, and 
Ion Gh. Maurer and Valter Roman as deputy-directors. Cite According to the Society’s organizational diagram, 
the position of the latter two was later occupied in 1954 by Alexandru Buican, journalist at Scânteia, and Eduard 
Mezincescu, former Minister of Culture. ANIC, Fond S.R.S.C, File 1/1954, f. 24-25. 
84 By 1951 the Society had established 28 regional, 39 district branches and 112 readerships; it claimed 18,000 
members and 6,200 representatives with the help of whom it purportedly held 92,000 conferences with 
11,500,000 participants. Approximately, 7 percent of these conferences (6,400) were reportedly held in 
Hungarian, German, Serbian, Ukrainian, Tatar, Turkish and Greek. ANIC, Fond S.R.S.C., File 3/1951, f. 8. The 
SDSC’s reported publications of brochures were 23 titles in Romanian in 1,165,000 copies, 16 titles in Hungarian, 
German and Serbo-Croatian in 73,000 copies. ANIC, Fond S.R.S.C., File 1/1951, f. 37. The Society also printed 
60 articles in the local and central press, broadcast 70 conferences in its Wednesday series and maintained a radio 
program for children “Responses to pupils’ questions” (“Răspunsuri la întrebările elevilor”) on Sundays at 8 a.m. 
ANIC, Fond S.R.S.C., File 3/1951, f. 8 and File 1/1959, f. 92. 
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Directed at a narrow audience of party cadres and cultural workers, this counter-narrative 
unfolded from the instructions and territorial reports of the SDSC’s Orgburo and the archives of 
the Central Committee. In contrast to the Society’s official discourse, it highlighted the 
paradoxes inherent in socialist discourse, party-state administration and resource distribution.85 
 
Between the Party and the State 
According to the provisions on institutional membership in its first statute, the Society 
seemed to enjoy a well-defined jurisdiction with respect to ministries, party organs and mass 
organizations. It also appeared to have a privileged status within the larger institutional web of 
the new socialist state.86 While the Society had the task to plan and produce the ideological 
materials for mass enlightenment and coordinate their dissemination, its institutional members 
were assigned the more menial role of facilitators, having to provide the Society with substantial 
financial support, audience, transportation and accommodation for its lecturers.87 The SDSC’s 
status as a nationwide ideological establishment also seemed to be confirmed by the extension of 
its institutional grasp into the villages in the late 1940s, when the rural readerships of the State 
Committee for the Houses of Culture (SCHC) were transferred to its jurisdiction.88  Yet, the 
Society’s internal reports painted a far messier image of an institution struggling with an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 This contrast between the regime’s propagandistic narrative for mass consumption and its internal narrative of 
affliction and ambiguity is noted for the Soviet Union by Victoria Smolkin in her dissertation, “‘A Sacred Space 
Is Never Empty:’ Soviet Atheism, 1954-1971,” 51.  
86 Statutul Societății pentru Răspândirea Științei și Culturii (Bucharest: S.R.S.C., 1949). 
87 ANIC, Fond S.R.S.C., File 2/1950, f. 29. 
88 ANIC, Fond S.R.S.C., File 6/1950, f. 29 and File 1/1950, f. 63.  
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ambivalent jurisdiction, organizational disarray, and devolution in a chaotic bureaucratic 
environment. 
By far the largest source of complications was the state’s decision to entrust the task of 
uplifting the masses to a multiplicity of mass organizations such as the Union of Romanian 
Democratic Women, ARLUS, and CGM, not to mention organs of the state administration such 
as the Ministry of Education, the State Committee for Culture and the Arts and the Ministry of 
Labor. Without doubt, this tenacious drafting of all institutions in society into mass cultural work 
was paradigmatic to socialist regimes.89  Yet, as the Society’s records show, the ensuing overlaps 
in the fields of institutional authority presented not only central organs but also regional and 
district branches with considerable challenges. For instance, mass organizations and people’s 
councils, the different sections of which were subordinate to various ministries, often duplicated 
the Society’s conference schedules at the local level.  On the local level, this resulted in the 
excessive repetition of lectures and alienating target audiences, as a result.90 Besides popular 
demobilization, the duplication of efforts by party-state organs also gave way competition over 
local audiences, adding to the frustrations and institutional inefficiency of local branches. A 
member at the Executive Council meeting on October 10, 1955 complained as follows: “I held a 
lecture at Sibiu, but there were five other lectures scheduled for that day. So that all the people 
who would have participated in ours split up.” As he concluded, several branches struggled with 
the same problem: “the lack of coordination in cultural activity.”91 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 David Brandenberger, The Propaganda State in Crisis: Soviet Ideology, Indoctrination and Terror Under Stalin, 
1927-1941 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), 22. See also, Peter Kenez, The Birth of the Propaganda 
State: Soviet Methods of Mass Mobilization, 1917-1929 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985). 
90 ANIC, Fond S.R.S.C., File 7/1952, f. 45. 
91 ANIC, Fond S.R.S.C., File 67/1953, f. 50. 
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Such encroachments on the SDSC’s field of authority were amplified when various local 
organs of the party-state arrogated the Society’s institutional structures for their own purposes. 
According to certain reports of the Personnel Office (“Secția Cadre”) drawn up in the aftermath 
of periodic controls in the provinces, regional party committees and mass organizations often 
regarded the local SDSC as a “reservoir of speakers” and “a factory of public lectures” on which 
they could readily rely in times of campaigns to ameliorate the systemic chronic shortage of 
activists and propaganda materials. An analysis of the Society’s activity in the Hungarian 
Autonomous region described this situation well: 
 
There were frequent cases when the branch received “orders” from ARLUS [the 
Association for Strengthening Romanian-Russian Relationships] to mobilize lecturers 
[…]. Especially in the Month of [Soviet-Romanian] Friendship, ARLUS assigned the 
branch several duties, creating the impression that the SDSC was its subordinate. Thus, 
besides asking the branch to recommend and mobilize lecturers for ARLUS conferences, 
it also drew up instructions for the writing of reviews on all movies that would be shown 
during the Week of the Soviet Film, reviews which were also to be presented by SDSC 
lecturers. […] It appears that this type of collaboration with the SDSC originated from 
the regional party, which had demanded the branch repeatedly to draw up lectures that it 
[the party] needed. The Committee of Fight for Peace put forth the same demands and the 
branch complied with docility, forgetting our instructions. Thus, it happened that several 
lectures not approved by the Executive Council were held under our banner.92 
 
Claims that the hijacking of the SDSC’s lecturers was an institutional habit learnt from the 
regional party structures also appeared in reports from the Stalin and Galați regions. One such 
report complained, for instance, about the regional party’s tendency “to push the SDSC branch 
into the mechanical completion of Agitprop responsibilities and [its attempt] to transform it into 
another editorial staff in charge of producing and presenting conferences.”93  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 ANIC, Fond S.R.S.C., File 64/1954, f. 48. 
93 ANIC, Fond S.R.S.C., File 4/1958, f. 116. 
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The appropriation of the Society’s lecturers by other party-state organs to plaster the 
cracks in the regime’s propaganda apparatus may also explain the Executive Council’s constant 
frustration with local SDSCs, which seemed to operate “at the eleventh hour,” despite the 
plethora of centrally developed plans.94 Without doubt, soft and overlapping jurisdictional 
boundaries, with all the inefficiencies, competitions and bureaucratic disorganization they 
entailed, produced and irradiated tensions vertically, between the Society’s central and local 
organs, and horizontally between the SDSC and ministries, people’s councils, and mass 
organizations. This bureaucratic wrangling often crystallized into a discourse of blaming, where 
the Society and the organs of the party-state took turns in casting responsibility on the other side 
for encroachment, the duplication of efforts and reluctance to coordinate and cooperate.95 Within 
the Society proper, central organs routinely criticized lower levels for circumventing or ignoring 
instructions. While regional branches transmitted the language of blaming inward and 
downward, the SDSC’s local cadres often re-directed it upward, claiming that the governing 
bodies’ excessive planning led to “a loss of contact with the field.”96   
Such tensions suggest that the SDSC operated in an arbitrary and chaotic institutional 
context, being enveloped in a constant bureaucratic wrangling over jurisdiction with other mass 
organizations and the party-state administration from the local to the central level. Indeed, these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 ANIC, Fond S.R.S.C., File 5/1956, f. 293. 
95 Regional and district branches frequently noted that trade unions, the cultural departments of people’s councils 
and even the regional party committees in the role of patrons, refused to support the organization of conferences. 
ANIC, Fond S.R.S.C., File 2/1950, f. 32 and File 6/1950, f. 40. In other cases, when lecturers arrived for a 
scheduled conference, their hosts had not mobilized an audience or otherwise failed to make the necessary 
preparations, reasons for which between 11-20% of the conferences in the last quarter of 1955 had to be called 
off.  ANIC, Fond S.R.S.C., File 7/1955, f. 166-167. Illustrative is the case of Professor Gh. Vlăhuță, who arrived 
to town of Rupea in Stalin region at 11 p.m. and was forced to sleep on the bench at the raions people’s council 
because cadre responsible for cultural affairs was nowhere to be found. ANIC, Fond S.R.S.C., File 3/1955, f. 43. 
For the widespread phenomenon of blaming, see Katherine Verdery and Gail Kligman, 65. 
96 ANIC, Fond S.R.S.C., File 1/1955, f. 54-65. 
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were modi operandi symptomatic of the dual party-state structure inherited from the Soviet state. 
As historian Stephen Kotkin argued “the parallelism of the party-state pyramids and the 
multiplicity of the state itself created overlapping jurisdictions” and produced “everything from 
petty squabbling to bureaucratic warfare, which, although mostly invisible” were endemic to the 
Soviet “bureaucratic Leviathan,” and by implication, to all state socialist regimes.97 According to 
Katherine Verdery and Gail Kligman, for the Romanian regime the legacies of the Soviet party-
state also involved poor planning and tremendous organizational difficulties.98  
Aware of such bureaucratic idiosyncrasies, the Executive Council and the CC’s 
Department of Agitation and Propaganda issued repeated instructions to SDSC branches and the 
relevant organs in party-state administration calling for cooperation and coordination in their 
work.99 Further attempts included the allotment of delegates to the cultural departments of trade 
unions, people’s councils and party committees. And since the overlap with the State Committee 
for Culture and the Arts proved particularly detrimental, the Society also renounced its 
permanent presence in the villages by transferring jurisdiction over rural readerships to the 
ministry’s subsidiaries at the local level. 
By the mid-1950s, however, optimistic belief in the workability of such solutions seemed 
to dissipate. With Khrushchev’s thaw, Soviet encouragements for socialist states to pursue 
national roads towards communism soon translated into proposals to dissolve the SDSC.  Yet, 
amidst the backlash against the Hungarian Revolution and Khrushchev’s antireligious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as Civilization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 
xvii and 297. 
98 Katherine Verdery and Gail Kligman, Peasants under Siege: The Collectivization of Romanian Agriculture, 1949-
1962 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), esp.58-68. 
99 ANIC, Fond S.R.S.C., File 1/1950, f. 94-v., 132, File 6/1950, f. 11-v., 39, 40 and File 8/1952, f. 73-76. 
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campaigns, such a unilateral reorganization of mass enlightenment in Romania was considered 
radical enough to provoke Soviet antagonism.   As a 1955 Agitprop report argued: 
 
If the SDSC were to discontinue its activity, the Ministry of Culture, C.C.S and other 
institutions would have to create their own apparatus for the drawing up of materials 
necessary for propaganda through conferences, which would accentuate the parallelisms 
and would constitute a waste of labor force and financial resources...The Soviet 
experience and that of other people’s democracies confirm the utility of such a mass 
organization of the intelligentsia in the mass dissemination of political and scientific 
knowledge.100   
 
Although party-organs had seemingly opted for reform instead of dissolution, the first 
and the second re-making of the Society in 1954-1955 and 1960-1961 restricted its financial and 
human resources and its jurisdiction substantially. Accordingly, the resolutions adopted in April 
1954 and May 1955 “On the improvement of disseminating political and scientific education 
among the masses” and “On the reform of SDSC” mandated obligatory and unpaid community 
work (muncă obștească) from all intellectuals.101 At the Executive Council meeting on 10 
October 1955, propaganda secretary Leonte Răutu explained that a primary goal of these 
resolutions was to push the SDSC towards greater reliance “on the collaboration of intellectuals 
instead of a structure excessively bloated and comprised of people [that were] frequently ill-
prepared.”102 The party documents also circumscribed the Society’s jurisdiction by assigning 
workers’ clubs and “red corners” in factories to the CCS and sanctioning the transfer of 
jurisdiction on cultural work in rural areas to the Ministry of Culture (former CSCA). Through 
these reforms, the SDSC was to become a mass organization of intellectuals, an enlarged corps 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 53/1954, f. 264-265. 
101 ANIC, Fond S.R.S.C., File 2/1955, f. 30-38. 
102 ANIC, Fond S.R.S.C., File 1/1955, f. 54. 
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of experts endowed with the mission to produce brochures and hold lectures for the purposes of 
mass political and scientific education at the request of party-state organs at all levels. The 
cumulative effect of the two resolutions amounted to a devastating blow to the SDSC’s 
institutional prestige. The obligatory community work of intellectuals and the reduction of the 
Society’s jurisdiction decimated its central and provincial salaried personnel by 65-77.5 percent 
and entailed a budgetary curtailment of 52 percent.103   As propaganda secretary Leonte Răutu 
described in a report to Gheorghiu-Dej, intellectuals affiliated with the Society based on 
“voluntary work” gave seventy percent of its public lectures without any remuneration. What is 
more, state subvention for the SDSC had fallen from 9.5 million lei in 1957 to 5.6 million in 
1960 with the prospect of being completely withdrawn by 1963.104  
 Despite repeated delineations of the SDSC’s jurisdictional functions, the parallelisms, the 
bureaucratic warfare and mutual blaming persisted well into the early 1960s.105 For instance, in a 
note on the activity of the SDSC forwarded to Gheorghiu-Dej, Leonte Răutu observed that the 
SDSC “needed to develop and strengthen its collaboration with the trade unions [CGM], the 
Ministry of Education and Culture, the Union of Working Youth and the Women’s National 
Council.” It also “had to overcome parallelisms.”106 Yet, in addition to the bureaucratic legacy of 
the Soviet state, projecting a coherent approach on the place of nation and religion proved to be 
an additional challenge for the young socialist propaganda state. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 ANIC, Fond S.R.S.C., File 4/1955, f. 13-33. 
104 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Cancelarie, inv. 2348, File 31/1961, vol. II, 11-15. 
105 Statutul Societății pentru Răspândirea Științei și Culturii (Bucharest, 1956). For the Central Committee’s     
resolution, see ANIC, Fond S.R.S.C., File 2/1955, f. 30-38.  
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The Society and Soviet Understandings of Nation and Religion  
 The RCP’s approach to nation and religion relied extensively on Soviet atheist rhetoric, 
the church policies of the 1930s and 1940s, and on Stalin’s revisions of the relationship between 
national identity and socialist patriotism after 1945.  Accordingly, Romanian ideologues usually 
presented three discrete yet intertwining interpretations of bourgeois national ideology and 
religion and correspondingly offered divergent methods of engagement under socialism. With 
some approximation, these conceptualizations could be categorized as politico-historical, socio-
economic and cultural – although all three were influenced to various degrees by Marxist-
Leninist ideology as it evolved after Stalin’s consolidation of power in the Soviet Union.107 
Heir to the Bolshevik rhetoric of class struggle from the 1920s and 1930s, the politico-
historical approach recognized that, by the early twentieth century, bourgeois nationalism and 
religion had folded into each other to inform citizens’ loyalties and the politics of government. It 
portrayed religion and nationalism therefore as intertwining forms of mystification that obscured 
social power relations and diverted the proletariat from recognizing its own exploitation and 
dehumanization. Reflecting on the historic relationship between Orthodoxy and Romanian 
nationalism, for instance, Simion Ghiță, the editor of The Anthology of Atheism in Romania, 
stated bluntly: 
 
The role of the Orthodox Church in the state grew not because of ‘ancestral faith’ but in 
order […] to put the revolutionary consciousness of the masses to sleep [and] to uphold 
the bourgeois-feudal regime, shaken by profound social contradictions. Religious 
ideology is used by chauvinist and racist circles in the fight against socialists, democracy 
and the freedom of conscience.108 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 In the following pages I am greatly indebted to Smolkin’s analysis regarding the co-existence of these three 
narratives in Soviet understandings of religion; however, I extend it to include the ideological elite’s approaches 
to bourgeois nationalism and socialist patriotism. See Smolkin, 56-59.  
108 S. Ghiță, et al. Antologia ateismului din România, 44-45.   
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Informed by Marxist-Leninist ideology, such conceptualizations led party leaders to attribute 
national-religious affiliations to distinct institutions, political parties and social groups. Branded 
as class enemies, these became the victims of repressive measures. The RWP pursued the control 
and marginalization of national elites by uniformly purging their ranks, banning their parties and 
abolishing the monarchy in 1948. By comparison, despite the churches’ subordination to the 
Department of Cults, the show trials, and waves of anti-clerical campaigns, measures for 
supervision and repression towards confessions and clerics showed great diversity.109  
Yet, in their political approach to nation and religion, Romanian leaders were also 
inspired by the latest inflections in Soviet ideology. For instance, in its politics of alliance with 
the Romanian Orthodox Church and its program of scientific-materialist enlightenment, the 
Romanian regime mimicked Stalinist religious and atheist policy of the 1930s and 1940s. In 
these decades, the Soviet Union embraced a more traditionalist position and more pragmatic 
objectives (e.g. industrialization and the promotion of socialist patriotism) at the expense of a 
Bolshevik utopian verve. This shift was motivated in part by Stalin’s urge to mobilize the masses 
for war and his plan to project Soviet socialism towards Eastern Europe. Over the course of two 
decades, these factors expedited a re-evaluation of the Soviet state’s relationship with the 
Russian Orthodox Church and induced the overall cessation of militant atheist propaganda. The 
Soviet Union at this point also inaugurated a softer policy of scientific-materialist enlightenment 
in 1947 with the foundation of the All-Union Society for the Dissemination of Political and 
Scientific Knowledge, a policy trend that Romanian communist leaders apparently followed.110  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109  For a brief overview of various anti-clerical measures see Comisia Prezidențiale pentru Analiza Dictaturii 
Comuniste, Raport Final (Bucharest: Humanitas, 2007), 447-472.   
110 On the marginalization of Soviet atheist propaganda in this period, see Victoria Smolkin, “‘A Sacred Space 
Never Remains Empty:’ Soviet Atheism, 1954-1971.” For Stalin’s wartime and post-war compromise with the 
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By comparison to this relaxation of religious policy towards Orthodoxy, Stalin’s 
conception of the place of national identity became radicalized in the wake of the Cold War and 
was accompanied by an offensive against Titoist “national deviations” and a state-sponsored 
anti-Zionist and anti-Semitic campaign. Both decimated party ranks across the socialist camp in 
1948-1953. In line with these developments, Romanian party leaders purged party ranks and 
denounced “the iniquitous principle of national unity” in December 1948 issuing two Politburo 
resolutions on the national question and Zionism, respectively.111 Since Stalin’s new line also 
meant the rejection of the principle of multiple national roads to socialism in favor of the Soviet 
path, the Romanian regime molded its nationality policy accordingly. On the one hand, it 
converged with Soviet practices that advanced nationality languages and cultures for the largest 
ethnic minorities by maintaining schools, theatres, a print media and which also promoted 
nationality elites into positions of leadership in the government, economy and cultural and 
scientific life.112 Such concessions were naturally intended to render national affiliations 	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meaningless and open the way for class struggle and the formation of above-class identities.113 
On the other hand, by the early 1950s Romanian leaders also came to privilege people’s 
integration into socialism on an individual and class-based level as opposed to a collective and 
ethnic one, claiming that the national question in Romania had been solved. This gradual turn 
had ramifications for nationality institutions: the Central Committee shrank the press and school 
network of nationalities, particularly those of Hungarians and Jews. It also transformed minority 
mass organizations from representative and community building institutions into “democratic 
committees,” simple conveyor belts of propaganda.114 This turn in nationality policy also 
inflected the SDSC’s work. Following instructions from the Central Committee and the Council 
of Ministers, the Society intensified its dissemination of scientific-materialism and socialist 
patriotism in high-priority regions.115 Concentrated mostly in Transylvania, administrative 
jurisdictions such as Stalin, Hungarian Autonomous Region, Hunedoara, Cluj, Sibiu, Bacău and 
Galați, had significant populations of ethnic Hungarians and Germans alongside other religious 
minorities whose loyalty the state considered suspect (Roman-Catholics, Greek-Catholics, 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, etc.).116   
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115 For reference to one series of instructions of this kind see ANIC, Fond S.R.S.C., File 7/1952, f. 53-60. 
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While the penchant for “class war” underlying the political narrative constantly called for 
revolutionary vigilance and cultivated the image of an omnipresent and omnipotent “class 
enemy,” the socio-economic understanding was inherently more confident about the ultimate 
passing of both nation and religion. Derived from the Marxist-Leninist premise of 
modernization, this approach led Romanian ideologues to posit an inverse relation between 
societal development and religious and national consciousness. On the one hand, the socio-
economic view assumed that industrial development, urbanization, and bureaucratization as well 
as the spread of education, health care and social services would result in the eradication of 
superstitious beliefs as the masses recognized that their gods were created out of fear of the 
blind, unpredictable forces of social life.117 This assumption about the inevitable forward march 
of secularization was widely shared by contemporary advocates of modernization theory across 
the political divides of the Cold War.  To the extent that they privileged individual to ethnic 
integration, Romanian communists also espoused Lenin’s and Stalin’s initial belief that national 
self-awareness, although an unavoidable historic phase in the development of socialist societies, 
would eventually disappear under socialism.118 Since the economic and cultural equalization that 
socialist modernity was supposed to produce international working class identity and lead 
ultimately to the eradication of national and religious affiliations alike, the regime identified 
modernization as its paramount task. The deputy Minister of Education Mihail Roșianu aptly 
summarized this widely held view at a conference for the superintendents of education in 1948:  
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Thus, it is clear that religion doesn’t disappear as a result of anti-religious propaganda, 
ideological struggle, [and] through this method of the materialist culturalization of the 
masses…The goal instead is socialist construction, the transformation of society’s social 
base, that is the eradication of the [social] roots of religious superstitions.119  
    
 Since ‘class war’ and modernization processes were supposed to produce new socialist 
citizens as a matter of course, it was possible for proponents of either the political or socio-
economic conception to espouse the view that national identity and religion would have to be 
overcome through politico-administrative measures or by improving the social conditions of the 
citizenry, respectively. By contrast the cultural narrative, which emerged by the late 1930s and 
was rooted in the Bolshevik party’s self-conception as a cultural vanguard, had a broader agenda 
to struggle with national identity and religious belief as part of its effort to civilize the “backward  
masses.”120 In Romania, as elsewhere in the socialist camp, this cultural approach implied a more 
active ideological engagement with the masses in the form mass enlightenment. It also involved 
the promotion of various leisure activities. Accordingly, Romanian socialist citizens were to turn 
into self-taught people who attended lectures and evening courses, visiting libraries regularly. In 
their time of relaxation, they were also to attend films and lectures at local houses of culture 
(case de cultură), participate in amateur dance or theater troupes, or in the various clubs on 
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literature, technology, natural science etc.121 The stated assumption of these measures was that 
next to political and scientific-materialist lectures, socialist leisure would inevitably transform 
mass consciousness and everyday life.   
 These three interlocking narratives produced tremendous ideological confusion with 
regard to the status and future of both nationalism and religion – a confusion that had profound 
implications for the SDSC’s execution of party instructions. Romanian party leaders issued 
resolutions announcing that the solution of the national question and religion was a function of 
the mutually reinforcing offensives launched on the political, socio-economic and cultural fronts. 
The Politburo’s Resolution on the National Question welded the three discourses together and 
underscored the successful offensive against feudal and capitalist classes, the equal entitlement 
of nationalities to socio-economic and cultural development, and the importance of inculcating 
the spirit of brotherly conviviality and proletarian internationalism in mass consciousness.122 
Leonte Răutu’s programmatic article on “religious freedom” in the early December issue of 
Scânteia proceeded in a similar vein. It mobilized the language of class war to justify the 
regime’s several anti-clerical measures but also called for the dissemination of scientific 
knowledge and a struggle for “a life of welfare and culture” amidst the masses.123 More 
importantly, such publications affirmed the subordination of the nationality and the religious 
question to the broader project of socialist construction and claimed to cement “the political-
moral unity of the working class” under party leadership.    	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Yet, although these official documents drew inspiration from the Stalinist offensive of the 
1930s, no doubt partly as a result of Soviet pressure, their primary goals were to mobilize 
popular support and introduce a new party line rather than to clarify the discursive incongruities. 
Thus, the discreteness of villains and victims in official rhetoric continued to be blurry. Analyses 
of the societal and epistemological underpinnings of nation and religion and prescriptions for 
desirable state practices also refracted ambivalence. As a result, it became possible for cultural 
workers to become adepts of any of the three views and engage in methods ranging from militant 
overzealousness, passivity and under-execution to outright refusal. Since numerous cultural 
workers proceeded exactly in this manner, the SDSC’s internal reports continuously criticized 
the Society’s apparatus and its various institutional affiliates for deviating from ideological 
prescriptions. An internal report addressed to the vice-president Vasile Buican, for instance, 
criticized the Society’s trade union delegates for their widespread practice of closing factory 
gates and forcing workers to attend conferences. The report also singled out a certain comrade 
Plopeanu at the propaganda section of the North Station party cell in Bucharest for refusing to 
assist mass mobilization and for declaring that the facilitation of the SDSC’s lecture “Comrade 
Gheorghiu-Dej: A Life of Service” was not party responsibility.124 A featured review from May 
16, 1951 in Contemporanul, on the other hand, chided both the SDSC’s district branch and the 
central committee of Vâlcea region for their lack of enthusiasm and complacent attitude towards 
mass enlightenment. Furthermore, it reproved the apolitism of a cultural worker who, while 
delivering a lecture on the Chinese occupation of Tibet, missed a perfect ideological opportunity 
to underline the importance of class war against churches.125 As both documents implied, the 	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wide spectrum of undisciplined behavior among cultural workers damaged the SDSC’s public 
image and the regime’s efforts at mass enlightenment. 
The early programmatic documents also obscured the deep ideological rifts and the lack 
of a unified political will in the central and local organs of the party-state. These in turn further 
aggravated the systemic ideological incongruities that the Romanian regime had already 
inherited from Marxist-Leninist thought. Fissures among party leaders and government 
representatives on religious policy became particularly evident following the secularization of 
state education, which the Ministry of Public Education launched in August 1948. To pacify the 
mounting popular outcry of religious believers at the removal of school icons and at the state’s 
broader offensive against religion, Deputy Minister Mihail Roșianu, a proponent of the socio-
economic stance, instructed county inspectors of education to assume a position of neutrality to 
prayers, icons and other religious symbols in schools.126 When the Secretariat met a couple of 
days later, Vasile Luca reminded his colleagues that the separation of church and state was a 
consequence of bourgeois-democratic revolutions, a historic stage that the Romanian agrarian 
state had not undergone. He suggested the re-introduction of catechesis in public education. 
While others among the “Muscovites” agreed that the laicization of schools had been both 
theoretically and politically premature, Luca’s policy reversal called for objections mainly 
because it implied the RWP’s capitulation to popular pressure. Instead, Ana Pauker underlined 
the significance of class militancy against priests and kulaks. Reading the resolutions of the 12th 
and 13th Congress of the CPSU held in 1923 and 1924, Teohari Georgescu suggested, on the 
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other hand, a moderation of anti-clerical rhetoric and the publication of popular scientific 
literature. By the end of the meeting, Gheorghiu-Dej undertook to champion the offensive 
against religion on all three fronts. Leonte Răutu’s article on religious liberty appeared shortly. 
Yet, the lack of a coherent platform in the Central Committee demonstrated discord on the 
religious question, which arguably remained present at least until the purge of the Pauker-Luca-
Georgescu lot in 1952, causing confusion on the lower echelons of the party’s propaganda 
structure. 
 Beside the rifts in the Central Committee on central issues of propaganda, contradictions 
between the party’s publicly stated ideological commitments and its state practices introduced 
additional confusion in the party apparatus. The nationality question was such a case. By 
denouncing “national unity” and transforming nationality mass organizations into simple 
conveyor belts of propaganda in 1948, the party-state adopted the model of individual integration 
and branded all attempts to claim collective rights or maintain separate ethnic institutions as 
“isolationist.” The creation of the Hungarian Autonomous Region (HAR) under Soviet patronage 
during the 1952 administrative reorganization of Romania contradicted this principle. Whereas 
the resolution had stated that the priorities of the proletariat trumped the nationality question and 
implied that class would override ethnicity, the establishment of an administrative region based 
on ethnic principles suggested that the nationality question was more complex and national 
identity had more permanence.  As historian Stefano Bottoni argued, “After the death of the 
chief ‘patron’ of Szekler autonomy, for Bucharest HAR became Stalin’s awkward heritage [and] 
a problem to be handled.”127 Thus, Romanian nationality policy after the early 1950s 
increasingly sought to reduce nationality rights and nationalize the RWP’s ranks outside the 	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Hungarian Autonomous Region. Such measures naturally alienated the Transylvanian Hungarian 
party elite and intelligentsia, whose support for the RWP rested on the party’s initial 
advancement of “ethnic particularism.” They increasingly came to identify Imre Nagy, the 
Chairman of the Council of Ministers in the Republic of Hungary, as a national leader.128 
Besides emerging center-periphery rifts on ethnic rights, an increasingly diversified nationality 
policy also left the question open regarding whether the new socialist patriotism was Romanian-
centric or whether it still accommodated ethnic-particularism. 
 The political education provided by the SDSC’s own school and the various party 
institutions of education did not help bridge the ideological incoherence at the heart of official 
discourse nor resolve the deep-seated disparities between ideology and administrative practice.  
While most party cadres in Agitprop and the SDSC’s central apparatus earned degrees from the 
‘Ştefan Gheorghiu’ Academy for Socio-Political Education or the A. A. Jdanov Upper School 
of Social Sciences, the staff members and creative intelligentsia active in the provincial 
framework of the Society rarely attended the foremost party schools in the 1950s. Instead, they 
acquired their political education by attending 3-6 month courses at the regional party schools 
and workers’ universities.129  
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Since the syllabi and study materials devised by the Department of Agitation and 
Propaganda were rather general, the SDSC’s cadre apparatus acquired its ideological training 
through the numerous party instructions and the various articles and brochures published in the 
socialist print media. These materials only perpetuated rather than resolved existing ideological 
inconsistencies. More importantly, the SDSC encountered major difficulties in including its 
cadres in the party’s system of education. In the shifting ideological ambiance of the 1950s, the 
numerous purges, each lasting for months at a time, contributed to massive cadre fluctuations 
and shortage. In the end, as the SDSC’s vice-president Eduard Menzicescu conceded at a session 
with the Department of Agitation and Propaganda, "instead of educating valuable specialists in 
all domains," the Society often had to resort to working with "insufficiently qualified people."130  
 Given these circumstances, the SDSC’s internal reports continuously complained about 
the ideological illiteracy and substandard education of SDSC’s cadres, bemoaning the 
ideological mistakes that seeped into conferences, exhibits and the Society’s publications. For 
instance, in a report compiled in the aftermath of a control visit (muncă de control) in the 
Hungarian Autonomous Region, an SDSC inspector described the set-up of the travelling exhibit 
“The Origins and Evolution of Man” aghast:  
 
The display “Atavisms and Rudiments” was placed next to the “Map of Human Races”; 
Miciurin and Lysenko were included under “Achievements in the R.P.R.”; “Man rules 
over nature” was put next to “Races”, etc. The political displays were not fore-grounded 
especially the final one with comrade Stalin and comrade Gheorghiu-Dej was put in the 
same line and before the classical thinkers of Marxism.131 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 ANIC, Fond S.R.S.C., File 1/1955, f. 65. 
131 ANIC, Fond S.R.S.C., File 7/1952, f. 28-48. 
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Reporting on the activity of the Timișoara branch to the SDSC’s Executive Committee Bureau in 
April 1958, Imre Robotos singled out a Hungarian translation of a conference on the RWP’s 
nationality politics to illustrate the systemic prevalence of this problem.132 Instead of promoting a 
sense of equal entitlement and ownership of the party-state among brotherly nations, the 
translator creatively translated the ideologically acceptable “common territory” (teritoriu comun) 
into “shared living-space” (közös lakhely), suggesting that “all who lived in the same flat or 
house were of the same nationality.” In addition to such “gross and comic nonsense,” the 
translator claimed that “the RWP solved the Jewish problem,” using a language reminiscent of 
national socialist anti-Semitism, and branded the entire Turkish nationality as servants of 
imperial and bourgeois interests. Such ideological mistakes perverted the content and meaning of 
Society’s activity, Robotos argued, discrediting the SDSC’s institutional cause and ridiculing 
both the translator and the public lecturer in an irreparable manner.133 
The concern with “ideological aberrations” and public ridicule informed several 
discussions regarding SDSC reforms in the 1950s. The first proposal along these lines came at 
the meeting of the Executive Council on April 30, 1953. These proposals noted that the Society 
needed to focus on the preparation of lectures of “a high scientific and ideological level” and on 
the cultivation of “well-prepared and specialized readers.” It retained its organizational 
responsibilities only over conferences, exhibits and other events that were organized in urban 
public halls, factories and cultural institutions. Conclusively, the organizational and financial 
burdens for conducting political and scientific education in rural houses of culture, factories and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 Imre Robotos (1911-2011) was the former editor of the socialist Hungarian daily Romániai Magyar Szó and later 
Előre. Because he supported de-Stalinization following Khrushchev’s speech at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, 
he is marginalized. At the time of his report on the SDSC’s Timișoara branch, he was the chief editor of the 
Hungarian section within the State Press for Literature and the Arts (“Editura de Stat pentru Literatură și Artă”). 
133 ANIC, Fond S.R.S.C., File 13/1958, f. 23-26. 
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collective farms entered into the jurisdiction of the State Committee for the Houses of Culture 
and the Central Counsel of Trade Unions and their local committees of culture. Furthermore, the 
SDSC was to provide lectures and hold events only at the explicit request of such organs.134  In 
1954-1955 and 1960-1961 the SDSC underwent additional reforms. Yet, existing concerns over 
the ideological gaffes of cultural workers remained a sore issue 1963, when the Society was 
dissolved under the banner of the reorganization of the Ministry of Culture into the Committee 
for Culture and the Arts. 
In producing a preliminary institutional history of the SDSC as it attempted to align 
citizen’s selves with the worldview of socialist patriotism and scientific-materialism, this study 
displayed the breakdown of the ideological and bureaucratic apparatus. It showed that despite 
devoting considerable resources to the social and spiritual emancipation of the masses from the 
mystifying imaginaries of the “Christian nation,” the party hierarchy faced discouraging results 
by the end of the 1950s and early 1960s. Throughout its existence the SDSC continued to operate 
in an arbitrary and chaotic institutional context and was enveloped in a constant bureaucratic 
wrangling over jurisdiction with other mass organizations, the party apparatus and state 
administration at both the local and central level. In addition to the problems emanating from the 
dual party-state structure, the SDSC’s success was also curbed by problems of financial 
resources, cadre shortage and propaganda training not to mention the ideological inconsistencies 
and contradictory state practices that emerged from post-war Soviet approaches to national 
identity and religion.  
These systemic failures of the early Romanian communist state put the familiar scholarly 
argument about the chronic deficit in national and historical legitimacy of the Romanian 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 ANIC, Fond S.R.S.C., File 2/1953, f. 2-125.  
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Communist Party into a new perspective. In particular, the obstacles the SDSC encountered 
nuance our understanding of the historical contingencies that paved the regime’s road towards 
de-Sovietization, national-communism, and Ceausescu’s personality cult in the 1960s. First, I 
suggest that the persistent malfunctions of the propaganda state opened up spaces of 
indeterminacy, creativity and unanticipated meanings giving everyday citizens and cultural 
workers significant room to interpret political and scientific education in rather selective, 
incongruous even frivolous ways. Ultimately, through behaviors that ranged from 
accommodation and indifference to outright rejection, these social categories arguably shaped 
the demise of the Soviet-inspired SDSC in 1963. More importantly, these early collisions of the 
state’s totalizing aspirations with a set of social actors and political and economic realities on the 
ground also helped shape the rhetorical devices and institutional mechanisms with which the 
Ceausescu’s regime would later embark on the invention of a distinctly Romanian atheist 
socialist nation. In particular, the obstacles the SDSC encountered as it tried to adapt Soviet 
institutions and concepts help explain why the late socialist regime abandoned “red” life-cycle 
rituals and, instead, meshed socialist and interwar “bourgeois” methods of mass mobilization to 
launch mass cultural events such as the “Song for Romania” (Cântarea României) Festival. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
MEDIEVAL MONASTERIES, 
 HERITAGE AND THE SOCIALIST SACRED IN CEAUȘESCU’S ROMANIA  
 
In 1978, International Workers’ Day fell on Orthodox Easter Monday. Visiting socialist 
Romania from the United Kingdom at the time, the Anglican Sister Eileen Mary found a 
surprising, yet apparently common, scenery at one of the Orthodox monasteries in Northern 
Moldova. The atmosphere around Agapia, she later wrote, was “somewhat like that of an English 
seaside resort on a bank holiday,” except for the fact that the occasion was an Orthodox holy 
day. People, who had attended midnight service “in their thousands,” “now wandered around the 
village in family groups dressed in their best clothes, taking photos, buying souvenirs at the 
monastic shop, eating simple monastic food and attending parts of the services.” Historic 
monasteries in Romania were preserved with state assistance, she noted, and received many 
thousands of tourists and pilgrims year round. Romanians were escaping “their high-rise flats 
and twentieth century amenities, her conclusion went, “to find their roots again in the traditional 
Romanian way of life which the monasteries represent[ed]” and from which most of them were 
but “one generation removed.” 134  
Sister Eileen Mary’s sketch stands in sharp contrast to accounts of demolished religious 
buildings that made the Ceaușescu regime so notorious in the late 1980s. To this day, the 
inhabitants and architects of Bucharest, scholars, and journalists most often evoke the late 
socialist party-state in terms of its blatant destruction of historic monuments. Their empty spaces 
were to provide place for Ceaușescu’s new grandiose civic centers and boulevards, whether in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 Sr. Eileen Mary SLG, “Orthodox Monasticism in Romania Today,” Religion in Communist Lands 8, no. 1 
(1980), 24. 
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the capital or the provincial cities.135 In particular, Bucharest’s twenty-some bulldozed churches 
along with numerous other historic religious buildings, which were hidden behind high-density 
apartment complexes, have served to emphasize the regime’s anti-nationalism and its 
simultaneous commitment to atheism.136  
Yet, before Ceaușescu became infamous for his massive demolition and construction 
projects, party and state officials assimilated cultic buildings into the patrimony of the socialist 
state. The first attempts in this direction occurred in the immediate post-Stalin era under the first 
party leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, when restoration projects opened in 1954-1957 at select 
churches. After 1965, numerous ecclesiastic buildings became sites for state-funded 
archeological digs and restoration programs. More importantly, they were integrated into the 
conduits of socialist tourism and a secular patriotic education, becoming centers for the making 
of the new socialist man.  Lists of historic monuments and of outstanding renovations underwent 
careful political selection. Yet, in 1960-1977 the socialist regime funded the reparation and 
restoration of seventy-nine churches in contrast to only sixty-two civic structures.  
Most of the churches retained their cultic function while simultaneously serving as 
museums and tourist destinations.137 Some, like the princely monasteries of Putna and Argeș, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Because the literature on church demolitions in Bucharest is rather extensive I give only a few examples here. 
Silvia Kerim, Vedere din parfumerie (Craiova, 2000). Lidia Anania et al., Biserici osândite de Ceaușescu: 
București, 1977-1989 (București: Editura Anastasia, 1995). Dennis Deletant, Ceaușescu and the Securitate: 
Coercion and Dissent in Romania, 1965-1989 (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 308-311. Jessica Douglas-Home, 
”Letter,” The New York Times, 17 October 1987, 30. 
136 Open Society Archives, Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications 
Department, HU OSA 300-8-47-209-12, Situation Report: Romania, 16 August 1985, “The Destruction of Old 
Bucharest Continues,” 25-30. Dinu C. Giurescu, The Razing of Romania’s Past (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Committee, International Council on Monuments and Sites, 1990). 
137 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 27/1977, 14-16. 
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gave home to repeated church and state commemorations.138 Cultic building also acquired 
mobility in socialist commerce. Their images appeared on commemorative stamps and postcards. 
These representations were also circulated in historical and architectural descriptions through the 
socialist press, in the brochures of the Council for the Dissemination of Science and Culture, and 
in tourist guides. By the late 1960s, in fact, the state had cast a number of religious buildings as 
carriers of socialist memory and identity. It encouraged citizens to take ownership of their own 
integration into the socialist nation by sightseeing and caring for these built vestiges of the past.  
Given the centrality of religion to Cold War politics and to Romania’s pursuit of an 
independent road within the socialist camp, party officials also relied on cultic buildings and 
movable religious art for a number of reasons. Establishing the “liberalism” of the regime on the 
international political scene, emphasizing “national sovereignty,” and pursuing close cultural and 
diplomatic relations with the “west” were all official priorities at the time. As the head of the 
Department of Cults Dumitru Dogaru suggested, taking foreign church leaders or citizens to 
restored church monuments in ethnically heterogeneous areas such as Transylvania were to 
assure visitors of the freedoms minorities enjoyed and of the good inter-ethnic and inter-
confessional relations that existed in the country. Church monuments also served to enlighten 
visitors about the numerical preponderance of the Orthodox Church and the Romanian people. 
Especially in ethnically mixed areas, such monuments were mobilized to reaffirm national  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 In 1955, the Romanian Orthodox Church commemorated the seventy-year anniversary of its independence from 
the Ecumenical Patriachate of Constantinople at the Argeș monastery with representatives of the Central 
Committee. In 1966, the monastery also hosted state festivities commemorating four-hundred-fifty-years since its 
construction. In 1957, celebrations organized by the Union of Communist Students’ Association (Uniunea 
Asociației Studenților Comuniști) also took place at Putna. In 1966, the monastery gave home to socialist mass 
festivals again during celebrations regarding the laying of the monastery’s cornerstone. 
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sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the socialist nation.139  
To establish the permissiveness of the regime on the international scene, crosses, icons 
and other religious artifacts were customarily circulated through foreign exhibits. “Romanian Art 
Treasures,” for instance, toured Britain’s major cities in 1965-1966. “Romanian Icons” opened in 
June 1971 in Düsseldorf, the Federal Republic of Germany, while “Romanian Folk Costumes 
and Peasant Paintings” was inaugurated in Tokyo in 1977.140 In the meantime, immovable cultic 
structures along with the recent achievements of socialist industrialization – factories, hydro-
electric dams, blocks of flats and high-rise hotels – served to brand Romania as an international 
tourist destination, indisputably modern yet the home of a rich national past available for 
“western” consumption.  
The Romanian socialist state’s symbolic and economic investment into church-
monuments raises questions about the relationship between religion, the sacred, and socialist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Administrativ-Politică, inv. 3059, File 14/1966, vol. I., ”Notă Informativă – 8 
august 1968,” f. 296. Ibid, “Notă – 13 iulie 1968,” f. 279-280. As Dogaru’s words in the document suggest, these 
answers were directed against the Hungarian diaspora in North America, which lobbied with western 
governments and international human rights organizations on account of the regime’s persecution of minorities 
and which, in the tradition of territorial debates after the world wars, often presented Transylvania as a 
Hungarian space. Andrew Ludanyi, “Hungarian Lobbying Efforts for the Human Rights of Minorities in 
Romania: the CHRR/HRRF as a Case Study,” Hungarian Studies 6, no. 1 (1990), 77-90. Holly Case, Between 
States: The Transylvanian Question and the European Idea during World War II (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2013). For how Saxon churches were used to mend Romania’s image in the eyes of both East German and 
West German tourists see, James Koranyi, “Voyages of Socialist Discovery: German-German Exchanges 
between the GDR and Romania,” Slavonic and East European Review 92, no. 3 (July 2014): 479-506, esp. 490-
6. 
140 Archive of the Ministry of Culture and National Patrimony (Arhiva Ministerului Culturii și Patrimoniului 
Național, henceforth AMCPN), Consiliul Artelor Plastice - Monumente Istorice, File 4161/1965, “Către I.P.S. 
Mitropolit Iustin Moisescu, Arhiepiscopia Moldovei și Sucevei,” f.1. According to the exhibition’s catalogue, 
Rumanian Art Treasures: Fifteenth to Eighteenth Centuries (Edinburgh, 1965), Romanian religious art was 
shown to visitors at the Royal Scottish Museum, the National Museum of Wales, and the Arts Council Gallery in 
London. AMCPN, Comitetul de Stat pentru Cultură și Artă, File 4675/1971, “Aprobare gratuitate pentru 
catalogul Icoane din România în limba germană pentru expoziția din Düsseldorf,” f. 165. ANIC, Fond C.C. al 
P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 20/1977, f. 8-16. Author’s note: the Archive of the 
Ministry of Culture has not been organized into funds; it lacks inventories and most files are without pagination. 
Therefore, when citing, I will indicate the title of the file and the document with the file’s pagination, where 
available. In other cases, the document’s pagination will appear in square brackets. 
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modernity. Conventional Marxist-Leninist understandings approached religious belief as “false 
consciousness” – more specifically, as a manifestation of counterrevolutionary politics, 
economic backwardness, and scientific ignorance. Propaganda materials most often professed 
that the advent of socialist modernity heralded the inevitable “withering away” of religion. 
Taking their cue from this ideological rejection of faith, studies overwhelmingly explored the 
various means by which communist states sought to disenchant society not only by physically 
repressing and removing religion from public space but also by ideologically overcoming belief 
in the hearts and minds of citizens. Communist states’ oft-avowed opposition to religion also 
inspired historians to analyze how the party-state’s periodic furor against religion translated into 
various forms of spatial distancing, for which the most obvious example was the demolition of 
church-monuments in the Soviet Union.141 As Igor Polianski suggested, an important aspect of 
such processes of de-sacralization also included temporal distancing. This entailed the recasting 
of churches as anti-religious museums and the framing of faith as an allochronic, deviant, and 
socially exploitative ideology that would be successfully overcome by Marxist-Leninist 
science.142  
By analyzing the emergence of church-monuments at the center of the Romanian socialist 
regime of heritage, this chapter examines the historicization and aesthetization of religion – in 
effect, its re-signification as national memory. The first two sections look at how the discourse 
on historical monuments, especially cultic buildings, evolved under the first party leader 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 Orlando Figes and Boris I. Kolonitskii, Interpreting the Russian Revolution: The Language and Symbols of 1917 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999); Karl D. Qualls, From Ruins to Reconstruction: Urban Identity in 
Soviet Sevastopol after World War II (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009).  
142 Igor Polianski, “The Antireligious Museum: Soviet Heterotopia between Transcending and Remembering 
Religious Heritage.” Paul Betts and Stephen Smith, eds. Religion, Science and Communism in Europe (London: 
Palgrave, 2016), 253-274. 
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Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej at a time when the early socialist regime set out to disrupt historical 
memory by rearranging spaces, people, and property, as well as institutions and hierarchies of 
expertise. Amidst the regime's particular preoccupation with constructing new physical markers 
for the bright socialist future, I explore the reactions that marginalized churches and monastic 
structures elicited from the Securitate, the Ministry of Cults, the Central Committee as well as 
various experts – architects, historians and preservationists.  I pay close attention to how the 
emergence of the national communist line after Stalin’s death and the related shifts in nationality 
policy, church-state relations, and patriotic-atheist education affected the scant but initial 
restorations and official commemorations at cultic sites. These processes, I argue, prepared the 
way for certain monasteries to transition from their marginal status to sites worthy of 
conservation and socialist national memory. 
The third section of the chapter explores the emergence of institutionalized care for cultic 
buildings and the commencement of massive restoration projects during late socialism. I trace 
how Nicolae Ceausescu's particular ideological priorities meshed with the aspirations of 
medievalist art historians and preservationists who were marginalized in the 1950s. The resulting 
shift in regimes of expertise, resource allocation and institutional hierarchy, I argue, was 
exemplified through the newly established Commission for Historical Monuments and the 
emergence of particular monasteries as officially sanctioned sites for socialist tourism and 
patriotic education.   
The last section examines citizen’s petitions and letters of opinion to political leaders in 
order to analyze how everyday people related to church-monuments. I argue that, while ordinary 
citizens reproduced key elements of official rhetoric, they also pressured the state to extend the 
cultic material culture it considered representative of its past.  Everyday people constantly 
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provoked officials to clarify the ideological relationship between religion and the national past. 
What their engagement reveals is that, for the production of value around church-monuments in 
late socialist Romania to happen, the fit between the values assigned by the state and by 
everyday social actors needed to be minimal. Thus, the intersection between official and popular 
discourse cannot be taken as proof that the party leadership managed to form a consensus around 
the ideological meaning of cultic monuments. 
 
The Early Socialist Regime of Heritage 
After 1948, party leaders fully embraced their utopian desire to cast society anew. 
Accordingly, the new regime set in motion complex processes that re-signified and reordered 
spaces, people, property, not to mention institutions and hierarchies of knowledge. At the center 
of socialist modernization, cities were meant to embody and glorify “the new life.” As the 
authors of a 1949 Central Committee report on the systematization plan for the capital noted, 
socialist urbanization constituted “an act of prestige for the local organs of state power.” Yet, it 
was also “an action of great importance in the current political moment” because it announced 
the transformation of the fatherland under socialism.143  
Not surprisingly, endeavors to remake Bucharest as a model for future socialist cities 
already reflected the interconnectedness of such strategies.  Advancing socialist realist art and 
architecture, centralized economic and “scientific” urban planning, state expropriations and new 
housing policies, such urban visions helped legitimize the re-making of institutional structures 
and fields of expertise (most notably in architecture and urbanism). The re-constitution of urban 
space was also instrumental to the creation of socialist property and the empowerment of 	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previously marginalized classes who were now to inhabit downtowns – the cultural, social and 
physical centers of a new society.144 
 This extraordinary investment in the revolutionary transformation of society needed 
symbolic and material grounding in a past that legitimized the viability of an alternative, socialist 
future. As Jan Assman argued, institutionalized forms of cultural memory such as History are 
disembodied from the realms of everyday experience and social bonds. As a result, such forms of 
memory necessitate re-incorporation through ritualized forms of communication, most notably 
spatial referents like monuments or artifacts.145 Indeed, as for other modern states, the practice of 
reading history onto stone was a quintessential strategy through which the regime satisfied its 
desire for material self-representation and pursued its aspiration for a new social order. However, 
because of Marxism-Leninism’s teleological philosophy of history and its emphasis on 
materialism, traces of the past contained in material culture also constituted the ultimate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Grama, 84-96; Liviu Chelcea, “State, Kinship, and Urban Transformations during and after Housing 
Nationalization, Bucharest, 1945-2004” (PhD Dissertation, University of Michigan, 2004), 95-131; Ana Maria 
Zahariade, Arhitectura în proiectul communist, România, 1944-1989 (Bucharest:Simetria, 2011), esp. the chapter 
“Locuința și orașul socialist,” 44-62. The restructuring of the institutional framework and professional expertise 
in architecture and urbanism began in 1949 and was concluded in 1952 with a resolution adopted by the CC and 
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     Paradoxical at its core, this process reflected both the extension of political control and the regime’s immense 
political interest and financial investment in architecture and urbanism, which it recognized as crucial for urban 
remodeling, the building of a planned economy, and the advent of a bright socialist future. Also, as Zahariade 
notes, the state’s programmatic drive for the socialist city coincided with the project of modernist architects 
active already during the interwar years, among whom “the idea that Romanian cities represented large villages 
was quite widespread” and who impatiently welcomed the chance to experiment with more daring visions of the 
city, regardless of whether they felt close to Marxism-Leninism or not. Zahariade, 51-54. 
145 Jan Assman, “Communicative and Cultural Memory,” in Cultural Memory Studies: An International and 
Interdisciplinary Handbook, ed. Astrid Erli and Ansgar Nünning (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), 114. 
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“objective” proofs which could legitimize the regime’s claim that its new historical narrative 
corresponded to actual “scientific truth.”146  
The Dej regime’s efforts to rearrange the physical markers of the past commenced during 
the first countrywide campaign of iconoclasm in 1947-1952. This drive resulted in the 
demolition of numerous monuments and sculptures erected by the Romanian monarchy and the 
relocation of others. A few, those deemed more adaptable to the regime’s desired versions of the 
past, underwent physical and symbolic alteration.147 As in the Bolshevik case, these steps hardly 
evidenced the regime’s mindless furor. Such acts constituted, rather, a complex semiotic process 
through which the socialist state sorted through the visual symbols of power that belonged to 
previous regimes as it was searching for its own usable past.148 
Yet, as Grama argued, the regime’s efforts to construct itself a new body politic by 
redefining and rearranging heritage involved a more complex process of remaking institutional 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Grama, 217. 
147 The state’s nuanced approach to vestiges of the past was evident early on. Thus, in 1948, it decided to demolish 
the sculpture of politician Ionel I.C. Brătianu, one of the architects of Greater Romania, and the equestrian statue 
of Romania’s first monarch, King Carol I. A year earlier, however, it chose to re-signify the Masoleum of 
Mărășești. Despite the joint Russian-Romanian offensive against the Austro-Hungarian 1st Army at the Battle of 
Mărășești (1917), the Romanian monarchy had commissioned this monument solely in the memory of Romanian 
soldiers.   
     The reinterpretation of the monument in 1947 proceeded through the re-burial of the Russian general Feodor 
Alexandrovici Coloacev, commander of Russian Army’s 8th Artillery Division at the battle. Alexandru 
Panaitescu, De la Casa Scânteii la Casa Poporului: Patru decenii de arhitectură în București, 1945-1989 
(Bucharest: Simetria, 2012), 238; “Masoleul de la Mărășești” at 
www.bucurestiivechisinoi.ro/2012/01/mausoleul-de-la-marasesti (last accessed 8 January 2014). 
     This internment achieved a complex symbolic operation. It “rectified” the nationalist interpretation of history and 
provided material proof of Russian-Romanian brotherhood. It also made a monument to the First World War 
usable to the Romanian and Soviet leaders who otherwise refused to commemorate this period of “imperial 
strife.”  
148 James Rann, “Maiakovskii and the Mobile Monument: Alternatives to Iconoclasm in Russian Culture,” Slavic 
Review 74, no. 4 (Winter 2012): 766-791. 
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structures, regimes of expertise and cultural property. Thus, in May 1950, despite the efforts of 
its members to ensure continuity in the new political context, the Commission for Historical 
Monuments, which was responsible for shaping heritage in interwar Greater Romania, was 
dissolved. Its staff was imprisoned or dispersed to other institutions. As the makers and keepers 
of new cultural institutions, emerging elites overtook part of the former Commission’s 
responsibilities at Department for Museums and Monuments (Serviciul Muzee și Monumente), 
which was recently established under the aegis of the Committee for Cultural Establishments, 
and at the Scientific Commission of Museums and Monuments (Comisia științifică a muzeelor și 
monumentelor), also a new institution within the Romanian Academy.149 Within a couple of 
months, the Committee sent out circulars to the provisional regional assemblies. In accordance 
with the Law for the Preservation and Restoration of Historical Monuments dated 29 July 1919, 
it recognized  “houses, palaces, castles, fortresses, churches, monasteries” built before 1834 as 
historical monuments worthy of preservation.150 Soon, the Committee also called for the 
establishment of “Collectives for the Historical Monuments” at the regional, county and city 
level and the preparation of immediate registries and forbade demolition, renovations or any kind 
of remodeling on buildings hundred years or older, without the express permission of central 
authorities.151  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 Established on 17 March 1950 under the aegis of the Council of Ministers, the Committee for Cultural 
Establishment functioned until November 1953 when it was reorganized as the Ministry of Culture. The 
Scientific Committee of Museums and Monuments (Comisia științifică a muzeelor și monumentelor) at the 
Academy came into being by Decree nr. 46/1951. See the legislation to this effect, “Decretul 63/1950 din 17 
martie 1950,” Buletinul Oficial no. 25 (17 March 1950); “Decree 462/1953 din 31 octombrie 1953,” Buletinul 
Oficial 2, no. 44 (31 October 1953); “Decretul 46/1951 pentru organizarea științifică a muzeelor și conservarea 
monumentelor istorice și artistice,” Buletinul Oficial 3, no. 35. 
150 Archive of the National Institute for Historical Monuments [Arhiva Institutului Național de Monumente Istorice, 
henceforth AINMI], File 3814, “Acte normative muzee și monumente, 1947-1952,” 8. Qtd. in Grama, 78. 
151 Grama, 71 and 78-79. 
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Such provisions certainly stood in the shadow of a new Soviet awareness regarding the 
place of monuments in national patrimony, which had emerged from Stalin’s progressive 
reconciliation with Russian national symbols and as a result of destructions during the Second 
World War.152 However, rather than simply demonstrating unequivocal care for the vestiges of 
the past as a result of Soviet influence, Romanian political interest in the thorough recording of 
items and sites, and the concentration of decision-making power over the fate of monuments at 
the center revealed political imperatives particular to an emergent governmentality.  
Such preoccupations exemplified the regime’s struggle to appropriate cultural property 
and to assert political control over time and space.153 At the same time, the new regime of 
heritage also signaled a radical departure from the interwar traditions of the Commission of 
Historical Monuments. Under the influence of interwar religious conceptualizations of 
nationhood, the Commission had treated late-medieval, especially Orthodox churches and 
monasteries, as the chief category of national monuments. It had also identified them as major  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 David Brandenberger, National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Russian National 
Identity, 1931-1956 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 91-92.  Jean-Louis Cohen, "Soviet Legal 
Documents on the Preservation of Monuments," Future Anterior 5, no. 1 (2008), 62-63. 
153 The frequent institutional reorganizations and re-allocations of patrimony in the 1950s suggest that this process 
was hardly streamlined and clear-cut. Thus, in 1953 with the establishment of the Ministry of Culture (previously 
State Committee for Cultural Establishments) and the State Committee for Construction and Architecture 
(henceforth SCCA, previously the Ministry of Public Works and in 1959-1974 the State Committee for 
Construction, Architecture and Systematization) monuments of culture were re-arranged as follows: the Ministry 
of Cults acquired custodianship over religious monuments; historical and archeological patrimony was 
transferred from the Academy’s Department to the Ministry of Culture. Architectural heritage became the 
SCCA’s care. AMCPN, Direcția Arte Plastice Contemporane, File 24625/1958, vol. 1, “Informare asupra 
situației monumentelor de cultură din R.P.R.,” [2-5]. This changed again in 1955, 1959, and 1969, as I explain in 
the next pages. 
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sources of inspiration for the vocabulary of a Romanian national style in architecture.154 
However, by the late 1950s instead of civic or religious built structures, freshly uncovered 
medieval archeological artifacts became the “perfect heritage” under Dej.  
As Grama explained, this particular love affair indicated the wider influence of Soviet 
feudal archeology as a privileged episteme in legitimizing Cold War geopolitics.155 By proving 
the pervasiveness of Slavic culture across the region, east European archeologists in the 1950s 
and early 1960s helped resuscitate and adapt myths of Slavic kinship, which had underwritten 
nineteenth century Russian expansion into Europe; thus, they gave temporal roots and material 
proofs to a new discourse about socialist brotherhood “with the USSR at its core,” which now 
served as a foil for Soviet expansion. The distinct emphasis on the rewriting of history through 
feudal archeological artifacts was intrinsic to this discourse because, according to Marx and 
Engels, the feudal mode of production was indispensable for the emergence of socialism. 
Documenting and recovering traces of feudalism became, thus, a key strategy to justify the 
Marxist historical paradigm and the inevitability of socialism. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Grama, 82. On the emergence of the national style, see Carmen Popescu, Le Style National Roumain. Construire 
Une Nation a Travers l'Architecture (1881-1945) (Bucharest: Simetria, 2004). The old Commission’s particular 
penchant for ecclesiastical structures and the enthusiasm of its members for a Romanian national style reflected 
the influence of the famed historian Nicolae Iorga. As an enduring member and later president of the 
Commission in 1930-1936, Iorga traveled extensively across the country and recovered such churches in his 
travelogues and historical works. Despite his agnosticism, Iorga viewed Orthodoxy as deserving of respect as 
long as it contributed to Romanian nationhood. Nicholas M. Nagy-Talavera, Nicolae Iorga: A Biography (1998), 
97.  For Iorga’s representative works in this sense, see Istoria bisericii româneşti şi a vietii religioase a 
românilor (Vǎlenii-de-Munte: Tipografia Neamul Românesc, 1908-1909) and Sate și mănăstiri (Bucharest: 
Editura Librăriei Pavel Suru, 1916). What also explains the Commission’s embrace of churches as privileged 
heritage is that the “taking over territory by means of religious buildings and their upgrading” constituted a key 
strategy by which the Romanian nationalizing state symbolically appropriated the newly acquired territories of 
northern Dobrogea (after 1878), Transylvania, Bukovina, and Bessarabia (after 1918). Augustin Ioan, Power, 
Play and National Identity: Politics of Modernization in Central and Eastern European Architecture – The 
Romanian File (Bucharest: Romanian Cultural Foundation, 1999), 16-17. 
155 Grama, 213-214. 
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 Ironically, the particularly privileged career of archeology and archeological artifacts in 
the 1950s and early 1960s also owed much to the continued institutional and conceptual 
marginalization of the emergent Romanian School of Archeology under Vasile Pârvan in the 
interwar period. Indeed, the Dej regime recognized the value of this disciplinary realm for 
marginalizing dominant regimes of expertise and material representations of an Orthodox 
national past. It elevated archeology within its own institutional structure by renaming the 
Museum of Antiquities, where Pârvan’s followers previously found a home, into the Institute of 
Archeology and including it in the Academy.156  
Beyond the particular uses the early socialist regime found for archeology, medieval 
artifacts became desirable as a result of two particular traits, as Grama explained. Freshly 
unearthed from the ground, these findings were “new,” ideologically uninhabited by previous 
regimes, and thus lent themselves more easily for the making of new pasts. Because of their 
mobility, they also endowed the early communist regime instantly with a significant heritage that 
could be “amassed, distributed and displayed” through the emergent network of museums.157  
 By comparison to archeological artifacts, monuments above ground led agitated lives 
during the 1950s. The first extensive socialist legislation and inventory, which matured 
progressively since the beginning of the decade, made the peripheral status of architectural 
heritage official. The List of Monuments of Culture on the Territory of R.P.R, a 1956 publication 
of the Academy, and the enclosed “Resolution nr. 661 of the Council of Ministers” classified 
monuments into four different categories (archeological, historical, architectural and art 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 The interwar Commission’s endorsement of churches “as perfect heritage” formed grounds for intense debates 
over imaginaries of national history with the Museum of Antiquities and the emerging archeological school of 
Pârvan. For him, relics of antiquity constituted more adequate material representations of the past because they 
allowed the stretching back of the nation beyond medieval times. Grama, 64-65 and 145. 
157 Grama, 100-101. 
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monuments). Although it attributed their local care to people’s councils and the Ministry of Cults 
(in the case of religious buildings and artifacts), at the central level their care became the 
responsibility of other institutions.158 Thus, the Academy’s custody over archeological artifacts 
and reservations (automatically deemed to carry historical value) reflected the continued 
centrality of these forms of materiality to the narratives of the past that archeologists at the 
Academy were producing.159 By comparison, built structures categorized either as historical or 
architectural heritage came under the care of the Ministry of Culture and the State Committee for 
Construction and Architecture (henceforth SCCA).  
The inclusion of civic and cultic buildings in the registry of cultural monuments certainly 
indicated that they carried certain value for the socialist state. Thus, architectural sites were 
declared historical if they recalled important historical events: “the revolutionary struggles of the 
people, the working class, and the party, the life and activity of progressive political 
personalities, people’s heroes and creators in the fields of science, art and technology, the graves 
of such personalities” or “the history of technology, military, economy and everyday life.”  
“Castles, fortresses, palaces, cultic buildings, mansions, urban and rural ensembles, ruins and 
remains of old constructions, bridges and grave sites” that did not meet the regime’s historical 
criteria but had “special architectural value” and were therefore significant for “the history of 
architecture” were declared “architectural monuments.”160 This latter category included some 
secular structures that had been previously part of the interwar regime of national patrimony but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 The categories used in 1955 for the classification of monuments were apparently in place two years earlier at the 
time when the Committee for Constructions, Architecture came into being as a result of recent legislation on the 
socialist reconstruction of cities and the organization of the field of architecture. AMCPN, Direcția Arte Plastice 
Contemporane, File 24625/1958, vol. I., “Informare asupra situației monumentelor de cultură din R.P.R.,” [4].   
159 Grama, 86. 
160 Lista monumentelor de cultură de pe teritoriul R.P.R. (Bucharest: Comisia Științifică a Muzeelor, 1956), ix-x. 
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which were now re-classified. Recently nationalized buildings expropriated from the class enemy 
constituted the second sub-category of architectural monuments. The third group included the 
bulk of religious buildings erected in 1878-1945 as well as churches and monasteries that had 
once carried “historical value” according to pre-socialist Commission of Historical 
Monuments.161 To be precise, the List nominated approx. 2,400 churches as monuments of 
architecture. Only one qualified as an archeological monument. No cultic buildings were listed 
as historical monuments. 
Within the socialist regime of heritage, historical architectural sites were certainly 
considered more valuable to the socialist state than “architectural monuments.” At the same time, 
both types of constructions proved to be less politically valuable in the 1950s. Immovable and 
already enveloped in the historical narratives of past regimes, they presented a more difficult task 
in terms of ideological reinterpretation, centralization and display than the “new” and mobile 
archeological artifacts.  
Also, Dej’s rejection of socialist realist architecture in November 1953 and the 
subsequent re-integration of previously marginalized “autochtonous” experts in urban planning 
set off a slow shift towards modernism. In fact, inspired by interwar modernist ideas such as the 
city as a unit of production, functionality and efficiency “rather than gratuitous beautification,” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 By calling on the 1919 law, which even the interwar Commission had regarded obsolete on account that it 
attributed historical value only to buildings and artifacts dating from before 1834, the Department of Museums 
and Monuments at first provided no legal protection against damage or demolition for civic and religious 
architecture erected after 1834. Built after the mid-nineteenth century, in the regime’s eye, these sites were an 
outcome of the formation and modernization of the Romanian nation-state and the aesthetic preferences of an 
emerging middle class. Grama, 79. Since in the language of class struggle and socialist realism these structures 
exemplified bourgeois architects’ betrayal of “the valuable artistic traditions of our people” and their 
enslavement to foreign capital, the regime refused to include them in “the past” it wanted to display. ANIC, Fond 
C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Cancelarie, inv. 2348, File 103/1952, “Hotărârea privind construcția și reconstrucția 
socialistă a orașelor precum și organizarea activității în domeniul arhitecturii,” f. 13-22. The 1955 List revised 
the status of sites built after 1834. Along with other monuments that lost their historical value as a result of re-
classifications, these constructions were now recognized as “monuments of architecture” under the broader 
Soviet-inspired category of “monuments of culture” and were at least nominally protected by law.  
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these architects found common cause with the Dej regime, which rejected Soviet guidance in 
urban planning and architecture as it embarked on the road towards indigenous socialism.162  As 
a result, overall interest in the care for architectural monuments declined further in comparison to 
the early 1950s, when the post-war Soviet preservation movement held strong and when Stalin’s 
call for the domestication of socialist realism under the banner “national in form, socialist in 
content” allowed for the appreciation of “progressive values,” especially in architectural heritage 
ante-dating the nineteenth century. The scarcity and haphazard allocation of funding only 
confirmed the growing indifference to architectural monuments.163   
The peripheral status of architectural or historical edifices in the new regime of heritage 
put their future preservation in question.  While archeological sites and artifacts were central to 
the production of new histories and lay safely in the hands of “experts of the past” at the 
Academy’s Institute of Archeology, the institutional allocation of edifices intimated their 
questionable destiny primarily because their care belonged to institutions with a mandate to 
shape a new social reality. The State Committee for Construction and Architecture supervised 
architectural sites and it shared custody over historical monuments above ground with  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 Zahariade, 82. 
163 According to a report prepared by the Central Committee’s Department of Science and Culture in 1958, the 
Academy, the SCCA and the Ministry of Culture, institutions endowed by law with the care of cultural 
monuments, did not have the financial means necessary for the protection and restoration of built heritage. Out of 
the 19.380.000 lei assigned for such works in the state budget, 18,500,000 lei were at the disposal of other 
institutions, primarily the Ministry of Cults and local people’s councils, which as the report noted, used these 
monies “without discernment and the necessary competence” and often “for other purposes.” AMCPN, Direcția 
Artelor Plastice, File 24625/1958, vol. 1, “Referat privind problema monumentelor de cultură din R.P.R.,” [1-2]. 
Petre Constantinescu-Iași, Minister of Cults in 1953-1957, gave a rough confirmation, noting in an article that 
funds for church repairs administered by his institution increased from 200,000 lei in 1953, to 2 million in 1954, 
9 million in 1957 and 18 million in 1958. Petre Constantinescu-Iași, “Respect față de monumentele istorice,” 
Monumente și muzee 1 (1958), 18. 
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Department of Monuments and Museums at the Ministry of Culture.164 While the Department 
controlled material forms of the past alongside the Academy and thus produced and distributed 
“new history” through its network of museums and curators, its parent institution, the Ministry of 
Culture, and the SCCA ultimately assigned both historical and architectural monuments to 
kulturniks and urban planners in charge of producing new social relations through new forms of 
culture, economy and spatiality over the old: socialist monuments, houses of culture, proletarian 
housing and industrial constructions.165 
 
On the Margins 
 By virtue of their categorization as architectural monuments, cultic structures shared the 
overall peripheral status of the built environment in early socialist patrimony. What particularly 
amplified the ideological rejection of monasteries as material forms of the past was the national 
and spiritual mission that the monarchy, the fascist right and certain Orthodox hierarchs had 
bestowed upon monasticism in the interwar years. Relying on longstanding critiques of 
monastic decadence, King Carol II and later Ion Antonescu had pushed for thoroughgoing 
reforms of monastic life during the late 1930s. At a session of the Council of Ministers in 1941, 
Antonescu had briskly called on members of the government to deal with the “problem of our 
monasteries”: “There are beacons of intrigue and moral infection. We will either lead these 
shrines onto the road of the nation’s superior interests, or we destroy them. Transform them into 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 The Ministry of Culture also acquired responsibility over mobile works of fine art and historical artifacts  (871 
items); the two institutions shared responsibilities over paintings, sculpture and applied art located in 
architectural monuments (4,000 in number).  AMCPN, Direcția Artelor Plastice, File 24625/1958, vol.1, 
“Informare aspura situației monumentelor de cultură din R.P.R.,” [4-5]. Monuments also appear to have been 
categorized based on “national, regional and local interest” after 1958. AMCPN, Direcția Artelor Plastice, File 
24625/1958, vol. 1, “Referat privind problema monumentelor de cultură din R.P.R.,” [1].  
165 Grama, 59, 102, 109, 125-126. 
80 
 
	  	  
effective centers of work and discipline!”166 Such state efforts to employ monasteries for nation-
building and social modernization energized the existing aspirations of reform-minded Orthodox 
clerics who sought to develop monasteries into “beacons of high spirituality,” intellectual 
activity, economic self-sufficiency and agricultural modernization in order to advance an 
Orthodox national modernity.167 Such reforms were especially fruitful in the diocese of Râmnic 
with the assistance of Justinian Marina, then director of the Theological Seminary in Râmnicu 
Vâlcea (1932-1945) and later the Romanian Patriarch (1948-1977). Other bishoprics, however, 
implemented such reforms only sporadically during the 1930s and the Second World War.168 
  Amidst allusions that monasteries were institutions of social exploitation, the state’s 
renewed call for reform after 1948 served in part to justify the expropriation of ecclesiastical 
property. Such calls also reflected efforts to establish control over Orthodox institutions. In the 
context of post-war reconstruction and the unfolding class struggle of the 1950s, these 
materialities also encapsulated histories against which the state defined itself, both in terms of 
the past and the future it sought to embody. Beyond these ideological imperatives, however, the 
political meanings assigned to monasteries under Dej stemmed from the epistemologies and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 M.D. Ciucă, A. Teodorescu şi B. Fl. Popovici, Stenogramele şedinţelor Consiliului de miniştri-Guvernarea Ion 
Antonescu, vol. II. Ianuarie-martie 1941 (Bucharest: Arhivele Naționale ale României, 1998), 314.   
167 Historian of Romanian Orthodoxy George Enache argues that the pressure for reform came both from the state 
and from within the progressive circles of the church. Influenced by the nationalization of monastic holdings in 
the mid-19th century and the challenges of modernity, clerics such as Visarion Puiu, Patriarch Nicodim 
Munteanu, and Bishop of Râmnic Vartolomeu Stănescu, developed plans of reform that stressed the rational use 
of agricultural lands and the need establish theological seminaries, professional and missionary schools, artisans’ 
workshops and social welfare institutions (orphanages, retirement homes, and hospitals). Among others, their 
goal was to prevent vagrancy and to assure that monks and nuns received high spiritual training, lived a genuine 
communal life (“viață de obște”), and were involved in society. See “Monahismul ortodox român la început de 
veac XX. Apologeți și reformatori,” Ziarul Lumina, 21 March 2010, at http://ziarullumina.ro/chipuri-si-fapte-
din-viata-bor/monahismul-ortodox-roman-la-inceput-de-veac-xx-apologeti-si (last accessed 15 February 2014). 
qtd. In Adrian Nicolae Petcu, “Atelierele meșteșugărești din mănăstirile ortodoxe în perioada 1949-1960,” 
Caietele CNSAS no. 6 (2010), 230-234.  
168 Petcu, “Atelierele meșteșugărești,” 231. 
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conceptual labor of the Ministry of Cults and the Securitate.169   
 As in other socialist states, these two institutions shared responsibility over cult affairs and 
religious life. Reorganized in 1948, at the time of the adoption of the Law of Cults (Decree nr. 
178), the Ministry of Cults (in 1957-1974 the Department of Cults) had the institutional mandate 
to assure the ideological and institutional integration of cults into the socialist system through 
administrative supervision and ideological control. By virtue of its overall function to integrate 
fear into state-making and to respond to the party’s self-conception of being constantly under 
siege by enemies, the Securitate had the mission to find and uproot religious practice, which 
according to its view constituted anti-state activity at heart.170  
 Rather than being transformative simply through regulation and repression, the two 
institutions also generated new social relationships. Because of their staff and their position in 
the institutional ecology of the socialist state, these structures adopted a particular interpretive 
lens and produced knowledge about religion accordingly. The Ministry and the Securitate had 
taken shape through osmosis with interwar institutions and absorbed some of their personnel.171   
In order to compensate for their own “unhealthy” social origins, some cult inspectors and agents 
often built on pre-socialist narratives about the decadent state of monasticism.172 Reports also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 On the Securitate’s functions and its conceptual labor, see Katherine Verdery, Secrets and Truths: Ethnography 
in the Archives of Romania’s Secret Police (Budapest: CEU Press, 2013), esp. 155-212. Below I extend her 
arguments to the Ministry of Cults. 
170 Verdery, Secrets and Truths, 24-25. 
171 Verdery and Anca Șincan attribute such continuities in personnel to the initial lack of experts in the 1950s. 
Verdery, Secrets and Truths, 10-11. Anca Șincan, “Of Middlemen and Intermediaries: Negotiating the State-
Church Relationship in Communist Romania” (PhD Dissertation, Central European University, 2011), 10-11. 
172 For instance, one report from 1948 described monasteries as follows: “with a few fortunate exceptions, [they] are 
not beacons of morality and culture, and what was said in the past about their importance for Romanian 
civilization and culture, often enters the domain of myth.” Archive of the Romanian Information Service [Arhiva 
Serviciului Român de Informații, henceforth ASRI], Fond D, file 7755, vol. 3, f. 118.  
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informed party leaders profusely about monasteries’ pernicious pull on the masses, the growing 
concentration of bourgeois intellectuals and legionaries and about monasteries’ role as centers of 
armed anti-communist resistance.173 In part, some of these reports were rooted in reality. 
However, inspectors and agents also reified the political meanings associated with these sites as 
they de-contextualized the practices of ordinary citizens and monks to generate their own 
overarching institutional narratives. Indeed, despite commonalities in their discourse, the 
Ministry of Cults and the Securitate presented monasteries in a differentiated light as 
“ideologically corrupt communities” or as places of pernicious “legionary conspiracy,” 
respectively. In accordance with their particular views, these institutions also lobbied party 
leaders to take different approaches: more moderate administrative measures or terror and mass 
closures. I argue that this divergence in meanings and values assigned to monasteries emanated 
from inter-organizational struggles characteristic to socialist institutions.174 Thus, the two 
institutions produced political meaning around monasteries in part to perpetuate their respective 
function and to achieve political centrality and access to resources in the institutional ecology of 
the socialist state.  
 Rooted in pre-1945 projects with which he had been intimately involved, Patriarch 
Justinian Marina’s efforts for improvements in monastic education and the transformation of 
monasteries into centers of communal life (obște) and artisan production protected Orthodox 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 For historical scholarship on the relationship of monasteries to the Iron Guard, intellectuals, and anti-communist 
resistance, see George Enache, Monahismul ortodox și puterea comunistă în România anilor ’50 (Bucharest: 
Editura Partener, 2009) and Adrian Nicolae Petcu, “Participarea Bisericii Ortodoxe Române la rezistența anti-
comunistă,” in Gheorghe Onișoru, ed. Mișcarea armată de rezistență anti-comunistă, 1944-1962 (Bucharest: 
Kullusys, 2003).  
174 The similarities and differences in discourse became particularly crystallized in 1957-1958 as the Securitate and 
the Ministry of Cults competed over pre-eminence to direct the anti-religious measures against Orthodox 
monasteries. For the two positions, see Archive of the Council for the Study of the Securitate Archives [Arhivele 
Consiliului pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securitâții, henceforth ACNSAS], Fond Documentar, File 74, vol. 7, 28-
46 and 68-73. Qtd. in Enache, 45-48. 
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monasteries during the initial wave of anti-religious repression. The party leadership considered 
the Patriarch’s reforms as signs of compliance with state power and socialist principles of work, 
collectivism and intellectual enlightenment. As a result, it deemed the Orthodox Church to be 
devoid of “a structural deficit” and attributed reactionary cases as external, not congenital to 
Orthodox monasticism.175 Despite continued reports from the Securitate and the Department of 
Cults, such circumstances allowed a veritable spiritual and economic flowering of monasticism 
during the 1950s. Monasteries became targets for closures only in 1958-1961, during the last big 
wave of religious persecutions.176  
  A couple of commemorations and restorations in the mid-1950s seemed to interrupt the 
symbolic marginalization of cultic monuments. Grandiose public celebrations took place at the 
princely monastery of Curtea de Argeș in October 1955, when the Romanian Orthodox Church 
canonized the first Romanian saints in its history. In 1954-1957, the state also spent significant 
funds on the restoration of the Hungarian Roman-Catholic St. Michael Cathedral and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 The two relevant documents here are the Statute for the Organization and the Functioning of the Romanian 
Orthodox Church (1948) and Regulations for the organization and the administrative and disciplinary 
functioning of monasteries adopted by the Holy Synod on February 25, 1950. According to the Regulations the 
main responsibility of monastic personnel was prayer and work; the document also included provisions for the 
establishment of workshops for the crafting of objects necessary for monastic life. Based on another decision of 
the Synod in 1950, monasteries became “communities” (obște), which pleased the authorities “because it eased 
informative surveillance.” George Enache, Monahismul ortodox și puterea comunistă în România anilor ’50 
(Bucharest: Editura Partener, 2009). 
176 In a 1958 report, the Securitate counted 191 monasteries with 6,400 monks, nuns, brothers and sisters in 
comparison to 178 monasteries with 5,300 monastic personnel in 1949. Archive of the Romanian Information 
Service [Arhiva Serviciului Român de Informații, henceforth ASRI], inv. D, file 7755, vol. 1., ff. 28-46. Qtd. in 
Cristina Păiușan and Radu Ciuceanu, eds. Biserica Ortodoxă sub regimul communist, 1945-1958, vol. 1 
(Bucharest: INST, 2001), 323. By 1960, there were apparently only 132 monasteries open, others were 
transformed into museums, hospitals, orphanages, etc. The numbers are confusing, however, because this report 
lists 224 monasteries in 1949 as opposed to the 191 indicated by the 1958 report. ACNSAS, fond Documentar, 
file 66, ff. 440.  The delay in the closure of Orthodox monasteries and disbandment of some of their personnel 
stood in stark contrast with the fate of Roman-Catholic monasteries, which were closed already in 1949-1952, 
orders being legally dissolved without exception. By comparison, party leadership planned to reduce Orthodox 
monasteries only by approximately a half, “focusing on the dissolution especially of those established after 
August 23, 1944.” ASRI, inv. D, file 7755, vol. 7, f. 46 in Păiușan and Ciuceanu, Biserica Ortodoxă sub regimul 
communist, 331. 
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Calvinist Matthias Church in Cluj.  
 Rather than representative of new trends in socialist heritage and official memory culture, 
these events reflected official attempts to search for regime individuality and wither the political 
instability that enveloped the East Bloc in the mid-1950s. Carefully orchestrated to coincide with 
the seventy-year commemoration of the Church’s autocephaly, thirty years after the 
proclamation of the Romanian Patriarchate and seven years following the “reunification” of 
Greek-Catholics with the Orthodox Church, the festivities at Argeș carried a complex 
propagandistic message. These festivities were meant to underscore the regime’s openness and 
uniqueness in the socialist camp in front of both domestic and international audiences. Thus, the 
canonization of the first ethnically Romanian saints was instrumental for simulating religious 
freedom at a time when the forced unification with the Greek Catholic Church was showing 
signs of failure. These canonizations also spoke of the regime’s efforts to capitalize on the 
church’s relations abroad in the interest of developing new directions in foreign policy and in 
order to obtain support from a majority for which national and religious belonging largely 
coincided.177  
 In addition to presenting an image of openness and religious freedom, the restoration of the 
two most iconic Hungarian churches in Cluj, the ethnicity’s cultural capital, represented the 
regime’s attempt to quiet Hungarian protests. Romanianizing policies and the dismantling of 
ethnic institutions outside the Hungarian Autonomous Region deteriorated the party’s 
relationship with Hungarian cadres and the wider public, who increasingly looked at the 
Hungarian Prime Minister Imre Nagy not simply as a loyal communist but as a national leader. 
The struggles between the Soviet Party and Nagy’s reformist government alongside the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Leuștean, Orthodoxy and the Cold War, 65-70. 
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Hungarian Communist Party’s new interest in “the problematic questions” of the Transylvanian 
Hungarian minority created an uncertain political terrain for the Dej regime not the least because 
of the high minority representation in the party.178 In this context, the official approval and state 
funding dedicated for the care of an ethnicity’s heritage served to corroborate the impartiality of 
Romanian nationality policy. It was simultaneously an attempt to manage the destabilizing 
effects of Hungarian minority discontent and thereby ward off both Soviet and Hungarian 
probing in Romanian affairs.179  
The political pragmatism underlying these events and the overall marginality of religious 
buildings in the early socialist heritage meant that numerous ecclesiastical structures could in 
fact become expendable for the benefit of built structures in which the state recognized itself.180 
Despite the regime’s anxiety over triggering religious discontent, this became clear when three 
Orthodox churches were torn down in 1958-1959 to make room for the Palace Hall, the famed 
site of party congresses in Bucharest. It was also confirmed by the demolition of numerous other 
cultic buildings following the construction of various dams and artificial lakes for the Hunedoara 
Steel-and Iron Works and the Bicaz Hydroelectric Power Plant (1950-1960), the first and most 
treasured mega-projects of Dej’s industrialization efforts.        
The plight of civic and ecclesiastical monuments during the regime’s relentless forward 
march towards a new society hardly went unnoticed. In fact, throughout the 1950s several 
preservationists, art historians and architects sounded the alarm about the deplorable condition of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 For a detailed examination of the policies of Romanianization implemented outside the Hungarian Autonomous 
Region in 1952-1954 and the evolution of relationships between the RCP, Imre Nagy and the minority, see 
Stefano Bottoni, Sztálin a székelyeknél (Miercurea Ciuc: Pro Print, 2006). 
179 The Ministry of Cults allocated 830,000 lei and 300,000 lei for the restoration of the Calvinist Mathias Church 
and the St. Michael Roman Catholic Cathedral, respectively. AINMI, file 3381, Corespondența Bis. R-Cat Sf. 
Mihail/1958-1964, f. 60.    
180 Grama, 102. 
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monuments.  They clamored over the damaging effects of a rapidly expanding state bureaucracy, 
the rising popular demand for housing, and the lack of professional expertise in the execution of 
repairs, alterations and preservation projects. As an editorial in the review Architectura noted, 
during a research campaign led in 1951 by the Department of Architecture of the Polytechnic 
University and the Institute of Construction Design in Bucharest, students and practitioners of 
architecture discovered “numerous inadequacies regarding the maintenance and preservation of 
our national patrimony.”181  Transformed into communal apartments or appropriated for the new 
institutions of the party-state, civic buildings underwent extensive internal remodeling under the 
banner of strict functionality. Repairs, painting and reconstructions executed without any proper 
expertise and in blatant disregard of architectural styles caused irreparable harm, the authors 
noted. Some manors and town halls survived the demolition plans of village collectives and 
urban planners only due to the intercessions of students and practitioners of architecture or of 
committed citizens.  
Churches were just as unfortunate. In the attempt to protect the painted Moldovan 
monastery of Sucevița from seeping water, some “well-intentioned citizens” cast its base in 
cement, as a result of which the water damage proceeded to the walls cracking the plaster and 
destroying the four-hundred-year-old frescoes of the monastery. In other cases, protest to official 
circles came because of the destructions caused by new housing constructions. For example, 
when the city council of Cluj-Napoca built a three-storied apartment building too close to the 
fifteenth-century Matthias church, architects in the city joined forces with artists and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 “Monumente istorice: Note pe marginea unor constatări,” Arhitectura 2, no. 1 (January 1951). 
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Calvinist diocese to ask for the demolition of the new facilities, arguing that it not only 
diminished the church’s artistic value but gravely damaged its foundations.182  
This situation persisted throughout the 1950s. According to a report of the Central 
Committee’s Department of Science and Culture from 1957, one third of monuments ranked 
officially as being of “national interest” were in a dire situation, needing urgent consolidation 
and restoration.183 In another report, the Ministry of Culture added that despite its numerous 
notifications to the Minister of Councils, subsequent measures only addressed the state of “an 
exceptionally small number of monuments of culture.”184 
Such sources suggest that besides the official bias for new socialist forms of materiality 
and attached fields of expertise, the various local departments of people’s councils encroached 
on architectural heritage as they struggled to manage contradictions between the ideological 
drive from above (esp. new tenancy policies, the pursuit of monumental art and industrial 
constructions) and existing challenges on the ground: the post-war population pressure, the 
rapidly expanding socialist institutions’ need for residential space, the consolidation of  
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 AMCPN, Biserica Reformată Matia - Str. Kogălniceanu – Cluj, File 3362/1956-1964, f. 41. 
183 AMCPN, Direcția Artelor Plastice, File 24625/1958, vol.I, “Referat privind situația monumentelor de cultură din 
R.P.R.,” [2].  
184 AMCPN, Direcția Artelor Plastice, File 24625/1958, vol.I, “Informare asupra situației monumentelor de cultură 
din R.P.R.,” [5]. 
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agricultural land, and the post-war economic slump.185  
The persistence of arguments for the value of ecclesiastical structures in Arhitectură and 
in the correspondence among institutions caring for monuments of culture suggests that 
preservationists, art historians and some architects, previously associated with the movement for 
a national style in the 1930s, engaged in significant cultural politicking around both secular and 
religious architectural heritage and invested considerable thought in raising its symbolic 
importance for the socialist regime. Indeed, monuments above ground in the 1950s became the 
terrain on which marginalized experts struggled for political and financial resources. In the 
process, they built on their interwar rivalries with modernists. They argued about forms of 
materiality and narratives of the past and deployed current themes in official language in pursuit 
of their own elevation in the hierarchy of institutions and regimes of knowledge at the expense of 
modernist architects, archeologists, and people’s councils.  
Indeed, in 1950-1953, at a time when the early socialist regime of heritage was still in 
flux, a number of architects, preservationists and art historians mobilized elements of official 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 Investment into new housing had constituted the frontispiece of numerous party documents, being considered of 
high priority for the material and cultural uplift of the working masses. However, despite its pronounced 
ideological commitments for the empowerment and social welfare of workers, the regime focused rather on 
reparations and remodeling of existing residential space, monumental architecture (Casa Scânteii, National 
Opera, constructions for the Festival of Youth in 1953), socialist monuments and industrial mega-projects. The 
post-war economic slump aggravated by the large reparations paid to the Soviet Union, the turbid political 
climate of the early 1950s and the regime’s particular priorities to pursue legitimacy through futuristic self-
representation and industrialization contributed thus to a scarcity of funding not only for restorations but also for 
housing projects. In fact, until about 1960 the state continued to fulfill the needs for office space of its 
increasingly complex and voluminous state apparatus as well as the popular demand for housing by relying on 
the stock of space expropriated from the class enemy or emptied by the former state.185 Such strategies increased 
the population pressure on monuments and added to their mistreatment because they aggravated the existing, 
already substantial, housing crisis. The scarcity of housing reached critical levels in the post-war era also because 
of the destruction of residential space by Allied bombardment during the war, the industrialization efforts of the 
1950s and the subsequent wave of post-war migration of approximately 200,000 citizens to the cities. Panaitescu, 
234.  The socialist state’s overwhelming desire to commemorate its own historical narrative is evidenced by the 
twenty-nine resolutions that the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers passed in 1947-1969 
authorizing the erection of fifty-three statues and monuments “consecrated to significant events in the history of 
the fatherland, of the proletarian movement or to political, scientific and cultural figures.” AMCPN, Artă 
monumentală, File 3937/1953, “Stadiul realizării unor statui și monumente a căror ridicare a fost hotărâtă prin 
documentele de partid și de stat” (1969), [4]. 
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discourse to endorse civic and religious buildings as important sources of inspiration for a new 
socialist architecture. By doing so, they simultaneously advanced themselves in the socialist 
regime of knowledge and institutional hierarchy. For instance, in the previously quoted op-ed 
from the January 1951 issue of Architectură, the editors acknowledged the dual historical and 
architectural importance of civic and religious buildings and called on the central and local 
organs of government, architects and socialist citizens to emulate the Soviet preservation 
movement. Since according to Stalin’s teachings on nationhood, their argument continued, such 
monuments embodied “national specificity,” constituting the nation’s contribution to “the 
common lore of world culture” and the point of departure for a new culture that was “nationally 
specific in form but the content of which tended to become socialist,” the editors even called for 
the establishment of a central institution to care for the maintenance, restoration and 
popularization of such monuments.186 In effect, by ignoring the classification of monuments of 
culture and the institutional allocation in place, the editors of this article referenced Stalin’s 
preservation movement only to argue against Soviet models in heritage and to lobby for their 
own institutional advancement and resources.187 
Participating in the unfolding debates about “heritage” and “socialist modernization” 
during initial plans for the reconstruction of Bucharest, Petre Antonescu, the famed proponent of 
the interwar national style and erstwhile member of the Commission of Historical Monuments, 
also imbued the historical aesthetics of socialist realism with notions of class war and of the anti-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 “Monumente istorice: Note pe marginea unor constatări,” Arhitectura 2, no. 1 (January 1951).  
187 This was not the first plea along these lines. As Grama notes, the Director of the Scientific Commission of 
Museums and Monuments wrote letters in 1950 to the Committee of Cultural Arts and the Committee for 
Cultural Establishments, protesting the separation of “historic monuments” from “art monuments” and arguing 
that all buildings carried both artistic and historical value. He suggested, in fact, that the old institutional 
distribution of monuments be re-established and that consequently a newly formed Commission for Historical 
Monuments acquire all the decision-making power and resource necessary for the care of monuments dated after 
1,200. Grama, 80-82. 
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cosmopolitan campaign raging at the time in order to promote the late medieval monastery Mihai 
Vodă in central Bucharest as a privileged form of materiality.188 After a “scientific visit” with 
urban planners and architects from the Institute of Construction Design and the Scientific 
Association of Technicians, he argued that visits to such “monuments of national architecture, 
which we hope will enjoy ample attention” helped “our architects” critically analyze and mold 
such elements of national specificity into new models suitable “for our age of socialist 
construction.” Furthermore, forthright observation and grasp of such sites also allowed architect 
to discard influence of “decadent bourgeois architecture” and “constituted a decisive step in the 
fight against cosmopolitism,” Antonescu added.189  
In another article from May 1952, Gheorge Curinschi, the future prominent art historian 
of pre-modern religious architecture, similarly recovered churches and monasteries of the 15th 
and 16th century both as historical heritage and as repositories of a progressive vocabulary useful  
for the domestication of socialist realism and for the fight against cosmopolitanism.190 Curinschi 
challenged the theorists of “cosmopolitan architecture” for claiming that “our old architecture 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 The architect, urban planner and preservationist Petre Antonescu (1873-1965) studied at the École Nationale 
Supérieure des Beaux-Arts, Paris and, after designing numerous public buildings, monuments and churches 
based on a re-interpretation of the Romanian repertoire of medieval monastic and ecclesiastical architecture, he 
became one of the most influential authors of the interwar national style. See his works, Petre Antonescu, Clădiri 
& studii: case, biserici, monumente și palate, încercări de architectură românească și clasică (Bucharest: 
Tipografia Guttenberg, 1913), Biserici nouă: proecte și schițe (Bucharest: Bucovina, 1943). For a discussion of 
his work and a short bio see, Luminița Machedon and Ernie Scoffham, Romanian Modernism: The Architecture 
of Bucharest 1920-1940 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), 23-25, 362.  
189 Petre Antonescu, “Ansamblul architectural Mihai-Vodă,” Arhitectura 2, no. 1 (January 1951).   
190 George Curinschi (Chișinău, 1925 - Bucharest, 1996) was a student of architect, art historian and preservationist 
Grigore Ionescu graduating in 1949 from the Institute of Architecture in Bucharest. Initially, he worked at the 
Institute for Construction Design (Institutul de Proiectare a Construcțiilor) and the Institute for the Study and 
Planning of Cities (Institutul de Studii și Proiectare a Orașelor). In 1953 he transferred to the Department of 
Historical and Art Monuments at the SCCA, dedicating himself to the study of architecture and preservation. 
After completing his dissertation, he worked briefly at the Department of Systematization as chief architect and 
in 1963-1968 he was technical director at the Department of Historical Monuments (SCCAS). In 1968 he 
embarked on a career in education but maintained contact with the field of restoration as a member of the 
Committee of Approval of Historical Monuments until 1972. He distinguished himself primarily as a historian of 
feudal architecture, preservationist and professor at the Institute of Architecture “Ion Mincu,” Bucharest. See his 
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produced monuments of religious character, the elements of which could be of no use in 
contemporary creation,” an unmistakable reference to modernist dismissal of Orthodox 
architectural traditions. For Curinschi, the architect’s ability to express “the new content of our 
changing society” in the aesthetics of socialist realism depended on “the reconsideration of the 
entire artistic patrimony of our people.”191 Ecclesiastical buildings of this period exhibited “the 
progressive features of our national architecture,” Curinschi explained, on account of the 
masons’ social origins and the subsequent influence of popular aesthetics on religious 
architecture; at the same time, these monasteries and churches also carried historical value 
because they commemorated the internal class struggles leading to the foundation of feudal 
states and the progressive aspirations of feudal rulers, people and the Orthodox Church for 
political liberation against Ottoman rule. 
Beyond the referencing socialist realism and the anti-cosmopolitan campaign, Curinschi’s 
emphasis on other themes prominent in early socialist discourse provide the opportunity to 
examine how church buildings could be the carriers of new pasts during this early period.192 
First, the anti-Ottoman and anti-Catholic narratives, which were characteristic of pre-1945 
Romanian national historiography and are evident in this piece, were harnessed for socialist anti-
imperialism (directed against “western capitalism” at this time) as well as for the ongoing 
oppression of Catholic churches. His valuation of the progressive historical and aesthetic role of 
the Orthodox Church, on the other hand, referenced the regime’s close association with some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“Memoriu de activitate” [Account of activities] dated 19 November 1974 and a bibliography of his works in 
Iurie Colesnic, Basarabia necunoscută (Chișinău: Editura Museum, 2004), 250-263. 
191 George Kurinschi, “Lupta poporului pentru independența împotriva robiei turcești,” Arhitectura 3, no. 4-5 (April-
May 1952), 37-43. 
192 Ibid, 40-41. 
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Orthodox prelates during the first years after regime’s installation as well as the state’s complex 
attempts it made in order to use the church for its own legitimacy. Last but not least, Curinschi’s 
representation of 15th century feudalism as a golden age of state centralization, cultural 
development, and political partnership among the feudal lord, the Church and the masses 
rehearsed the Marxist-Leninist idea of feudalism as a key period for the emergence of socialism.  
After 1953, with the decline of the Soviet heritage movement and the progressive 
departure from the historicist aesthetics of socialist realism, such articles disappeared from 
Arhitectură. Its pages changed to exclusively feature graphic presentations and photographs of 
communal apartments, industrial complexes or urban planning projects stressing the modernist 
notions of efficiency and economy.193 However, these trends did not imply an end to 
preservationist lobbying, which continued in correspondence between institutions and experts 
throughout the late 1950s and the early 1960s.  
Emblematic in this sense is the exchange between Virgil Vătășianu, medieval art 
historian and member of the Academy, and Ștefan Balș, architect and preservationist at planning 
department of the Central Institute for Urban and Regional Systematization (Institutul Central a 
Sistematizării Orașelor și Regiunilor - ICSOR), both of whom had played a central role in the 
interwar movement for preservation and national style.194  In 1958, a year after the closing of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 Carmen Popescu, “Looking West: Emulation and Limitation in Romanian Architectural Discourse,” Journal of 
Architecture 14, no. 1, 109-128.  
194 Virgil Vătășianu (Sibiu, 1902-Cluj, 1993) was a graduate of the University of Vienna in 1927. He served as the 
secretary of the Romanian School in Rome (1930 - 1931, 1934 - 1936 and 1938 - 1946) and taught at the 
University of Babeș/Babeș-Bolyai in Cluj. He became a member of the Romanian Academy in 1974.  
     Ștefan Balș (Bucharest, 1902-1994) was a preservationist, architect and historian of architecture. He studied 
under the proponents of the national style, Petru Antonescu and Paul Smărăndescu. After specializing in 
architectural restoration at the Romanian School in 1928-1930, he worked at the Commission for Historical 
Monuments. In the socialist period, he was responsible for numerous restorations of ecclesiastical and civic 
buildings in his capacity as director of the Department of Monuments of History and Art at the SCCA in 1953-
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restoration area at the Roman-Catholic Saint Michael Cathedral in Cluj, Virgil Vătășianu wrote 
an extensive letter to the Academy’s Scientific Committee of Historical Monuments. He 
vehemently critiqued his own institution for not acquiring control over the restoration of a church 
which, categorized as an architectural monument in the 1955 List, lay in effect outside the 
Committee’s legal mandate and jurisdiction. Vătășianu also attacked architects at ICSOR and the 
city’s council for elaborating and executing the restoration project without the guidance of the 
Academy’s art historians and preservationists; they not only prohibited research into the history 
of Gothic architecture but also compromised the quality of restorations in a sever manner.  To 
avoid similar cases, Vătășianu reiterated the impassioned plea of other architects, art historians 
and conservation specialists for the concentration of all heritage activities under the purview of 
one institution and called in effect for a return to the traditions of interwar heritage, regimes of 
expertise and institutional framework: 
 
I wished to notify the Committee in an attempt to either remedy the situation or to take 
measures so that in the future the Committee retains leadership and direct supervision of 
restoration works, assuring thus the gathering of scientific data, the correct preparation of 
restorations and the subsequent scholarly appreciation of accumulated observations. The 
example of these events also constitutes a serious practical illustration of the necessity to 
organize as urgently as possible a Committee for Historical Monuments that possesses 
competent and unique jurisdiction over all bodies called to carry out restorations.195 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1972 and later as a staff member of the Department of Historical Monuments at the Council for Culture and 
Socialist Education (previously the Committee for Culture and the Ministry of Culture).  
     Established by Vasile Pârvan, architect Duiliu Marcu and Nicolae Iorga, among others, the Romanian School 
advanced the positive image of the country abroad while providing training and research opportunities for art 
historians, historians, linguists, literary scholars, archeologists, and preservationists on problems of national 
history. On the Romanian School and its association with the movement for a national style, see Veronica 
Turcuș, “Elevii Școlii Române din Roma sub directoratul lui Vasile Pârvan: Direcții de cercetare și raporturi 
personale,” Anuarul Institutului de Istorie George Barițiu din Cluj-Napoca XLIX (2010), 193-234. 
195 AINMI, Catedrala Romano-Catolică Sf. Mihail, Cluj, File 3376/1954-1957, f. 10. 
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Vătășianu’s intercession met with the aspirations of the Scientific Committee, which declared his 
observations “pertinent,” forwarding the letter to the Department of Monuments of History and 
Art at the SCCA for study.196  Ștefan Balș, in his double capacity as architect at ICSOR and 
preservationist at the Department at the time, responded to the Scientific Committee promptly. 
He rejected Vătășianu’s claims about the lack of proper expertise and guidance from the 
Committee on legal and factual grounds but agreed with his plea for a single institution:  
 
Regarding the set-up of restoration projects, the law (H.C.M. 661/1955) requires that 
plans be executed by ICSOR under the supervision of the Department of Monuments of 
History [and Art] at SCCA. The Scientific Committee of Historical Monuments to which 
comrade professor V. Vătășianu refers has no business with conducting restorations, its 
purpose being completely different. We note in passing that part of this Commission at 
the Academy of R.P.R. are professor and academician Duiliu Marcu, professor Horia 
Teodoru, professor Gr. Ionescu, who are all members of the SCCA’s Registration Board 
as is architect Ștefan Balș from the planning department of ICSOR. Therefore, the 
affirmation that these restoration works were done without the knowledge of the 
Academy’s Committee of Historical Monuments seems exaggerated. In conclusion, we 
cannot agree with prof. Vătășianu’s report except on the final part where he shows the 
necessity of establishing a single institution with sole authority over […] restoration 
works.197  
 
This exchange epitomizes, on the one hand, how preservationists debated “proper expertise” in 
their attempt to push against the existing regime of heritage and its privileged forms of 
materiality (archeological artifacts) or reasserted their institution’s jurisdiction and mandate in 
face of challenge. Despite their embeddedness in competing institutions, both Vătășianu and Balș 
endorsed the establishment of Committee for Historical Monuments. At the same time, they 
sought redefine heritage and to elevate the position and institutional resources of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 AINMI, Corespondența Bis. R-Cat. Sf. Mihail, File 3381/1958-1964, f. 8. 
197 Ibid, 14. 
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preservationists, architects, and art historians marginalized in the existing networks of 
knowledge and expertise.  
The continued lobbying on the pages of Arhitectura and in institutional correspondence 
appeared to bear results by the end of the decade, at a time when official memory culture 
decisively acquired national overtones. Following the partial return of Romania’s national 
treasure, the withdrawal of Soviet troops, and Gheorghiu-Dej’s triumph against contestants for 
party control (Mihai Constantinescu and Iosif Chișinevschi), political leaders showed 
unprecedented openness to consider intellectual grievances and even a willingness to re-think the 
socialist regime of heritage along autochtonous lines.198 To commence this process, the Council 
of Ministers authorized the Academy to publish Monuments and Museums (Monumente și 
Muzee), the first specialized review on conservation since 1949.  In the inaugural issue, Petre 
Constantinescu-Iași, the former Minister of Cults, reconstructed the genealogy of the pre-
socialist preservation movement and catalogued current hurdles, stopping short only of 
requesting the establishment of a central body.199 The Council of Ministers additionally solicited 
reports from the CC’s Department of Science and Culture and the Ministry of Culture on the 
condition of monuments.  
The reports that emerged in October 1957 following the government inquiry punctuated 
some distinctive problems but also repeated some familiar arguments that preservationists, 
architects and art historians had already mobilized in their cultural politicking. The Department 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 On how developments in the late 1950s affected official memory culture, see Bogdan Iacob, “Stalinism, 
Historians, and the Nation: History-Production under Communism in Romania, 1955-1966” (Ph.D. Dissertation, 
Central European University, 2011), 100-157. 
199 The changes in official discourse apparently resulted in substantial increase in funding. The Committee of State 
Planning allegedly allocated an unprecedented 5,500,000 lei for urgent repairs. Constantinescu-Iași, “Respect 
față de monumentele istorice,” 18.  
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noted discrepancies between the legal obligations of institutional custodians (the Academy, the 
Ministry of Constructions and the Ministry of Culture) and available funding.200 The Ministry, 
by comparison, drew attention to the clumsy procedures in place for the elaboration of 
restoration and repair plans. It also outlined the institutional chaos that resulted from the frequent 
changes in the allocation of monuments.201 The authors of the two reports concurred that the 
overall neglect of monuments of culture resulted mainly from the allotment of their care to 
institutions without proper professionals – the people’s councils, the Ministry of Cults, and 
unspecialized construction works under the former SCCA. But the overall lack of a centralized 
authority was also a significant impediment.202 As a result, both the Department and the Ministry 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200 As I noted previously, according to the Department of Science and Culture, these institutions could not honor 
their legal duties “because from the total of 19.380.000 lei allocated for the restoration of monuments, 
18,500,000 are at the disposal of the Ministry of Cults and the people’s councils, which use them without 
discernment and necessary competence.” Some people’s councils even used these funds “for other purposes.” 
AMCPN, Direcția Artelor Plastice, File 24625/1958, “Referat,” [1-2].  
     This distribution of funds reflected the socialist state’s simultaneous drive for centralization and its declared 
commitment for the enfranchisement of the masses through people’s councils, which as Lenin put it, offered “the 
oppressed toiling masses the opportunity to participate actively in the free construction of a new society.” V.I. 
Lenin, “The Soviets at Work,” at www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1918/mar/x03.htm (last accessed 6 
February 2014), originally published in Pravda no. 83 (April 28, 1918).  
201 The Ministry of Culture noted: “the system for the preparation of restoration projects is unwieldy. The designs 
and the technical documentation for the repairs and restorations needed by monuments of culture, regardless of 
the cost of such works, is prepared by the Central Institute for the Design and Planning of Regions and Cities and 
for Bucharest by the Design Institute Bucharest, following requests by the executive committees of people’s 
councils on the territory of which these monuments are located. These institutions are so overburdened that a 
documentation ordered in the current year can be completed only the following year, and restorations the year 
after, until which time the monument in question deteriorates.” AMCPN, Direcția Artelor Plastice, File 
24625/1958, vol. 1, “Informare,” [4]. 
202 As the Ministry of Culture noted, “People’s councils lacked specialized personnel who could research and 
observe the state of monuments and take measures on time. Only six regional people’s councils had departments 
of architecture and urbanism responsible for the monuments of culture in the region. […] The frequent changes 
in the allocation of monuments produced a chaotic state: the fact that there are three institutions and there is no 
central authority to address problems.” Ibid. In addition to stressing the lack of competence at the people’s 
councils and the Department of Cults, The CC’s Department of Science and Culture attributed the bad state of 
monuments to “the lack of a central coordinating institution responsible for all problems regarding monuments of 
culture […] the lack of construction works specialized in the preservation of cultural monuments.”  
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called for the establishment of a committee under the aegis of the Council of Ministers with its 
own apparatus of preservationists and a specialized construction factory.203 
 By spring 1958, the Council of Ministers drafted a bill on the establishment, structure 
and duties of the State Committee for Historical Monuments and submitted it for review to 
several organs of the state: the State Committee for Planning, the Ministry of Finance, the 
Department of Cults, the Ministry of Culture and the Academy, among others. State planers and 
representatives of the Ministry of Finance took similar positions; they rejected the idea of a new 
committee with regional offices and specialized construction works. Instead, they suggested that 
monuments become the responsibility of either the Ministry of Constructions or the Ministry of 
Culture.204 By comparison, the bill endorsed by the Academy and the Ministry of Culture asked 
for the establishment of a Committee for Historical Monuments that had regional branches under 
the control of local people’s councils. Having complete authority over monuments, this 
Committee was also to receive funds to support restorations, research, and travel grants for 
international study.205   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203 Out of the two institutions, the Department was the most outspoken. It asked for “the establishment, organization 
and functioning of the State Committee of Historical Monuments.” Under the aegis of the Council of Ministers, 
the Committee was to inherit the responsibilities, personnel, documentation and financial resources of all 
institutions that were thus far in charge of monuments. AMCPN, Direcția Artelor Plastice, File 24625/1958, 
“Referat,” [2].  
     The Ministry’s appeal was more veiled. It mentioned that the creation of a unique institution had been discussed 
since March 1954, with no results, and suggested that the Council of Ministers call on staff to assemble 
documentation for the administrative resolution of the problem. AMCPN, Direcția Artelor Plastice, File 
24625/1958, vol. 1, “Informare,” [4]. In the bill that it later put forth, the Ministry’s proposals came very close 
the Departments. See discussion below. 
204 AMCPN, Comitetul de Stat pentru monumente istorice: înființare și organizare, File 3973/1958, “Informare cu 
privire la proiectul de decret și H.C.M. pentru organizarea și funcționarea Comitetului de Stat pentru 
Monumentele Istorice,” [1-2]. 
205 Ibid, [3-9]. 
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In the end, the Council of Ministers decided against the preservationist lobbying. It 
discontinued the review Monumente și Muzee in 1959 and it transferred historical and 
architectural monuments to the care of the Department of Historical and Artistic Monuments at 
the State Committee for Construction, Architecture and Systematization (henceforth, SCCAS; 
previously the SCCA). Thereby, it not only limited the resources of both the Academy and 
Ministry of Culture but also curtailed the material forms on which the Academy’s narratives of 
the past would be based.206  
This concentration of material forms (historical and architectural monuments) and 
resources under the SCCAS coincided with nation-wide efforts of socialist urban reconstruction 
and intimated the regime’s priority of building new life on top of the old.207 At the same time, the 
classification of monasteries as “architectural monuments” remained in place. Portrayals of 
monasteries as sites of ideological corruption and legionary conspiracy advanced by the 
Department of Cults and the Securitate acquired official credence for two reasons. First, some 
intellectuals recently released from political detention in 1954 gathered at these locations. 
Second, after the Hungarian Revolution and amidst Khrushchev’s anti-religious campaign (1958-
1961), party leaders looked at the economic and spiritual flowering of monasteries with 
increasing suspicion. Not surprisingly, Patriarch Justinian soon lost the trust of official circles 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 Based on Art.2., Section J of Decree 781 (19 June 1959), the State Committee for Construction, Architecture and 
Systematization (previously SCCA) received the responsibility to direct and supervise the conservation and 
restoration of historical and architectural monuments; to organize studies required for the elaboration of research 
projects; to approve all surveys and projects; to organize the design and execution of important works of 
restoration; and to administer funds for restorations and allocate resources for urgent interventions. Accordingly, 
the Academy retained responsibility over archeological sites and the Ministry of Culture over paintings, 
sculpture, applied art and monumental art. AMCPN, Consiliul Așezămintelor Culturale: Trecerea unor sarcini 
[asupra] monumente[lor] de cultură, File 3988/1960, f.1-8. 
207 The implementation of the socialist reconstruction and economic planning of cities re-commenced in 1957 with 
the establishment of regional institutes of design, which in 1959 were transferred as departments of 
systematization, urbanization and planning under the jurisdiction of regional people’s councils following the 
Resolution for the Improvement of Urban Planning within the Local Councils adopted by the Council of 
Ministers on 20 November 1959. Panaitescu, 31. Grama, 130.   
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and came to be perceived as “the initiator and leader” of a reactionary monastic movement. 
Within a few years, the Department and the Securitate also closed approximately half of 
Orthodox monasteries and reduced monastic personnel to a quarter of its size.208 
 
 Eparchy Monasteries 
open as of 
1/1/1959 
Monasteries open at 
the passing of 
Decree 410/1959 
Closed in 
1/1/1959-
3/31/1960 
Monasteries remaining  
after 3/31/1960 
1. Bucharest         35             33        12             23 
2. Jassy (M)         57             45        37             20 
3. Craiova (W)         16             16          5             11 
4. Sibiu (T)         10               7          3               7 
5. Timișoara (B)         13             13          5               8 
6. Arad (B)           6               4          3               3 
7. Oradea (T)           4               4          3               1 
8. Cluj (T)         10               6          5               5 
9. Galați (D)           6               6          -               6 
10. Buzău (W)         21             19          1               8 
11. R. Vâlcea (W)         29             29          5             28 
12. Roman (M)         17             12        92             12 
13. TOTAL       224           194        92           132 
Table 1. Evolution of the number of monasteries in 1959-1960. The letters in brackets indicate the regions Banat, 
Transylvania, Moldova, Dobrogea and Wallachia. ACNSAS, Fond Documentar, File 66, f. 440. 	  
 Eparchy Nr. of 
monastic 
personnel on 1 
January 1959 
Evicted 
between 1 
January- 1 
March 1959 
Remaining as of 
1 March 1959 
To be evicted in 
accordance with 
Decree 410/1959 
To remain 
in place 
1. Bucharest 1,301 254 1,047 538 509 
2. Jassy (M) 2,040 1,006 1,034 633 401 
3. Craiova (W) 192 86 106 21 85 
4. Sibiu (T) 71 20 51 17 34 
5. Timișoara (B) 53 32 21 12 9 
6. Arad (B) 75 55 20 5 15 
7. Oradea (T) 10 8 2 - 2 
8. Cluj (T) 85 45 40 5 35 
9. Galați (D) 437 251 186 33 153 
10. Buzău (W) 853 548 305 255 50 
11. R. Vâlcea (W) 654 341 313 203 110 
12. Roman (M) 443 329 114 61 53 
 TOTAL 6,014 2,975 3,239 1,783 1,456 
Table 2. The situation of monks and nuns in Orthodox monasteries in 1959. ACNSAS, Fond Documentar, File 71, 
f.481. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 Enache, Monahismul ortodox. 38-41. 
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Notwithstanding these closures, attempts to elevate medieval monasteries in the existing 
hierarchy of the socialist regime of heritage began in 1960-1961. The regime embraced the de-
Russification of Romanian culture as a result of the party’s growing dissatisfaction with 
Khrushchev’s thaw and Soviet economic plans for Romania within the COMECON. In this 
context, such a shift in the early socialist heritage indicated a rapprochement with the Patriarch 
and the Orthodox higher clergy. Orthodox clerics became cultural ambassadors abroad and soon 
utilized the Church’s foreign relations to ease the regime’s economic and political opening 
towards the West.209 The effort of the Department of Cults to prepare displays of official 
histories for visitors at two hundred-nineteen cultic buildings, the growing number of tourist 
guides, the commencement of the first restorations and plans to expand and re-categorize 
monuments also indicated a new direction.210  
 New trends in state-church relations and in the regimes of value dominating socialist 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209 As a sign of protest, Patriarch Iustinian withdrew to the monastery Dragoslavele for a month during which he 
composed a grievance to the address of the Council of Ministers and otherwise tried to block the decree by 
avoiding its application, by calling on monastic personnel to remain in place, by reassigning them to 
administrative posts or by sending them back to the monasteries at the first opportunity. Enache, Monahismul 
ortodox, 51-52. See also, ACNSAS, Fond Documentar 71, f. 429-430 and 432-435.  
     Regarding the party’s reliance on the church’s foreign connections, see Lucian Leuștean, Orthodoxy and the Cold 
War. Kaisamari Hintikka, The Romanian Orthodox Church and the World Council of Churches, 1961-1977 
(Helsinki, 2000). 
210 AMCPN, Istoricul a 188 lăcașuri de cult, File 4090/1963, f.1. In 1963 albums and tourist guides of three 
monasteries were printed or in the process of printing in four languages (Romanian, German, English, and 
Russian); similar publications were planned for twenty-six other monasteries in 1964-1965 in the newly 
inaugurated series for tourists Short Guides to Historical Monuments (Mici îndreptare de monumente istorice) 
and Short Albums of the State Committee for Construction, Architecture and Systematization (Caiete album 
CSCAS). This number was planned to double in the following year. AMCPN, Note, referate, monumente, File 
4125/1964, “Nota în legătură cu lucrările despre monumentele istorice bisericești,” [1-3].  
     In 1959-1964, restoration works commenced on thirty-six shrines (mainly Orthodox, Roman-Catholic, Calvinist, 
Lutheran and Muslim) and several others underwent urgent repairs. See “Cronică: Principalele lucrări de 
restaurare a monumentelor istorice din Republica Socialistă România, 1959-1969,” Buletinul Monumentelor 
Istorice 39, no 1 (January 1970), 73-78. The extension of the list of monuments took place in 1963. ANIC, Fond 
C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitatie și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 27/1977, “Notă privind activitatea de restaurare a 
monumentelor istorice, precum și modalitatea de realizare (istorie),” f. 10. The new list was not published and I 
did not come across it in the archives.  
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heritage did not mean that monasteries acquired positive political credentials. In fact, the 
Securitate maintained special structures for their observation and ideological supervision 
throughout the socialist period. Neither did cultic buildings displace previous forms of “perfect 
heritage.” Archeology and the material traces it recovered continued a privileged existence until 
the 1980s. Their instrumentality to authenticating the historical necessity of socialism remained. 
Once de-Sovietization commenced, “alongside built structures, archeological artifacts became 
indispensable for giving socialism proto-Romanian roots and for erasing Slavic connections in 
Romanian culture. 
 
Monasteries and Churches as Perfect Heritage 
Following in Dej’s footsteps, at the Ninth Congress of the Romanian Communist Party 
Ceaușescu recast normative temporalities underlying socialist construction in Romania so far. By 
declaring the victory of socialism and correspondingly renaming the body-politic the Socialist 
Republic of Romania, he professed the historical simultaneity of Romanian and Soviet 
advancement towards communism, one of the core doctrines of non-alignment Dej had initiated 
in 1960 at the Third Party Congress. But Ceaușescu’s truly unprecedented affirmations 
concerned the permanence of nations under socialism, indeed their very indispensability to 
“mankind’s advance towards socialism and communism.”211 The projection of the socialist 
nation and, by implication, of the party as its guardian into the future required a commensurate 
but reverse turning back in time. Firstly, this meant the construction of a narrative about the 
continuity of the Romanian revolutionary movement at the origins of which stood some partially 
recovered figures of early Romanian socialism while the party marked its inevitable peak. This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211 See the section of his speech entitled “Socialist Order: the Flowering of Nations and the Socialist State” in 
Congresul al IX-lea al Partidului Comunist Român (Bucharest: Editura Politică, 1965), 69. 
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self-insertion into the history of homegrown socialist traditions involved another change in 
nomenclature, most notably the re-naming of the Romanian Workers’ Party as the Romanian 
Communist Party. Secondly, this stretching both ahead in time and backwards into the past 
further involved a movement away from the proletariat as the progressive subject and driving 
force of history towards the nation - a process that signaled the marrying of the teleology of 
national continuity and socialist development into one homogeneous temporal framework. 
This cognitive reordering of official time perceptions needed anchoring in space. As the 
capital, Bucharest was the center of such efforts to homogenize the regime’s new temporal and 
spatial referents. Accordingly, the Central Committee engaged in an unprecedented dead-body 
politics deciding to rebury over two hundred “representative figures” of the 1950s, the interwar 
underground, and the early socialist movement at the masoleum of socialist heroes (Monumentul 
eroilor luptei pentru libertatea poporului și a patriei, pentru socialism).212 Furthermore, for the 
inauguration of the National Museum of History in 1972, the Romanian Embassy in Rome also 
acquired from the Vatican the copy of Trajan’s Column, which was held to portray the nation’s 
ethnogenesis and which was commissioned in 1939 under Carol II after the original.213 Yet, the 
retrospective carving of a desired past into the vast territory of the state required a more ample 
effort. Indeed, in the company of select party leaders, Ceaușescu personally toured various 
regions across the country in 1965-1966 with a mission to re-signify built structures in line with 
new conceptions of historical time. Planned according to carefully orchestrated scenarios, these 
work visits (vizite de lucru) spoke of Ceaușescu’s efforts to capture the trust and loyalty of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Cancelarie, inv. 2574, File 95/1967, f. 29-31, 32-36, 37-38, 42-46. Those 
reburied included Ana Pauker, Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu, Ilie Pintilie (a member of the communist underground, who 
died in the prison of Doftana during the earthquake of 1940), and Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea (widely 
celebrated as the father of the Romanian socialist movement).  
213 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Cancelarie, inv. 2574, File 169/1966, f. 1-4. 
103 
 
	  	  
party’s second rank and the local citizenry while effectively rehearsing with them the new 
language of the regime.214 At the same time, the destinations of the party leader’s travels were 
not simply local party and mass meetings or inspections of model industrial constructions. They 
included memorial houses and monuments of forgotten national heroes, both secular and 
religious. Indeed, during his tours of the regions, the First Secretary lavished copious attention 
on select monasteries, which he now recovered as material testimonies to the nation’s past. 
Received with salt and bread in the old custom of welcoming guests, Ceaușescu 
addressed on such occasions a rather mixed audience of believers and non-believers – party 
cadres, Orthodox hierarchs and priests, and socialist citizens – and used a rather circumspect 
language of forgetting and remembrance. Veiling their sanctity and cultic function into oblivion, 
he re-signified monasteries as secular monuments to exemplary national heroes and a progressive 
nation, calling them “veritable schools of patriotism” indispensable for the construction of 
socialist civilization. At the conclusion of his visit at the monastery of Putna, for instance, 
Ceaușescu and party leaders in his company signed the following inscription into the Golden 
Book of visitors:  
 
We visited with great emotion the Putna monastery, where he, who was Moldova’s glory 
and the defense shield for [our] ancestral land, has his eternal home. Stephen the Great, 
legendary hero, whose struggle and deeds dedicated to the fatherland’s and the people’s 
liberty and independence, along with other great rulers of the country, stands at the 
foundation of Romania. These evocative places that testify to the antiquity of our 
traditions of struggle, culture and civilization are a veritable school of patriotism and trust 
in the people’s power, which completely sovereign over its destiny, today continues the 
glorious traditions of its ancestors, building a new blooming socialist fatherland. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214 Beyond a reach for popular legitimacy, these visits and the administrative-territorial reorganization of the country 
from regions to counties in 1968 reflected Ceaușescu’s attempt to root out the autonomies of power in the 
regional party branches and to fashion a new base of provincial party support. See Zoltán Csaba Novák’s 
introduction in his collection of documents, Aranykorszak: A Ceaușescu- rendszer magyarságpolitikája 
(Miercurea-Ciuc: Pro Print, 2011), 31-32. 
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anniversary of five hundred years since the construction of this monastery is a new 
opportunity to honor the splendid patriotic traditions of the Romanian people.215 
 
At this and subsequent visits, Ceaușescu evoked into socialist memory other monasteries and 
founding fathers of the nation and state from the medieval period in a language that referenced 
the familiar themes of sovereignty, independence and national continuity. Most, like the ruler 
Neagoe Basarab (r. 1512-1521) resting at the monastery in Curtea de Argeș, Wallachia’s former 
capital, had not been recalled in official settings for years. In addition, Ceaușescu made explicit 
claims that homage to these figures and places of national memory constituted, in fact, the 
celebration of socialism’s victory. At the necropolis of another great voevod, Mircea the Elder (r. 
1386-1418), the Golden Book contained the following lines:  
 
We visited the Cozia monastery with great interest – one of the most representative 
monuments of our ancient arts, the home where the great lord of Wallachia, Mircea the 
Old sleeps his eternal sleep. The struggle of Mircea and of other brave voevods of the 
Romanian lands for literacy, independence and national being has come to its brilliant 
conclusion in our free, independent and sovereign fatherland – the Socialist Republic of 
Romania.216 
 
The framing of monasteries as testimonies of a secular past represented a radical 
departure from the political and symbolic significance that monastic structures carried in the 
1950s. It also stood in contrast with the continued Soviet categorization of cultic buildings as 
architectural monuments, which remained in place even after the resurgence of the Soviet  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
215 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Cancelarie, inv. 2574, File 79/1966, f. 22-23. 
216 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Cancelarie, inv. 2574, File 71/1966, f. 46-48. 
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conservation movement in the late 1970s.217 Instead, these Romanian cultic structures became 
the grounds for the appropriation, commemoration and aesthetization of the national past and 
were put in service of cultivating the affective dimensions of socialist patriotism. 
The re-signification of select monasteries and their elevation in the socialist regime of 
value indicated the budding centrality of religion to late socialist representations of the past. It 
also revealed that, for the regime’s, ideal social relations were increasingly understood in terms 
of national rather than class belonging. Their status as monuments indispensable to the 
construction of a socialist civilization also announced a significant growth in the cultural, 
institutional and financial resources available for preservationists and for church restorations. In 
the meantime, the Central Committee resolved to allow religious service in most.218 By the mid-
1970s most monasteries completed their metamorphosis in the socialist regime of heritage. They 
were re-classified as historical monuments in the 1974 Law on National Patrimony along with 
civic structures erected before 1834. As a result, they underwent extensive restorations and 
became popular sites of tourism and patriotic education. 
 Medieval ecclesiastical monuments appealed to the late socialist leaders because they 
offered the possibility to marry Marxist ideology with nationalism. They also grounded new 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217 I thank Catriona Kelly for sharing the information about the categorization of church buildings. The Soviet 
approach to the museification of religion never gained significant ground among eastern European socialist 
regimes, although there were a few isolated cases where churches were re-worked into anti-religious museums, 
most notably the Patriarchal Church in Veliko Tarnovo, Bulgaria. Aneliya Dimitrova, “Staging the Nation: 
Bulgaria’s Medieval Capital from Civic Tourism to Socialist Heritage Restoration and Beyond” (PhD 
Dissertation, Indiana University, Bloomington, 2012). Albania is an exception because following Enver Hoxha’s 
declaration in May 1967 that Albania was the world’s first atheist state cultic buildings were turned into sports 
arenas, hotels, and museums or destroyed in this country.   
218 At the CC meeting on 31 January 1969, the head of the Department of Cults Gheorghe Nenciu advocated, in 
contrast to initial proposals, that religious service be allowed in cultic buildings officially recognized as 
monuments. These sites were too geographically isolated as a result of which they were frequented almost 
exclusively by foreign tourists. The danger of forbidding the religious use of these structures, he warned, would 
invite commentaries that likened Romanians to Soviet Russians. The new measures that the CC accepted as a 
result did not forbid religious practice in monuments. ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, 
inv. 2898, File 5/1969, “Stenograma ședinței din 31 ianuarie 1969 pe tema propagandei ateist-științifice,” f. 41.  
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historical interpretations in materialities that were both familiar and novel. As I suggested, feudal 
traces of the past allowed socialist states, in general, to justify the Marxist teleology of 
development from feudal modes of production to socialism.  
In the 1960s the medieval period was increasingly identified in Romanian national 
historiography as the time when the cultural boundaries of the nation began to coalesce with 
political boundaries. In this context, medieval cultic buildings provided temporal and spatial 
markers for a new discourse about the quintessentially national genealogy of a home-grown 
socialism.219 The privileged career of medieval monasteries and churches in the 1960s and 1970s 
also owed much to the marginalization of these material forms and the fields and networks of 
expertise they sustained during the Dej period.  By resuscitating myths of a “golden age,” art 
historians, preservationists and architects now helped overwrite myths of Slavic brotherhood and 
championed instead narratives about the birth of the Romanian socialist nation. Medieval 
monasteries appealed to the regime for two additional reasons. Because they were immobile and 
also constituted the oldest and most imposing structures, they furnished the state with material 
markers of national territory and served as proofs for the greatness of medieval Romanian 
civilization at a time when debates about the belonging of Soviet Moldova reemerged between 
Romanian historians and their Soviet colleagues.220  
Beyond pointing to an adaptation and instrumentalization of regimes of expertise and pre-
socialist narratives of the past, the particular insistence of the late socialist regime on built 
ecclesiastical structures went hand in hand with Ceaușescu’s “dead-body politics,” which lay at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 Iacob, 280-281. 
220 On these debates, see Adam Burakowski, Dictatura lui Nicolae Ceaușescu, 1965-1989 (Iași: Polirom, 2011), 45-
60. The same underlying logic elevated the position of wooden churches in Transylvania as debates unfolded 
with Hungarian historians. 
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the heart of his personality cult.221 By recovering the burial grounds of exemplary national 
heroes, which medieval monasteries often were, Ceaușescu appropriated the symbolic capital of 
famous dead bodies. Thus, he re-inserted himself into the imagineries of kinship so central to the 
affective dimensions of nationhood.  
During the late 1960s, Ceaușescu’s political and economic reforms, though admittedly 
limited, had brought a time of national effervescence, consumer liberalization and economic 
growth, opening new sites for patriotic education and socialist leisure.222 As architect and 
preservationist Ion Mircea Enescu recalled, access to patrimonial architecture across the country 
was limited in the 1950s due to a lack of hotels and proper means of transportation.223 In fact, 
most material forms that the state harnessed for patriotic education – socialist monuments or 
archeological artifacts housed in museums – invited citizens to the embodiment of the socialist 
future, the city. Vacationing, on the other hand, understood in the 1950s predominantly as 
proletarian tourism, took citizens to cure places where, through medical therapy and rest, they 
recuperated labor productivity so central to a regime that privileged work as the foundation of 
personal worth, social progress and welfare.224 As consumption and leisure became central to 
Cold War culture wars in the 1960s, the Romanian state charted new methods in patriotic 
education that increasingly included active tourism. This type of sightseeing focused on historic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221 Katherine Verdery, Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist Change (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1999), 27-33.  
222 Jill Massino, “From Black Caviar to Blackouts: Gender, Consumption and Lifestyle in Ceaușescu’s Romania” in 
Consumption in Cold War Eastern Europe ed. Paulina Bren and Mary Neuburger (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 227. Burakowski, Dictatura lui Nicolae Ceaușescu, 92.  
223 Uniunea Arhitecților Români, Arhitecți în timpul dictaturii (Bucharest: Simetria, 2005), 69. 
224 Diane Koenker, Club Red: Vacation Travel and the Soviet Dream (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), 12-
13. 
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and natural sites of attraction and was meant to educate citizens about “their socialist fatherland” 
through travel.225 
 In this context, monasteries re-signified as secular monuments were also conceived of as 
sites for patriotic schooling and were considered valuable because they offered the possibility of 
travelling into the past. Indeed, the regime encouraged all social categories and generations to 
visit these ecclesiastical buildings. The Bureau of National Tourism and the Bureau of Tourism 
for Youth organized sojourns for socialist citizens, published guidebooks and postcards, while 
schools took students for study trips there. Although these ecclesiastical structures had enjoyed a 
privileged status in monarchist heritage and were enveloped in pre-socialist narratives of 
Orthodox nationhood, their elevation in socialist heritage did not translate into an 
acknowledgment of their role in Romanian “national awakening” during the nineteenth century. 
Thus, official publications routinely ignored their cultic and spiritual function, indicating the 
regime’s attempts to balance its commitment to scientific atheism with its reach for domestic 
legitimacy and international support. 
 Restorations often facilitated citizens’ travel through history. Materialities were often re-
arranged to enhance the “historical authenticity” of monasteries while simultaneously increasing 
their touristic value. Indicative of such efforts were the restorations at Putna. The chief architect 
Ioana Grigorescu proposed the demolition of a nineteenth century building unrepresentative of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225 The Central Committee approached tourism as a venue for patriotic education while discussing reforms already 
in 1959.  A report presented at this occasion stated as follows: “Touristic activity promotes familiarity with the 
beauties and riches of the fatherland, historical monuments and socialist constructions, [and contributes to] the 
education of workers and youth in the spirit of patriotic love, devotion to work for the construction of socialism, 
[and] the safe-guarding of peace.” ANIC, Fond CC al PCR, Cancelarie, inv. 3109, File 1/1959, “Referat cu 
privire la reorganizarea activității turistice în RPR,” f. 26.  
     However, the second wave of reforms in 1966 brought the decisive shift in doctrines of socialist rest. While the 
state planned to double revenues from active tourism until 1970, medicalized spa vacations were expected to 
increase by only a meager 17% increase. ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R, Secția Cancelarie, inv. 2574, File 150/1966, 
“Propuneri privind noua organizare a turismului în România,” f. 18. 
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Putna because of its amorphous architecture and lack of historical value.226  “To liberate the 
monument’s points of perception and perspective,” she recommended “reorganizing the 
environment necessary for the monastery’s domestic life.” “Reshaping sight-seeing routes, 
paving the roads of access and establishing a parking lot for cars” were also necessary to ensure 
that these “do not block the view on the monument.” “Landscaping and the endowment of 
external space with alleys, paths, kiosks, tables and benches for visitors” were required as well. 
With regards to the general aspect of the surrounding environment, Grigorescu proposed the 
demolition of the current farmstead and “the installation of an open amphitheater for field 
celebrations [serbări câmpenești].” For the enhancement of touristic programs, Grigorescu 
likewise argued for “the restoration of the wooden church in the village” on the grounds that, 
according to popular tradition, it had belonged to Moldova’s first ruler Dragoș I (r. 1347-1354). 
These plans, she concluded, emphasized the history of Putna, “its period of flowering during the 
period of Stephen the Great, its tragedy and ruin, and later the persistent staunchness of different 
rulers to revive life at this cultural beacon.” In this way, Greuceanu stressed, restorations would 
“enable the visitor to traverse this history.”227  
Medieval monasteries also became instrumental to Ceaușescu’s aggressive pursuit of 
political and economic relations with the west. As I noted earlier, at the beginning of 1960s the 
foreign relations of the Romanian Orthodox Church and Orthodox hierarchs became 
instrumental to Dej’s foreign policy. Ceaușescu continued with this trend with an added 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226 With a diploma in architecture in 1947 from the Institute of Architecture “Ion Mincu” in Bucharest, Ioana 
Grigorescu (b. 1915) worked as a preservationist at the Department of Historical Monuments at SCCAS. She 
coordinated and authored restoration projects and repairs at the monasteries of Slatina (1963-1972), Secu (1963-
1972), Sihăstria Secului (1966-1969), and Putna (1966-1972). With other architects, she also led projects at the 
monastery of Dealu-Târgovişte (1963-1972), Suceviţa (1960-1970), Humor (1960-1971), Voroneţ (1960-1961), 
Dragomirna (1961-1971) and Galata–Iaşi (1960). 
227 AMCPN, Lucrări de cercetări și demolări la mănăstirea Putna, File 4442/1968, “Memoriu justificativ,” [3]. 
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ingredient: caring for church monuments through restorations and the instrumentalization of 
icons for foreign exhibits was central to representing a palatable image of the regime to the west 
at a time when “religion” increasingly became a ground for cold war cultural and ideological 
competition.228  
But beyond their centrality to symbolic politics, medieval monasteries that were 
integrated into touristic circuits constituted economic assets to a regime that strove to maximize 
its market share in western European tourism in order to balance Romania’s trade deficit.229 A 
proposal prepared for the meeting of the Permanent Presidium of the Central Committee on the 
reform of tourism in 1966 made this very argument: western tourists were important to increase 
foreign currency revenues for the purposes of external balance of payments. Apparently, 
Romania lagged behind socialist countries such as Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic 
when it came to profits accrued from international tourism.230 The number of tourists had more 
than doubled in 1958-1965 and Europe captured 70 percent of profits in the global tourist 
industry. Thus, the proposal identified western tourists as the chief means for tripling Romanian 
foreign currency gains during the next five-year plan. As the authors argued, “an analysis of the 
international tourist market showed that for the conditions of our country the number of tourist 
entries from Northern and Central Europe could be significantly increased” because vacationers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 Diane Kirby, ed.  Religion and the Cold War (London: Palgrave, 2003). 
229 ANIC, Fond CC al PCR, inv. 2574, File 150/1966, “Protocolul ședinței Prezidiului Permanent al CC al PCR 
privind propuneri referitoare la noua organizare a turismului în România din 22.11.1966,” f.13-15. That medieval 
monasteries became important in this calculation is evident from the fact that the Bureau of National Tourism 
organized tours around such sites and also published guidebooks in English, French, and German.  
230 The foreign currency western visitors spent in the country, for example, made up a faint 4 percent of Romania’s 
exports while revenues from foreign tourists, in general, amounted to an even lower 1.9 percent of profits gained 
from commodities sold abroad. According to the new five-year plan, capitalist visitors were expected to generate 
325 million lei in 1970. By comparison, the Romanian state hoped to accrue on 95 million lei from socialist 
tourists. 
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from the Federal Republic of Germany, Austria and the Scandinavian countries yearned for 
“warmer climates, especially the seaside” but also demanded holidays in “alpine regions.”231 
Ceaușescu’s own remarks before the Central Committee Secretariat on 8 April 1969 were also 
telling in this regard. When explaining the urgency of restricting the travel of Romanian citizens 
to the west, the party leader asserted clearly: 
 
I am for a substantial reduction in the number of trips abroad to the West, even for 
activists… I am asking for a reduction in the amount of hard currency allotted to tourism; 
this should be reduced to 25 percent because we cannot waste hard currency abroad… 
We are short of hard currency and we have organized this kind of tourism in order to 
bring tourists and hard currency into the country, not in order to waste our hard currency 
abroad.232 
 
With these in mind, it is not surprising that the serial publications and guides published 
under the aegis of the National Tourist Office lured western tourists to monasteries in the 
Carpathians. In the 1968 issue of Holidays in Romania, for instance, a guide promised visitors a 
unique tour that led “through the gentle slopes of Bucovina’s hills, […] around the painted 
monasteries, in a region with the smell of resin and villages with painted roofs.”233 In fact, the 
integration of monasteries and other cultic buildings into the circuits of international tourism 
appears to have been sufficiently wide-spread in Eastern Europe to invite complaints from Soviet 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Cancelarie, inv. 2574, File 150/1966, 17. 
232 Florica Dobre and Dan Taloș, eds. Români în exil, emigrație și diasporă: documente din fosta arhivă C.C. al 
P.C.R. (Bucharest: Pro Historia, 2006), 181. Qtd. in Dragoș Petrescu, “Closely Watched Tourism: The Securitate 
as Warden of Transnational Encounters, 1967-9,” Journal of Contemporary History 50, no. 2 (April 2015), 350. 
233 National Tourist Office, Holidays in Romania (Bucharest, 1968), 28-29. See also, Mihai Iancu, Demostene 
Popescu, România: Ghid-atlas turistic (Bucharest: Stadion, 1971) published in Romanian, English, German, 
French and Russian.  
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tourists about the lack of sites attesting the great achievements of socialist construction and 
Soviet influence.234  
The shifts that Ceaușescu’s ideological re-evaluations unleashed in the mid-1960s helped 
anchor monasteries as testimonies of a desirable history. Notwithstanding important continuities, 
archeological artifacts seized to monopolize the category of “perfect heritage” under late 
socialism. Medieval built structures, especially churches and monasteries stepped into the 
foreground of a new time-space politics as institutions, expertise, disciplinary realms and 
legislation consolidated around these materialities.  
After Ceaușescu’s tour across the country, an indication for such a shift came in early 
October 1969 with the adoption of “Decree no. 674 for Measures on Construction, Architecture 
and Systematization.”235 With the transfer of the Department of Historical Monuments from the 
State Committee of Construction and Architecture to the Committee of Culture and the Arts, the 
regime moved custody over structures above ground from institutions of the present and the 
future to a department whose mission lay more squarely in the cultivation, study and 
preservation of “the past.” Although still categorized as “monuments of architecture,” cultic 
buildings seemed to lose from their political ambivalence as a result. Yet, this institutional 
reshuffling foreshadowed political actions of far greater significance for the repositioning of 
ecclesiastical structures within socialist heritage. In fact, with the gradual re-establishment of the 
pre-socialist Commission of Historical Monuments in 1969-1972, the regime revived 
institutional traditions and regimes of expertise that had treated late-medieval, especially 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234 Anne E. Gorsuch, “Soviet Tourists in Eastern Europe,” in Turizm: the Russian and East European Tourist under 
Capitalism and Socialism, ed. by Anne E. Gorsuch and Diane P. Koenker (Ithaca, 2010), 215. 
235 ANIC, CC al PCR, Fond Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, 27/1977, “Situația sintetică a lucrărilor de restaurare 
a monumentelor istorice și de arhitectură,” f. 2. 
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Orthodox, churches and monasteries as a major category of national monuments alongside 
archeological artifacts.236  
The first stage of this institutional rearrangement was manifest in the launch of the 
Bulletin for Historical Monuments. In 1970 the Committee of Culture decided “to continue the 
tradition of the bulletin’s old series.” It also brought together an editorial board of “old experts” 
“to assure the scientific stature of this publication.”237 Dispersed in the 1950s to various 
institutions and called upon to fashion a material culture of the past acceptable for the Dej 
regime, these experts - art historians, museum curators, archeologists and conservationists - had 
played an active role in the Committee for Historical Monuments (CMI), promoting medieval 
ecclesiastical churches as perfect heritage for imaginaries of Orthodox nation-hood.238 Under the 
banner of the Bulletin, these experts naturally became instrumental to a new kind of heritage-
making. As the Ministry of Culture stated in a letter to the Secretary General of the Ministry of 
Education, the Bulletin’s mission was “to study, preserve and popularize valuable monuments in 
our country, revealing the historical conditions and cultural moments tied to their edification,” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
236 The old Commission’s particular penchant for ecclesiastical structures owed much to the role that historian 
Nicolae Iorga, an enduring member and later president of the Commission, played in the promotion of Orthodox 
conceptualizations of Romanian nationhood. But the Commission’s endorsement of churches “as perfect 
heritage” formed grounds for intense debates over imaginaries of national history with the Museum of 
Antiquities and the emergent archeological school of Vasile Pârvan, for whom relics of antiquity were more 
adequate material representations of the past because they allowed the stretching back of the nation beyond 
medieval times. As Grama explained, the continued institutional and conceptual marginalization of Pârvan’s 
ethnic ontology during the interwar period ironically contributed to the particularly privileged career of 
archeology and archeological artifacts in the 1950s and early 1960s, as the Dej regime recognized the value of 
this disciplinary realm for marginalizing dominant regimes of expertise and material representations of an 
Orthodox national past. Grama, 80-86. 
237 AMCPN, Direcția Muzee și Monumente, File 4511/1969, “Nota nr. 18067 din 29 iulie 1969,” f. 78. The editorial 
board included former members of the interwar Commission: architects Ștefan Balș, Richard Bordenache, 
archeologists and historians Constantin Daicoviciu and Dionisie Pippidi, and art historians Vasile Drăguț, 
Grigore Ionescu, and Virgil Vătășianu, among others. Iuliu Șerban, “Buletinul Comisiei Monumentelor Istorice,” 
at www.patrimoniu.ro/ro/bcmi-istoric (last accessed February 27, 2014). 
238 With impressive publication lists and conservation work, most of these experts had established themselves in the 
history of medieval art, architecture and restoration during the interwar years. 
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and thus to make a considerable contribution “to the knowledge of our fatherlands history and 
our precious historic and artistic patrimony.”239  
 The anchoring of medieval religious buildings in institutional traditions, structures of 
value and networks of expertise that interlinked “old” with “new” culminated in 1972. Invoking 
the eighty-year jubilee since the establishment of the pre-socialist Commission of Historical 
Monuments, the socialist state renamed the Department for Historical Monuments after its 
predecessor. It thereby provided greater scope for the revival of the Commission’s cultural 
memory and for its work in the making of socialist life.240 Art historian and the new head of the  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
239 On this account, the Ministry of Culture also suggested that the Ministry of Education include the Bulletin in its 
catalogue of orders for 1970 and make this resource available for students and faculty in high-schools and higher 
education. AMCPN, Direcția Muzee și Monumente, File 4511/1969, Letter to Nica Nicolescu, Secretary General 
at the Ministry of Education (31 July 1969), f. 85. 
240 In fact, the institution established in 1892 was first named the Commission for Public Monuments and only 
subsequently the Commission of Historical Monuments (1906-1948). This obfuscation of names and dates for 
the purposes of a jubilee speaks to the socialist state’s attempt to reach for continuity with “national traditions” as 
far back into the past as possible, while being oriented to Western trends in preservation. The Venice Charter 
(1964) classified all monuments of the past under the generic term “historical monuments,” and then into sub-
categories such as “archaeological monuments,” “architectural monuments,” “monuments of plastic arts,” 
“commemorative monuments,” “monuments of landscape architecture,” and “technical monuments.” Curinschi, 
Restaurarea monumentelor, 13-23.  
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Commission Vasile Drăguț241 along with historian Aurelian Sacerdoțeanu,242 architect Horia 
Teodoru243 and art historian Virgil Vătășianu – preservationists who had long awaited a better 
position in the institutional ecology of the socialist state – celebrated this juncture in the 
anniversary issue of the Bulletin. They invoked the founding fathers of the Commission, their 
epistemology, the canon of their works and the legislative traditions that had undergirded the 
Romanian preservation movement from the nineteenth century until the late 1940s. Drăguț 
paused at length on the influence of the Romanian Critical School on the preservation movement 
in the early twentieth century and inadvertently referenced the prominence of medieval 
ecclesiastical buildings in the interwar regime of heritage. He also evoked Nicolae Iorga’s role in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
241 Vasile Drăguț (Craiova, 1928 - Bucharest, 1987) was a graduate of the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of 
Bucharest (1946-1949). Throughout his activity, he maintained close relations with the Orthodox clergy, 
contributing to numerous church publications on Orthodox sites of religious practice. He was buried in the 
monastery Râmeți, where he helped discover what is allegedly the earliest evidence (1377) describing the 
organization of the Eastern Church in Transylvania. As head of the Commission in 1972-1977,  he came into 
open conflict with Ceaușescu, whose demolition plans he protested against with Grigore Ionescu, Dionisie 
Pippidi, Dinu Giurescu, Radu Popa and Aurel Trișcu. “Vasile Drăguț,” Revista Monumentelor Istorice 72, no. 1 
(2001-2003). “Prof. Dr. Vasile Drăguț,” Mitropolia Ardealului 33, no. 1 (January-February, 1988). 
242 Aurelian Sacerdoțeanu (Costeşti, 1904 – Bucharest, 1976) was a university professor, medievalist, archivist and 
specialist in the auxiliary fields of history who directed the State Archives in 1938-1953. As heir to the 
Romanian Critical School, he edited and annotated the works of one of the “founding fathers,” Dimitrie Onciul. 
As a medievalist, he contributed to research on the beginnings of Romanian political organization and to the 
archaeological excavations at the monastery of Curtea de Argeș in the 1920s, at which he participated besides D. 
Onciul. See Constantin Moisil’s letter to Aurelian Sacerdoțeanu, 30 May 1946 in Lungu, Corneliu-Mihai et al., 
eds. Aurelian Sacerdoțeanu: Corespondență, 1928-1976 (Bucharest: Arhivele Naționale Române, 2004). Matei, 
Alexandru, “Bibliografia operei profesorului Aurelian Sacerdoţeanu (1922-1974). Partea I. Cărţi, Studii şi 
articole. Izvoare,” Revista Arhivelor 33, no. 4 (1976), 450-456. 
243 Horia Teodoru (Ploiești, 1894 – Bucharest 1976) studied architecture at the Institute of Architecture in Bucharest 
and the École nationale supérieure des Beaux-Arts in Paris, later specializing in urbanism and conservation as a 
fellow at the Romanian Academy in Rome in 1926-1928.  He worked at the Commission of Historical 
Monuments until its dissolution in 1949, when he commenced a teaching career at the Academy of Plastic Arts 
in Bucharest. His work as an architect in the interwar period (Dalles Foundation in Bucharest, among others) 
attests to a modernist style but as a preservationist he devoted significant attention to the restoration of historic 
monuments, especially medieval churches. Dicționarul universal al arhitecților (Bucharest: Editura Științifică și 
Enciclopedică, 1987), 314-315. 
     Other preservationists had published works along these lines throughout the 1960s. See, for instance, Grigore 
Ionescu, “Conservarea și restaurarea monumentelor istorice din țara noastră în anii puterii populare,” Arhitectura 
15, no. 4 (April 1964): 54-58. Gheorghe Curinschi, Restaurarea monumentelor (Bucharest: Editura Tehnică, 
1968). 
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militating for the unaltered (historically authentic) conservation of monuments over and against 
French-inspired methods of creative restoration that involved the aesthetic correction and 
modernization of monuments.244  
A Commission established on such rich legacy also had new duties in the current 
conditions of “our socialist society.” Drăguț explained that the studies, inventories and 
restoration works the Commission completed were not simply “technical” anymore. Instead, by 
giving “the politics of restoration balance and consistency,” the Commission participated “in the 
entire scientific and cultural process” of socialist transformation and was called upon to fulfill 
“an eminently broad-ranging cultural mission.” In the end, despite the differences in the gravity 
of their calling, “the numerous and intimate links” between the pre-socialist and the new 
Commission underscored, in Drăguț’s conclusion, “a certain consensus in the history of modern 
and recent Romanian culture, an awareness shared among generations of learned men in our 
country […] for the inalienable preservation of monuments considered to be concrete testimonies 
of history in their complex reality.”245 
Indications that cultic buildings qualified as remnants of the past entered a final stage in 
1973. In June, Dumitru Popescu, the President of the Council of Culture and Socialist Education, 
submitted a draft for a new decree to the Council of Ministers proposing, among others, to 
amend the language of previous legislation by substituting the generic Soviet-inspired term 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
244 Vasile Drăguț, “Răspunderea unei aniversări,” Buletinul Monumentelor Istorice 41, no. 3 (1972): 3-6. In terms of 
basic interventionist theories in heritage, Iorga and other Romanian preservationists in his time rejected the 
school of the French restorer Eugène Emmanuel Viollet-le-Duc (1814 – 1879), for whom restoration meant "to 
reestablish [a building] to a finished state, which may in fact never have actually existed at any given time." 
Instead, they appear to have sided with British conservationist John Ruskin (1819-1900) and Italian architect and 
art historian Camillo Boito (1836-1914), who enunciated the thesis of “historic restoration,” advocating the 
historical study of the monument in the interest of “authentic” conservation, which allegedly kept intact the 
monument’s evolution through history. Gheorghe Curinschi, Restaurarea monumentelor, 13-23. 
245 Drăguț, “Răspunderea unei aniversări,” 3. 
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“monuments of culture” with “historical monuments,” a term “traditional in Romanian and 
international legislation.”246 Popescu’s proposal had important implications for medieval 
ecclesiastical buildings because it intimated their juridical re-categorization from “monuments of 
architecture” to “historic monuments.”247 Although approved by several organs of the state, the 
Council of Ministers appears to have deemed the adoption of such a legislative measure 
premature given the new inventory underway. Following law 64/1969, the Council for Culture 
and Socialist Education (former Committee for Culture), the National Archives and the National 
Bank were already engaged in a nation-wide effort to detect and record all movable and 
immovable artifacts of national interest in a centralized registry.248 Notwithstanding the delay, 
the legislation on national patrimony that emerged at the conclusion of this inventory used the 
terminology Popescu’s draft suggested. Re-signified as “historic monuments,” cultic buildings 
proceeded as a result from the ambiguous margins to the center of socialist heritage, being now 
on par with archeological sites, lay feudal structures and socialist memorials.249  
In fact, this new law on national patrimony signaled the end of a cycle in the life of 
monasteries. The law marked their gradual and convoluted transition from being “beacons of 
legionary activity” that corrupted the socialist project in the 1950s to the lieux de memoire of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
246 AMCPN, Direcția Economică – Oficiul Juridic, File 4723/1972, “Expunere de motive [H.C.M. privind declararea 
ca monumente istorice a unor obiecte arheologice, de arhitectură, artă plastică și memoriale], f. 4. 
247  This list was subsequently amended by the Decision no. 1619 of the Council of Ministers dated 3 October 1957 
and in 1963 another revision commenced, being concluded only in 1974 with the publication of the new law on 
patrimony (Decree 63/1974). ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 27/1977, 
f. 9-10. So far, I have not come across the two lists for the purposes of comparison. 
248 These included artifacts of artistic, historical or documentary value as well as precious metals and stones. “Legea 
nr. 64/1969 pentru aprobarea Decretului 724/1969 privind protejarea și păstrarea bunurilor de interes național ce 
reprezintă valori artistice, istorice sau documentare, precum și a unor obiecte conținând metale prețioase și pietre 
prețioase de valoare deosebită,” Buletinul Oficial no. 148 (19 December 1969).  
249 “Legea nr. 63 din 20 octombrie 1974 privind ocrotirea patrimoniului cultural național al Republicii Socialiste 
România,” Buletinul Oficial, no. 137 (2 November 1974). 
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1970s central for socialism’s attainment. It is not surprising in this context that, at the juncture of 
its dismantling in November 1977, the Department of Historical Monuments (reorganized in 
1974 as the Central State Commission of National Cultural Patrimony) reported to Ceaușescu the 
restoration of seventy-nine ecclesiastical buildings compared to sixty-two civic structures.250 As 
the Department of Agitation and Propaganda noted, the underlying criteria for these restorations 
had been “the cultural-artistic importance of the site, its significance as a historical document 
attesting the existence and continuity of the Romanian people, the urgency and difficulty of 
intervention, the need to include the entire territory of the country in restoration and […] the 
rational use of restored sites as economic, cultural-didactic and touristic destinations.”251 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
250 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 27/1977, f. 12-13. The actual report 
mistakenly indicates seventy-one ecclesiastical structures, whereas the detailed lists appended confirm seventy-
nine.  See ibid, Annex 1, f. 14-62. 
251 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, 27/1977, “Notă privind activitatea de 
restaurare a monumentelor istorice, precum și modalitatea de realizare (istorie),” f. 11. 
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               Total  62 119,305,864 79 100.297.395 141 219,603,259 7 84 50 
1 Bucharest  8 12,396,024 3 2,192,698 11 14,588,722 - 8 3 
2 Alba 2 2,575,334 6 6,286,369 8 8,861,703 1 5 2 
3 Arad 1 2,907.000 - - 1 2,907,000 1 - - 
4 Argeș 1 576.171 6 6.905.000 7  - 2 5 
5 Bacău 2 1,829,358 - - 2 1,829,358 - 2 - 
6 Bihor - - 3 1,575,669 3 1,575,669 - - 3 
7 Bistrița-
Năsăud 
2 2,590,835 1 150,000 3 2,740,835 1 2 - 
8 Brașov 3 12,894,010 2 9,768,207   2 1 2 
9 Buzău 1 980,815 - - 1 980,815 - 1 - 
10 Cluj 3 2.502.409 13 6.316.963 16 8.819.372 - 10 6 
11 Constanta 6 23,216,087 1 416,880 7 23.632.967 - 6 1 
12 Dâmbovița 2 7,708,105 2 1,038,966 4 8,747,071 - 3 1 
13 Galați 1 48.528 - - 1 48,528 1 - - 
14 Gorj 2 1,903.094 2 837.178 4 2,740,272 - 4 - 
15 Harghita - - 1 184,808 1 184,808 - - 1 
16 Hunedoara 1 5,697,608 2 664,357 3 6,361,965 - 2 1 
17 Iași 4 6,440,675 7 14,619,041 11 21,059,716 - 8 3 
18 Ilfov 1 3,663,695 2 1,108,681 3 4,772,376 - 1 2 
19 Maramureș 1 188,232 4 1,793,167 5 1,981,399 - 3 2 
20 Mehedinți 4 6,165,199 1 2,349,967 5 8,515,166 - 4 1 
21 Mureș 2 9,792,726 3 460,767 5 10,253,493 - 2 3 
22 Neamț 1 4,457,561 4 13,497,454 5 17,955,015 - 1 4 
23 Olt - - 1 759,000 1 759,000 - 1 - 
24 Prahova 2 857,313 1 536,173 3 1,393,486 - 2 1 
25 Sălaj - - 1 111,616 1 111,616 - 1 - 
26 Sibiu 3 1,371,455 2 915,942 5 2,287,397 - 4 1 
27 Suceava 4 4,208,527 10 26,249,492 14 30,458,019 - 6 8 
28 Timiș 1 1,573,418 - - 1 1,573,418 1 - - 
29 Vâlcea 3 1,032,106 - - 3 1,032,106 - 3 - 
30 Vrancea 1  1 1,559,000 2 3,288,579 - 2 - 
Table 3. Monuments restored in 1960-1977. ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898,  
                File 27/1977, f. 14-16. 
 
Popular Consumption 
Ceausescu’s speech at the 9th Party Congress and his tour of the regions in 1966 elicited 
great enthusiasm especially from the urban sections of society.  Answering his call for popular 
contributions to the commemoration “of our historic past,” amateur writers flooded state 
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publishers with poems, novels, epics, and other patriotic literary works of historical 
inspiration.252  Publishing houses and houses for “popular art” (casele creației populare) rejected 
a bulk of these pieces on account that they were ideologically questionable, not “at the level of 
today’s readers” or did not meet the aesthetic requirements of “literary composition and style.”253 
But citizens also turned to the socialist press, mainly Scînteia and România Liberă, the State 
Committee for Culture and Arts (Ministry of Culture before 1963, Council for Socialist Culture 
and Education after 1970) or even to Ceaușescu himself. Relying on the well-established 
socialist genres of public-letter writing, they often petitioned for the publication of biographies of 
national heroes. Or, they solicited tourist guides, brochures and postcards of historic monuments, 
including monasteries. On other occasions, citizens argued for the historic and touristic value of 
historical buildings and lobbied for funds towards restorations often assuming a critical tone 
towards the official politics of heritage.254 Most of these authors were men, who identified  
themselves as members of local people’s councils, parishioners, priests, veterans, retirees or  
 
 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
252 AMCPN, Biroul de reclamații și sesizări, File 22655/1966, f. 221-226, 245, 321, 336; AMCPN, Consiliul pentru 
Răspândirea Culturii și Științei, File 25435/1966, f. 98 verso. 
253 AMCPN, Biroul de reclamații și sesizări, File 22655/1966, f. 200, 211-216.  The Committee’s archive did not 
preserve these manuscripts, making it difficult to reconstruct in-depth the editors’ and censors’ broad ideological 
and aesthetic considerations or the authors’ discursive engagement with cultural politics.  
254 On the genres of citizen’s letters see Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Supplicants and Citizens: Public Letter-Writing in 
Soviet Russia in the 1930s,” Slavic Review 55, no. 1 (Spring 1996):78-105.  
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workers.255  
Ceaușescu’s appropriation of monasteries as sites of patriotic education and socialist 
tourism encouraged this outpouring of public interest. So did experts from county museums who 
educated ordinary citizens about the historic significance of civic and cultic monuments in their 
region in local dailies.256 Later on, the 1974 law on patrimony consecrated “the constitution, 
care, studying and the public circulation of national cultural patrimony” as part of the patriotic 
duty of every citizen. Such acts were to be “expressions of the working people’s new, socialist 
consciousness, [and manifestations] of new social relations in our society.”257  
  Most writers took pains to present themselves as socialist patriots, relating their 
devotion in a vivid emotional language that rehearsed the official emphasis on monasteries as 
testimonies of the nation’s secular past and sites of attraction for ordinary citizens, international 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
255 The sample for this section include about a dozen letters from citizens, local people’s councils and parishes culled 
from the archives of the Ministry of Culture and National Patrimony.  I found most letters in the collections of 
the Office for Notifications and Complaints (Biroul de reclamații și sesizări, or in short Biroul sesizări) and of 
the Department for Museums and Monuments. (Departamentul pentru Muzee și Monumente). The relevant ones 
for this chapter were in files 4190/1965, 22653/1966, 22655/1966, 22656/1966, 25435/1966, 4407/1968, 
4462/1969, 4465/1969, 4463/1969, 4498/1969, 4526/1969. My sample may be biased in favor of letters that 
lobbied for the care of monasteries and churches because the archives of the Ministry of Culture from the 
socialist period lack inventories. Most often I pulled files off the shelf or picked them up from the cement floor 
because the writing on their spine indicated that they contained citizens’ letters. Others I came across by chance 
in the collections of various departments dealing with monuments and museums, the plastic arts, or among the 
files of the Council for the Dissemination of Culture and Science (Consiliul pentru Răspândirea Culturii și 
Științei).   
     Because the letters I have found fall exclusively within the years of 1965-1969, commonly understood as a time 
of limited liberalization, this period is overrepresented here. Some of the letters, not mentioned here, included 
petitions for the construction of secular monuments to the nation or the care of folk monuments (houses and 
other structures from villages), especially Files 4190/1965, 22656/1966, 4519/1969. It is impossible to know how 
many letters ended up at the different branches of the Ministry and what portion of these dealt directly with 
monasteries and heritage.  Quantitative data on the basis of which I could speak of their statistical distribution in 
terms of time periods and geographic origins has not been compiled. Nor, have I encountered sources that 
indicate the average rate of daily letters received at the Ministry.  
256 An example for an annual digest of articles published on this topic in the counties is at AMCPN, Direcția 
Muzeelor și Monumentelor, File 4407/1968, vol. II, esp. f. 244-245. 
257 “Legea nr. 63 din 30 octombrie 1974 privind ocrotirea patrimoniului cultural național,” Buletinul Oficial nr. 137 
(2 November 1974), Art. 5. 
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tourists, and artists. On the occasion of the five-hundred-year anniversary of Putna’s construction 
in July 1966, Ion Părpală, a worker from Urziceni, Bucharest region appealed to the SCCA’s 
Department for Publishers, proposing the publication of a monograph on Stephen the Great’s 
over forty historical monuments “in great numbers.” Although barely known by many, Părpală 
observed, these “great artistic and cultural achievements of the fifteenth and sixteenth century 
were a rich fountain of inspiration for artists and intellectuals from the country and abroad.” “I 
think of the art at [the monasteries of] Voroneț, Putna, Dragomirna, Sucevița, Moldovița, and 
Neamțu […] that mirror the age-old art and culture of our people to the entire world.” Părpală 
suggested, therefore, that a council of specialists publish a monograph “accompanied with ample 
photographs, sketches, [and] paintings” to popularize these monuments across the country’s 
borders as “a matter of national pride.”258 
 In his letter to the President of SCCA Pompiliu Macovei, Stere Ciobotaru, a retired 
lawyer from Craiova, established his credentials as a socialist patriot by summarizing the official 
politics of heritage. He enumerated his sojourns to the country’s monuments through the 
National Tourist Office, admitting that his desire for the uplifting sight of monuments of nature, 
socialist cities and Moldovan monasteries could not be quenched. For these reasons, Ciobotaru 
reminded Macovei, “the competent organs had to be actively concerned in every county with the 
enhancement of such sites and the attraction tourists from home and abroad.” In the hope of 
“cultivating a sentiment of care for historic monuments and tourism in the county of Vrancea,” 
he petitioned the president to re-open four monasteries that were closed in 1959 as part of the 
state offensive against Orthodox monasticism. Evoking the end to hostilities between the feudal 
rulers of Moldova and Muntenia, Matei Basarab (1558-1654) and Vasile Lupu (1595-1661), 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 AMCPN, Biroul de reclamații și sesizări, File 22655/1966, f. 194. 
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Stere argued that these monuments marked a historical moment in the making of the Romanian 
nation. The monastery of Vărzărești, in particular, he added, did not even need costly repairs and 
“a couple of monks could take care of its maintenance.”259  
The Orthodox village priest Radu Dăscălescu from Suceava county similarly invoked the 
historic significance and artistic value of three local cultic buildings. Erected by Moldovan 
rulers, these apparently enjoyed great popularity among domestic and foreign tourists. The 
Department of Cults and the Committee for Culture and the Arts needed to employ a guide who 
could enlighten visitors about the aesthetic and historical value of these monuments, Dăscălescu 
argued. Also, while the “church of Petru Rareș” (b. 1532) had electricity and “was well-liked by 
visitors,” the Roman Catholic Church of Alexander the Good (b. 1421) lay in ruins and funds 
were necessary for its consolidation. More importantly, the White Church of Stephen the Great, 
“a monument of great historical importance for our people and an edifice of great art,” needed 
lighting. Dăscălescu pleaded with Macovei: “We come to [you] Mister Minister to ask you to be 
so kind and grant us help with approximately 15,000 lei, a sum with which we can introduce 
electric light so that visitors do not leave the monument without admiring it in its full 
splendor.”260  
Parishioners also approached the Committee to ask for assistance in recovering religious 
artifacts from other churches and monasteries. Thus, Constantin Crăciun and Constantin Nichita 
from the village of Văleni near Piatra Neamț wrote to the ministry requesting that it give orders 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
259 AMCPN, Direcția Muzeelor și Monumentelor: Reclamații, sesizări ale oamenilor muncii, File 4529/1969, f. 40-
41. The three additional monasteries were Soveja, Dalhăuți, and Cotești. 
260 AMCPN, Direcția Muzeelor și Monumentelor, File 4462/1969, f. 78. Victor-Dan Kisilevici, “Operațiuni de 
conservare la Biserica Sf. Gheorghe - Biserica Albă din Baia, județul Suceava” in Monumentul: Lucrările celui 
de-al IV-lea Simpozion “Monumentul. Tradiție și viitor” at http://monumentul.ro/monumentul/?page_id=2553 
(last accessed 3 July 2016). 
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to the monasteries of Bistrița, Bisericani, Agapia, Văratec and the Bishopric of Iași to return 
more than a hundred icons attributed to the distinguished iconographic school of Văleni, which 
had functioned there during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The village’s pride, the 
parishioners admitted, the icons were to be exhibited in the newly established historical museum. 
These mirrors of “our glorious past” attested the bravery and patriotism of local people, whose 
vigilance protected these relics from the destruction of foreign invaders. “The [people’s] council 
paved roads for us, erected edifices, gave us electricity and a school with sixteen teachers,” 
Crăciun and Nichita wrote, suggesting that a museum with such national patrimony concluded 
the socialist transformation of the village.261  
On other occasions citizens called on party leaders to compete with the cultic heritage of 
national minorities and to popularize a past that emphasized the imperial suppression of 
Romanian national aspirations only to underscore their eventual triumph. In August 1965, for 
example, Ion Receanu, a retiree from Alba Iulia addressed a letter to Ceaușescu himself. He 
expressed his delight with the First Secretary’s “courageous affirmations” in front of the 9th 
Congress and in front of foreign representatives “regarding the inalienable and indivisible [sic!] 
rights of socialist Romania.” “Regardless of how healthy our social origins is,” Reuceanu 
continued, “we cannot deny that we are a noble people, […] a people endowed with many 
qualities because in a short while we could realize such grand achievements in our country with 
the wise guidance of the Party.”  
Reuceanu went on to utter a desperate plea for the hallmarking of “our national 
patrimony” in the city. He was concerned with the numerous tourists, who passing through the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261 While the systematization of villages acquired notoriety in the late 1970s and 1980s, Ceaușescu had already 
announced the transformation of rural settlements through economic planning and socialist architecture at the 
National Party Conference in 1966.  
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historic city, “besides the canalization from Roman times,” saw only “only very faintly marked 
historical monuments from our national patrimony.” Instead, he observed “they see a fortress 
built by the Austro-Hungarians [sic!] […] and a grand Roman-Catholic church, in which our 
compatriots [Hungarians] take great pride claiming that it is 800 years old.” To amend this 
situation, Reuceanu was of the opinion that a statue of Mihai the Brave be erected at the north 
gate – in front of the Roman-Catholic Episcopal cathedral where the ruler had entered the Alba 
Iulia fortress. Additionally, he called Ceaușescu’s attention to the small bust of Lady Stanca, 
Mihai Viteazu’s wife, in Făgăraș, asking that it be hallmarked since it indicated “the place where 
she had been imprisoned after [the Habsburg general] Basta killed Mihai.”262  
One of the most idiosyncratic letters came from Ioan Tăutu. A self-described “poor son 
of the people” and a veteran of the Second World War living in Oradea, he wrote Macovei a 
letter that blended the genres of self-denunciation and petition.263 Having enlisted to “liberate our 
Fatherland from the fascist yoke,” Tăutu confessed to his royalist sentiments and his service on 
the eastern front during the war, while weaving himself an identity as an anti-fascist patriot with 
pro-Russian sentiments. His reason for approaching the minister was “the icon of August 23.” 
Tăutu had commissioned this artifact at great financial cost after his return from the front in 
order to commemorate the country’s “liberation” by Soviet troops, his experience during the war, 
and his love for “the freed Romanian people.”264 With the former king represented amidst the 
natural beauties of his home region, working class housing and the village in his home village, 
the icon also contained a text in which Tăutu sang praise to the liberated mountains, the people’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
262 AMCPN, Propuneri pentru deschideri de noi muzee, File 4190/1965, f.59-60. 
263 AMCPN, Biroul de reclamații și sesizări, File 22653/1966, f. 74-77. 
264 Tăutu claimed that it took him two years, until 1947, to pay off the icon from his salary and he even had to sell 
his clothes. 
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folk songs and art, and the wooden churches of Transylvania. Having seen the collections of 
artifacts from monasteries across the country in the Museum of Religious Art at the Palace of the 
Republic, Tăutu pleaded with the Committee and the Department of Museums and monuments to 
recover the icon from his village church and exhibit it in one of the newly established 
museums.265 Not commissioned “out of interest” but because of his love for August 23, the icon 
“honored socialism and the entire Romanian people,” Tăutu argued, and would bring leaders 
prestige beyond the borders. 
In line with the paternalism of other socialist states, the officials of the Romanian party-
state encouraged such public letter writing as a means to ensuring citizens’ political literacy and 
participation in the building of socialism. The frequent appeal to leaders as guardians of the 
nation in these letters also enforced their sense of legitimacy and their idea of the essentially  
democratic nature of state socialism.266 Accordingly, the editorial councils and the Department of 
Historical Monuments, where public letters often arrived, honored such inquiries and requests. 
They crafted detailed replies about publication plans and introduced new titles on the list. Thus, 
within a month to receiving his suggestion to publish a monograph on the monasteries erected by 
Stephen the Great, the SCCA informed Părpălă that the state publisher Meridiane had already 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265 The Museum of Religious Art functioned at the time in the church inside the former royal residence, Cotroceni 
Palace. It is unclear when it was actually opened. Tăutu’s letter contradicts the official history of the church 
displayed on the website of the Romanian Presidency, which dates the opening of the museum to 1968. See 
www.presidency.ro/?_RID=b_prezentare&exp6=biserica (last accessed 20 June 2014). 
266 Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as Civilization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 
esp. chapter 5. Sheila Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Lives in Extraordinary Times (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 176-177. Tear Off the Masks! Identity and Imposture in Twentieth Century 
Russia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), esp. chapter 9. Lewish H. Siegelbaum, “’Dear Comrade, 
You Asked What We Needed’: Socialist Paternalism and Soviet ‘Rural’ Notables,” Slavic Review 57, no. 1 
(Spring 1998): 107-132.  
      According to Ferenc Fehér, paternalism had meaning because this type of “charismatic legitimation” went hand-
in-hand with repression. See "Paternalism as a Mode of Legitimation in Soviet-Type Societies," in T. H. Rigby 
and Ferenc Fehér, eds., Political Legitimation in Communist States (London: Macmillan, 1982), 66-67. 
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brought out a couple of monographs on these monasteries in its popularizing series “Pocket 
Guides to Historic Monuments.” Furthermore, the Academy had published in 1964 an ample 
scholarly collection entitled Moldovan Culture during Stephen the Great and the first volume of 
History of Romanian Art, scheduled to appear in 1967, was to have an entire section on these 
monuments as well. Notwithstanding such titles, the SCCA assured Părpăla that the 
comprehensive monograph he suggested would be transmitted to Meridiane to be included in 
future publication plans.267   
When there was popular request, the different divisions under the aegis of the State 
Committee for Culture and the Arts (henceforth SCCA) also launched inquiries into the state of 
monasteries and religious artifacts and decided upon citizens’ solicitations regarding restorations. 
Reuceanu’s pleas for the erection of a statue marking Mihai the Great’s conquest of Alba Iulia 
were very well received. In a couple of months, he received a response announcing him of the 
official decision to erect the proposed monument, which was unveiled in November 1968 at the 
semi-centennial anniversary of Transylvania’s unification with Romania.268 The Committee also 
sent a delegate to locate Tăutu’s icon of August 23 but since it could not be found at the church 
of his home village where he had donated the artifact, Tăutu’s proposal could not be resolved.269  
Public letters to high officials did not always secure the desired result. Thus, Ciubotaru’s 
request to re-open monasteries that commemorated the end of conflict between Romanian 
principalities seemed unpalatable to a regime that increasingly read the nation’s ethnogenesis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
267 The volume authored by two medievalists was published by Meridiane two years later. See Nicolae Grigoraș and 
Ioan Caproșu, Biserici și mănăstiri vechi din Moldova până la mijlocul veacului al XV-lea (Bucharest: 
Meridiane, 1968). 
268 AMCPN, Propuneri pentru deschideri de noi muzee, expoziții, File 4190/1965, f. 61. 
269 AMCPN, Biroul de reclamații și sesizări, File 22653/1966, f. 80. 
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back to times immemorial and stressed the organic unity and brotherly love at the heart of 
national being.  As a result, the three monasteries remained closed for public visits throughout 
the socialist period.  A museum in Văleni that did not commemorate secular national heroes but 
was to pay tribute to national history through icons was also not what the regime had in mind at a 
time when villages seemed the last frontier to be incorporated into the body-politic of the 
socialist state.270 The Committee similarly denied funds for the electrification of the White 
Church, as a result of which Dăscălescu, the Orthodox priest, introduced electricity with the help 
of workers from the Electric Networks Plant without the knowledge of the local delegate at the 
Department of Monuments and Museums.271 
While public letters were purposefully crafted for a specific audience, these sources 
allowed scholars elsewhere to reconstruct citizens’ world views and trace how official discourse 
shaped popular mentalities. In the process, such studies observed not only citizens’ acquisition of 
political literacy, their creative re-workings of authoritative scripts, and their ideological 
transgressions but also noted how public letters allowed officials to reassert and clarify the 
ideological boundaries of state socialism. My close reading of citizens’ epistolary exchanges 
with the state exemplify the various degrees to which ordinary people re-produced some key 
elements of official rhetoric, most notably the emphasis on monasteries as secular sites of 
national memory, patriotic education and tourism. However, these letters also indicate that what 
citizens construed to be officially acceptable interpretations of relics and monuments was 
sometimes quite idiosyncratic. In some cases, the Committee could still deem artifacts like 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
270 Although the re-fashioning of villages according to state socialist ideals acquired notoriety especially in the late 
1970s and 1980s, Ceaușescu had launched the new phase already in 1966 at the National Congress. 
271 Victor-Dan Kisilevici, “Operațiuni de conservare la Biserica Sf. Gheorghe - Biserica Albă din Baia, județul 
Suceava” in Monumentul: Lucrările celui de-al IV-lea Simpozion “Monumentul. Tradiție și viitor” at 
http://monumentul.ro/monumentul/?page_id=2553 (last accessed 3 July 2016). 
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Tăutu’s icon as worthy of recovery while it excluded others - the three monasteries in Vrancea 
and the museum of icons in Văleni - that pressed more forcefully against the confines of socialist 
heritage. Notwithstanding their value for studying popular engagement with official language, 
citizens’ epistolary exchanges with the party-state do not reveal whether they appreciated 
monasteries as sites of religious practice or sacred nationhood. It is safe to assume that these 
letter writers exercised self-censorship, omitting arguments they suspected to be officially 
objectionable, and they strove instead to present themselves as citizens with a socialist 
consciousness.  
The story of how church-monuments became part of “perfect socialist heritage” 
highlights how religion came to be promoted as a treasured past in late socialist Romania. As this 
chapter showed, during the on-set of de-Sovietization in the early 1960s, official circles 
recognized the centrality of religion in Cold War politics and wished to emphasize their openness 
and uniqueness in the socialist camp both to domestic and foreign audiences. As a result, Dej had 
put an end to the anti-clericalism of his earlier years, and political commitment to “scientific-
atheist enlightenment” within the regime’s broader civilizing agenda had progressively 
weakened. Party leaders also relied heavily on the Orthodox Church in foreign policy to assure 
an economic and political opening towards the west. Meanwhile, initial attempts to elevate cultic 
monuments in socialist heritage indicated an official desire to obtain support from believers at 
home.  
Despite his efforts to deny the umbilical cord that bound him to the previous regime, 
Ceaușescu amplified these aspects of cultural diplomacy and symbolic politics after 1965. Thus, 
churches became sites of official memory, patriotic education, and international tourism because 
assigning positive historical value to cultic heritage and, by extension, Orthodoxy, was 
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instrumental for buttressing the new regime’s legitimacy both at home and abroad. This strategy 
produced a number of distinct, yet related, results. On the one hand, as citizens’ letters attest the 
decisive shifts in the politics of heritage during the late 1960s helped shore up widespread 
popular enthusiasm for a new party leadership that was recognized as ”the guardian of the 
nation,” in marked distinction from the Dej regime. It also enabled previously marginalized 
interwar experts who had viewed churches as the key category of national monuments to re-
emerge at the center of socialist heritage-making after decades of lobbying for their own 
resources and professional interests. In this sense then, this chapter demonstrates that we cannot 
understand the domestic opposition from ordinary citizens and preservationists that Ceaușescu’s 
demolition of church-monuments elicited in the 1980s without analyzing how the regime had 
ironically created conditions for such a broad response. On the other hand, as Chapter Four will 
demonstrate, the official embrace of cultic buildings also provided an impetus for the renewal of 
the atheist project in the late 1960s. While in the official view medieval monasteries were to 
instill socialist citizens with a quintessentially secular understanding of the past, the atheist 
ideological establishment soon pointed out that the circulation of church-monuments as national 
symbols in socialist publications and tourism contributed to an upsurge in popular religiosity. 
Reports noted that ordinary citizens and the lower party ranks often seemed to reach the 
conclusion that the state endorsed religious practice. This realization, I argue, helped trigger 
numerous sweeping inquiries into popular religiosity, which in turn strengthened the need for the 
ideological re-evaluation of atheist education and also contributed to the regime’s anti-religious 
iconoclasm after 1977. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
CEAUȘESCU’S THAW AND RELIGIOSITY: 
THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE CONSIDERS ATHEISM, 1965-1974 
 
During Nicolae Ceaușescu’s short-lived liberalization and at the climax of his massive 
popularity worldwide, the Central Committee showed a fresh desire to overcome popular 
religiosity for the sake of atheist convictions. Ceaușescu himself announced the need for 
continued “militant attitude” against “outdated mentalities” at the 9th Congress in July 1965.273 
As Radio Free Europe later observed, the official desire to “normalize atheism” was clearly 
indicated in the 1965 Constitution by provisions guaranteeing citizens’ right “not to profess any 
religion.”274   
This chapter explores the revived interest to overcome faith starting from the late 1960s. 
Although apparently contradictory, the regime’s commitment to eradicate faith alongside the 
political and symbolic instrumentalization of churches discussed in the previous chapter were 
part of the same effort to manage the meaning and course of Romanian socialism.  To reveal 
shifts in official approaches towards atheism, this chapter explores efforts to renew the atheist 
drive in 1965-1974 in the context of the broader ideological transformations of the early 
Ceausescu era. I show that, while the party-state’s anti-religious commitment constituted a 
response to the dynamics of religious life during the thaw and also emanated from the regime’s 
anxiety to maintain ideological control, the transformation of atheism in the 1970s was made 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
273 Congresul al IX-lea al Partidului Comunist Român, 19-24 iulie 1965 (Bucharest: Editura Politică, 1965), 93. 
ANIC, Fond C.C. al PCR, Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 38/1966, f. 25. 
274 Open Society Archives, Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications 
Department, HU OSA 300-8-47-187-16, "Situation Report: Romania, 14 October 1970", 14 October 1970, 9. 
This was a significant departure from previous constitutions. While the 1948 Constitution guaranteed “the 
freedom of conscience and the freedom of religion” (Art.27), its 1952 version provided only for “the freedom of 
conscience” (Art.84). By comparison, art. 30 of the 1965 Constitution stipulated that “anyone was free to profess 
or not to profess a religion.”  
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possible by official openness to revisionist Marxism. Indeed, the opportunity to depart from the 
vulgar Orthodox Marxist perspectives on religion that characterized the Dej era allowed atheist 
experts to stress that Marxist-Leninist theory did not give accurate explanations for the 
persistence of belief or provide directions for how to disenchant socialist society.  Such 
arguments proved pivotal, in turn, for ushering in a new cohort of specialized cadres and 
preparing the way for the quintessential transformation of atheist work during the Ceaușescu era 
– the subject of Chapter Four.  
One of the most interesting questions about religion and ideology in this period is why 
the regime became invested in the atheist enterprise at the height of political liberalization in 
Romania. As the previous chapter noted, the death of Gheorghe-Gheorghiu Dej provided 
opportunities for the new regime to appropriate and intensify the moderate policies that had 
come to characterize relations between the Orthodox Church and the state after the last 
antireligious campaign in 1958-1961. Reliance on the church’s foreign connections and the 
treasuring of religion as the national past constituted means for obtaining political and financial 
support from ”the west” and for shoring up popular allegiance at home. This attitude was 
extended to the main minority confessions for added reasons: to establish the regime’s liberalism 
in terms of nationality policy and, at the same time, to underscore national sovereignty over 
ethnically heterogeneous areas such as Transylvania – especially in front of foreign visitors.  
In light of this pragmatic approach to religion, then, one of the objectives of this chapter 
is to clarify the relationship between two aspects of the regime’s secularizing project: anti-
clerical policy and atheism. As I demonstrate, the Ceaușescu regime’s efforts to exhibit a certain 
care for religious institutions and their built heritage was deceptive and should not be mistaken 
for an ideological reconciliation between communism and religion. What changed by the early 
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1970s was not the objective to overcome religion but the approach by which to do it. Indeed, 
whereas anti-clerical policy and atheist education were fellow travellers up to the early 1960s, a 
decade later these two components of the anti-religious endeavor diverged. They came together 
again only in the 1980s, at the height of re-Stalinization.   
 
The Thaw 
Ceaușescu’s emergence as the party’s Secretary General on 22 March 1965, three days 
after his predecessor’s death, inaugurated watershed transformations in every aspect of socialist 
life. His assertion at the 9th Party Congress that the party’s mission was to raise the Romanian 
people “higher to the pinnacle of socialism, well-fare, and happiness” soon ushered in a period of 
“good life.”275 Indeed, the People’s Republic appeared to have ripened into an “autochtonous 
socialism.” The national past and sentiment were back. Passports were more readily available. 
The cultural and physical frontiers towards “the west” slowly opened up. Consumption became 
more luxurious, socializing and cultural life more effervescent, and a brighter future seemed 
finally within the grasp of ordinary citizens.276  
While pursuing a consumer thaw and civic contentment, the regime also showed a novel 
interest in enlivening of ideology. Ceaușescu’s contention at the 9th Congress that the Marxist-
Leninist forefathers did not foresee all the obstacles to socialist construction constituted a call for 
Marxism as “a live science.”277 His statement that each communist party had to adapt ideology to 
the social realities particular to their country echoed Marxist revisionist ideas about the need to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
275 Nicolae Ceaușescu,”Raportul C.C. al P.C.R.,” in Congresul al IX-lea al Partidului Comunist, 22.  
276 Dragoș Petrescu, “Closely Watched Tourism: The Securitate as Warden of Transnational Encounters, 1967-9,” 
Journal of Contemporary History 50, no. 2 (Summer 2015): 337-353.  
277 Ceaușescu, ”Raportul,” 90.  
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depart from Stalinist norms in the interest of democratization. The desire to reframe ideological 
issues was palpable with the temporary marginalization of Leonte Răutu, the grey-eminence of 
agitation and propaganda since 1948. Repeated denunciation of “ossified” (Soviet) dogma also 
enveloped party meetings at all levels.278 This new line was unmistakable by 1968. The Central 
Committee embarked namely on the political rehabilitation of Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu, Teohari 
Georgescu, Ana Pauker, and others – former R.C.P. activists, who had been condemned 
allegedly in violation of socialist legality under Dej. It was also in this pivotal year that 
Ceaușescu declared sympathy towards the Czechoslovak leadership at the moment of the 
Warsaw Pact invasion.  
Ceaușescu’s speeches and the new party resolutions signaled intellectual destalinization 
and the departure from bureaucratic administrative methods as well. Besides legality, socialist 
democracy, and national sovereignty, cultural and political education gained emphasis. Party 
documents likewise stressed the need to go beyond the formalism and campaign-like character of 
ideological activities. In its  “Recommendations for the Improvement of Mass Political Work,” 
the Department of Agitation and Propaganda rebuked party organizations for conducting 
propaganda almost exclusively “at the indication of central party organs,” with no apparent party 
discipline or commitment.279 During the numerous control visits, local communists also came 
under fire from the Orgburo for insufficient ideological preparation, economic misconduct, and 
the lack of comradely behavior.280 In fact, Paul Niculescu-Mizil, secretary of the Central 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
278 Cristian Vasile and Vladimir Tismăneanu, Perfectul acrobat: Leonte Răutu, măștile răului (Bucharest: 
Humanitas, 2008), 98-99. 
279 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 52/1966, f. 22.  
280 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Organizatorică, inv. 2781, File 7/1966, f. 86-87, File 50/1966, f. 143-146, File 
57/1966, File 35/1967, f. 142-146. 
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Committee reminded regional party secretaries in November 1966 that, since little work had 
been done to enlighten the masses in problems of morality, ethics, behavior and everyday life, 
the inculcation of civic-moral values became a new priority in the party’s overall education 
work.281 As Katherine Verdery writes, this renewed preoccupation with the beliefs and behavior 
of socialist citizens evidenced that, besides coercion, ideological persuasion became the 
trademark of late socialism in Romania.282 
At the same time, in keeping with the regime’s Stalinist commitments, Romanian official 
circles were anxious over retaining the ideological reins. The Central Committee soon 
institutionalized party control with the creation of a separate Ideological Commission, the role of 
which was to streamline activity in ideology, political education and culture.283 To ensure 
ideological control, the regime likewise mobilized tremendous resources and rearranged 
institutions as well as the highest party ranks.284 From his loyal supporters Ceaușescu promptly 
established the Executive Committee and the Permanent Presidium, the new decision-making 
bodies of the Central Committee.285 Party leaders decided to enliven youth education about 
conduct in society and the family by thoroughly reforming the methods and organization of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
281 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 43/1966, “Stenograma întâlnirii din 
14-16 noiembrie 1966 cu secretarii comitetelor regionale de partid care se ocupă cu problemele ideologice,” f. 
206. 
282 Katherine Verdery, What Was Socialism and What Comes Next? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 
41-42. As Gail Kligman argued, the law of 1966 banning abortion was the clearest indication of the regime’s 
interest in controlling the individual body of citizens and the private sphere of family. Gail Kligman, The Politics 
of Duplicity: Controlling Reproduction in Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 22.   
283 Adam Burakowski, Dictatura lui Nicolae Ceaușescu, 1965-1989 (Iași: Polirom, 2011), 103. 
284 As Burakowski notes, these institutional reforms were particularly significant because during the Dej period there 
were no dramatic changes in state administration, only “corrections.” Burakowski, Dictatura lui Ceaușescu, 184. 
285 Mihnea Berindei, Dorin Dobrincu and Armand Goșu, Istoria comunismului din România, vol. 2: Nicolae 
Ceaușescu – Documente, 1965-1989 (Iași: Polirom, 2012), 6. For the revitalization of pioneer activity in 1966-
1967, see ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Cancelarie, inv. 2574, Files 27/1966, 44/1966, and 169/1967.  
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Communist Youth Union and the Organization of Pioneers.286 These efforts also extended to 
institutions of repression, the cultural establishment, and the academia. As Dennis Deletant 
writes, the rehabilitation of the Pătrășcanu lot prepared the way for the reassertion of party 
control over the Ministry of the Internal Affairs and the Securitate. Under the banner of the need 
to extend “socialist legality,” both institutions were drawn under a measure of judicial 
supervision and their former head Alexandru Drãghici, Ceaușescu’s key rival, was removed from 
his various positions in the Central Committee.”287 By 1970, the preoccupation with ideological 
discipline also involved the Committee for Culture, which was reorganized as the Council for 
Socialist Education and Culture.  The Romanian Academy suffered a serious blow the same year. 
All of its institutions in the social and human sciences were transferred to the newly established 
Academy of Socio-Political Sciences – in Ceaușescu’s words, “a body of ideological and 
political government directing social research.”288 These efforts to transform ideology and 
culture lasted several years and culminated in the adoption of a series of landmark measures: the 
official announcement of the “mini-cultural revolution” in 1971, the adoption of the Code of 
Principles and Norms for Communists’ Work and Life, Socialist Ethics and Equity in 1974, and 
the establishment of the “Song for Romania” National Festival in 1976.289 
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 The Party’s concern with religious belief and atheism belonged to this period of 
ideological renewal and emanated from the Ceaușescu regime’s preoccupation with directing the 
nature of Romanian socialism. Beginning in 1966, shortly after the 9th Party Congress, the 
regime revived its ideological battle against mysticism, signaling an end to the relative relaxation 
of anti-religious efforts in the late Dej years. The 1966 atheist campaign lasted approximately 
nine months, was geographically circumscribed – converging primarily on regions with high 
concentrations of national minorities, neo-Protestants and illegal “sects” – and appears to have 
had a limited echo in the predominantly Orthodox areas of Romania.290 Notwithstanding, the 
campaign provides an important vantage point on the transformation of atheist work. As it 
happens, the Ceaușescu regime’s first call to arms against religiosity stands in contrast to the 
more exhaustive endeavors that began in 1969 and highlights the metamorphosis that atheism 
underwent over the course of the 1970s. At the turn of the decade, namely, atheist experts 
examined the dynamics of religious life during the thaw through more nuanced, reformed 
Marxist ideas, a change of perspective that put its mark on the future of atheist propaganda. 
 
The 1966 Campaign  
The signal for the 1966 campaign in atheist education came in the form of a resolution 
from Ceaușescu’s newly constituted body in the Central Committee, the Permanent Presidium.291 
Beginning February, Central Committee activists inspected various party organizations, branches 
of the Communist Youth Union, people’s councils, trade unions, and institutions of education 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
290 Out of the 16 regions, 10 constituted the focus of the campaign: the Transylvanian regions of Maramureș, 
Crișana, Hunedoara, Cluj, the Mureș-Hungarian Autonomous Region, and Brașov; Suceava in Moldova; and 
Oltenia, Ploiești, and Bucharest in Wallachia.  
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and culture in order to mobilize the entire cadre apparatus for atheist education. Their findings 
were not encouraging. Popular religiosity was undergoing a revival and atheist education was on 
the defense. These discoveries caused considerable alarm. As Agitprop noted, the neglect of one 
area of ideological work created a fertile terrain “for the appearance and persistence of 
conceptions alien to our ideology” and effectively jeopardized the entire effort to develop 
socialist consciousness.292 These developments confronted party leaders with key questions: 
“What phenomenon was taking place at the ideological level? What were the political 
consequences of this phenomenon? And what needed to be done to withdraw the population 
from under the influence of religious propaganda?”293  
As Agitprop tried to make sense of this state-of-affairs, it returned to two dogmatic 
interpretations that defined the anti-religious discourse of the Dej-years: the political and cultural 
narrative.294 Given the axiomatic tenet of socio-economic determinism, the Marxist-Leninist 
political narrative described religion as a reactionary class phenomenon. Believers were deemed, 
in turn, to be citizens of questionable political loyalty who were the pawns of religious 
organizations. This understanding inspired an administrative approach to religion, which 
included attempts to enclose religious practices “within church walls” and to reduce confessional 
institutions and clerical activity to a minimum. The political narrative also carried with it certain 
assumptions about how to measure the strength of religion in socialism. In line with other 
ministries of religious affairs in socialist countries, the Department of Cults assessed the vitality 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
292 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 17/1966, “Informare privind activitatea 
organelor și organizațiilor de partid din regiunea Brașov pentru propagarea cunoștințelor științifice și combaterea 
misticismului,” f. 10. 
293 Ibid, f. 3. 
294 Romanian anti-religious rhetoric during the early socialist years adapted Soviet discourses on religion to 
domestic conditions. For the Soviet version of these narratives see, Victoria Smolkin, “‘A Sacred Space Is Never 
Empty’: Soviet Atheism, 1954-1971” (PhD Dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 2010), 56-59.  
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of religious life primarily quantitatively, by compiling statistical information about religious 
organizations. To a much lesser degree, it also paid attention to the qualitative aspects of 
churches’ activity in order to deduce their popularity with the masses. Thus, local inspectors 
gathered information on the following: the intensity and methods of priestly activity (in religious 
education and pastoral service, in particular); the institutional strength of churches (the number 
of priests, churches, and theological seminaries); the frequency of ritual practices among 
believers (the observance of major holidays and life-cycle rituals - mainly baptisms, weddings, 
and burials; attendance at masses and pilgrimages, etc.); and the economic health of parishes and 
bishoprics. The Department of Cults calculated the latter from believers’ ritual fees and their 
donations in money, labor, and goods to clergy salaries and the maintenance of cultic buildings.  
As historian Victoria Smolkin noted, such categories indicated that communist officials 
conflated organized religion with popular religiosity.295 Indeed, in the Dej period, cult inspectors 
invariably suspected local priests whenever believers gathered at pilgrimage sites or spread 
rumors about miracles or an impending global apocalypse. Having established a nexus between 
pastoral activity and financial gains, officials also saw the profit motive behind clerical service 
and identified priests as social parasites who preyed on ignorant believers. This aspect of the 
political narrative acquired a new angle especially in the context of collectivization drives, when 
priests became associated with deviance and criminality. 
Emphasis on the subversive nature of religion propelled ideologists to formulate a 
cultural narrative according to which religion was “backward” and called for an active 
ideological engagement with believers through enlightenment measures. Part of the broader 	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agenda to inculcate “culturedness,” this approach focused on the political and materialist 
education of believers. The assumption was that by revealing the pernicious politics of religious 
organizations and by disproving metaphysical cosmologies with scientific facts, believers would 
inevitably abandon faith. Because rituals were recognized as important to the practice of religion, 
indeed for the socialization of believers, ideologists stressed the importance of providing citizens 
with alternatives – “cultured” leisure activities such as literary and art clubs, film evenings, and 
amateur theater and folk dance performances. Due to the didactic verve of the cultural narrative, 
lectures constituted the preferred method and when it came to the religious question, lecturers 
were expected to draw out the multiple ways in which religion was incompatible with socialism, 
science, and modernity overall. When assessing the success of these efforts, party leaders 
naturally employed the same categories with which they measured religious life. They zealously 
compiled statistics about the number of lectures and cultural activities organized by the various 
institutions of the party-state down to the village level. They often compared the upkeep and 
economic health of culture houses to that of local parishes. In qualitative terms, the top party 
echelons also evaluated the vigor of atheist efforts by comparing the passion of various cadres to 
that of the local priest. Party leaders likewise kept a keen eye on whether the population 
considered socialist activities or religious practices more attractive. 
Given that these two narratives juxtaposed religious organizations with the local 
institutions of the party-state, the Agitprop naturally blamed the religious revival on the 
increasing activity of priests and the simultaneous “passivity” of the rank-and-file. Thus, the 
Agitprop’s final report criticized local cadres for lacking militancy in liberating citizens from 
“the darkness of mysticism.”296 Despite multiple instructions from the central organs, the need to 	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intensify the battle against religious belief was rarely discussed at the local meetings of party and 
state institutions and was marginal in the ideological training of cultural activists.297 Even when 
some organizational initiative was evident, reports noted that scientific brigades refrained from 
confronting religious worldviews: lectures “did not reveal the theoretical, scientific-atheist 
implications of natural scientific knowledge” and fulfilled a narrow role of “simple scientific 
information,” being unattractive and unconvincing to believers.298 In fact, Agitprop observed that 
out of the total 276,000 lectures in 1965 less than 1.4 percent “battled” religion in an explicit 
manner.299 Although the amateur artistic and sports movement was cited as a particularly 
effective means to involve believers in leisure activities, in many villages its theater, folk dance, 
and musical groups had come to naught. Reports often noted, however, that church-organized 
orchestras, brass bands, choirs, artistic programs and sports games thrived in the very same 
parishes.300 Indeed, local party organs and people’s councils were criticized for abandoning the 
material base of the artistic and sports movement: the socialist culture house. While the clergy 
managed to increase church income, introduced electricity in cultic buildings, and mobilized 
believers for volunteer work in order to renovate parish holdings, most houses of culture 
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encountered difficulties in gathering enough funds to erect appropriate headquarters with the 
necessary sanitation and electricity.301  
Top party organs also explained the popular attraction to religion by noting that priests 
used more attractive methods to win believers over. Besides offering various material stimulants 
(sweets, crosses, icons, or aid in cash, food, and clothing), the Lutheran, Calvinist and Roman-
Catholic churches presented themselves as guardians of Hungarian and German national values. 
For this reason, Agitprop surmised, they adapted popular traditions and renewed traditional 
minority associations (e.g. the Saxon neighborhoods or brotherhoods and sisterhoods for 
youth).302  Particularly versatile in religious education, priests relied on poems, religious games, 
and musical recitals or used vinyl players, tape-recorders, and slide projectors. All of this was 
naturally to underscore the “deviousness” of religious officials and their attempt to undermine 
the political loyalty of citizens to the party state.303 But Agitprop also insisted on these findings 
to outline the stark contrast between popular care for churches and houses of culture, the latter of 
which lacked comparable technological apparatus and display materials (documentary films, 
slides, illustrations).304 Even when available, such resources were employed only sporadically in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
301 The generosity of believers towards various churches was noted in both the Agitprop’s final report and in the 
regional reports. ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 38/1966, f. 16, 21 and 
File 17/1966, f. 4. 
302 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 17/1966, f. 5.   
303 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 22/1966, f. 6. 
304 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 17/1966, f. 4-5, 13-14, 25. ANIC, 
Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Cancelarie, inv. 2574, File 46/1966, f. 20.  According to the Department of Agitation 
and Propaganda out of the 9,616 houses of culture in the country less than thirty percent had adequate offices, 
less than fifteen percent had television or slide projectors. By comparison, there were 10,000 churches. ANIC, 
Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 38/1966, f. 12 and 21. At the November meeting with regional 
party secretaries Ion Moraru drew attention to the same problem. As he noted, the network of socialist houses of 
culture was uneven across the regions and therefore insufficiently developed. “If in Banat we do not have culture 
houses in 9 villages, in the region of Jassy 700 out of 770 do not have financial resources […]. We have entire 
districts in this country where there is no appropriate culture house in any village.” ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., 
Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 43/1966, f. 116. 
143 
 
	  	  
atheist work and “languished most often in closets and drawers without being used.”305 “And 
how could houses of culture conduct atheist propaganda,” inspectors wondered, if their material 
situation propelled directors to establish a symbiotic relationship with the local parish. One such 
example came from the village of Tărlungeni (Brașov), where the culture house lent benches to 
the church for religious service in exchange for parish tables needed at socialist events.306 
Central Committee inspectors attributed the rank-and-file’s indifference towards the 
resurgence of church activity to cadres’ “weak scientific-education” and their lack of familiarity 
with Marxist-Leninist teachings on religion. To underscore the gravity of the situation, Agitprop 
recited numerous cases when local cadres harbored strong relationships with their parishes 
regardless of the creed. Especially in rural areas, it was customary for party cadres to financially 
support churches “with maximum donations,” participate in religious rituals, and send their 
children to religious education.307 In the regions of Cluj, Mureș and Ploiești, records showed that, 
only in the fall of 1965, 700 party members accepted to be elected as curators in parish councils. 
Members of the Communist Youth Union were also noted for entering Orthodox and Protestant 
theological schools.308 As Agitprop poignantly asked: having compromised their consciousness, 
“what example of ideological discipline, or political orientation could such communists provide 
for the rest of society?”309  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
305 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 17/1966, f. 14. 
306 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 17/1966, f. 11. 
307 Ibid, f. 7-8. See also ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 19/1966, f. 9, File 
22/1966, f. 9 and File 38/1966, f. 19. 
308 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 38/1966, f. 20. 
309 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 17/1966, f. 5. 
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 Such questions indicated that from the perspective of the party elite, being a model 
communist remained ideologically incompatible with any form of religiosity. As a result, the 
cadre who served both the Party and God had a “compromised” consciousness and needed to be 
persuaded to see the light. Arguments about the lack of ideological awareness among the rank-
and-file certainly made sense in 1966. Fifty percent of the cadre apparatus joined the party only a 
couple of years earlier and came predominantly from the Romanian peasantry in rural areas, 
where Orthodox life had continued relatively unperturbed.310 With the dissolution of the Soviet-
inspired Society for the Dissemination for Science and Culture and the renewed closeness with 
the Orthodox higher clergy after the last anti-religious campaign, the ideological militancy 
against religion subsided as debates with the Soviet Union in the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance propelled the party to root itself into Romanian society.  
What the Agitprop did not admit, until years later, was that the confusion of the lower 
party rank regarding the party line on religion was to some extent genuine and it emanated from 
the relations with the Orthodox Church and overall liberalization of the political sphere.311 
Indeed, party cadres and propagandists did not necessarily distinguish between church policy and 
the party’s ideological stance.  The director of the culture house in the village of Cisnădioara, for 
instance, “did not understand why it was wrong for her to give donations to the Evangelical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
310 Ioan Chiper, “Consideraţii privind evoluţia numerică şi compoziţia etnicã a P.C.R., 1921–1952”  Arhivele  
totalitarismului 6 (1998), 25-44.  In April 1962, at the start of the CAER dispute with the Soviet Union, the 
Central Committee changed the requirements for party members, no longer requiring citizens to prove their 
“healthy social origins.” As a result, in 1962-1965, the party apparatus grew by approximately 200,000 members 
per year and its social composition changed radically in favor of the peasantry. Intellectuals also became 
overrepresented in comparison to their overall numbers in society. Stelian Tănase, Elite și societate: Guvernarea 
Gheorgiu-Dej, 1948-1965 (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1998), 193. As Kenneth Jowitt noted, beyond gaining access 
to „material perquisites and general advantages” associated with membership, these categories joined because of 
“anti-Soviet nationalist sentiments” and the benefits that industrialization promised expecially for the technically 
proficient sectors of the intelligentsia. Kennet Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: 
The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 213.  
311 As I show later in this chapter, the contradictions and confusion that liberalization introduced in terms of the 
party line on religion was addressed seriously for the first in an Agitprop meeting on 31 January 1969. 
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Church on a regular basis.”312 And Central Committee inspectors became irritated with one 
collective party secretary, in particular, because he refused to accept that his membership in the 
parish council was a “grave” matter.313 In fact, because of the discrepancy between the party’s 
position on church policy and religious belief, some local cadres did seem to argue that the 1965 
Constitution safeguarded the right to profess religion.314 From this legal perspective then, party 
membership and faith were quite compatible; rather, it was the party’s requirement for members 
to renounce their religion which contravened “socialist legality.”  
 
The Meaning of Religion 
 It is important to stress that, while the Agitprop spoke of the overall “intensification of 
religious life,” political understandings of religiosity were hardly generic. In accordance with 
orthodox Marxist tenets, party leaders scoffed at the genuineness of all forms of religious 
philanthropy and pastoral care – whether church social welfare programs, care for the ill and 
dying, or spiritual guidance – and they suspected clerical parasitism and treachery instead. But 
not all kinds of religion were considered to be dangerous to the same extent. As a matter of fact, 
the political narrative inherited from the Dej period distinguished religiosity by age, confession, 
ethnicity, and the “foreign factor.” Reconstructing this typology is instrumental for 
understanding the changes that conceptions of the believer and atheist education underwent by 
the late 1970s.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
312 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 17/1966, f. 11. 
313 Ibid, 8. 
314 Ibid, f. 5.  
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  As the Ceaușescu regime mobilized society for building communism, it became clear that 
the advent of a “bright socialist future” and of an atheist society hinged ultimately on the 
regime’s success in prevailing upon the youth. Because from the state’s perspective, the youth 
“did not have established religious sentiments and convictions,” they constituted the most 
suitable category for the inculcation of scientific worldviews and the struggle against religion.315 
Captivating the support of the next generation was also instrumental because the hearts, minds, 
and labor force of young people could secure the (re)production of communism on the long term, 
both in the ideological and material sense. Lastly, in the tradition of modern ideological regimes 
the Romanian party-state seized upon the youth as a metaphor to present its political purposes as 
progressive, pure, and nationally invigorating.316  
For these reasons, Central Committee inspectors during the 1966 campaign were 
particularly preoccupied with youth religiosity and viewed this problem in light of broader 
questions about political socialization in education, the family and communist youth 
organizations. Thus, the schools and the Ministry of Education were criticized for negligence in 
the atheist education of youth while pedagogues were urged to become more vigilant about 
students’ family lives and daily activities outside the school. But reports also showed that 
teachers were often reluctant to draw out the explicitly materialist-atheist implications of their 
teachings and were unwilling to use house visits and parent-teacher meetings to confront 
religious families. In fact, rather than withdrawing youth from the influence of the local priest, 
school boards customarily decided against such cultural events even on Sundays purportedly to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
315 Ibid, f. 27. 
316 Gail Kligman, The Politics of Duplicity. Karin Taylor, Let’s Twist Again: Youth and Leisure in Socialist Bulgaria 
(Berlin: LitVerlag, 2006), 11-20. Anne Gorsuch, Youth in Revolutionary Russia (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2000).  
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avoid “overburdening the students.”317  In reaction to this indifference, Agitprop warned that 
avoiding to address the opposition between religious cosmologies and scientific materialism 
allowed the family and the church to play a disproportionate role in youth education to the 
detriment of the state. The unfavorable effects were quite apparent in the rising levels of 
religious education among children and students. In the region of Cluj, reports indicated that in 
urban areas 15-30 percent of pupils attended Protestant programs, while in rural areas their 
number grew to 70 percent.318 Central Committee inspectors reported that in some villages in the 
region of Brașov 90 to 100 percent of children participated in religious education.319 This 
situation was quite “anachronistic,” Agitprop opined, because teachers, instead of fulfilling their 
role in the cultural and atheist education of the masses, abutted churches both indirectly and 
directly. Not only did teachers customarily avoid speaking out against religion but they also 
practiced religious rituals themselves.320 
Besides various educational institutions, the Union of Romanian Student Associations, 
the Communist Youth Union, and the National Organization of Pioneers had key roles in atheist 
education. Thus, central organs urged communist youth organizations to join houses of culture in 
developing “new and healthy traditions that appealed to man’s aspirations for a life rich and 
varied in interests and manifestations”: youth Thursdays, carnivals, and balls as well as rituals 
for communist weddings, the presentation of identity card, and for coming of age. The leisure 
time of youth and socialist rituals were of particular concern because reports implied that young 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
317 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 17/1966, f. 5  
318 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 19/1966, f.  1, 7- 20.  
319 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 17/1966, f. 5. 
320 Ibid, f. 31. 
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people found the material incentives of priests, their various educational methods or artistic 
activities attractive. The young also seemed emotionally susceptible to the “exalted style of 
religious practices and rituals.”321 In other words, religion’s appeal to the youth was a key 
problem because the future of Romanian communism hinged on the regime’s ability to recreate 
itself through the younger generation. As Agitprop pointed out, whereas religion “mutilated 
children spiritually” and curbed the development of “an optimistic self with trust in life and love 
for work,” an upbringing in the atheist spirit restored youth to their vanguard role in 
communism, making them “assiduous propagators of science and culture” in the family and the 
wider society.  
In the new political atmosphere of Ceaușescu’s thaw, central organs were especially wary 
about the increased efforts of neo-Protestants regarding the education of youth and their overall 
influence on Romanian religious life. Of fairly recent appearance, Baptists, Adventists, 
Pentecostals, and Evangelical Christians alongside some banned “sects” were considered the  
least indigenous and constituted possibly the most inter-ethnic religious communities.322 As in 
other socialist states, for Romanian party leaders, every sectarian was on the extreme side of 
”religious fanaticism and bigotry.” Indeed, sectarians were often cited for their utter isolation 
from socialist politics, culture and society and they were described as hostile towards the state. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
321 Ibid, f. 3, 13, 18, and 19; see also File 38/1966, f. 17 and 21. 
322 These religious organizations appeared on the territories that became Romania after 1918 during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. Elis Neagoe-Pleșa and Liviu Pleșa, “Cultele neoprotestante din România 
în perioada 1975-1989,” in Adrian Nicolae Petcu, ed. Partidul, Securitatea şi Cultele, 1945-1989 (Bucharest: 
Nemira, 2005), 350-394.  
     From the legal sects, Baptists (approx. 53,000) were the most numerous in the regions of Banat, Crișana, and 
Cluj; Seventh Day Adventists (approx. 34,000) in the regions of Bucharest, Ploiești, Suceava, and Mureș; 
Pentecostals (approx. 46,000) in the regions of Cluj, Crișana, and Banat; Evangelical Christians (19,000) in the 
regions of Bucharest, Brașov, Iași and Suceava. Illegal sects – Jehovah’s Witnesses (approx. 11,000) and 
Reformed Adventists (3,000) – were the most active in Cluj, Maramureș, Mureș, and Brașov. ANIC, Fond C.C. 
al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 38/1966. 
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Their rejection of medical assistance, their withdrawal from work, elections, and military service, 
and their refusal to send their children to school appeared to be a rejection of modernity as a 
whole.323 From the perspective of the Central Committee’s Agitprop, the influence of foreign 
sectarian organizations provided additional reasons for concern.  Having increased the number of 
their adherents from 74,000 to approximately 200,000 since their legalization in 1948, neo-
Protestant sects were not only the fastest growing religious organizations in urban and rural 
Romania but also had the highest number of priests per believer. Foreign missionary activity 
only amplified the resilience of this religious community. Entering the country under the guise of 
tourists, numerous neo-Protestant missionaries organized clandestine meetings, held sermons, 
and distributed pious literature. Additionally, reports warned, religious propaganda from the 
“west” and other socialist countries “infiltrated” state borders by post and by radio broadcasts 
specially destined to Romanian believers.324 
In areas where religion was intimately linked to nationality, party leaders read the 
upsurge in popular religiosity and clerical activity as evidence for anti-Romanian mobilization 
and political unreliability. The fact that reports from the 1966 campaign focused predominantly 
on the churches of the main national minorities revealed the extent to which ethnicity continued 
to modify the religious question. Indeed, Agitprop and the Department of Cults provided ample 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
323 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 38/1966, “Informare cu privire la 
munca de răspândire a cunoștințelor științifice în rândul maselor,” f. 17-18. 
324 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 38/1966, “Informare cu privire la 
munca de răspândire a cunoștințelor științifice în rândul maselor,” f. 17-19. Although according to this report, the 
state reduced the number of clergy by thirty percent in 1960, neo-Protestant sects had a pastor for every 200 
believers in stark contrast with other cults, which averaged a priest per 1,200 believers. See also ANIC, Fond 
C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 19/1966, 18-19. 
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evidence emphasizing that religious vitality was predominantly a Transylvanian problem.325 As 
they noted, catechesis among German Lutherans and Hungarians who belonged predominantly to  
the Roman-Catholic, Calvinist, and Unitarian creed, was “more intense.”326 On account of their 
claim that these churches were “guardians of national traditions, culture and language,” 
Hungarian and German clerics were also reported for “propagating national isolation and distrust 
towards the nationality politics of our party state.”327 Two dioceses, in particular, presented a 
special problem to the Romanian party-state. The German Lutheran pastors under the Bishopric 
in Sibiu were noted for giving various national folk customs such as carnivals and communal 
feasts “a religious color.” They likewise mobilized believers to attend mass and maintain 
cemeteries via traditional mutual aid and youth associations that had purportedly fulfilled a 
strictly economic and social purpose in the past.328 High levels of participation in religious 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
325 As the Department of Cult noted, religious education did not constitute a problem in the case of the Jewish 
minority because the number of believers was steadily decreasing as a result of emigration. Dobrogea, another 
ethnically and religiously diverse region, was not a concern for the regime either because there was little 
preoccupation with religious education among Armenian Christians, Ukrainians of the Old Rite, and Muslims. 
Archive of the State Secretariat for Cults [Arhivele Secretariatului de Stat pentru Culte, henceforth ASSC], Fond 
Departmentul Cultelor, Secția Studii, inv. 35, File 86/1967, vol. 8, “Report,” 5 January 1967, f. 5. Besides their 
small numbers, these nationalities were not a cause for concern also because, after eliminating most of their 
educational and cultural institutions in 1948, the Ceaușescu regime considered the assimilation of Jews, 
Armenians, Ukrainians, Turk and Tatars to be a practically completed process. Zoltán Novák, Aranykorszak, p. 
22 in manuscript. 
326 Ibid, 6-9. To indicate the significance of the close correspondence between religious belonging and nationality in 
Transylvania, Agitprop reminded party leaders that of the 1.2 million Roman-Catholics, 690,000 Calvinists and 
67,000 Unitarians, most were Hungarians. An additional 33,000 Hungarians belonged to the Evangelical 
Bishopric in Cluj. Most Germans (the Saxons) adhered to the Evangelical Church of the Augustan Confession in 
Sibiu (184,000), while others (the Schwabs), fewer in number and settled mainly in the Banat, were Roman-
Catholic. ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 38/1966, f. 12. 
327 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 17/1966, f. 5  
328 Both forms of Saxon communal organization went back for centuries. Neighbourhoods (Nachbarschaften) were 
mutual aid associations that included all married Saxons under a democratically elected male “elder” 
(Altknecht), while unmarried girls and men automatically became members of the youth organization of their 
respective sex (Schwesterschaften and Bruderschaften) after confirmation. Contradicting the Department’s claim 
about the secular nature of these associations, Andreas Möckel notes that in the interwar period both were 
supervised by the local Lutheran church council. See Andreas Möckel, Umkämpfte Volkskirche: Leben und 
Wirken des evangelisch-sächsischen Pfarrers Konrad Möckel, 1892-1965 (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2011), 46. 
ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 17/1966, File 38/1966, f. 17. 
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services were similarly reported in the Archbishopric of Alba-Iulia. Priests in this diocese often 
carried out “chauvinist agitation” during their sermons. Believers routinely decorated their parish 
with flowers in Hungarian national colors for religious feasts and the episcopal visitations of  
Archbishop Áron Márton.329  
In part, the socialist state’s concern over historic Transylvania and the Partium originated 
from the inclusion of these regions into Romania after the First World War. Not only were these 
areas ethnically and confessionally heterogeneous but their late incorporation into the Romanian 
nation-state meant that the interwar regime achieved negligible results in their national and 
religious assimilation. In fact, responding to the aggressive nationalism of Greater Romania, the 
German and Hungarian communities engaged in “minority nation-building,” effectively 
establishing “parallel societies” in which the churches effectively overtook the functions of the 
missing nation-state in economic organization, cultural life, and education.330 From the point of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
329 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 22/1966, “Unele aspecte privind 
influența cultelor și sectelor religioase (Maramureș),” 7 April 1966, f. 6. Because the control of the Archbishop 
of Alba-Iulia extended over the entire territory of historic Transylvania and the Partium, Áron Márton had 
jurisdiction over most Roman-Catholics in Romania. The Archbishopric of Jassy and Bucharest controlled 
Moldova and Wallachia where the number of Catholic believers was much smaller.  
     Áron Márton (1896-1980) was named Bishop of Alba-Iulia in 1938, being elevated to the rank of Archbishop of 
Alba-Iulia by Pope Pius XII in 1948 as part of the Vatican’s resistance to communism. Bishop Márton 
distinguished himself as an important figure in Hungarian minority-building already during the interwar period. 
As a result of the anti-religious campaigns of the Dej regime, he was imprisoned in 1949, released in 1956 and 
was put under house arrest in Alba-Iulia from 1957 until 1967.  The bishop had strong support among Catholics, 
especially in the Hungarian Szeklerland and his region of origins (Harghita county). He drew believers in 
tremendous numbers to the pilgrimage in Csíksomlyó (especially 1946-1949), and during his chrismation tours 
and pastoral visits in the late 1940s and 1957. In fact, out of all minority clerics he was the one who commended 
the most attention from the Central Committee, the Securitate and the Department of Cults. The reason for this 
was in part that he was a long-time adherent of the staunch anti-communist Cardinal József Mindszenthy in 
Hungary. The archbishop was released from house arrest in 1967 at the request of Cardinal König of Vienna. 
This decision was a direct outcome of the regime’s desire to mend its image with the Vatican and with Catholic 
believers at home. See Péter Sas, Az erdélyi római katólikus egyház, 1900-1948 (Budapest: Mundus Kiadó, 
2008). Stefano Bottoni, Sztálin a székelyeknél: A Magyar Autonóm Tartomány története, 1952-1960 (Miercurea 
Ciuc: Pro Print Könyvkiadó, 2008), esp. 313-332. 
330 Although these arguments were made about Hungarian minority-building, I extend these to the German 
community as well. Nándor Bárdi, Otthon és haza: Tanulmányok a romániai magyar kisebbség történetéről 
(Miercurea Ciuc: Pro Print, 2013), 13-14, 437-447. Zoltán Kántor, “Kisebbségi nemzetépítés – a romániai 
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view of the Ceaușescu regime then, the religiosity of these nationalities was inherently suspect 
not only because it contravened materialism but because it also implied a rejection of Romanian 
statehood and the idea of the socialist nation, then in the process of being re-defined.331  
What further aggravated an already adverse situation in the eyes of the party leadership 
were the effects of Catholic modernization in Transylvania. To adapt the Church to the 
requirements of the twentieth century and to push for Catholic moral-spiritual renewal, the 
Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) increased the role of laity in church government, allowed 
the vernacularization of liturgy, commenced dialogue with other religions and atheists, and 
called on Catholics to engage with the social problems of the world.332 In a note to the Council of 
Ministers, the head of the Department of Cults Dumitru Dogaru warned that the Vatican Council 
“constituted an ideological front against atheist communism” and was expected to have “direct 
repercussions in the country.”333 Indeed, as the Council came to a close, party leadership 
observed the surging activity of Catholic clergy and believers at the hands of Archbishop 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
magyarság, mint nemzetépítő kisebbség,” Régió: Kissebség, Politika, Társadalom 11, no. 3 (March 2000): 219–
241; Zoltán A. Biró, Stratégiák vagy kényszerpályák. Tanulmányok a romániai magyar társadalomról 
(Miercurea Ciuc, Pro Print, 1998), 50–94. On how the German Lutheran Church was instrumental in developing 
Romanian German consciousness and strategies for minority-building see Bernhard Böttcher, Gefallen für Volk 
und Heimat: Kriegerdenkmäler deutscher Minderheiten in Ostmitteleuropa während der Zwischenkriegszeit 
(Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2009), 314-116. Harald Roth, “Zum Wandel der politischen Strukturen bei den 
Siebenbürger Sachsen 1918 bis 1933,” in Minderheit und Nationalstaat ed. by Harald Roth (Köln: Böhlau 
Verlag, 1994), 99-113;  
331 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 38/1966, f. 17. It is important to note 
that on 15 January 1966 (a month before it began mobilizing the regions for atheist education), Agitprop hosted a 
debate on the new questions of Romanian nation-building. The goal was to depart from the Soviet line and the 
traditions of the 1950s. The document which emerged from the meeting and was adopted later on described 
nationalities as “newcomers” to Romanian lands in the spirit of the thesis on Dacian-Roman continuity. This 
implicitly meant that nationalities were assigned secondary citizenship. The document also denied the necessity 
of collective nationality rights. This context added to the reasons why German and Hungarian confessions were 
regarded as politically unreliable. ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Cancelarie, inv. 2574, File 180/1966, f. 
172. 
332 William H. Swatos, ed., Encyclopedia for Religion and Society (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 1998), 539. 
333 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Organizatorică, inv. 2781, File 14/1966, vol. I., “Notă întocmită de 
Departamentul Cultelor – 5 februarie 1966,” f. 39. 
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Márton, whose circulary letters emphasized the religious education of children, added special 
masses to the ritual calendar, and called believers to renew their commitments to the Church in 
keeping with the Council’s goals.334 
Although this remained unsaid in Agitprop reports on the 1966 campaign, what also 
informed the focus on Transylvania and the Partium was the increase in Greek-Catholic activity 
in the aftermath of the Council. Notwithstanding the role of the Uniate clergy in Romanian 
national awakening beginning the late eighteenth century, the political reliability of Greek-
Catholics had been questioned by Orthodox nationalist circles already in the interwar period. 
This was in part because demographic data in the newly acquired territories raised fears about 
the de-nationalizing influence of the Vatican.335 From the perspective of the socialist state, 
Greek-Catholics were also a security risk and a source of foreign political influence. In this 
sense, thus, the forceful merging of the Uniate cult with the Orthodox Church 1948 pointed to a 
meeting of interests between the Romanian Workers’ Party and the interwar national aspirations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
334 Sources mention two letters issued in September 1965 and January 1966. For the bishop’s letters see ANIC, Fond 
C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Administrativ-Politică, inv. 3059, File 14/1966, f. 43-46. ANIC, Fond C.C. al PCR, Secția 
Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 38/1966, f. 17 and ASSC, Fond Departmentul Cultelor, Secția Studii, inv. 
35, File 86/1967, vol. 8, “Indicații la catehizare,” f. 38-39. 
335 On the Transylvanian School and the Romanian national movement, see Keith Hitchins, A Nation Discovered: 
Romanian Intellectuals in Transylvania and the Idea of Nation, 1700-1848 (Bucharest: Encyclopaedic 
Publishing House, 1999) and Orthodoxy and Natonality: Andreiu Șaguna and the Rumanians of Transylvania, 
1846-1873 (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1977). On the interwar period see, Hans-Christian Maner,”Die griechisch-
katholische Kirche in Siebenbürgen / Rumänien, 1918-1939: Zwischen nationalem Anspruch und 
interkonfessioneller Wirklichkeit,” in eds. Hans-Christian Maner and Norbert Spannenberger Konfessionelle 
Identität und Nationsbildung: die griechisch-katholischen Kirchen in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa im 19. und 20. 
Jahrhundert (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2007).                              
     Statistical evidence from 1939 and 1940 showed the following demographic distribution for Orthodox and 
Greek-Catholic believers. In the Banat 56.1 percent were Orthodox and 3.6 percent Greek Catholic; in historic 
Transylvania 27.8 percent were Orthodox and 31.1 percent Greek Catholic; in Maramureș 36.8 percent Orthodox 
and 25.2 percent Greek-Catholic; in Bukowina 71.9 percent Orthodox and 2.3 percent Greek Catholic. See 
Anuarul Statistic al României 1939 și 1940 (Bucharest, 1940), 74. 
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of political Orthodoxy.336 Despite the particular attention that the Securitate and the Department 
of Cults paid to the de facto “unification of the Romanian Orthodox Church,” Uniate believers 
and clerics continued to present a problem. They not only kept their practices clandestinely and 
in great numbers but also “agitated” for the re-establishment of their cult oftentimes even after 
formally joining the Orthodox creed. July 1956 had been a peak period, for instance. Special 
masses were held in a couple of centers in Transylvania and 20,308 believers petitioned the 
Department of Cults letters to re-establish the Greek Catholic Church.337  
Ten years later the reports of the regime attributed the upsurge of Greek Catholic 
mobilization to the Second Vatican Council, which in the spirit of ecumenical dialogue with 
Eastern Orthodoxy, brought attention once more to the status of the Uniate churches in 
communist states. Thus, two exhibits, ”The Silent Church” in Rome and ”The Church in 
Suffering” in West Germany centered on Greek-Catholics in Eastern Europe while at each of the 
Council’s session special liturgies were held for the ”garrotting of the Greek-Catholic Church in 
Romania.” In Romania, the Department of Cults blamed Archbishop Áron Márton for 
disseminating news about the Council and for supporting the activity of the clandestine Greek- 
Catholic bishops who were released after the general amnesty of 1964.338 As a result, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
336 This exchange between the Romanian Orthodox Church and the party-state was hardly between political “equals” 
and did not mean that the RWP embraced religious-national ideals. Rather, this “re-unification” of Greek-
Catholics served a triple purpose of reducing the influence of the Vatican, gaining national legitimacy with the 
Orthodox majority, and co-opting the Romanian Orthodox Church.  
337 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Administrativ-Politică, inv. 3059, File 14/1966, vol. I, “Notă, 29 noiembrie 
1966,” f. 177. Ovidiu Bozgan, “Mișcarea petiționară greco-catolică din 1956,” in Ovidiu Bozgan ed. Studii de 
istoria bisericii (Bucharest: Editura Universității București, 2000). 
338 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Administrativ-Politică, inv. 3059, File 14/1966, vol. I, ”Notă, 5 mai 1966, f. 
158. The clandestine bishops were: Ioan Dragomir (1905-1985), Bishop of Maramureș; Ioan Cherteș (1911-
1992), Bishop of Cluj; Ioan Ploșcaru (1911-1998), Bishop of Lugoj; Gheorghe Iuliu Hîrtea (1914-1978), Bishop 
of Oradea; and Alexandru Todea (1912-2002), Bishop of Alba-Iulia. They were all secretly ordained in 1948-
1950. Shortly afterwards, they were arrested for “subversive anti-state activity,” spending various amounts of 
time in jail and under house arrest. After 1964, most of them maintained contact with the Vatican and were 
considered by the Department of Cults to be “staunchly committed to the reconstitution of their church.” ANIC, 
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Council’s works were broadly commented upon even among ”reverted” Uniate clerics and 
believers ”as evidence for the overwhelming superiority of Catholicism in the contemporary 
world.” In the regions of Maramureș and Crișana, in particular, members of ”the Greek-Catholic 
resistance” and some ”oscillating elements” became convinced that it was the moment to declare 
their pro-Catholic sentiments and ask the party leadership to re-examine the legal status of their 
church. On this account, some lauded Hungarian socialism for allowing the existence of the 
Greek-Catholic Bishopric of Hajdúdorog. Others effectively questioned the new regime’s 
devotion to national traditions, noting with irony that, neo-Protestant sects with “foreign origins” 
were legal whereas the “indigeneous” Uniate creed so central for Romanian national awakening 
continued to be banned.339 
In addition to these political attitudes, reports of the Department of Cults found further 
confirmation for the unreliability of Uniates in the prevalence of Greek-Catholic insignia 
(statues, holy water fonts, and icons), devotional practices and Marian associations in 
Transylvanian Orthodox parishes.340 Unlike legalized creeds, whose activities could be 
circumscribed to specific locations and supervised by the state, Uniate communities often 
gathered outside church walls in private homes. Additionally, from the perspective of the 
Romanian regime, Greek-Catholics were perceived to be particularly vulnerable to “mixed 
marriages.”341 In fact, when marrying Roman-Catholics, Uniates were deemed to have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secţia Administrativ-Politică, inv. 3059, File 14/1966, vol. I, “Notă,” 27 May 1968, f. 257-
270. See also, Berindei et al., 387, footnote 7-11. 
339 ASSC, Fond Departmentul Cultelor, Secția Studii, inv. 35, File 86/1967, vol. 8. 
340 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Administrativ-Politică, inv. 3059, File 14/1966, vol. I, “Notă,” 29 November 
1966, f. 175-184. 
341 A large percent of Roman-Catholic baptisms originated from mixed marriages with other cults. To underscore the 
significance of Catholic “proselytism” through marriage, the Department of Cults gave extensive statistical 
information. For example, during 1940-1962, at a parish in Timișoara 27.74% of marriages were mixed (309 out 
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committed the capital crime of having gravitated “towards authorities and centers hostile to our 
[national] unity.”342 What concerned the Department the most, however, was the attitude of the 
Orthodox Church. Even though Catholic marriage regulations were “not only a problem of faith 
but a national one,” Orthodox priests “did not seem particularly bothered by this question.”343 
This meant, the Department concluded, that the intermarriage between Orthodox, formerly Greek 
Catholic, Romanians and Hungarian Roman Catholics resulted in children who “could be easily 
denationalized through religious education.”344 As a result, as the regime revived its atheist 
efforts, officials of the party-state paid increased attention to Greek-Catholics. Orthodox clerics 
were called upon to renew measures and consolidate the unification. Official historical 
publications also began emphasizing that the Greek-Catholic Church, historically subservient to 
the politics of the Vatican, ”sought to impede the national unification of the Romanian people in 
decisive moments of history, 1848 and 1918, as well as more recently during the Dictate of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of 1,114) and 23.25% at a parish in Caransebeș, the latter contributing to 20% of baptisms. In 1950-1962, the rate 
of intermarriage was 55.7% (181 out of 325) at a parish in Mediaș and 58.7%  (80 out of 150) at a parish in 
Sighișoara. In regions with more compact Hungarian populations, the rates were even higher. Thus, during 1946-
1962 in Valea lui Mihai, a village in the Crișana region, 353 mixed marriages out of 493 (71%) amounted to 53% 
of baptisms (630 out of 1,182) in the same interval. ASSC, Fond Departmentul Cultelor, Secția Studii, inv. 43, 
File 86/1964, vol. 8/1, “Referat din 21 septembrie 1964: cãsãtoria mixtã la cultul romano-catolic,” f. 62-63. 
     Problematically, from the point of view of the Department of Cults, the lack of marriage regulations in the case 
of the other main confessions only helped the Hungarian Catholic cause. Thus, the main minority churches 
sanctioned mixed marriages “without establishing any conditions regarding the religion of the spouses or the 
children.” According to the same document, the two Hungarian Calvinist dioceses in Cluj and Oradea adopted 
similar canon laws to resist Catholic proselytism in 1942 but these ”had expired.” The situation was the same 
with the marriage regulations of the Hungarian and German Evangelical churches. Ibid. This latter claim is 
contradicted by reports citing German Lutheran pastors who forbade intermarriage. ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., 
Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 17/1966, File 38/1966, f. 17. 
342 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Administrativ-Politică, inv. 3059, File 14/1966, vol. I, “Notă,” 29 November 
1966, f. 175-176. 
343 The quote is from a 1964 document. ASSC, Fond Departmentul Cultelor, Secția Studii, inv. 43, File 86/1964, 
vol. 8/1, “Referat din 21 septembrie 1964: cãsãtoria mixtã la cultul romano-catolic,” f. 58-66. But the problem of 
intermarriage was approached through the angle of denationalization in 1966 as well. See footnote 341. 
344 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Administrativ-Politică, inv. 3059, File 14/1966, vol. I, “Notă,” 29 November 
1966, f. 183-185. 
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Vienna.” Given the 1,600,000 former Greek-Catholics in Transylvania and the Partium, the 
Department of Cults stressed that the “consolidation of the Orthodox Church” was a “supreme 
state interest.” After all, out of all religious organizations, the Vatican had the strongest potential 
for causing “ideological disorientation” and undermining “the unity of our people.” 345  
In addition to Orthodox clerical passivity, Transylvania and the Partium were ironically 
troublesome also because Catholic and (neo-) Protestant concerns over religious education 
provided arguments for the Orthodox Church to increase its own influence over the Romanian 
youth. Indeed, in this sense, the Department of Cults and Agitprop seemed to be of two minds 
about whether the majority church should mobilize or not. From the perspective of the state, 
Orthodox catechesis had been traditionally considered to be less ideologically dangerous. A note 
by the Department reflected this official position. It suggested that, whereas Catholic and 
Protestant religious education “was a deeply rooted tradition” emphasizing belief and an active 
commitment to religious life, the religious upbringing of children and students was not a 
distinctive concern in Romanian Orthodoxy. In this tradition, religious education emphasized 
ritual practice, rather than belief. In fact, the Synod’s new regulations on catechesis adopted on 5 
October 1950 had urged priests and church singers to prepare “believers of both genders and of 
all ages” for ritual practice; instead of acquiring a theological education, believers were thus 
expected to learn readings, prayers, and songs primarily for mass. The mobilization of the 
Catholic and (neo-) Protestant clergy, however, chipped away from this distinction. Orthodox 
priests began to establish church choirs, consecrated churches, and organized pilgrimages with 
the participation of a great mass of believers.  In the Cluj region, for instance, 15,000 believers 
gathered on the dedication day for the monastery of Nicula, “three times as many as in previous 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
345 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secţia Administrativ-Politică, inv. 3059, File 14/1966, vol. I, “Notă,” 29 November 
1966, f. 175-184. 
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years.”346 More importantly, Orthodox clerics paid increasing attention to the religious education 
of youth to the point where they adopted Catholic and (neo-) Protestant practices such as Sunday 
schools, religious evenings, and Bible hours even in homogeneous Orthodox communities.347 It 
was this new focus of Orthodox clerics to inculcate belief as opposed to simple ritual observance 
that aggravated party concerns over the religiosity of the Romanian youth in Transylvania. 
Indeed, that Agitprop otherwise turned a blind eye to both believers and clerics from the majority 
confession underscores the fact that in the 1966 atheist campaign party leaders continued to 
consider Orthodoxy the least subversive religion much in line with a typology borrowed from the 
Dej period.    
 
The Thaw and the 1966 Campaign 
Unsurprisingly, by blaming particular religious organizations and the passivity of the 
local ranks, what the party elite conveniently did not explore was the nexus between religious 
life and the thaw – in short, its own role in the revival of popular faith. The effects of the opening 
of borders towards the “west” provided perhaps the most unmistakable signs. Indeed, the 
Agitprop’s observations about the “infiltration” of foreign missionaries and the growing 
influence of religious organizations from abroad relied in part on earlier reports. In October 
1965, for instance, the Minister of Internal Affairs Cornel Onescu had already warned the 
Council of Ministers that, in order to stimulate “the mystical-religious fanaticism of clerics and 
believers,” various Catholic and (neo) Protestant associations from both sides of the iron curtain 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
346 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 38/1966, “Informare cu privire la 
munca de răspândire a cunoștințelor științifice în rândul maselor,” f. 17.     
347 ASSC, Fond Departamentul Cultelor, Secția Studii, inv. 35, File 86/1967, vol. 8, “Report,” 5 January 1967, f. 1, 
3-4, 6-8. (Case 2013) 
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flooded the country with thousands of bibles, letters, and other religious publications.348 As 
Onescu suggested, these could penetrate state frontiers more effortlessly by mail or with the help 
of international tourists and Romanian citizens because traveling across borders had become 
easier. Also, the General Directorate of Press and Printing (Direcția Generală a Presei și 
Tipăriturilor), the main state body in charge of censorship, had ceased confiscating religious 
literature in April 1965. Surely, the fact that Agitprop reports of the 1966 campaign did not 
address these and similar effects of liberalization on religious life emanated in part from the 
notion that the leadership “was always right.” Nevertheless, this reluctance for self-reflexivity 
was significant because it reflected the degree to which the political and cultural narrative were 
entrenched.      
 Reliance on the established approaches meant that the 1966 atheist campaign proscribed 
old administrative and didactic measures in its renewed effort to uproot religion from within 
Romanian borders. “Restrictive measures,” the head of the Department of Cults Dumitru Dogaru 
explained, “were out of the question” because they would provoke international protest and 
aggravate the regime’s relationship with believers at home. Instead diminishing the strength of 
religion necessitated a “long-term plan” that combined careful supervision of religious life with 
legal pressure limiting the clergy’s activity and the ideological enlightenment of socialist elites. 
Necessary steps, Dogaru proposed, also had to be taken in the form of semi-legal administrative 
measures that would curtail the number of priests and believers, by reducing enrollment numbers 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
348 ANIC, Fond Consiliul de Miniștri, Secția pentru Problemele M.A.I., File 152/1965, f. 52-59. Qtd. in Mihnea 
Berindei, Dorin Dobrincu, and Adrian Goșu, eds. Istoria comunismului în România, vol. II: Documente Nicolae 
Ceaușescu, 1965-1971 (Iași: Polirom, 2012), 73. To safeguard the Marxist-Leninist education of Romanian 
citizens, the Juridical Department of the Central Committee instructed central organs to take advantage of 
standards in “socialist legality.” Religious materials “in great quantities” could be seized on account of the state’s 
monopoly in foreign commerce (art. 8 of the Constitution) and prohibitions against unauthorized commercial 
activity in the penal code. As the Juridical Department explained, otherwise the seizure of religious materials 
contravened art. 33 of the Constitution which guaranteed the secrecy of correspondence. 
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in seminaries, withdrawing state appointments from priests, and by banning the conversion 
requirements in the Catholic marriage system. The same formula was to be applied to every 
religious cult with the necessary modifications to accommodate for confessional specificities.349 
All of these measures had to be pursued “with the appropriate tact” and attention to confessional 
specificities – to wit, without initiating a campaign that would offend believer’s sentiments and 
reduce the effectiveness of the regime’s anti-religious efforts.350  
Above all, the party-state’s approach to religion needed further clarification (lămurire). 
The Council for the Dissemination of Cultural and Scientific Knowledge was the first to heed the 
warning. By early July it revised plans for atheist work in its regional branches in the Mureș 
Hungarian Autonomous Region, Crișana, Hunedoara and Oltenia. Its leading specialists likewise 
initiated seminars on the party line towards religion and the methodology of scientific-atheist 
education for atheist activists, cultural workers, religious inspectors, and party leaders.351 Similar 
actions were undertaken in Bucharest and the rest of the regions in the fall and winter months. 
The call for increased attention to the religious question and the intensification of atheist 
propaganda was similarly aimed at the State Committee for Culture and the Arts and the 
Ministry of Education. The two institutions were instructed to develop better “cultured” leisure 
activities in order to attract the population and to mobilize teachers for propaganda work with 
parents and the youth. The Agitprop’s directives naturally assigned pride of place to party organs 
at the local level; they were not only called on to explain the ideological line on religion but were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
349 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Administrativ-Politică, inv. 3059, File 14/1966, f. 40-42. 
350 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 38/1966, f. 25-32. Prepared in 1979 for 
the Central Committee, a report from the Department of Cults indicated that the number of clerics was reduced 
from 11,352 to 10,677 in 1968-1978. ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Cancelarie, inv. 3129, File 54/1979, 
“Documentar asupra cultelor religioase, situația personalului clerical, pe culte și a lăcașurilor religioase, 
învățământul teologic,” f. 50-54v. 
351 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 38/1966, f. 1-2, 7-10.  
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also required to train better atheist cadres and become model communists for the rest of the 
population.352 Alongside the tightening yet careful circumscription of administrative measures, 
this insistence on cadres’ ideological militancy and accountability corresponded with the overall 
reinstatement of party control in all aspects of social and political life during the Ceaușescu era. 
As before, the 1966 campaign allotted the print media a prominent place in the 
confrontation with religion and the dissemination of atheism. Agitprop chided publishing houses 
and journalists for neglecting the scientific-materialist education of the masses. Publishers were 
singled out for issuing books in small numbers and with an unsatisfactory visual quality. In fact, 
besides the brochures issued by the Council for the Dissemination of Science and Culture and 
Editura Științifică, publishing houses had taken relevant titles completely off their lists. It was for 
these reasons that trade union and village libraries had poor collections; most had not received 
any new titles since 1963.353 Newspapers and journals did little better. Alongside publishers then, 
Scânteia Tineretului, Flacăra, Contemporanul and Știință și Tehnică were prompted to increase 
publications and address problems with religion in a straightforward manner.354 In the aftermath 
of the atheist campaign, the print media issued numerous articles that proclaimed the party line 
on religion. The Hungarian newspaper Ifjúmunkás, for instance, broached the relationship 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
352 Ibid, f. 27-30. 
353 Ibid, f. 21. An extensive report prepared by the Council for the Dissemination of Science and Culture in February 
1966 confirmed that publication numbers were reduced from 72 Romanian titles in 1963 (average number of 
copies 37,000) to 45 titles in 1965 (average number of copies 23,500). Among others, the report noted that 
ordinary citizens complained about the crisis, noting that they could not find such publications in villages or in 
bigger cities like Brãila. ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 5/1969, “Notă 
în legătură cu broșurile de popularizare a științei din colecția C.R.C.C.S.,” f. 43-56. Interestingly, the report also 
observed that publishing brochures ceased to be profitable since publication numbers were reduced in the central 
plans. Whereas for Romanian language brochures publishers incurred a deficit only in 1965 in the amount of 
178,000 lei, in the case of minorities it was 344,000 lei in 1963-1965. Ibid, “Situația financiară rezultată din 
editarea broșurilor de popularizare a științei în perioada 1963-1965,” f. 55. In 1969, an atheist expert argued that 
this shortage of publications accounted for the curious fact that Hungarians from Romania turned to publications 
in Hungary (issued in an average 150,000 copies) to fulfill their curiosity about science. Ibid, f. 28. 
354 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 38/1966, f. 22. 
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between atheism and ethics or atheism and science, while Lupta de clasă evoked the “precursors 
of contemporary atheism” and reported on “current philosophical debates on religion and 
atheism.”355 Revista Pedagogică, the review of the Institute of Pedagogical Sciences, and 
Academy’s Revista de filosofie (The Philosophical Review) followed suit with specialized 
articles on the evolution of the idea of man in pedagogical thought, current trends in the 
propagation of science and culture,” and the history of human devotion to gods.356 The 
Agitprop’s call for more attention to ritual practice saw many predictable publications that 
presented the history of religious life-cycle ceremonies and popularized socialist alternatives for 
baptisms or weddings.357  
The 1966 campaign in atheist education revealed the party leaders’ perception on 
religion. However, the real significance of its story lies in the questions that the Party asked and 
the ones it did not ask. To recall the question posed by the Department of Agitation and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
355 Zoltán Farkas, ”Erkölcs és ateizmus,” Ifjúmunkás: A K.I.SZ. Központi Bizottságának Hetilapja 11, no. 30 (27 
July 1967), 6. Zoltán Farkas, ”Tudomány és vallásos hit,” Ifjúmunkás 12, no. 30, (25 July 1968), 1 and 6. Petru 
Berar, ”Precursori ai ateismului contemporan,” Lupta de clasă 46, no. 11 (November 1966), 114-118. Petru 
Berar, ”Religia si ateismul în dezbaterile filozofice contemporane,” Lupta de clasă 47, no. 2 (February 1967), 
120-122. Petru Berar, ”Literatura de informare științifică și ateismul,” Lupta de clasă 48, no. 7 (July 1968), 51-
59. Degan Vasile, Considerații despre religie și propaganda ateist-științifică (Cluj, 1969), Pompiliu Caraion, 
Geneza sacrului (Bucharesti: Editura Științifică, 1967). D.D. Roșca, Existența tragică (Bucharest: Editura 
Academiei R.S.R., 1968). Al. Posescu, “Tendințe și poziții ateiste și materialiste în filozofie în perioada 
interbelică,” Curente și orientări în istoria filozofiei românești (Bucharest: Editural Academiei R.S.R, 1967), 
169-224. 
356 Ioan Cerghit, “Evoluția ideii despre om în pedagogie, concepția materialist-dialectică despre om, bază 
metodologică a pedagogiei socialiste,” Revista de pedagogie: Organ al Institutului de Științe Pedagogice 15, no. 
1 (January 1966), 14-31. Emil Iordăchescu, ”Orientări actuale în activitatea de popularizare a științei și culturii,” 
Revista de pedagogie 17, no. 8 (August 1968), 119-125. P.Bălă, ”Cultul divinităților care mor și înviază,” 
Revista de filozofie no. 9 (1967). Tache Aurelian and Anton Costescu, Cultul sfinților (Bucharest: Editura 
Științifică, 1966). 
357 Gheorghe Bălteanu, Botezul și împărtășania (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedică Română, 1969). C. Priescu, I. 
Teoharide and Lal Romulus, ”Ceremonia va avea loc în saloanele,” Scînteia tineretului 23, no. 5708, (26 
September 1967), 1-2. ”Moment Solemn al tinereții – sărbătoarea majoratului: Anotimp al maturității,” Scînteia 
Tineretului 23, no. 5766, (5 December 1967), 2 and 5.  
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Propaganda, what phenomenon was taking place at the ideological level? What were its political 
consequences of this phenomenon? And what needed to be done to withdraw the population 
from under the influence of religious propaganda?  
Certainly for the ideological elite the answers were clear: the revival of popular faith they 
identified on the ground occurred because of the mobilization of particular religious 
organizations and the simultaneous lack of ideological militancy of the party’s rank-and-file. 
Religion was incompatible with communism, indeed threatened socialist construction, according 
to top officials. But for many ordinary people this was not necessarily obvious. Even local party 
cadres found it quite acceptable to serve God and Party at the same time, making themselves 
ineffective as model communists for the wider masses. And in the leadership’s mind all of this 
converged into a problem that required the party to put atheist education back on its agenda, not 
in the form of a series of campaigns but as a permanent endeavor. 
The question that the ideological elites did not ask was to what extent the resurgence of 
popular religiosity they observed on the ground was not only their own making but also reflected 
some of their long-standing biases. The dissolution of the Society for the Dissemination of 
Science and Culture in 1963, the opening of borders, and the party’s increasingly “pragmatic 
approach” to churches reflected the liberalization of the social and political sphere that began 
already under Dej. Rather than constituting a surprise, in the context of the thaw, the 
abandonment of scientific-atheist enlightenment in “recent years,” the influx of foreign 
missionaries, and the “confusion” of cadres about the party line on religion should have been 
expected then. The overwhelming number of reports on minority religions also reflected that the 
Central Committee did not look closely enough at Orthodox believers; instead, it focused its  
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attention on the religious organizations that it had traditionally viewed as the most threatening.358 
Regardless, the fact that the connection between the thaw and religious life were not explored in 
Central Committee reports or addressed in the measures is indicative for how party leaders 
understood religion.  
As the Ceaușescu regime made sense of the religious landscape and re-affirmed the 
atheist mission, discussions about atheist education took a back stage for a couple of years in 
party organs, both at the central and local level. This return to a relative calm on the atheist front 
was encouraged by the political priorities of the new party leadership in 1966-1968: Ceaușescu’s 
focus on eliminating rivals in the Central Committee and on consolidating his power with the 
rank-and-file, among others through the administrative re-organization of the country.359 The 
Prague Spring of 1968 likewise presented challenges on the domestic front and in relations with  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
358 In 1966, the last effort of Agitprop to mobilize for the intensification of atheist education was on November 14-
16, 1966 when all party secretaries from the regions were called into a meeting to discuss “problems of 
ideological work.” However, the fact that the 1966 campaign was not a general call for mobilization but was 
directed at particular regions was evident in Paul Niculescu-Mizil’s speech at the meeting. As he stated, 
“Unfortunately, in particular places we see an intensification in the activity of certain religious sects, [and] 
religious cults, but our party organs are not only on the defensive; they do not even respond with rich programs 
in the propagation of scientific knowledge.” ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 
43/1966, “Stenograma întâlnirii din 14-16 noiembrie 1966 cu secretarii comitetelor regionale de partid care se 
preocupă cu problemele muncii ideologice,” f. 206. An overview of Central Committee documents in 1966-1968 
further confirms that the campaign concerned only certain religious organizations and regional party committees. 
In fact, Agitprop did not draw up an official “plan of measures” (plan de măsuri) until 1968 and this plan also 
echoed the particular bias of the 1966 campaign; the measures insisted on intensifying ideological activity in 
regions where the influence of cults and sects had grown. See File 5/1969, “Măsuri privind intensificarea 
activității de educație științifică a maselor,” dated 31 May 1968, f. 150-160, esp. 151-152.   
359 The administrative-territorial reorganization of the country from 16 regions to 41 counties in 1968 reflected 
Ceaușescu’s attempt to root out the autonomies of power in the regional party branches and to fashion a new 
base of provincial party support. See Zoltán Csaba Novák’s introduction in his collection of archival documents 
on the party’s Hungarian nationality policy, Aranykorszak: A Ceaușescu- rendszer magyarságpolitikája 
(Miercurea-Ciuc: Pro Print Könyvkiadó, 2011), 31-32. 
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the Soviet Union.360 At the same time, the particular question of how to turn a practicing believer 
into an atheist acquired unprecedented significance for two reasons: first, because in the post-
Stalinist climate of the time, party leaders denounced repression and terror as instruments of rule 
with the removal of Alexandru Drăghici;361 and second, because good relations with churches 
and believers, indeed “the presence of religious life” in socialist Romania, remained central to 
the tightening of economic and political relations with “the west.” Thus, coercion was no longer 
the best option for socialist construction. The Party-state’s efforts turned to ideology as the 
single-most effective means for mass mobilization. In part, this foreshadowed the qualitative 
transformation of atheism over the next decade. What also helped propel atheism to the center of 
party concerns was a concrete incident. On Christmas Day 1968, a student demonstration took 
place in the heart of Bucharest that raised tensions in the Central Committee, already high 
because of Ceaușescu’s famous bravado against the crushing of the Prague Spring. 
 
Of Hooligans, Christmas, and Atheist Experts 
 Ceaușescu’s “Balcony Speech” on 21 August 1968 denounced the Soviet-led invasion of 
Czechoslovakia and sought to demonstrate the unity of the Romanian people around the 
leadership. While in hindsight “performing disapproval of the Soviets” was “the best card” the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
360 I have not encountered any evidence in the Central Committee Files or in the local archives confirming that these 
measures were cleared by the Central Committee and sent to the regions. Because of the Prague Spring and the 
French May, 1968 was a particularly precarious year in which the regime wanted to avoid popular 
demonstrations. Therefore, it is very likely that these measures never left the Agitprop’s desk. 
361 As Berindei, Dobrincu and Goșu note, by constituting a commission in 1965 to “reveal” the abuses and illegal 
acts of the Securitate in the 1950s and early 1960s, Ceaușescu sought to distance himself from the Dej regime 
and “fashion himself as a liberal in the public opinion.” Berindei, Dobrincu, and Goșu, 7. The content of the 
commission’s report was discussed initially in closed sessions of the Central Committee in 1967 but in 1968 
local party committees were informed of its “findings.” Deletant, Ceaușescu and the Securitate, 79. The 
commission’s report was presented to the party’s local committee in Harghita county on 28 April 1968 during 
the presence of Mihai Gere, deputy member (membru supleant) of the Executive Committee. See, National 
Archives of Harghita County [Arhivele Naționale Direcția Județeană Harghita, henceforth ANDJHR], Fond 
Comitetul Județean P.C.R., inv. 851, File 2/1968, f. 23-87. 
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party leader played in his entire career both domestically and internationally, late 1968 was a 
precarious time for the RCP.362 The Ceaușescu regime was at the height of its isolation in the 
socialist camp. This was, therefore, a time of maximum prudence. Indeed, the threat of Soviet 
invasion seemed real enough to mobilize the army, call able-bodied Romanians into the newly 
formed patriotic guards (gărzile patriotice), and to contact the Yugoslav leadership, the only 
other signatory of the Warsaw Pact that had not participated in the offensive against the Prague 
Spring.363 In fact, according to the new leading party propagandist Dumitru Popescu, nicknamed 
“the Almighty,” August 1968 marked the beginning of the ideological ”frost” – commonly dated  
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
362 Corina L. Petrescu, “Performing Disapproval Towards the Soviets: Nicolae Ceaușescu’s Speech on 21 august 
1968 in the Romanian Media,” in Between Prague Spring and French May: Opposition and Revolt in Europe, 
1960-1980 ed. Martin Klimke, Jacco Pekelder, and Joachim Scharloth, 2nd ed. (London: Berghahn, 2013), 199-
210.  
363 Burakowski, Dictatura lui Ceașescu, 129-135. Forseeing the possibility of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia 
already in July, the Central Committee asked the Chinese Communist Party to keep an eye on the Prague Spring 
and to prevent the Soviet Union from embarking on a “military adventure” that could threaten other socialist 
states. ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secţia Relaţii Externe, File 103/1968, f. 2- 15. The idea to contact the 
Yugoslav party, mobilize the military and form the patriotic guards were decided already on the day of 
Ceaușescu’s speech. See ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Cancelarie, inv. 2574, File 133/1968, “Stenograma 
şedinţei Comitetului Executiv al C.C. al P.C.R. din ziua de 21 august 1968,” f. 6- 26. ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., 
Administrativ-Politică, inv. 3059, File 5/1968, “Planul de măsuri al Ministerului Forţelor Armate,” f. 81- 82. On 
August 26 the Central Committee instructed county party committees to organize, train, and arm the patriotic 
guards in their jurisdiction. Ibid, f. 83- 84. A month later the Permanent Prezidium approved the army’s proposal 
to extend the term of 55.000 soldiers on reserve by 1-3 months. ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Cancelarie, 
inv. 2574, File 164/1968, f. 2. 
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after the July Theses of 1971.364 In this volatile political environment, it is unsurprizing that the 
so-called “Christmas Demonstration” rattled the Central Committee without fail. Because it 
revealed a dent in the party’s legitimacy, there was fear that Christmas 1968 could serve as an 
excuse for a Warsaw Pact invasion. Indeed, as historian Adam Burakowski argues, these were 
the reasons why the party leadership acted energetically to an otherwise “banal incident” and 
why the event became an ideological ”turning point” for the Communist Youth Union and the 
party, more generally.365  But the Christmas Demonstration did not only convince the regime to 
pink-slip its limited thaw. In marked distinction from the 1966 campaign, this incident also 
propelled the party to involve “atheist experts” in Central Committee conversations.  Without 
precedent, this move subsequently prepared the way for quintessential changes in the regime’s 
atheist endeavors over the course of the 1970s. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
364 In his memoir Popescu states that “there was no ‘mini-cultural’ revolution, the frost started in 1968” because of 
the acuteness of the Soviet-Romanian conflict. Dumitru Popescu, Cronos autodevorându-se: Panorama 
răsturnată a mirajului politic (Bucharest: Curtea de Argeș, 2006), 232.  
     After the marginalization of Leonte Răutu, Dumitru Popescu (born in 1928) became the chief ideologue of the 
Ceaușescu regime. At this time, he was a member of the Central Committee (1965-1989) but he later received 
appointments in the Secretariat (1969-1989) and the Executive Committee (1969-1989). In 1950-1956, he was 
editor of the cultural magazine Contemporanul. After completing a six month course on the press at the Higher 
School for Social Sciences A.A. Jdanov in 1956 in Moscow, he had a stellar career in the Romanian socialist 
media. He was chief-editor of the Youth’s Spark (1956-1960), General Director of the Romanian press service 
AGERPRESS (1960-1962), chief editor of The Spark (1965-1968), president of the National Council of 
Romanian Radio and Television (1971, 1976-1978), and head of the Central Committee’s Press Department until 
1977. He was also the chief figure in the state administration of socialist culture in the Ceaușescu era, being the 
president of the Council  for Socialist Education and Culture in 1971-1977. In the 1980s, he was named rector of 
the Pary Academy Ștefan Gheorghiu (1981-1989) and member of the Academy of Socio-Political Sciences. 
Florica Dobre et al, Membrii C.C. al P.C.R., 1945-1989: Dicționar (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedică, 2004), 
480-481. According to Vladimir Tismăneanu, the epithet “the Almighty” was attached to Popescu’s name when 
his despotism and narcissism became evident during his time at The Spark. Vladimir Tismăneanu, “Cine a fost 
Dumitru Popescu-Dumnezeu? Marele pontif al religiei politice ceaușiste,” 3 December 2011, at 
http://www.contributors.ro/cultura/cine-a-fost-popescu-dumnezeu-marele-pontif-al-religiei-politice-ceausiste/ 
(last accessed 29 January 2015). 
365 Burakowski, 134. Comisia Prezidențială Pentru Analiza Dictaturii Comuniste, Raport Final (Bucharest: 
Humanitas, 2006), 153. 
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Possibly a reverberation of the global youth movements at the time, the “Christmas 
Demonstration” began on 25 December 1968 as a student caroling and it caught the authorities 
completely off guard. Virgil Trofin, the head of the Secretariat recounted the events the next day. 
“At 2:30 in the night a group of hundred students, initially gathered at the Medico-
Pharmaceutical Institute, proceeded to the other dorms.” In ever-greater numbers eventually 
reaching a thousand, the columns of students moved through the main arteries of central 
Bucharest, past the University of Bucharest, across the Magheru Boulevard and on to the 
Romana Square. Ululating and caroling with fir in their hands, they apparently caused such an 
“infernal noise” that “the phones could not be used” in the Central Committee.366 According to 
Anca Șincai, a participant at the events, as they danced the nationalist Round Dance of 
Unification (Hora Unirii) on the main squares, the students managed to attract the attention and 
sympathy of the capital’s inhabitants, some of whom joined after the Christmas mass.367 To 
avoid escalation, party leaders ordered the Securitate and the police to stand down and they did 
not wake Ceaușescu up – as historian Burakowski suspects, for fear that first secretary would 
resort to force and undo the gains of August 1968. It was only at the behest of Cornel Pacoste 
and Marin Rădoi, leading party secretaries at the University Center and the city of Bucharest that 
the crowds finally dissipated from the North Railway Station.368  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
366 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Cancelarie, inv. 2574, File 216/1968, ”Stenograma ședinței Comitetului 
Executiv al C.C. al P.C.R. din 25 decembrie 1968,” 7-12. Published in Adam Burakowski, “Un eveniment 
important aproape necunoscut: demonstrația studenților din București, 24 decembrie 1968,” Arhivele 
Totalitarismului 14, no. 1-2 (2006): 243-247. Quotations are from p. 244. 
367 See Adrian Cioflâncă’s interview with Anca Șincai, ”Cum am devenit instigatoarea numărul unu,” Revista 22 (22 
December 2006), at www.revista22.ro/cum-am-devenit-instigatoarea-numarul-unu-3330.html (last accessed 15 
January 2015). 
368 Burakowski, ”Un eveniment important,” 239.  
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Although hardly a political protest, this rare manifestation - spontaneous rather than 
officially organized – drew the interest of the Soviet, Polish, and East German embassies and 
elicited a disproportionate response from the Romanian party elite.369 On December 27 the 
Council of Ministers extended the winter holidays, as a result of which students left the capital in 
substantial numbers.370 Along with two other colleagues, Anca Șincai was arrested for 
demanding ”Freedom for students!” in front of the U.S. Embassy. Universities expelled 
numerous students or called upon them to publicly unmask themselves.371 Disciplinary measures 
also reverberated through the highest party ranks. Ion Iliescu, head of the Ministry of Youth and 
first secretary of the Communist Youth Union (U.T.C.), along with other members of the UTC’s 
Central Committee underwent the ritual of “self-criticism” and were called upon to tighten 
ideological control over youth.372 For their negligence to stop such ”hooliganism” with mass 
arrests, the secretary for the Securitate Vasile Patilineț and the mayor of Bucharest Dumitru Popa 
received harsh reprimands from Ceaușescu himself.373  
Beyond the overall ideological tightening, Christmas 1968 gave a critical momentum to 
official preoccupations with atheism because it put the question of Orthodox religiosity squarely 
on the table. After all, the fact that the primary initiators of the manifestation were Romanian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
369 Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland, Fond DIR-0-24/1/69, W-9, File 28/74, 1-4. Published in 
Burakowski, ”Un eveniment important,” 240-243.  Polish political attaches gathered information primarily from 
the Soviet Embassy, which may have sought to exploit the event. To Moscow the embassy reported namely that 
besides “Liberty,” the crowds also shouted “Down Ceaușescu!” At this point, Anca Șincai and Romanian 
archival documents do not confirm that such denunciations of the party leader were uttered at the manifestation. 
370 ”Decretul Consiliului de Miniștrii privind zilele libere 3 și 4 ianuarie,” Buletinul Oficial (27 December 1968). 
371 Comisia Prezidențială, ibid. 
372 ANIC, Fond C.C. al U.T.C., inv. 3, File 15/1968, “Stenograma ședinței Biroului C.C. al U.T.C. din ziua de 26 
decembrie 1968,” f. 130. 
373 Burakowski, “Un eveniment,” 245. 
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students, without the involvement of priests or international religious organizations, meant that 
the event could not be explained away with the political narrative so characteristic of the 1966 
campaign. Indeed, at the emergency Executive Committee meeting on 25 December, Virgil 
Trofin and Nicolae Ceaușescu agreed that the Christmas incident pointed to a deep problem. 
Notwithstanding earlier efforts to revive atheism, “our conceptions about the world, life and 
society” remained utterly absent from all levels of instruction. As a result, the closing of this 
ideological void at the heart of communist education begged a more comprehensive re-
examination of atheist work, the Executive Committee concluded.374 In line with such 
instructions, Agitprop’s deputy head Petre Constantin promptly drew up a new proposal for 
measures and on 31 January 1969 convoked a meeting with “atheist experts” to consult on the 
revival of religiosity and the problems with atheism. As Constantin emphatically stated, the 
expected outcome of the forum was not an anti-religious campaign or militancy in atheist 
education; experts were to provide suggestions on how to transform atheism into a permanent 
and consistent activity.375  
 
“How Do We Stand With Religious Mentality? We Have To Know Too” 
The party cadres and academics who gathered at the Agitprop in January 1969 addressed 
some of the more fundamental, theoretical and practical, challenges that confronted atheist work 
under the new regime. Indeed, the most striking and revealing discussion at the meeting revolved 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
374 Burakowski, ”Un eveniment important,” 239-240. The fact that Christmas 1968 propelled central party organs to 
prioritize atheism is underscored by the declaration of Ilie Rădulescu, the head of the Department of Agitation 
and Propaganda during a control visit to Harghita county. He informed the county committee of the recent 
student manifestation at Christmas in order to emphasize that ”atheist-scientific education of the people was a 
permanent concern in party work.” Direcția Județeană Harghita a Arhivelor Naționale, Fond C.J.P.C.R., inv. 851, 
dos. 3/1969, ”Proces verbal al ședinței ordinare a biroului Comitetului Județean din 14 mai 1969,” f. 119. 
375 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Propaganda and Agitation, inv. 2898, File 5/1969, ”Stenograma ședinței din 31 
ianuarie 1969 pe tema propagandei ateist-științifice,” f. 15-16. 
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around the nexus between the thaw and religiosity, the historic interference between religious 
and Romanian culture, the very typology of religion, and importantly, the institutional demotion 
of atheist education after 1963. This forum revealed a significant departure from the rhetoric of 
the 1966 campaign and marked the emergence of new directions in atheist propaganda.  
As the regime’s reach for “national authenticity” in the 1960s translated into a more 
moderate church policy and promoted the selective embrace of pre-socialist cultural heritage, 
numerous experts at the meeting worried that atheism was quickly losing ground to religion. The 
liberalization of the socialist press and the penal code caused a series of difficulties with the 
churches and intellectual circles, in particular. As the head of the Department of Cults Gheorghe 
Nenciu376 explained, depictions of the Pope as a “champion of [religious] reform, progress and 
peace” in Contemporanul convinced church leaders that “we have abandoned atheist 
propaganda” and that certain publications even promoted pro-religious positions. Moreover, 
Pope Paul VI’s photograph and an article in Luceafărul, the weekly of the Romanian Writer’s 
Union, “encouraged Catholic elements in Transylvania who think of the re-establishment of the 
Greek-Catholic church, [and] of the intensification of religious life” arguing that new trends in  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
376 According to a biography prepared by the Securitate, Gheorghe Nenciu, born in 1922 in the village of Bălteni 
close to the capital, graduated from the Department of Philosophy and joined the P.C.R. in 1945. After 
working for the Securitate in 1945-1952, he was retired and excluded from the party on grounds that his father 
had been a kulak and a member of the National Peasant Party. In 1953 his exclusion was revoked and he 
joined the Ministry of Cults as a chief inspector. The Securitate characterized him as follows: ” In his activity, 
Nenciu is appreciated as a reliable cadre with good professional training, aware of religious problems and 
politics, energetic, [and] principled in work. At his post, he proved to have sense and tact in relation with 
church representatives in the country, reason for which he won their respect and consideration; he militated for 
the application of our party’s policy in this domain of activity. He represented the interests of our state in an 
appropriate manner during his contacts with church representatives from abroad.” ACNSAS, FD/Bucureşti, 
File nr. 11206, vol. 9, f. 198-198v. Qtd. in Adrian Niculae Petcu, “Activitatea Departamentului Cultelor în 
atenția Securității, 1970-1989,” Caietele CNSAS 2, no. 4 (2009), 73-74. 
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socialist legality provided protection and public space for religious manifestations.377 In fact, 
academician and propagandist Constantin I. Gulian378 emphasized that the recent “concessions 
towards anti-Marxist and non-Marxist ideology” put atheist education on the defense on all 
fronts. Suspending rigorous censorship, state publishers competed to re-print interwar 
Orthodoxist philosophy and literature and in the process recent Marxist publications ended up at 
best equaling rather than outweighing the massive number of such works.379 As the socialist 
press abandoned its role in providing ideological guidance on Marxist-Leninist concepts, 
religious poetry appeared in Contemporanul, the organ of the State Committee for Culture and 
the Arts. Because of such a retreat in the ideological battle against religion, Gulian observed, in 
literary circles and among students at the institutes of art, the departments of philology and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
377 Nenciu stated that he had “an entire file” on such problems. ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Propaganda and 
Agitation, inv. 2898, File 5/1969, ”Stenograma ședinței din 31 ianuarie 1969 pe tema propagandei ateist-
științifice,” f. 38. 
     Art.319 of the new penal code made the disruption or obstruction of the religious practices of a legally 
recognized cult punishable by imprisonment from one to six months. It sanctioned the same punishment in cases 
when a person was pressured to participate in religious rituals or to carry out a religious act pertaining to a cult. 
“Codul Penal,” Buletinul Oficial no. 55-56 (23 April 1973). While still prohibiting religious proselytizing, this 
article allowed some degree of public presence for cults and thus qualified provisions in the 1948 Law of Cults, 
which had enclosed religious activity within church walls deeming all public religious manifestations contrary to 
public order and “good morals.” 
378 Constantin I. Gulian (1914-2011) was a philosopher. In 147 he acquired a doctorate in philology from the School 
of Literature and Philosophy at the University of Bucharest. He later became the head of the Department of the 
Philosophy of History (1953-1975), the head of the Academy’s Institute of Philosophy and History (1954-1971).  
Besides being a visiting professor in Bruxelles, Heidelberg, and Paris, he also taught in Warsaw, St. Petersburg 
and Moscow probably in the 1950s. According to Vladimir Tismăneanu, he was instrumental in condemning 
interwar Orthodoxist philosophers and in the drawing up a Zhdanovist canon of Romanian and universal 
philosopy during the early 1950s. Vladimir Tismăneanu, “C.I. Gulian, exterminatorul filosofiei românești,” 
România Literară no. 2 (12 January 2012), at 
http://www.romlit.ro/c._i._gulian_exterminatorul_filosofiei_romneti (last accessed 6 September 2014). 
379 Explicitly, Gulian brought up the recent re-publication of Blaga’s three volume work Trilogia culturii and 
Constantin Noica’s books in which, among others, he reread Plato through Hegelian philosophy: Douăzeci si 
sapte de trepte ale realului (Bucharest: Editura Științifică, 1969) and Platon: Lysis (cu un eseu despre înțelesul 
grec al dragostei de oameni si lucruri) (Bucharest: Editura pentru Literatură Universală, 1969). 
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philosophy, it suddenly became “bon ton to wear a cross and to swear by [Lucian] Blaga and 
other representatives of idealism.”380  
The party’s attempt to present a future classless society through the cultivation of 
Romanian folklore also placed serious demands on atheist education, especially around religious 
holidays.381 As Tache Aurelian, 382 professor of philosophy at the University of Bucharest 
suggested, the Christmas Demonstration was in some ways an outcome of the folklorization of 
cultural life. To illustrate this point, he recounted that when the Polytechnical University invited 
the choir of the University of Bucharest to sing “winter songs,” certain university students and 
faculty endorsed caroling as part of folk customs and could not or appeared to be unwilling to 
differentiate between folklore and “mystical influence over popular customs.” Worse yet, during 
Easter “illustrations with red eggs, [and] Jesus Christ” became increasingly frequent in socialist 
commerce; this phenomenon evolved to the point where shop windows “were studded with red 
eggs.” 383  Such customs were not lay, Aurelian warned, and raised questions about how atheists 
should deal with holiday traditions that were so thoroughly anchored in Christianity. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
380 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Propaganda and Agitation, inv. 2898, File 5/1969, f. 21 and 28. The two poems 
Gulian mentioned were Eugen Jebeleanu’s “Rugăciune” and Geo Bogza’s “Psalm” published in 1968 and 1969, 
respectively. 
381 On the turn away from the proletarian folklore of the 1950s towards peasant culture see Vintilă Mihăilescu, “A 
New Festival for the New Man: The Socialist Market of Folk Experts during the ‘Singing Romania’ National 
Festival,” in Studying Peoples in the People’s Democracies II: Socialist Era Anthropology ed. Vintilă 
Mihăilescu, Ilia Iliev and Slobodan Naumović, Halle Studies in the Anthropology of Eurasia vol. 17 (Berlin: LIT 
Verlag, 2008), 59-60. 
382 Tache Aurelian (1930-1991) graduated from the Department of Philosophy at the University of Bucharest and 
obtained his Ph.D. at the University of Leningrad with a thesis entitled “Religious alienation and human 
emancipation.” After his return to Romania in 1955, he taught at ancient, medieval, and renaissance philosophy 
as well as the philosophy of religion at his alma mater. Vladimir Tismăneanu recalls him as “the official atheist.” 
See ”Politologie și conformism în Epoca de Aur,” last accessed 20 January 2015 at 
http://www.contributors.ro/cultura/politologie-si-conformism-in-%E2%80%9Eepoca-de-aur%E2%80%9D-
cazul-ovidiu-trasnea/ (last accessed 6 September 2014). 
383 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Propaganda and Agitation, inv. 2898, File 5/1969, f. 34. 
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In effect, atheists argued that by revisiting the national agenda, the Ceaușescu regime 
removed an important ideological barrier to religious influence in both elite and folk culture. 
Such developments placed new imperatives on atheist work.  Atheists claimed, for instance, that 
the laicization of “national traditions” – in other words, the detachment of the “mystical,” 
“idealist” dimensions of cultural heritage from its inherently historical and aesthetic values – was 
increasingly a priority. In order to reinstate ideological rigor in this sense, Constantin I. Gulian 
noted that atheists required assistance from philosophers of culture and folklore specialists as 
these experts could “clarify” difficult questions that were bound to emerge about “religious 
paintings” (icons) and customs.384 But while imperative, atheists also agreed that the symbolic 
reevaluation of national heritage had to remain a fine instrument in the battle against belief; it 
could not dovetail into crude Soviet methods such as the museification of church monuments and 
the banning of religious practice. The head of the Department of Cults Gheorge Nenciu criticized 
Agitprop for proposing such measures in the first place. Religious service had to continue at 
these monuments and the guides had to remain priests who were instructed “to emphasize the 
historical and artistic value of the respective monument.” In effect, he reminded party leaders not 
only that the very “brand” of Romanian socialism was at stake but that closing a handful of 
churches was tantamount to a proverbial drop in the sea. Foreign tourists “had to find religious 
life,” Nenciu exclaimed “because otherwise they will say: the Romanians closed [their] churches, 
they made them into museums. That’s what they say about the Russians. Now let us judge: in 
this country we have 12,000 churches total. If we close 10, do we solve the problem?”385 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
384 Ibid, f. 24. 
385 Ibid, f. 41. 
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As atheists pointed to the new ideological challenges that the thaw imposed on their 
work, what the transformation of atheism actually entailed in terms of methods led to even more 
probing questions. Alexandru Koppándi,386 head of the press sector, criticized Agitprop for 
resorting to outdated forms of propaganda and for providing local organs with instructions that 
were essentially meaningless. 
 
On page 8 it is written that atheist work should be conducted in a differentiated 
way. Such a general instruction does not solve any problems. Because we are not 
giving such instructions for the first time […] And then, county committees will 
also pass on instructions for differentiated work. In my opinion we have to decide 
what we intend to do, with whom and where? Because we are battling mysticism 
in a completely general manner regardless of what cult people belong to, how 
accentuated their belief is, etc. […]387 
 
The problem, Koppándi implied, was that whereas the political narrative distinguished between 
confessions, its typology of religion did not inform atheist work in a substantial manner. In fact, 
being directed from Bucharest, atheist-scientific propaganda was attuned principally to the 
specificities of the majority cult but could not properly address a Calvinist, Roman-Catholic, or 
Lutheran audience.388 In part, this state-of-affairs was the result of an “utter crisis in atheist 
lecturers from among the minorities,” explained Paul Popescu-Neveanu, a long-time atheist cadre 
of the Council for the Dissemination of Science and Culture.389 Yet, considering that the party-
state deemed certain religious organizations more dangerous than others, contradictions of this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
386 Alexandru Koppándi (born in 1929) studied at the Higher School of Social Sciences A.A. Zhdanov (1952) and at 
the Higher Party School of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Moscow (1953-1956). He became an 
instructor at Agitprop in 1963 and later led its department for propaganda and press. He rose within the ranks of 
the Central Committee, becoming first a deputy member (1974-1984) and later a full member (1984-1989). For 
his complete biography see Dobre, et al., Membrii C.C. al P.C.R., 351-352. 
387ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 5/1969, f. 29 and 31. 
388 Ibid, f. 32. 
389 Ibid. 
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nature had serious repercussions for the battle against religion. To provide an illustration to this 
point, an expert recounted that, in the German village of Cisnădioara, the Lutheran pastor was 
ironically “the most devoted propagandist” against Baptists. Although not an adherent of 
atheism, the pastor not only prevented neo-Protestant proselytizing – a key concern for the 
regime – but instructed his fellow churchmen to be thankful for the party’s contribution to 
nuclear peace and mobilized them to participate in socialist life, at political meetings and cultural 
events. “Throwing all believers in the same basket,” the expert poignantly observed, prevented 
scientific-atheist brigades from recognizing opportunities for temporary, yet beneficial alliances 
with major cults.390  
 For many who took part at the Agitprop meeting then, the future of atheist work 
ultimately hinged on its ability to reach believers more effectively. It was admitted at this point, 
that notwithstanding the party’s ritualistic focus on quantity, statistics about lectures, scientific 
brigades, and brochures were a poor indication of success against religion because they obscured 
a crucial qualitative element – namely, that propagandists were out of touch with the flesh-and-
blood believer, especially in rural areas.391 As a result, experts increasingly articulated two new 
objectives for atheist work. First and foremost, to become more persuasive, the ideological 
establishment needed to acquire an accurate understanding of individual believers on the ground 
and the micro-social environment of their local communities and family. This in turn imposed 
the need for a new kind of atheist worker - not the occasional lecturer - but someone who was 
embedded in local social relationships and could provide a continuous counterweight to the local 
priest in the community.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
390 Ibid, f. 33. The person is not named in the document.  
391 Ibid, f. 18. 
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As an established propagandist with substantial training in sociology and psychology, 
Popescu-Neveanu392 was uniquely aware of the latest trends in atheist education across Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union.  It is not surprising, therefore, that he articulated the new path 
forward the clearest. Popescu-Neveanu dreamed of a permanent “counter-priest” in every 
village. Teachers or medics, who had their heart set on atheist work, could elucidate local 
conditions by gathering crucial ethnographic and sociological data. They were also uniquely 
capable to offset the social embeddedness of priests. Unlike outsiders, Popescu-Neveanu 
implied, local intellectuals had a “social status” and like the priest could work “from man to 
man” without any mediation.393 Ultimately, however, the development of applied and effective 
methods in cadres’ work called for a centralized understanding of the psycho-social realities and 
traditions on the ground. Since both top and local organs had poor knowledge of actually-
existing religion, Gulian concluded, “our sociology needs to undertake what the comrades in 
Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia completed: sociological, scientific research. How do we stand with 
religious mentality in our country? […] We have to know the truth too! How do we stand?”394 
The Agitprop’s forum in January 1969 became an appraisal of atheist propaganda as it 
had pursued not only since the thaw but already during the early Dej period. Consensus emerged 
around two key arguments: first, that the pursuit of a distinctively Romanian socialism presented 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
392 Paul Popescu-Neveanu (1926-1994) was a student of Mihai Ralea, a social scientist and cultural figure with 
Marxist sympathies and affiliations to the interwar left-wing agrarian (poporanist movement), who had 
distinguished himself in social and national psychology, political sociology and the sociology of culture. 
Popescu-Neveanu also studied with Gheorghe Zappan, professor of experimental psychology. After graduating 
with a degree in psychology at the University of Bucharest, Popescu-Neveanu completed a doctorate at the 
University of Leningrad under the famous Soviet psychologist Vladimir Nikolaevich Myasishchev. Once he 
returned to Romania, Popescu-Neveanu joined the Society for the Dissemination of Science and Culture (after 
1963 the Council for the Dissemination of Science and Culture) and was named professor of psychology at the 
University of Bucharest in 1969. 
393 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 5/1969, f. 19-20.  
394 Ibid, f. 24.  
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new ideological challenges in the battle against religious belief; and second, that atheism could 
be transformed based on the empirical discovery of religiosity, not according to the dogmatic 
understanding that Marxist-Leninist ideology provided. Indeed, atheists’ emphasis on the 
subjectivity of the individual believer, the micro-environment of relationship networks, and 
research on social reality echoed revisionist arguments and reflected the push to depart from the 
Stalinist perspectives regarding the socio-economic determinism of the macro-level and the 
concomitant embrace of hyper-rational bureaucratic mechanism. 
Yet, while the atheist elite approved the party’s aspiration for new directions, the 
question of how to give atheism a home in the institutional ecology of the party-state remained 
open. This predicament had become quite serious since 1963 when, under the banner of de-
Sovietization, atheist work was scaled back, or as many at the meeting argued, disorganized. 
Indeed, Popescu-Neveanu noted that at the Committee for Culture and the Arts atheist activity 
had become “administratively hemmed in” to a department within the Committee’s Council for 
the Dissemination of Science and Culture. The repercussions for atheist education and the 
professionalization of atheist work were almost prohibitive. Emil Iordăchescu, the head of the 
Committee for Culture and the Arts, for instance, called attention to the fact that ”Bucharest was 
one of the few capitals in Europe without a planetarium.” This was a significant gap considering 
that harnessing popular enthusiasm about space travel for the popularization of science had been 
a priority for atheists in the Soviet Union.395 Additionally, there were few specially trained 
propagandists and no popular or scholarly atheist journal. Literature on issues of interest or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
395 Ibid, f. 45. It is quite significant that atheist reliance on cosmic enthusiasm was at its height in the Soviet Union 
in the same period when the Dej regime embarked on de-Sovietization. By 1969, however, the popularization of 
space explorations as a form of atheist education entered into an age of bane. Victoria Smolkin-Rothrock, “The 
Contested Skies: The Battle of Science and Religion in the Soviet Planetarium,” in Soviet Space Culture: Cosmic 
Enthusiasm in Socialist Societies ed. Eva Maurer et al. (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011), 57-78.  
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textbooks on methodology had also become extremely scarce. In order to achieve the goal of 
eradicating religion, Popescu-Neveanu concluded, there was a need for an organization “outside 
the party” that had “full liberty of action” and could become the bedrock of atheist propaganda in 
the country.396 
Part of a transnational network of Marxist-Leninist atheists set up on Soviet initiative, 
Romanian experts were aware that the currents of post-Stalinist revisionism brought on sea 
changes in their work since the 1950s. Indeed, the official reliance on technocratic expertise, the 
rise of semi-official groups, and proliferation of institutions relatively independent from party  
control animated atheist propaganda across Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 397 It is not 
surprizing that, in an environment where atheist work was acquiring a better status and 
significant institutional resources, Romanian atheists called attention with a notable envy to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
396 Ibid, f. 16-17.  
397 While the richness of scholarship on Soviet atheism and the almost utter lack of similar works on Eastern Europe 
enables me to compare the evolution of the Romanian case only to the Soviet one, I do not wish to adopt a 
center/periphery model here. Soviet sources demonstrate, for instance, that atheists in Moscow were influenced 
by post-Stalinist atheist work in the Baltics and Bulgaria. According to Smolkin, the people’s universities were a 
“novel institution” in atheist work and were introduced by the Estonian “Knowledge” Society in 1959. Bulgarian 
atheist research and work also “provided an early model for the Institute of Scientific Atheism established in 
1964.  Smolkin, 112 and 190.  
     Programs for exchanging lecturers with various eastern European and Soviet atheist societies were established 
within the framework of national cultural treaties. These were used even in the early 1960s when Romanian 
atheist work was marginalized. Archive of the Ministry of Culture and National Patrimony [Arhivele 
Ministerului Culturii și Patrimoniului Național, henceforth AMCPN], Fond Comitetul de Stat Pentru Cultură și 
Artă, File 26297/1962-1964, File 26297/1962-1964, “Notă,” 4 July 1964. f. [1]. Ibid, “Notă,” 16 April 1964. In 
1966 the Committee for Culture and the Arts sent several lecturers as part of the exchange program to the Soviet 
Union, Mongolia, China, East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Ibid, File 19483/1966, ”Planul de relații 
externe al CSCA pe anul 1966 ce privește Consiliul pentru Răspândirea Cunoștințelor Cultural-Științifice,” f. 3-
4. Ibid,”Situația schimbului de conferențiari cu străinătatea în anii 1960-1964,” f. 6-18. Ibid, “Notă privind 
schimburile de conferențiari cu străinătatea în anii 1964-1966,” f. 30-35. Romanian atheists and science 
popularizers were also invited to the conferences and congresses of sister-Knowledge societies where they took 
stock of atheist work in the broader socialist camp. A Romanian delegation participated in 1964 the international 
conference on adult education in socialist countries of Europe organized by the Czechoslovak Knowledge 
Society and in 1966 at the 4th Congress of the Urania Society in East Germany. AMCPN, Fond Comitetul de Stat 
Pentru Cultură și Artă, File 16398/1966, “Notă privind schimbul de lectori pe 1964 între R.P. Română și unele 
țări socialiste,” 29 May 1964, f. [1-3]. Ibid, “Informare,” undated, f.1-5.  
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advances other socialist countries had made on the atheist front. As Dan Marțian,398 the first 
secretary of the Communist Youth Union pointed out, ”in problems of scientific-atheism, the 
Soviets had several versions of textbooks, bibliographies, specialized institutions, [and] quite an 
elaborate literature.”399 Tache Aurelian added that Moscow University had a complete 
department of scientific-atheism with eight lecturers and two professors, a library, and 
department for scientific research, which taken together occupied an entire wing at the Faculty of 
Philosophy. The Hungarian Association for the Dissemination of Scientific Knowledge had 
twelve journals for the popularization of science, out of which Világosság (The Light) dealt 
solely with questions of scientific-atheism. Moreover, the Kossuth Club functioned as a 
methodological office (cabinet metodic): it had a tidy library and propagandists did not have to 
search for special bibliographies and publications ”while freezing”; rather they were handed the 
required materials and could commence work promptly.400 Even in staunchly Catholic Poland, 
the Society of Atheists and Freethinkers had a premier philosophical journal, its own press 
department, group of lecturers and a research section. Their scholars “were connected to the 
entire world and followed the religious developments in a perfect scientific manner.” As 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
398 Dan Marțian (1935-2002) joined the Communist Youth Union in 1952 and studied at the Institute of Economic 
Sciences in Bucharest for a year (1954) before being sent to pursue his studies in the Department of History at 
Lomonsov University, Moscow (1955-1960). There he was politically recognized and by 1958 he was appointed 
as the secretary of the Romanian Communist Youth Union in the Soviet capital. After his return to Romania in 
1960, he was immediately appointed as lecturer in the Department of Scientific Socialism at the School of 
Philosophy, University of Bucharest. His career within the party was at its height in the late 1960s up until 1974.  
See his full biography on the website of the Institute for the Investigation of the Crimes of Communism at 
http://mineriade.iiccr.ro/pdf/DAN%20Martian.pdf (last accessed 15 January 2015). 
399 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 5/1969, f. 36. 
400 Ibid, f. 25-26. 
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Aurelian noted, this was in stark contrast to Romanian atheists who found out about international 
conferences on scientific education from the pages of the foreign press, at best.401 
What imposed a similar professionalization of atheist work in Romania was not only that 
it lagged behind propaganda in other socialist countries but that it also lagged behind religion. 
Departing from earlier dogmatic positions, Romanian ideologists observed namely that religion 
was modernizing and ”backwardness” had become an attribute of atheism. One major change 
was that churches no longer rejected the scientific explanation of man and the universe but 
instead accomodated to science. To illustrate the process in the Catholic case, the head of the 
Department of Cults Gheorghe Nenciu recounted the recent declarations of Pope Paul VI. “Pope 
Paul was asked what he thought about the flight of the spaceship Apollo 8 [in 1968]. He 
declared: we are increasingly becoming Copernicans. But still you have to be proud that God 
chose Earth to send his Son; on this matter we are Ptolemaics.”402  
While this development prompted atheists to insist on the opposition between scientific 
materialism and religious cosmologies, it also raised questions about an important tenet of atheist 
belief. In these conditions was popularizing science still the most effective weapon against 
religion? According to the deputy head of Agitprop Petre Constantin, changes in church dogma 
were, in fact, the least dangerous aspect of Catholic modernization. From the perspective of 
socialist states, it was far more worrying that the Vatican accommodated to modernity by 
embarking on a social mission in the world. As Petre suggested, the fact that the church 
addressed this-worldly affairs – “social problems that worried people” such as poverty, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
401 Ibid, f. 17-18.  
402 Ibid, f. 42. 
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development, and human rights – meant that the Vatican had transformed itself into a new kind 
of ideological opponent.403  
The problem was, some atheists warned, that modernization was not particular to 
Catholicism. As Dan Marțian noted, the Soviets were preoccupied with this issue.404 Indeed, the 
fact that ”in our case these more contemporary, more modern problems of religion have not been 
studied with sufficient care” pointed to a potentially fatal oversight in atheist propaganda. After 
all, he explained: “our future work in this domain” hinged on understanding the penetration and 
adaptation of the modern aspects of religion.405 Nenciu summed it up neatly: “we have to 
modernize too.”406 
 But even as top level atheist cadres acknowledged that the institutionalization of their 
work was instrumental, many were uncomfortable with making atheism a visible aspect of 
propaganda, mainly because of the potential domestic and international repercussions. Returning 
to an earlier point, Gheorghe Nenciu observed, “We cannot forget that […] there is favorable 
talk about the existing liberties in Romania.” While atheist education was required, he advised 
against publishing instructions in the press or giving schools directions on what to do with 
parents. What was at stake was not only ties with western countries but Romania’s relationship 
with the diaspora. “We seek to draw the diaspora from abroad closer to the country and there are 
some nice, positive responses that are useful for us,” Nenciu explained. “We do not have to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
403 Ibid. Joel Krieger and Margaret E. Crahan, The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 737. 
404 Indeed, according to historian Victoria Smolkin, Soviet atheists perceived the modernization of religion primarily 
in the fact that the church ceased to reject science and defined its function primarily in the spiritual realm. In part, 
this was the reason why Soviet atheists lost trust in the powers of science to battle religion. Smolkin, 41-42. 
405 Ibid, f. 36. 
406 Ibid, f. 42. 
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create circumstances so that we are criticized in this respect.”407 The tension between the official 
aspiration for legitimacy and the ideological commitment to banish belief lay at the heart of the 
Romanian atheist endeavor, and, in this respect, the views of Nenciu were representative of the 
sensitive position in which atheists found themselves.   Indeed, Constantin I. Gulian also worried 
about adverse results and suggested that in order to prevent activists from being popularly 
dismissed as “anti-Christs,” the founding of an atheist society had to take place under “a more 
discreet veneer.”408 What became clear then was that, in having to navigate between the party’s 
political instrumentalization of church policy and its pledge to battle religious mentalities, 
atheists were entering a profoundly novel terrain.  
       Unprecedented, the Agitprop’s forum with experts in January 1969 pointed to the 
beginning of a dialogue between party leaders and the atheist ideological establishment – a 
dialogue that would unfold until the 1980s, admittedly on very unequal terms. At the same time, 
the involvement of experts also suggested that, despite the party’s ritualistic insistence on 
Romanian distinctiveness, conversations in the semi-official sphere from this moment onwards 
became increasingly informed by the very questions that Soviet and eastern European atheists 
had been struggling with since the 1950s as socialist regimes began grappling with questions of 
post-Stalinist reform.409  
The Party’s interest in expanding and improving atheist education was evident in the 
directive it published shortly after the meeting. Thus, in the brochure With Regard to Atheist-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
407 Ibid, f. 38. 
408 Ibid, f. 24. 
409 Scientists, philosophers, and other members of the academia were on the board of the Society for the 
Dissemination of Science and Culture (1948-1963) but up to this point they had never been invited to Central 
Committee meetings to decide on ideological questions regarding atheism. See Chapter One. For the evolution of 
Soviet atheism, see Smolkin, op.cit. 
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Scientific Education, Agitprop underwent a ritual self-criticism for previous failures and called 
on all institutions of the party-state to make the cultivation of atheist convictions a permanent 
aspect of their ideological work.  The brochure insisted that atheist education had to explicitly 
address “the opposition between science and religion” and denounce “the modernization of 
religion.” In line with experts’ recommendation, Agitprop reminded party cadres and cultural 
activists to adopt a “differentiated” approach to believers based on their education, ethnic and 
confessional belonging. It further concluded that in order to close the gap between atheist 
education and social reality, ”the particularities of scientific-atheist education among adults, 
children and youth” required research in the domain of the sociology and history of religion, the  
contemporary currents in idealist and religious philosophy, and in the methodology of atheist 
education. At the same time, the 1969 directive forbade “administrative measures” or any 
practices that “offended” believers on the grounds that constitutional provisions guaranteed the 
“freedom of conscience” for believers and atheists alike. Indeed, Agitprop reminded activists that 
atheist education had to remain “a work of persuasion” and had to avoid any semblance of a 
“campaign.”410 
 
Atheist Education “with Tact” 
 Beginning in the late 1960s, the Party invested unparalleled amounts of resources to 
make atheism a permanent component of propaganda work. Cadre training was becoming more 
systematic both in higher and local party schools. The Academy Ștefan Gheorghiu introduced a 
course “on the theoretical and practical questions of scientific education.” At institutions of 
higher-education, lectures addressed “the principal problems of atheism” in courses on Marxism-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
410 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă , inv. 2898, File 5/1969, ”Cu privire la activitatea de 
educație ateist-științifică,” 58-74. 
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Leninism, the social sciences, and teacher training. Similar themes were incorporated in 
ideological education at popular and workers’ universities on the county level and in the new 
“atheist-scientific circles” formed within mass organizations and schools.411 Aimed at the wider 
population, planetaria opened in 1969 in Constanța on the Black-Sea coast, and in Baia Mare, 
northern Transylvania.412 As Romanian public television entered its golden age under socialism, 
programs such as “Teleuniversity,” “At the Gates of Knowledge,” “Pupils’ studio” became a 
principal means to reach adults and especially the youth.413 Notwithstanding its previous 
renunciation of “administrative measures,” the Party also strenghtened the institutional 
supervision of churches in order to buttress the ideological battle against religious belief.  Thus, 
the new Law of Cults adopted on 15 August 1970 formalized restrictions on donations and  
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
411 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă , inv. 2898, File 5/1969, f. 71-72. Ibid, File 22/1970, f. 
5-7. 
412 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă , inv. 2898, dos. 5/1969, f. 84. The Agitprop’s 
brochure mentioned the construction of a planetarium in Bucharest as well. Curiously, however, this was never 
built. Rather, the city’s popular astronomical observatory, which existed since 1910, was supposed to fulfill this 
purpose, although it was far less equipped to do so as a planetarium.  
413 Ibid, f. 23. Dana Mustata, “Television in the Age of (Post-)Communism: The Case of Romania” in Popular 
Television in Eastern Europe during and since Socialism ed. by Anikó Imre, Timothy Havens, and Kati Lustyik 
(New York: Routledge, 2013), 47-64. She notes that from the 1970s, children’s and youth programming took up 
most of the broadcasting time on Romanian channels, p. 57. 
186 
 
	  	  
enforced party control over the Department.414  
Although atheist reform moved to the center of ideological concerns, the practical 
implications of party directives remained unclear for both local and central organs. Indeed, in 
1969-1970 Agitprop reports noted time and again that local party cadres were still reluctant to 
address religious mentalities. This problem, the explanation went, was due to both “the 
belittlement of the religious influence exerted by the cults and sects” and to “confusions about 
the politics of our state towards the church.” 415 But while Agitprop rehearsed dogmatic 
explanations to account for “failures,” the clarifications local party cadres solicited suggests that 
their disorientation was to some extent genuine and went back to the tension that emerged 
between a more liberal church policy and the renewal of atheist propaganda after 1965.  
Thus, when Central Committee inspectors went to the regions again in the summer of 
1969, they were confronted with requests for practical instructions on a range of issues. As Ilie 
Rădulescu the head of the Agitprop reported, at local party meetings “questions were asked 
whether the presidents of people’s councils, being also first party secretaries, could grant 
audience to servants of the church or if mayors had to accept invitations to participate in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
414 Consiliul de Stat, “Legea nr. 42/1970 privind organizarea și funcționarea Departamentului Cultelor,” Buletinul 
Oficial 103 (15 August 1970). The meaning of these changes was explained in detail in a RFE report. Whereas 
there was already an established practice to control donations and thereby restrict church income, such measures 
were not formally stated in the previous law of cults. See, Open Society Archives, Records of Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department, HU OSA 300-8-47-187-16, Situation Report 
Romania, 14 October 1970, “Department of Religious Cults Reorganized,” 9-11. 
 Donations became a problem because of the opening of borders and the political instrumentalization of churches 
in relation with “the west.” Thus, relying on the reports of the Department of Cults, Agitprop informed the 
Central Committee as follows: “The organization of the Hungarian Calvinist Federation of America sent priests 
donations in dollars by money-order […]. Roman-Catholic priests receive textiles for vestments for free in 
packages from Switzerland and Austria. Some Catholic priests received 13 Zündapp motorcycles from the 
Federal Republic of Germany for which they paid [a customs fee] of up to 1,000 lei based on petitions approved 
by the [Romanian] Ministry of Foreign Commerce.”  ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția, inv. 2898, File 5/1969, 
f. 7. 
415 Ibid, “Propuneri privind îmbunătățirea activității de educare ateist-științifică,” 27 December 1969, f. 120. 
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festivities organized for the visit of a prelate.” 416 Indeed, it seemed that for some members of the 
rank-and-file the permissiveness of church policy signaled that religious practice and party 
membership were compatible. During a session of the Executive Committee in February 1970, 
the Minister of Youth Ion Iliescu shared a story from his own family to illustrate such cases:   
  
I actually had a discussion in my family, with more simple folk. [They are] honest 
and devoted party members but they hold baptisms, [and] weddings with the priest. 
And I asked them why do they do that? To which they said that now the issues are not 
the same anymore [nu se mai pun problemele chiar așa] if comrade Ceaușescu meets 
with foreign prelates. So, people interpret these things in the wrong way.417 
 
Confusion about what measures the party’s position on religion actually entailed also 
extended to top organs. In 1968, when Archbishop Áron Márton performed chrismation in 
Harghita county for the first time in twenty years, the Department of Cults in Bucharest had 
instructed that its inspector “did not have the right” to be in these areas lest “his presence 
impeded this religious ceremony.” For this reason, in 1969, when the next chrismation tour was 
scheduled, the inspector asked central organs for clarification. He noted that approximately 
40,000 believers were expected to gather just in four out of the forty-five localities where the 
archbishop was scheduled to pass.418 It was indicative that Ilie Rădulescu himself felt the need to 
turn to Nicolae Ceaușescu before confirming to the county party secretary that “special cultural  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
416 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 5/1969, f. 93-94. 
417 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Cancelarie, inv. 2574, File 16/1970, “Stenograma ședinței Comitetului Executiv 
privind activitatea de educație ateist-științifică a maselor,” 10 February 1970, f. 53. 
418 Ibid, File 5/1969, “Notă,” 15 January 1969, f. 14.  
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and educational events” could be undertaken.419  
Unsurprisingly, Agitprop reports emphasized the adverse results of this confusion. For 
instance, party cadres in the southeastern counties of Gorj, Olt, Dolj and Vâlcea were criticized 
for concluding that there was no reason to intensify their struggle with religious mentalities 
because “they had no religious sects” in their districts, only Orthodox believers.420 Local organs 
in Suceava and Iași county exhibited “a certain [measure] of insecurity” about what actions to 
undertake. As a result, during the celebrations of Saint John the New and Saint Paraschiva, both 
of which “attracted [Orthodox] believers from cities and villages in significant numbers,” cadres 
ensured “the good provisioning of cities” but organized no ample cultural events to “captivate 
the interest” of citizens.421 The fact that local organs remained neutral to, or worse yet, 
inadvertently aided religious life prompted the party elite to formulate repeated proposals and 
directives. 422 Indeed, the struggle to clarify the correct line and marshal grassroots energies for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
419 Ibid, “Notă,” 23 May 1969, f. 95. A previous handwritten note by Ilie Rădulescu from 15 January 1969 had 
instructed the Harghita county party secretary Sándor Szekeres via C. Petre to undertake measures “as intense as 
possible” but “with a lot of care,” without creating an “unpleasant” situation. Szekeres was also directed “to 
inform us what they [the county party committee] think of doing [specifically].” ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., 
Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 5/1969, “Notă,” 15 January 1969, f. 14. After Szekeres informed 
Agitprop, Rădulescu went to Ceaușescu because the first page of the Agitprop’s May report on atheist education 
included the following handwritten note: “Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu has been informed. Special educational 
and cultural measures should be taken for the visit of bishop M.A. Signed Ilie Rădulescu, 26 May 1969.”  
420 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 8/1969, “Notă,” 5 April 1969, f. 7. 
421 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 22/1970, “Notă cu privire la aplicarea 
planului de măsuri aprobat de Comitetul Executiv al C.C. al P.C.R. pentru intensificarea activității de educație 
științifică,” f. 47. For other reports see ibid, Files 1/1970, 11/1970, 14/1970. 
422 For a list of proposals to “improve atheist education” and the resulting directives, see ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., 
Secția Agitație și Propagandă, inv. 2898, File 5/1969, “Propuneri privind îmbunătățirea activității de educare 
ateist-științifcă,” 27 December 1969, f. 118-121. Ibid, File 22/1970, “Măsuri privind îmbunătățirea activității de 
educare științitifică și de combatere a misticismului și obscurantismului din conștiința maselor,” f. 5-14. ANIC, 
Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Cancelarie, inv. 2574, File 136/1972, “Protocolul și stenograma ședinței 
Secretariatului C.C. al P.C.R. privind planul de măsuri pentru intensificarea activității de educație ateist-
științifică.” Ibid, File 1/1973, “Planul de măsuri,” 22 December 1972, f. 34-42.  
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the ideological battle against religion partly explains why discussions on atheism and religion at 
the top party level achieved their peak in 1969-1973 in terms of both frequency and verve.   
 But while the top organs exhibited increasing impatience with local cadres for not falling 
in line, the Central Committees official language on religion remained contradictory. In fact, in 
the attempt to reconcile liberal priorities in church policy with ideological discipline in atheist 
education, top party organs resorted to the promotion of “atheism with tact.” When Ilie 
Rădulescu, the head of Agitprop, presented an extensive “Proposal on Improvements in the 
Atheist-Scientific Education of the Masses” at the Executive Committee’s meeting on October 2, 
1970, several members cautioned against getting into a controversy with religious believers. 
After confessing that he was an atheist since he turned 19, Gheorghe Rădulescu, vice-president 
of the Council of Ministers, advised against touching upon “delicate religious feelings, which are 
not dangerous but are tied to traditions.”423 To avoid even the slightest semblance that the 
“Central Committee embarked on a campaign against religion,” which in turn was bound to 
trigger a backlash in popular religiosity and clerical activity, Rădulescu also suggested that 
measures elude the “obsolete” term atheist, emphasizing instead the struggle against 
“obscurantism” rather than religious phenomena. The entire affair had to be conducted “with a 
lot of tact” and with qualified cadres. “We should not go to simple folks and give them I-don’t-
know-what lectures,” Rădulescu concluded.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
423 The economist Gheorghe Rădulescu, nicknamed “Gogu” by Ceaușescu, joined the Romanian communist 
underground in the 1930s. According to Vladimir Tismăneanu, in December 1989 he was “the last member of 
the RCP’s old guard in the top of the party and state hierarchy.” Vladimir Tismăneanu, Stalinism for All 
Seasons: the Political History of Romanian Communism (Berkeley, 2003), 267. In the 1970s and 1980s, his 
village house in Comana gave home to a literary circle, quite popular among aspiring and established writers, 
much like Leonte Răutu’s. Lavinia Betea, “Cenacliştii de la Comana ajunseseră „sus”, iar patronul lor – la 
Spitalul 9,” Jurnalul Național, 10 May 2010, at m.jurnalul.ro/special-jurnalul/cenaclistii-de-la-comana-
ajunsesera-sus-iar-patronul-lor-la-spitalul-9-544050.html (last accessed 30 October 2013). 
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  Virgil Trofin, chairman of the National Union of Agricultural Production Co-operatives, 
János Fazekas, vice-president of the Council of Ministers, and Dumitru Popescu, secretary at the 
Central Committee, all nodded to these propositions in their own speeches. The person whose 
opinions most decisively shaped the measures in terms of ideological framing, institutional 
channels and audience was Nicolae Ceaușescu. The first secretary agreed with both Popescu and 
Gheorghe Rădulescu. The problem of “anti-religious education” could not be presented so 
ostentatiously “in today’s conditions.” “We have to keep in mind, in comrade Dumitru Popescu’s 
words, that it is a long process of thousands of years and we cannot, however and anyway we 
want to, liquidate this thing in a couple of years.” In this light, Ceaușescu concurred that “this 
formulation of atheist-scientific education” be taken out because it suggested the beginning of a 
campaign. Under the banner of “scientific education against mysticism and obscurantism,” the 
Central Committee was to initiate instead “a profound and multilateral endeavor for people’s 
education, in which people’s degree of knowledge, their levels and philosophical problems” 
would be considered. Rather than dogmatic solutions, this question needed a complex approach 
that addressed “the entire education and attitude of man in society and towards spirituality.” The 
reason for this was, as Ceaușescu admitted, that he ultimately prefered “the party member, who 
goes to church but who is disciplined in work, orderly and fulfils his obligation to the one which 
does not go to church but introduces disorder, indiscipline, [and] chaos in society.”424 
When a new direction on atheist education was under discussion at the Central 
Committee Secretariat in January 1973, concerns revolved again around visibility and potential 
accusations that the Party embarked on a campaign against believers. The initiative to establish a 
research department in the Institute of Philosophy at the Academy of Socio-Political Sciences 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
424 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Cancelarie, inv. 2574, File 16/1970, f. 46-54; Dobre, et al., Membrii C.C. al P.C.R., 
506-507. 
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that investigated the history, philosophy, and sociology of religion invited no objections. But top 
party members chided Agitprop for proposing to publish a Guide for the Young Atheist and a 
theoretical journal on the problems of atheism and religion.425 For Ceaușescu, the directive’s 
ideological orientation was “outdated by twenty years” and did not reflect “the conceptions of a 
governing party.” “The way it posed problems, it could only cause difficulties for us,” his 
explanation went. “We will have the same results as the Soviets had.”426 For this reason, the 
Secretariat rejected the document and resolved to discuss matters again at the Ideological 
Commission.427   
In fact, emphasis on “atheism with tact” remained in place for much of the 1970s. 
Evident already during the 1966 campaign and 1969, this rhetorical turn indicated that the party 
elite was holding back on ideological militancy. In part, the underlying desire was to avoid 
domestic and international criticism. At the same time, the reformist inspiration of atheist 
demands for professionalization, resources, and institutional autonomy threatened to supplant the 
party’s monopolistic claims to knowledge and power in the tradition of Stalinist political culture.  
For these reasons, party leaders in the end vetoed the publication of specifically “atheist” 
journals and magazines or the establishment of the kind of professional atheist institution that 
experts had requested.428 Indeed, the sole purpose of the Association for the Dissemination of 
Science, formally founded in 1969 under the aegis of the Committee for Culture and the Arts, 
was to mobilize intellectuals locally through the people’s councils. The Association received no 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
425 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Cancelarie, inv. 2574, File 1/1973, “Stenograma ședinței Secretariatului privind 
planul de măsuri pentru intensificarea activității de educare ateist-științifică,” 15 January 1973, f. 13-14. 
426 Ibid, f. 16.  
427 Ibid, “Protocolul ședinței Secretariatului,” f. 3. 
428 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Cancelarie, inv. 2574, File 16/1970, f. 47. Ibid, File 1/1973, f. 13-14. 
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administrative personnel of its own and since the president of the people’s council was also the 
local party secretary, its entire activity remained strictly under party control.429 In effect then, the 
party elite refused to extend Romanian atheists the same liberties and financial resources that 
their counterparts in other socialist countries seemed to enjoy. As the next chapter will show, it 
was only during the re-Stalinization drive of the late 1970s that the leadership began to feel more 
comfortable with ideological militancy. Indeed, a signal for “the hard line” came in 1979 at a 
meeting of the Secretariat. In contrast to his statement in 1970, on this occasion Ceaușescu 
pointedly declared that, having religious world views was no longer permissible for the 
communist rank-and-file.430  
As party leaders and prominent atheists took stock of religious life over the course of the 
early Ceaușescu era, they recognized that atheism was on the defense. Certainly, the regime’s 
liberal measures in the 1960s – among others, the pragmatic approach to religious organizations, 
the recovery of the great figures of interwar Orthodoxist cultural currents, and the opening of 
borders to “the west” – did not help. As this chapter demonstrated, the costs that the thaw 
involved for the atheist endeavor were not articulated at first; in line with customary narratives 
inherited from the Dej period, the ideological elite blamed the religious revival it discovered in 
1966 exclusively on the cults and the lower ranks of the party-state. Believers themselves 
appeared to be mere victims of a battle that communism waged exclusively with the churches. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
429 The initial 1969 directive with Regard to Atheist-Scientific Education that announced the foundation of the 
Association suggested that there were intentions to establish professional institutions. The directive stated 
namely that the Association would conduct research, train cadres, advise the Party on atheist educational policy, 
and conduct mass education with branches on the county level. ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Propagandă și 
Agitație, inv. 2898, File 5/1969, f. 80. This decision was revoked at an Executive Committee meeting on 10 
February 1970 when the new contours of the association were outlined.ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Cancelarie, 
inv. 2574, File 16/1970, f. 47-48. 
430 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Cancelarie, inf. 3129, File 54/1979, “Stenograma ședinței Secretariatului C.C. al 
P.C.R. cu privire la propaganda materialist-științifică,” 4 July 1979, f. 15. 
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Such observations remained part of the explanation for the persistence of religion until the end of 
the communist era. By the early 1970s, however, a qualitatively new rhetoric emerged about 
atheism because of the reverberations of revisionist Marxism in Romania. Indeed, the records of 
the Central Committee reveal that party leaders and prominent atheists became increasingly 
reflexive about the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of their work. As they 
observed, atheist education was out of tune with the different types of believers, their individual 
convictions, and their micro-social environment. Rather than being made self-evident through 
ideology, religious life needed to be empirically discovered. And, atheism needed locally 
embedded counter-priests if it was to bring social reality in conformity with the party’s 
ideological aspirations.  
This chapter showed, that a crucial fallout of this shift in perspective was that church 
policy and atheism parted ways. Whereas the administrative oversight and restriction of religious 
organizations remained an important instrument for the state, because of the political 
instrumentalization of religion on the international and domestic scene, church policy ceased to 
be unabashedly anti-religious. In fact, this change was the reason why the Department of Cults 
found itself in an increasingly precarious position. The new law of cults adopted in 1970 
strengthened the Department’s oversight of church institutions and finances but it had to 
maintain good relations with religious organizations at the same time. Unsurprisingly, because of 
its double-role, the Department soon came under the surveillance of the Securitate for being too  
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lenient and politically unreliable.431 Meanwhile, the burden of battling religion shifted from 
administrative measures overwhelmingly to the atheist project. Surely, the Central Committee 
pursued atheist education “with tact” and left contradictions between church policy and atheism 
in place. But although there was a certain break on ideological militancy, the regime’s 
committment to overcoming religion was evident in the mobilization of previously marginalized 
experts.  As the next chapter will reveal, even though they had to operate in a circumscribed and 
reduced institutional environment, professional atheists and researchers became instrumental to 
the transformation of atheism in the 1970s. Indeed, without their work, the turn of socialist 
culture to spirituality and the course of socialist humanism during the re-Stalinization of 
Romanian society cannot be fully understood.   
   
 
 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
431 The Securitate opened a file on the Department of Cults (then called the Ministry of Cults) already in 1955, 
Adrian Nicolae Petcu writes. This initial file appears to have been closed in 1973 at the recommendation of lt. 
col. Ion Baciu, the head of the Securitate’s Bureau for Cults, who proposed this measure on the grounds that “in 
the period that passed since the opening of this file, subjects with antecedents or ones that posed a social threat 
was significantly reduced.” However, in December 1974 the file was re-opened under nr. 1636. See, Adrian 
Nicolae Petcu, “Activitatea Departamentului Cultelor în atenția Securității,” Caietele CNSAS 2, nr. 4 (Winter 
2009): 69-120. 
195 	  
	  	  
CHAPTER FOUR 
ROMANIAN SPIRITUAL CULTURE: 
 FROM HOMO RELIGIOSUS TO THE PROMETHEAN MAN  
 
 
By the early 1970s, party leaders and atheist experts concurred that anti-religious 
measures, as they had been implemented during the previous decades, did not adequately address 
the complexity of religion on the ground or the challenges religion posed to Romanian socialism. 
Atheist work needed a radical overhaul, the conclusion was. But while the Central Committee 
issued repeated directives and instructed cadres to be “tactful” when confronting believers, the 
meaning of this new atheism, its relationship to orthodox forms of scientific education or to the 
broader agenda of inculcating “culturedness” remained obscure.  
Indeed, when the Executive Committee gathered in February 1970, party leaders raised 
further questions about the substance of atheism and future forms of propaganda. Recent 
directives continued to insist on the centrality of cultural and sports activities in atheist 
education. Yet, the Minister of Youth Ion Iliescu doubted, for instance, that cultural uplift 
provided the expected results. Recalling his experience with a policeman, Iliescu observed that 
people entered the church “with piety” and kept these places “clean.” To the house of culture, 
however, they went “both with a cigarette in the mouth and with dirty shoes.”426  
Traditionally, Marxist-Leninist ideology linked respect of collective property to the cult 
of work, morality, and socialist construction. In this sense, Iliescu suggested that mannered 
conduct in cultic buildings revealed citizens’ devotion to supernatural forces. Conversely, the 
lack of similar behavior in houses of culture reflected citizens’ tenuous emotional bond to 
socialism and imposed the urgent need for citizenship education (educație cetățenească).  For the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
426 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Cancelarie, inv. 2574, File 16/1970, “Stenograma ședinței Comitetului 
Executiv privind activitatea de educare ateist-științifică a maselor,” f. 52-53. 
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leading ideologist Dumitru Popescu, “the Almighty,” however, the key challenge was not how to 
stretch atheist education wider so as to better inculcate socialist norms of conduct. The issue was 
rather how to root atheism deeper in the philosophical questions of man’s social existence and 
his relation to nature. Cultural and scientific enlightenment remained important directions in the 
activity against mysticism, Popescu argued. But ultimately they were insufficient.  
 
Lecturers come to the village, [and] talk about atoms. But by talking to people about 
these things they do not become atheists. Even if you talk to them about heavenly bodies 
launched [into space] they still do not turn into atheists for this [atheist conviction] is a 
question of philosophy and [a question] of man’s effective relationship to nature. That’s 
why I say that raising the cultural level is not decisive. Indeed, we are witnessing a 
certain recrudescence of mysticism among men of culture, writers and artists, who are 
informed about the evolution of modern culture. […]  
 
For this reason we need to preoccupy ourselves more with propagating our philosophy 
[…]; we need to talk more about the fundamentals of this philosophy because this will 
help the person to orient himself towards [his fellow] man and nature.427  
 
Both Iliescu and Popescu disputed a key assumption of the established cultural narrative of 
religion, namely that there was a direct correlation between “backwardness” and “faith,” 
“culturedness” and atheism. At the same time, their comments pointed to two possible directions 
in atheist education. Work could focus on social manners, including the affective dispositions 
behind them, or on philosophical beliefs. But while Nicolae Ceaușescu promptly instructed that 
both directions should be incorporated in “the multilateral education of people,” the fundamental 
questions of atheism remained unanswered. Indeed, despite the party’s oft-repeated claim to 
ideological leadership, at the meeting of the Secretariat in January 1973 the party leader gave 
general instructions again: atheist education had to be conceived “as an activity for raising the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
427 Ibid, f. 54-55. Emphasis added. 
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cultural and scientific level of the population.”428 In effect then, while the religious dynamic 
during the thaw and the reverberations of post-Stalinist revisionism in Romanian Marxist theory 
pushed atheism to the center of official preoccupations, top party echelons provided no further 
direction for how either the meanings or methods of atheism needed to change with respect to the 
Dej years.   
The presence of a certain degree of circularity in Central Committee instructions meant 
that the task of re-thinking foundational issues fell on the shoulders of a new category of 
specialists: professional atheists and scholars of religion. What did this new atheism encompass 
explicitly and how could it be enriched by fields of knowledge, such as sociology, folklore, 
psychology, and religious studies overall? In essence, the fact that atheism had been exclusively 
guided by definitions of its obverse, religion, presented a challenge. One could hardly revise one 
without the other. Was religiosity then, as cruder Marxist-Leninist formulations had maintained, 
still an aberration of human history to be promptly engineered away? Or did it perhaps reflect a 
spiritual, in a certain sense even natural, response to the abiding problems of human existence? 
Conversely, could Marxist-Leninist atheism remain centered in a scientific negation of 
metaphysics or did it perhaps need to evolve into a kind of spirituality superior to religion?  As 
the Party was increasingly, though not unwillingly, forced to legitimize socialism in indigenous 
national terms, experts likewise had to articulate how their ideas diverged not only from religious 
worldviews but also from the atheism of their Soviet ideological rivals.  
These issues required conclusive answers both in terms of theory and method. But for 
most who joined this sphere of ideological work, the task was far from trivial. There were three 
important obstacles along the path. Interwar sociology, ethnology, and psychology produced 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
428 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Cancelarie, inv. 2574, File 1/1973, “Stenograma ședinței Secretariatului privind 
planul de măsuri pentru intensificarea activității de educare ateist-științifică,” 15 January 1973, f. 16 
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some valuable works on popular religiosity based on state-of-the-art methods for the time: 
surveys, participant observation, and systematic collection of literary and musical folklore.429 In 
1948, however, these fields were denounced as bourgeois pseudo-science, a turn of fortune that 
precipitated a nearly thirty year hiatus in the scientific study of religion.430 Second, to become 
aware of recent trends in Marxist-Leninist atheism, experts also had to overcome the setbacks 
that de-Sovietization in the 1960s imposed on their theoretical understandings and instruments in 
propaganda work. For atheists in the 1970s, all of this meant that they needed to construct a field 
for the scientific study of religion and atheism, train a new generation of specialists, revive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
429 These works emerged primarily in the framework of the Cluj School of Experimental Psychology and the 
Bucharest School of Sociology. For the key works in psychology, see Lucian Bologa, Psihologia vieții 
religioase: contribuții la studiul structurii și evoluției vieții religioase individuale (Cluj: Editura Cartea 
Românească, 1930). Anatol Chircev, Psihologia atitudinilor sociale: cu privire special la români (Sibiu: Editura 
Institutului de Psihologie al Universității din Cluj, 1941), E. N. Mărgineanu, ”Atitudinea față de biserică,” 
Revista de psihologie teoretică și aplicată 2, no. 1 (January-March 1939), 44-57. N. Rădulescu, “Raportul dintre 
superstiții și atitudini sociale,” Revista de psihologie teoretică și aplicată 4, no. 3 (July-September 1941), 302-
310. These works were mentioned in Petre Datculescu, Educația materialist-științifică a tineretului: cercetări 
psiho-sociale (Bucharest: Editura Politică, 1980), 65-72. For a short history of the school, see Traian Herseni, 
Cultura psihologică românească (Bucharest: Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1980), 244-248. 
     Hegemonic in the social sciences during the interwar period, the Bucharest School assigned special teams for the 
study of popular spirituality, religious/magical customs, as well as life-cycle and seasonal rituals. For a list of 
works, see Nicolea Dunăre, “Cultura populară în cadrul școlii sociologice monografice,” Revista de etnografie și 
folclor 25, no. 2 (February 1980), 148. On methodology, see Constantin Eretescu, “De Gustibus non 
disputandum … Romanian Folk Studies in the Fifties” in Studying Peoples in the Peoples Democracies II: 
Socialist Era Anthropology eds. Vintilă Mihăilescu, Ilia Iliev, and Slobodan Naumović (Berlin: LitVerlag, 2008), 
41-46. 
430 The 1948 Law on Education removed these fields from university curricula and research institutions. Numerous 
experts in these fields were purged. The official denunciation of bourgeois social sciences came in the form of a 
brochure by Leonte Răutu entitled Împotriva cosmopolitismului și obiectivismului burghez în științele sociale 
(Bucharest: Editura Partidului Muncitoresc Român, 1949). For the fate of sociology, see Eretescu, op.cit.  
     The regime did not deal as harshly with folklore because experts in this field were useful for introducing Stalinist 
proletarian folk culture. Zoltán Rostás’ interview with Mihai Pop, “the father of Romanian cultural 
anthropology” and former member of the Gusti School, in Sala luminoasă: Primii monografiști ai Școlii gustiene 
(Bucharest: Paideia, 2003), 315-316.	   Nevertheless, the 1950s and early 1960s were a low point for research on 
religious folklore as well. While writing the introduction to the Bibliography of Romanian Folklore for 1951-
1955, Ion Mușlea, the founder of the Folklore Archive in Cluj (1930) noted, ”I took out the chapters ”customs 
and beliefs” (one file for holidays and one file for juridical customs), ”carols” (only one text), ”mythology and 
religious folklore” (two to three files), ”popular medicine and exorcism” (no file – the same as in the case of 
ethnobotanics, magic and superstitions). The absence of these chapters reflects the new trends in our folk 
studies.” Ion Mușlea, Arhiva de Folclor a Academiei Române. Studii, memorii ale întemeierii, rapoarte de 
activitate, chestionare, 1930-1948 (Cluj-Napoca: Editura Fundației pentru Studii Europene, 2003), 248.  
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discussions on research methods, and conduct actual investigations to inform policy. As the 
previous chapter demonstrated, the impulse for this was strong. The discovery of the “humanist” 
Marx and the comparatively stronger embrace of post-Stalinist revisionism in some socialist 
countries engendered new approaches to religion and secularization.431 Leading Romanian 
atheists were convinced therefore that they lagged behind their more “modern” Soviet and East 
European colleagues.   
 Historical precedents and party priorities brought further pressure to “indigenize” atheism.  
In Greater Romania, social scientific interest in religious mentalities was animated by the 
political and cultural Orthodoxism of the era. As a result, most interwar social scientists ascribed 
the Orthodox Church and the peasantry – which was, at this time, overwhelmingly portrayed as 
mystical-religious – a significant role in the preservation of “Romanian spirituality” in the face 
of a totalizing rational modernity.432 Amidst the challenges of nation-building and the existential 
malaise after the First World War, such intellectual positions also held widespread authority in 
the public eye. As the RCP returned decidedly to the national idea in the mid-1960s, presenting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
431 Patrick Hyder Patterson, “The Shepherd’s Calling, the Engineers’ Project, and the Scientists’ Problem: Scientific 
Knowledge and the Care of Souls in Communist Eastern Europe” in Religion, Science, and Communism in Cold 
War Europe eds. Stephen A. Smith and Paul Betts (London: Palgrave, 2016), 55-76. 
432  Debates certainly existed but views about the modernizing mission of the Orthodox Church were prevalent 
particularly among the members of the Bucharest School of Sociology. Most notably, the “father” of the school 
Dimitrie Gusti attributed an important role to the church in the country’s evolution. Influenced by Durkheim’s 
views on religion as a social glue, Gusti regarded Orthodoxy as intrinsic to national community, order and 
development. While he recognized that religion’s precise nature could change, he believed that it would 
ultimately fit with and perform important social functions in the modern cultural nation-state that his sociology 
would help bring forth. Hence came his view that churches and monasteries constituted moral institutions of 
popular enlightenment. This also explains why young theologians and local priests were incorporated into the 
monographic research teams. Such views of the Orthodox Church imply that Romanian social scientists did not 
necessarily embrace the teleology of secularization and modernity so widely shared elsewhere. Raluca Mușat, 
“Sociologists and the Transformation of the Peasantry in Romania, 1925-1940” (PhD Dissertation, University 
College London, 2011), 239-241. Antonio Momoc, “Sociology and Theology: Building the Romanian Cultural 
Nation,” European Journal of Science and Theology 9, no. 4 (August 2013), 101-109. On debates see, George 
Enache, “Dezbateri privind rolul social, politic și național al BOR în prima jumătate a secolului XX,” Dosarele 
istoriei 12, no. 1 (January 2007), 28-40. Zigu Ornea, Anii treizeci: Extrema dreaptă românească (Bucharest: 
Editura Fundației Culturale Române, 1995), esp. 87-132. 
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atheism in a Romanian garb became increasingly a priority. For atheists, at stake was not simply 
obtaining privileges in the institutional ecology of a party state’s centralized structure – that is, 
political support, funds, new publishing outlets, and research facilities. Rather, what hung in the 
balance was gaining public recognition for the emancipatory potential of atheist spirituality from 
a public that was, historically speaking, profoundly alienated from Marxism, orthodox or 
otherwise. To recall the pessimistic remarks of Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea, the founding 
father of Romanian Marxism,  “not even the greatest optimist would dare entertain hopes that 
modern socialist ideas could take roots” in these plains.433    
By investigating how new approaches to religiosity and atheism informed the articulation 
of a “Romanian spirituality” and drove ritual reform after 1976, this chapter examines the 
qualitative transformation of the socialist sacred during Ceaușescu’s “golden epoch.” To this 
end, I rely on party newspapers, scholarly journals, and restricted research reports. As I 
demonstrate, echoing revisionist ideas, experts’ ideological discourse and their sociological 
research on popular faith re-shaped both the semantic content and methods of atheist work in 
instrumental ways. Indeed, empirical findings confirmed that besides its spiritual functions, 
popular religiosity persisted because it was embedded in “traditions” around life-cycle rituals and 
seasonal celebrations. As a result, the Central Committee embarked on the laicization of folk 
culture in an unprecedented manner, fashioning among others a centralized system of festivities 
under the umbrella of the biannual “Song for Romania" Festival.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
433 P. Axelrod, 'Bericht über den Fortgang der sozialistischen Bewegung: Rumänien', Jahrbuch für 
Sozialwissenschaft 11 (1881), 320-6. Qtd. in Michael Shafir, “Political Stagnation and Marxist Critique: 1968 
and Beyond in Comparative Eastern European Perspective,” British Journal of Political Science 14, no. 4 
(October 1984), 457.	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“What Do We Put In Its Place?” The Meaning of Atheism  
In the late 1960s, Ceaușescu’s declarations concerning the open nature of Marxism 
encouraged the intellectual diffusion of Hungarian and Czech revisionism in socialist Romania. 
This ideological opening allowed the publication of Marx’s early writings and the works of 
alternative theorists like Georg Lukács. Young Marx’s suggestion that religion fulfilled real 
human needs, being a means for the pyschological mastery of existential problems, and the 
spiritual dimension inherent in his emancipatory vision of society contradicted the vulgar 
materialist approach that after the Second International characterized Marxism especially in the 
Soviet Union. The strong philological relationship with Marx’s Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts (1844), in particular, also allowed theorists to return to problems of ethics, 
consciousness, the spirit, transcendence, and the role of the individual in history – themes 
previously expunged from orthodox Marxism.434   
Thus, when in the early 1970s Romanian experts set out to discuss problems of atheism 
in light of revisionist currents, fundamental questions about religion and humanism turned up on 
the pages of various publications with ever greater frequency. These included “informational” 
and “methodological” booklets restricted for the internal use of party schools and research 
institutions.435 Articles on the problems of atheism likewise appeared in “Socialist Era” (Era 
Socialistă) which, as the party’s premier theoretical journal, addressed a broader audience of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
434 Shafir, 453. Vladimir Tismăneanu, “From Arrogance to Irrelevance: Avatars of Marxism in Romania” in The 
Road to Disillusion: From Critical Marxism to Postcommunism in Eastern Europe (New York: Routledge, 
2015), 144-145. Boris Majer, “Marxism, Transcendence, and Spirituality” in Marxism and Spirituality: An 
International Anthology ed. Benjamin Page (London: Bergin&Garvey, 1993), 125-137. 
435 E.g. in Bucharest, the Party Academy Ștefan Gheorghiu and Center for Research on Youth Problems both 
published such booklets entitled Caiet documentar and Caiet metodic, respectively. 
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ideologically savvy party members.436 Meanwhile, journals in philosophy, psychology and 
sociology of the Academy of Socio-Political Studies provided experts with a professional 
medium for conversation and referenced scholarship on religion published abroad.437 Finally, 
atheists also addressed key questions in party newspapers – primarily, The Spark and the Youth’s 
Spark, in cultural-scientific magazines such as “Our Age” (Contemporanul), “The Cultural 
Guide” (Îndrumătorul Cultural) and “Science and Technology” (Știință și tehnică), or in books 
intended for the general public. Side-by-side, these publications reveal how, in the process of 
revising their assumptions, atheists reached a new conclusion – namely, that the communist 
future hinged less on the battle against religion than on the making of a socialist spiritual life, 
distinctly atheist and Romanian.  While they retained their materialist convictions, albeit in a 
tempered version, these experts argued that atheist education could not focus only on the 
cultivation of scientific rationality. In order to facilitate the spiritual development of the 
individual and society as a whole, atheism needed to fulfill man’s moral, emotional, and 
aesthetic needs and thus allow for self-creation and the transcendence of existential limitations in 
this world. 
Before religiosity became a central party concern in the late 1960s, Romanian cadres had 
operated with the understanding that atheism was predicated above all on the opposition between 
science and religion. Proponents of this view inherited the crude positivist materialism of Georgi 
Plekhanov, V.I. Lenin and Stalin. Formed in the scientific enlightenment programs of the Dej 
era, these cadres dismissed religious belief as cognitive fallacy and tied it to mechanistic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
436 The journal was named “Class Struggle” (Lupta de clasă) until 1972 when it changed its name to Socialist Era. 
For the purposes of clarity, in this chapter I only use the last name in the text and in the citations. 
437 Such theoretical discussions were featured primarily in the “Journal of Philosophy” (Revista de filozofie) and 
“Social Future” (Viitorul Social) as well as in “Forum: Social Sciences” (Forum: Științe Sociale), a journal of 
higher education. 
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processes of class exploitation at work in society.  Conversely, they had exalted the natural 
sciences for the ability to disprove religious cosmologies and regarded Marxism-Leninism, given 
its stature as a social science, to be uniquely suited for revealing the twinned, cognitive and class, 
roots of religion. It was historic man, the argument went, who invented gods in an effort to 
explain his own powerlessness over the arcane forces of the universe and who, for centuries, 
made afterlife an instrument of his this-worldly exploitation. According to this approach, 
believers were victims of deception, both of their own and that of religious institutions. Atheists, 
on the other hand, figured as relentless champions of science and reason who expelled the 
darkness of faith from believers’ minds to ensure class emancipation.  When considering these 
conventions, it is perhaps not surprizing that in the early 1970s some atheists took the party’s call 
to improve their work as a ritualistic cue to reiterate previous ideological formulas. Indeed, 
throughout the Ceaușescu era, textbook authors taught the military, in particular, that ending the 
life-cycle of religion hinged ultimately on scientific enlightenment and class struggle.438     
For the vast majority of professional atheists, however, the religious landscape of the 
1960s and young Marx’s insistence on the importance of individual subjectivity in history 
proved that previous approaches were inherently problematic and downright untenable. Atheism 
required insight from other fields of knowledge, primarily sociology, philosophy and 
psychology, and an answer to the question of why religiosity continued to retain, even increase, 
its appeal to individuals in the inhospitable conditions of socialism. Indeed, echoing earlier 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
438 Academia Militară, Ateism științific (Bucharest: Editura Militară, 1976), 6-8. Zoltán Farkas, Prelegeri de ateism 
științific și critica doctrinelor religioase (Cluj: Editura Universității Babeș-Bolyai, 1972), 105-106. Simion 
Asandei, Ateism și religie (Bucharest: Editura Militară, 1980). Simion Asandei, Omul, știința și religia 
(Bucharest: Editura Militară, 1985), 25-27. Petru Romănescu, ed. Probleme de educație ateistă (Bucharest: 
Editura Militară, 1971), 54-69. The view that atheism was based on the opposition between science and religion 
was also predominant in a particular sub-genre of atheist literature: science fiction novels. See, Alexandru 
Mironov and Mihai Bădescu, eds. Nici un zeu în cosmos:  culegere de texte de anticipație pe teme ateiste 
(Bucharest: Editura Politică, 1985). 
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remarks in discussions with the Department of Agitation and Propaganda in January 1969, 
atheists and other experts added further arguments in the print media for why enlightenment 
workers continued to miss their intended audience and simultaneously provided suggestions for 
the future direction of atheist work.  
In this broader atmosphere of criticism, certain publications went as far as to question the 
very need for atheism as a distinct sphere of socialist construction. Emblematically, for the front 
page of The Youth’s Spark, the main organ of the Communist Youth Union, the prominent 
sociologist Henri H. Stahl439 authored an incisive critique of scientific-atheist education: first, for 
arguing against religious ideology as if glaring distinctions between organized and popular 
religion did not exist; and second, for assuming that fighting “ideology with counter-ideology” or 
exposing “the absence of logic” in faith was sufficient to convert believers to atheism. “In our 
rural world,” Stahl argued, believers “had no clue about the details of church dogma”; they 
embraced pre-Christian, pagan beliefs, which had degenerated into superstition, and practiced 
rituals “only in the magical sense.” Furthermore, cadres were “turned a deaf ear” whenever they 
could not demonstrate at least as much familiarity with religious texts as believers had, even if 
this familiarity amounted to “ten quotations.” In the face of such religious mentalities, Stahl 
poignantly concluded, “Enlightenment discussions were useless and inefficient.” “You could not 
argue!” Instead of confronting the believer, atheists needed sociology to uncover the social roots 
of paganism and had to focus on eradicating “backwardness.” 440 What Stahl proposed then was 
that the objectives of atheist work were identical to the broader tasks of societal modernization: 
urbanization, industrialization, general education and social welfare.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
439 Henri H. Stahl (1901-1991) studied in Bucharest and became a key figure of the Bucharest School of Sociology, 
founded by Dimitrie Gusti.  
440 Henri H. Stahl, “Cursuri de ateism,” Scânteia Tineretului, 26:6561 (23 June 1970), 1. 
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Such a radical position threatened to empty scientific atheist education completely of its 
meaning. It harked namely of the Marxist-Leninist socio-economic narrative, according to which 
modernizing processes would secure material well-being and therefore inevitably drive people to 
abandon beliefs that were ultimately rooted in ignorance and penury.441 Perhaps unsurprisingly 
then, leading party cadres reacted immediately to defend atheism’s autonomy and its very raison 
d’être.442 Within a fortnight Emil Iordãchescu, the secretary general of the Council for the 
Dissemination of Science and Culture, answered Stahl on the pages of Youth’s Spark. While 
admitting that enlightenment work left much to be desired, Iordãchescu dismissed Stahl’s 
“skepticism” and argued that the objective of sociological research was not simply to promote 
general modernization but to match atheist propaganda to the individual believer.443 Petru 
Berar,444 the editor of the party’s theoretical journal Socialist Era, recognized Stahl as an 
established figure of the interwar Bucharest School of Sociology, and suspected his arguments to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
441 According to Victoria Smolkin, because this socio-economic narrative, which incidentally Marxist-Leninist 
shared with western adherents of secularization theory, was inherently confident that modernization would lead 
to the demise of religion, its proponents saw confrontations with believers inherently futile. This was the reason 
for which many Soviet cadres were criticized for “passivity.” Smolkin, 57. 
442 It is perhaps worth noting that Stahl’s argument was perceived as particularly threatening because he spoke from 
several positions of authority: as a prominent interwar sociologist, as a committed (Austro-)Marxist, and as a key 
figure in the revival of sociology during the Ceaușescu era. During his research in the villages of interwar 
Romania, Stahl had acquired an extensive empirical understanding of popular religiosity, something that even 
prominent Romanian atheists lacked. Additionally, his attitude towards religion was not militantly Marxist-
Leninist but it was informed by broadly Marxist understandings. Indeed, his article suggests that Stahl saw 
religion as a socially determined phenomena and seems to have assumed along with many sociologists of his 
time that religiosity would wither under the forces of modernization. Finally, with the revival of sociology, Stahl 
was also at the height of his institutional position, being the director of the Department of Sociology at the 
Academy of Socio-Political Sciences in the early 1970s. On Stahl as an Austro-Marxist, see Zoltán Rostás, 
Monografia ca utopie: interviuri cu H.H. Stahl (1985-1987) (Bucharest: Paideia, 2000), 14-15.  
443 Emil Iordăchescu, “Sociologie,” Scânteia Tineretului 26:6570 (3 July 1970), 1 and 4. 
444 Petru Berar (1931-1983) graduated with a degree in journalism from the Department of Philosophy at the 
University in Bucharest in 1955, after which he served as the editor of “Class Struggle” (Lupta de clasă) until 
1971. During the late 1960s and 1970s, he emerged as one of the key representatives of the new atheist experts. 
After 1977 until his death, he taught and directed research on the sociology of atheism and religion at the Party 
Academy Ștefan Gheorghiu, the premier party school in Bucharest. “Petru Berar: Necrolog,” Revista de filozofie 
31, no.1 (1984), 79. 
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be an attempt to separate research on religion from atheist objectives. As a result, Berar rejected 
Stahl’s position that a new discipline would render the institutional network and the vast efforts 
in mass atheist education useless. Instead, he stressed that sociology was indeed necessary but on 
Marxist-Leninist grounds; it had to study “the dynamics of atheism and religion” and had to 
improve propaganda work.445 
As atheists publicly circumscribed the Party line on religion and started to outline 
“scientific atheism” as an academic discipline, many engaged theoretical and practical questions 
in an increasingly systematic manner. For Florin Georgescu, a researcher in the Institute of 
Philosophy at the Academy of Social and Political Sciences, anchoring atheism in the opposition 
between science and religion circumscribed atheist methods in a double sense. Scientific 
enlightenment, Georgescu argued, assigned equal importance to the “gnoseological” and social 
roots of faith. But in classical Marxist terms, religion was primarily an answer to social 
alienation not a product of human cognition – that is, man’s thirst for explaining “nature, social 
life, and his own inner world.” Furthermore, Georgescu argued, over the course of history, 
religion evolved into a “synthetic form” of false consciousness. As people’s impotence over 
dominating their social world grew in time, their beliefs increasingly overlapped with other 
aspects of socio-cultural life such as politics, law, art, and morality. In view of faith’s social 
origins and historical evolution, Georgescu contended that, while “a consistent atheism could not 
be built” without both the scientific rebuttal of religious worldviews and the Marxist study of 
faith, exclusive reliance on these tools was insufficient.  Atheism needed to move away from 
negation and become a “synthetic” social and cultural alternative to religion - “progressive 
politics, forward-looking art, materialist philosophy, democratic law, etc.” This was not to say 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
445 Petru Berar, “Polemică în jurul educației științifice-ateiste,” Era Socialistă (July 1970), 116-117.  
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that, instead of science, atheism was now the antipode of religion. Since religious and atheist 
consciousness mirrored historically distinct social developments, Georgescu concluded, they 
were not opposites but represented instead “two modes of human life.” “Religion was the past 
life of humanity. Future was on the part of atheism.”446  
 Akin to previous predictions about scientific thought and modernization, Georgescu’s 
confidence in the advent of an atheist society was deeply embedded in much broader narratives 
about secularization, according to which modernity inadvertently rendered faith antiquated and 
irrelevant. Popular periodicals, scientific journals, and other forms of media reproduced such 
pronouncements with verve throughout the Ceaușescu era. And yet, while atheists never 
fundamentally questioned the fateful march towards a disenchanted world, their understanding of 
religion’s ability to fulfill quintessential human needs became increasingly refined. This change 
of perspective, in turn, tempered their expectations about the straightforwardness of 
secularization.   
In fact, as they revised atheist theory and their understanding of religion, Romanian 
atheists drew considerably on the broader philosophical revisions of Marxism that were 
underway in Eastern Europe since the mid-1950s. Historian Pavel Kolář observed that the events 
of 1956 shattered the idea of a quick and straightforward march towards the communist future 
was eroded.447 As a result, history slowed down and became more indeterminate for Romanian 
atheists, much like to prominent Marxists and communist parties across Eastern Europe. In line 
with the broader post-Stalinist ideological shifts, Romanian Marxists also “discovered” that 
socialist societies generated their own contradictions and possibilities for alienation, reasons for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
446 Florin Georgescu, “Însemnări despre ateism și religie,” Revista de filosofie 4, no. 5 (May 1973). 
447 Pavel Kolář, “The Party as a New Utopia: Reshaping Communist Identity after Stalinism,” Social History 37, no. 
4 (November 2012), 404, 422-424. 
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which they increasingly came to argue that, contrary to previous pronouncements, religion was 
not a form of estrangement particular to past societies. It had a place in socialism too.448 
Religion was “in crisis,” atheists agreed not only in socialism but also on a global 
scale.449 Science desacralized faith by disproving religious cosmologies and by making 
religiosity itself an object of scientific inquiry; under the force of modernization, the hold of 
churches over man’s spirituality and socio-political life dwindled. Atheist cadres applauded 
socialist states, in particular, for eradicating the bourgeois-capitalist order and thus conclusively 
uprooting religion on the macro-social level. And yet, they warned that confident 
pronouncements that religion would wane, if not spontaneously then easily, were rash.450 As 
philosopher Petru Lucaciu observed, the persistence of faith in the unpropitious environment of 
socialism indicated that past societies were only “one principal source of mysticism.”451 Rather 
than dying out, atheists likewise observed that religious organizations “modernized,” having 
transformed themselves into qualitatively new ideological adversaries of communism. All of this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
448 On the theoretical discovery of the possibility of alienation in socialist societies see James H. Satterwhite, 
Varieties of Marxist Humanism: Philosophical Revision in Postwar Eastern Europe (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1992), 183.  
449 Petru Berar, “Educația științifico-ateistă a maselor: cerință a umanismului socialist,” Era socialistă 52, no. 5 
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românească,” Revista de filozofie 4, no. 10 (April 1972). Petru Berar, Religia în lumea contemporană (Bucharest: 
Editura Politică, 1983). 
451 Lucaciu, ibid.  
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demonstrated, according to Berar, that “religion was not always a survival” but had “profound 
roots” in socialist modernity and that overcoming it would be a long endeavor.452  
 As part of this process of ideological revision, prominent atheists also pointed out that the 
source of the remaining utopian confidence in secularization was that their colleagues failed to 
appreciate the distinction between abstract understandings of religion and the actual religiosity of 
believers on the ground. As the philosopher Ernő Gáll noted, Marxist-Leninist atheism 
“neglected the humanist legacy of the classics: Marx and Engels never forgot that religious belief 
was the mystified expression of man’s real earthly needs and problems.”453 Haralamb Culea,454 a 
sociologist at the Academy of Socio-Political Sciences, formulated this problem the clearest. 
Atheists expected watershed changes in believers’ mentality because they understood religion 
exclusively as an epiphenomenon of the macro-social sphere. Echoing the young Marx, Culea 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
452 Petru Berar, “Educația științifico-ateistă a maselor: cerință a umanismului socialist,” Era socialistă 52, no. 5 
(May 1972). For a similar view, see also Constantin Ioan, “ Educația ateistă a maselor și cercetarea științifică,” 
Revista de filosofie 5, no. 1 (January 1973).  
453 Ernő Gáll, Idealul Prometeic (Bucharest: Editura Politică, 1970), 271. 
     Ernő Gáll (1917-2000) was a prominent Transylvanian-Hungarian Marxist, who joined the illegal communist 
movement in the interwar period and who was a strong believer in Soviet communism during the 1950s, in part 
because as a Jew he was deported to Germany during the Second World War. In 1957-1984, he was the chief 
editor of the Hungarian Korunk, one of the most prestigious Marxist reviews in interwar Eastern Europe. After 
the 1950s, Gáll progressively became an opponent of Romanian communism and evolved into one of the key 
intellectual figures in late-socialist and post-socialist Hungarian minority-building while retaining his Marxist 
convictions throughout. Among others, it was under his protection and intellectual patronage that the Hungarian 
intelligentsia and university students in Cluj returned to interwar questions about “minority being” and that 
students from the Institute of Protestant Theology, most notably the circle of László Tőkés (the Calvinist minister 
commonly held to have helped trigger the revolution of 1989), joined “minority-building efforts.”  Author’s 
interview with László Vetési, 8 April 2011. While I quote Ernő Gáll among the other Romanian atheist 
theoreticians here, I shall note that the intersection of atheism, humanism, and minority existence during 1965-
1989 has its peculiar intellectual history in the Transylvanian-Hungarian case, warranting a separate investigation 
on its own.  
454 I was not able to identify Culea’s biographical information or institutional affiliation. The philosopher Ion Ianoși 
mentions him as a colleague at the University of Bucharest and indicates that Haralmb(ie) Culea was the 
Romanianized version of the Jewish name Harry Culer.  Ion Ianoși, Internaționala mea: cronica unei vieți (Iași: 
Polirom, 2012). Alexandru Tănase, “Socialismul și condiția umană,” Era Socialistă 59, no. 22 (20 November 
1979), 28-30. 
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observed, however, that faith was mediated by the entire, “concrete” human personality – not 
only his socially determined personality but also his subjective life. Religiosity persisted in 
socialist modernity precisely because its “last bastion” and deepest roots lay in a sphere 
“relatively autonomous” from the social – “man’s internal life.”455 It was for this reason that 
Petru Berar clarified: religious belief and feeling were not “survivals” in the conventional social-
historical sense. Instead, for certain sections of the population, faith constituted “a form of 
spiritual existence” with profound psychological roots in both the conscious and unconscious 
layers of the personality.456 Indeed, in line with greater emphasis on the individual in revisionist 
Marxism, atheists increasingly began to contend was that what made religion resilient in socialist 
society had less to do with cosmological explanations, its synthetic embeddedness in socio-
cultural life, or its social origins. The strength of “religiosity as religiosity” lay in functions that 
came to be described increasingly as subjective and spiritual – that is, religion’s ability to give 
meaning to death and therefore human life through the promise of salvation. 
The critique of previous conceptions of religion had two important implications: first, for 
how atheists reconsidered the trajectory of secularization and second, for how they reimagined 
atheism as an ideal. In a series of works intended for the local propagandist and the common 
citizen, Culea observed that religious life and modern society revealed a “bushy dialectics” 
(dialectică stufoasă): the involution of religion proceeded in stages along a “sinuous, jagged 
road” occasionally giving way to the recrudescence of faith.457 The piece-meal character of this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
455 Haralamb Culea, ”Implicații ale analizei sociologice a fenomenului religiozității după o investigație concretă,” 
Viitorul Social 2, no. 1 (5 January 1973).       
456 Petru Berar, “Educația științifico-ateistă a maselor: cerință a umanismului socialist,” Era socialistă 52, no. 5 
(May 1972). See also, Constantin Ioan, “ Educația ateistă a maselor și cercetarea științifică,” Revista de filosofie 
5, no. 1 (January 1973).  
457 Haralamb Culea, Religia sub semnul cercetării filozofice-sociologice: Dezbateri ideologice (Bucharest: Editura 
Politică, 1975), 7 and 60. See also, Berar, “Educația științifico-ateistă a maselor,” 25. 
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process meant that distinctions had to be drawn between certain stages. The spread of 
secularization, desacralization, irreligiosity, and even scientific rationalism in society constituted 
only “preliminary phases,” Culea argued, when the “demolition” of religion was the important 
task at hand.  But the move towards an atheist society raised the problem of “reconstruction.” In 
order to decisively uproot faith, atheists needed to offer a belief system that provided “integral” 
existentially meaningful answers to the key questions of human life. Culea explained:  
 
The task was not only to answer the question “What do we put in its [religion’s] place?” 
[…] Instead of faith in heavenly immortality, there was the need for an optimistic belief 
in the earthly immortality of humanity - [a belief] infused with a profound, mature and 
lucid sense of reality, [and] located at the antipode of a naïve, fantastical, religious 
yearning for eternal life. Atheism was not the mortification, but the vivification of man; 
not a mere contemplation, but a praxis guided by the ideal of human happiness. Marxist 
humanism assured the spiritual premises of this model, and communism secured its 
material, social foundations. But these conditions are not sufficient. It is also imperative 
to erect on a mass scale a Promethean human type, who is capable of experiencing fully 
(in thought and feeling) the happiness of a life based on creative action in the service of 
humanity, the sole humanist answer to the problem of death. The only problem of life, 
certain philosophers argue, is death. Atheism, […] reformulates this as follows: the only 
dignified and real alternative to death, the only lucid answer possible is a demiurgic 
life.458 
 
This was a spirituality of action that entailed commitment to individual self-creation and self-
transcendence next to involvement in collective efforts to ennoble human condition in a 
particular time and place. The influence and continuity of one’s actions in the life and work of 
others is what meant immortality to humanist Marxists. By presenting this “earthly” model of 
eternal life to cadres and the ordinary socialist citizen, Culea distinguished “integral atheism,” as 
he termed it, from lay mentality or the scientific-atheism of the Dej years.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
458 Culea, Religia sub semnul cercetării filozofice-sociologice, 70 and Culea, “Disocieri necesare în tratarea esenței 
ateismului,” in În sprijinul educației materialist-științifice a tineretului: Planuri tematice și bibliografice 
(Bucharest, 1973), 23. For discussions of the “Promethean” man as an atheist ideal, see Lucia Codreanu-
Dumitrescu, De la Sisif la Prometeu (Bucharest: Editura Politică, 1977).  
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At the same time, he broached a perennial problem in atheist thought. Quoting the French 
idealist philosopher Léon Brunschvicg, he explained, “we often hear that on ‘his death bed’ even 
the most acrimonious atheist regresses into ‘the first age of intelligence,’ in other words returns 
to the infantile religious belief in survival” because of the “consolation” that the prospect of 
afterlife gave.459 In effect then, Culea noted that atheism’s success ultimately hinged on whether 
it could develop a spiritual-emotional environment in society to address the problems of human 
existence in a meaningful and “optimistic” way. In practical terms, this meant developing an 
atheist art and culture on a mass scale. Aesthetics provided individuals with feelings of ecstasy, 
crucial for making atheist belief fully livable because it reconstituted the wholeness of the 
personality by linking “the external world to the internal, affective, intellectual, and moral world 
of the human being.”460 A mass culture erected on these principles was truly humanist, Culea 
argued. It gave the masses the confidence that their needs and aspirations can be expressed 
culturally, that their troubles in everyday life do not constitute a divine punishment, and instilled 
hope regarding the expansion of democracy. Such a mass culture redirected their real feelings of 
impotence over the finitude of human existence towards a “utopian horizon,” not unrealizable 
but realizable later on.461  
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
459 Culea, Religia sub semnul cercetării filozofice-sociologice, 71-72. 
460 Ibid., 86. 
461 Haralamb Culea, “Religie, mentalitate laică și ateism,” Forum: Științe Sociale 5 (1973), Special Issue: Probleme 
de ateism-științific, 161. 
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Romanian Spirituality 
Arguments that held up atheism as an existential model indicate that Romanian 
ideologists in the 1970s made the transition from a scientific to a humanist atheism.462 However, 
the question still remained: what made their ideas distinctly Romanian? Resolving this issue 
required atheists to reconstruct the genealogy of their thought in a twinned national and Marxist-
Leninist frame. As the Party’s growing monopoly over culture sharpened intellectual competition 
around national identity in the 1970s, arguments that gave atheism an indigenous root became 
prevalent.  
On the surface, the task entailed obscuring the continued influence of Soviet atheism in 
keeping with the regime’s claims to independence within the socialist camp. The issues raised by 
Romanian atheists in the 1970s overlapped extensively with the kinds of questions Eastern 
European and Soviet atheists began to ask in the post-Stalinist period, no doubt because of the 
broad impact of revisionist currents in socialist countries. Indeed, specialized bibliographies 
largely marked for the “internal use” of the party academy provided extensive lists on foreign 
scholarship and major thinkers in Marxist-Leninist atheism.463 Soviet works, in particular, were 
rarely mentioned in Romanian publications much less translated. Indeed, the only exceptions to 
this rule throughout the late socialist period was Petru Berar’s 1976 anthology on religious 
psychology, which included selections from the opus of Soviet scholars such as D. M. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
462 Smolkin, 89-131.  
463 See Problematica teoretică a fenomenului religios, Caiet Documentar no. 2 (1979) issued by the Party Academy 
Ștefan Gheorghiu. Petru Berar, ed. Fenomenul religios în istoria umanității: cercetare bibliografică (Bucharest: 
Academia Ștefan Gheorghiu, 1981). Elena Belu, ed. Cartea ateist-științifică: catalog tematic selectiv, 1963-1973 
(Timișoara: Biblioteca municipală, 1973).    
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Ugrinovici, V.V. Pavliuk, V.N. Serdakov, and I.N. Iablokov, and a handful of translations from 
the works of key atheists, most notably E. M. Yaroslavski and I.P. Frantzev.464 
To cast their endeavor into a national mold, some ideologists also set out to recover the 
ostensibly Romanian history of humanist, materialist and atheist thought, non-Marxist and 
Marxist alike. Efforts to construct such a genealogy from the “feudal age” onwards began 
already in the early 1960s and culminated in 1980s with the publication of anthologies such as 
Revolutionary Thought on Religion in Romania and the two-volume Philosophy and Religion in 
the Evolution of Modern Romanian Culture.465 These narratives assigned early socialists, in 
particular the illegal communist party (1921-1944), pride of place in the battle against mysticism 
often claiming tendentiously that their work had a “strong echo” among the working class and 
that the interwar period therefore accelerated “the confrontation between materialism and 
idealism.”466  
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Franțev, La izvoarele religiei și ale bunei cugetări (Bucharest: Editura Științifică, 1968). Emilian Mihailovici 
Iaroslavski, Biblia pentru credincioși și necredincioși (Bucharest: Editura Politică, 1963) and Cum se nasc, 
trăiesc și mor zeii și zeițele (Bucharest: Editura Politică, 1962).  
465 See, Institutul de Studii Istorice și Social-Politice de pe lângă C.C. al P.C.R., Gîndirea revoluționară din 
România despre religie: Din tradițiile concepției materialiste asupra lumii (Bucharest: Editura Politică, 1983). 
Simion Ghiță and Dumitru Ghișe, Filozofie și religie în evoluția culturii române moderne: Studii și antologie, 2 
vols. (Bucharest: Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1984). Earlier works were intended primarily for 
specialists, see Octavian Chețan, ”Gândirea ateistă în paginile revistei Contemporanul,” Cercetări filozofice 7, 
no. 5 (May 1960); Simion Ghiță, Carol Göllner, and János Hajós, eds. Antologia ateismului din România 
(Bucharest: Editura Științifică, 1962); Constantin I. Gulian, Simion Ghiță, Constantin Joja et al. Istoria gândirii 
sociale și filozofice în România (Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1964). Constantin I. Gulian, ed. Antologia 
gândirii românești, sec. XV-XIX, 2 vols. (Bucharest: Editura Politică, 1967). Petru Vaida, Dimitrie Cantemir și 
umanismul (Bucharest: Minerva, 1972). I. S. Firu and Corneliu Albu, Umanistul Nicolahus Olahus (Bucharest: 
Editura Științifică, 1968). As the Ceaușescu regime’s discourse became anti-Western and the obsession with 
Dacians in narratives of national origins intensified, historians shifted their attention away from Greco-Roman 
antiquity towards Geto-Dacian science and humanism. See Ion Horațiu Crișan, ”Valențe ale spiritualității daco-
getice,” Era Socialistă 59, no. 24 (20 December 1979), 34-37. Radu Florian, ”O controversă filozofică,” Era 
Socialistă 59, no. 8 (20 aprilie 1979), 45-47.  
466 Ion Babici, “Din tradițiile luptei P.C.R. împotriva misticismului și obscurantismului religios,” Forum: Științe 
Sociale 5, no. 3 (1973): 70-74.  
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On a more fundamental level, however, atheists also had to re-evaluate prominent 
arguments from the interwar period which had identified religion as a cornerstone of Romanian 
civilization and spirituality, whether past or future. As Herderian notions of the Volksgeist – “the 
spirit of the people” understood as a set of mental, intellectual, moral, and cultural characteristics 
– gained appeal in the Romanian national movement, the religiosity of the peasantry became a 
matter of debate particularly in folklore, the dominant nation-building science of the nineteenth 
century. Between the two world wars, however, the Romanian soul’s penchant for the 
metaphysical was no longer a question but a matter of consensus, especially among intellectuals  
adhering to the cultural and political Orthodoxism hegemonic at the time.467 As historian Sorin 
Antohi argued the pre-socialist imaginary of “an autochtonous Geist,” at peak in the interwar era, 
involved a “vertical escape” from the stigmatizing realm of Euro-centric symbolic geographies in 
that it placed national being “in a protective relationship with a divine or (in the secular versions 
of this way of thinking) a transcendental principle.”468  
The essentializing links that interwar thinkers like Lucian Blaga, Mircea Eliade, and 
Constantin Noica established between national essence and the peasant appealed to the Party, 
which from the mid-1960s promoted the Romanian peasantry and its culture (folklore) as 
“progressive” revolutionary forces in history. In part, this was the reason why such writers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
467 George Enache, “Christianity, Modernity and Romanian Folklore,” The Scientific Journal of Humanistic Studies 
4, no. 7 (July 2012): 109-116. For the various positions that, among others, the Gândirists, Trăirists, and the so-
called 1927 Generation embraced within the broader current of Orthodoxism see Michael S. Jones, “Culture as 
Religion and Religion as Culture in the Philosophy of Lucian Blaga,” Journal for the Study of Religions and 
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468 Sorin Antohi, “Romania and the Balkans: From Geocultural Bovarism to Ethnic Ontology,” Transit – 
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216 	  
	  	  
underwent partial rehabilitation and their works were published in the early Ceaușescu period.469 
But from the perspective of the ideological establishment, these intellectuals had also denounced 
materialism as alien to “the Romanian soul.” 470 As a result, nationalizing atheism in the 1970s 
spurred some to affirm the paganism, or better yet, the secularity of peasant mentality and 
spiritual life. Cloaked under the citation of canonized Romanian writers, ideological 
pronouncements to this effect took place, for instance, at the Party Plenum in November 1971 
where member of the Permanent Presidium Ilie Verdeț debunked claims about linkage between 
national being and religiosity. 
 
We have a people that does not know what mysticism is. In 1922 in the journal Calende, 
Tudor Arghezi said: the Romanian people are the least mystical people in the world. No 
other people has so many curses about crosses, gods, [and] gospels. Master Arghezi knew 
one thing or two – he had been a monk. Therefore, when I witness the propensity of my 
colleagues towards mysticism and the idea of death, I am amazed and do not understand 
why this happens when all of us belong to a people that has the same orientation towards 
life.471 
 
To posit the essential laity of the nation in consonance with Marxist discourse, 
intellectuals undertook more concerted efforts over the course of the decade, above all, around 
those classics of folk literature that had provided the foundation for arguments about national 
specificity and religiosity in the first place. Thus, commenting on the ballad of Meșterul Manole, 
the literary historian Liviu Rusu dismissed interwar interpretations and identified instead peasant 
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469 Katherine Verdery, National Ideology under Socialism. Florin Țurcanu, Mircea Eliade: Prizonierul istoriei 
(Bucharest: Humanitas, 2003), 583-588. 
470 Al. Posescu, “Tendinte si pozitii ateiste si materialiste in filozofie in perioada interbelica,” Curente și orientări în 
istoria filozofiei românești eds. N. Gogoneață, Simion Ghiță, Radu Pantazi et al., (Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 
1967): 169-224. 
471 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Cancelarie, inv. 3124, File 127/1971, “Stenograma ședinței plenare a C.C. al 
P.C.R. din 3-5.XI.1971,” f. 39. 
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quintessentially lay ethical system.472 In the epic poem Miorița, the philosopher Pavel Apostol 
discovered a “human ideal” for whom the problem of death strengthened “trust in the unlimited 
ability of man to overcome suffering and defeat.”473 This peasant morality and “profane attitude” 
towards meaning of life, the philosopher Alexandru Tănase concluded, was not sufficient to 
assure ”the lay orientation” of Romanian society. Yet, the peasant spiritual perspective had an 
invaluable “ethical and aesthetic potential” for socialist humanism.474 To return to the question of 
Romanian atheism then, what such arguments effectively proposed was that the Romanian 
peasant was the ancestor of a quintessentially national Promethean man. 
 By the late 1970s, ideological aspirations to articulate an existentially meaningful atheism 
and the discourse on national authenticity converged to instate “Romanian spirituality” into the 
political vocabulary of the Ceaușescu regime. A staple term of pre-socialist mystical and 
religious nationalism, in its recent iteration it constituted a new semantic constellation that 
subsumed the ideal of self-transcendent man alongside constitutive socialist values such as 
happiness, work, and collective spirit. As the regime’s re-Stalinization advanced during the 
1970s, “Romanian spirituality” increasingly diverged from the rhetoric of theorists that discussed 
atheist reform in the spirit of Marxist revisionism. Instead of their emphasis on “the inner 
dimension” of the human personality, the official usage reflected the submersion of the subject in 
the masses and the nation. In this national Stalinist discourse individuals only played the role of 
passive subjects in mechanistic processes of “national development.”  
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473 Pavel Apostol, Trei meditații asupra culturii (Bucharest: Dacia, 1970). 
474 Alexandru Tănase, “Tradiții laice în cultura românească,” in Cultură și religie (Bucharest: Editura Politică, 
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Much like its predecessor, socialist Romanian spirituality also reflected a symbolic 
geography that inverted dominant imaginaries of center and periphery. As a term, it was inflected 
namely by the discourse of protochronism that gained currency especially after 1974. 
Protochronism, Katherine Verdery writes, was a “rescucitation of interwar indigenist arguments 
about national essence” that were formulated from a position of symbolic and politico-economic 
marginality. It stressed the sovereignty, creative independence, and temporal priority of 
Romanian cultural creations in relation to “imperial” western and Soviet forms while 
emphasizing indigeneous accumulation of value and Romanian contributions to the “world 
stock” of cultural capital and historical development. This position was best summed up in the 
words of the key protochronist Dan Zamfirescu. The Romanian people, he argued, were “thirsty 
for justice, universal in their capacity for sympathy and for centuries devoted to the supreme 
value of humanism.” These characteristics made them ideally suited to work towards a “new 
universal mentality” and for the defeat of “demons that ruled […] the destiny of the human 
species in the twentieth century.”475 While mobilizing the ethical values of freedom, justice, and 
human solidarity, such notions of national humanism were naturally a far cry from the kind of 
revisionist Marxism that kept the existential questions of both societies and individuals in focus. 
The last decade of the “golden epoch” saw many predictable articles that used 
“Romanian spirituality” by combining elements of atheist rhetoric, Stalinist tenets, and national 
ideology.476 Certainly, numerous theorists who maintained an intellectual commitment to 
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476 Constantin Răducu, “Permanențe ale spiritualității românești,” Contemporanul, 27 March 1981. Vasile Vetișanu, 
“Spiritualitatea românească – O filozofie a originilor,” Contemporanul no. 41 (7 October 1983), 4. Ion Pietraru, 
”Umanismul revoluționar și educația ateistă”, Contemporanul no. 32 (5 August 1983), 4. Alexandru Tănase, 
“Formarea și înfăptuirea unei noi concepții revoluționare românești despre educația omului nou,” Cântarea 
României 4, no. 12 (December 1983), 2-3. 
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Marxist humanism and were often but by no means exclusively of a Jewish background did not 
participate in such rhetoric. In Bucharest, one could recall the sociologist Haralamb Culea and 
Ion Ianoși, a university professor in philosophy or in Cluj the Hungarian-Jewish Marxists Ernő 
Gáll, the editor of Korunk, or the philosophers Miklós Kallós and Endre Roth, both at the 
University of Babeș-Bolyai. Even Petru Berar, who had acquired a record for promoting the 
party line as the editor of Socialist Era, refrained from dressing atheism into a national garb. 
However, as the cultural authority of intellectuals became overwhelmingly dependent in the 
1980s on one’s willingness to cater to Romanian national discourse, these Marxist intellectuals 
became increasingly marginalized both in the party-state hierarchy and on the public scene. 
 
Studying Religion and Atheism 
Besides relying on experts for key ideological revisions, the regime’s commitment to 
reform atheist work during the 1970s was also evident in that higher education and research on 
religion commenced at various institutions across the country.477 For the future generation of 
intellectuals, courses on atheism opened at university departments of scientific socialism, 
philosophy and sociology. To train cadres while providing ideological control at the highest 
level, the Academy of Socio-Political Sciences set up its own laboratory of scientific-atheism.478 
Since the need to explain shortcomings and devise new methodologies for atheist education 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
477 The most informative and engaging controversies on atheism and religion probably took place at the numerous 
conferences, symposia, and closed meetings during which experts interpreted the ethnographic and sociological 
data gathered in the field or reflected on the psychological dimensions of belief. Such records were inaccessible 
to me in part because detailed research was not preserved in Central Committee archives. Furthermore, the files 
belonging to the Academy of Socio-Political Sciences, which often coordinated and evaluated such ventures, and 
the Department of Cults were inventoried and opened up for research only in 2014. In this part of the chapter I 
rely therefore on published research findings in chief socialist journals and more comprehensive reports marked 
for “internal use” that were preserved at the Library of the Romanian Academy of Sciences.  
478 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Cancelarie, inv. 2574, File 1/1973, f. 13. ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția 
Cancelarie, file 13/1986, f. 10v.  
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hinged on investigations of popular religiosity, research required systematic coordination. As a 
result, research groups were formed first under the aegis of the Council for Socialist Education 
and Culture under the supervision of the sociologist Haralamb Culea.479 Alongside scholars, 
these groups comprised teachers, cultural activists and party cadres – categories that would 
remain key for conducting research projects throughout the era. Given the regime’s heightened 
concern with youth religiosity, the Center for Research on Youth Problems also called on its own 
researchers in Bucharest as well as in its county centers in Cluj, Mureș, Maramureș and 
Neamț.480 In 1976, however, the Central Committee assigned the task of coordinating research to 
the Academy of Socio-Political Sciences in the framework of “priority themes” set in the five-
year plans.481 Accordingly, the Academy mobilized scholars at the numerous university centers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
479 Haralamb Culea, “Implicații ale analizei sociologice a fenomenului religiozității după o investigație concretă,” 
Viitorul Social 2, no. 1 (5 January 1972). Initiated under the aegis of the Council of Socialist Culture and 
Education, the first large-scale sociological research surveyed 9,000 believers over the age of 18 selected 
randomly from sixteen counties and fifty-eight localities (44 rural and 14 urban) and a more intensive 
interdisciplinary investigation of two villages in the north-west Transylvanian county of Bihor.  It mobilized 
approximately 600 teachers and cultural activists. See also, Haralamb Culea, “Religie, mentalitate laică, ateism,” 
Forum: Științe sociale no. 5 (1973), 158-188. 
480 Fred Mahler, Dezvoltarea conștiinței socialiste a tinerei generații (Bucharest: Centrul de Cercetări pentru 
Problemele Tineretului, 1979), 11. Organized by the Center for Research on Youth Problems in the spring of 
1976, this sociological and psycho-social research involved 1,200 pupils, students, and young workers in the 
capital and in the counties of Dolj, Galați and Mureș. Based on this model the deputy direction of the Neamț 
country branch of the Center Paul Șipurel coordinated research involving over 400 pupils and young students in 
1979. See Paul Șipurel, ”Aspecte ale formării convingerilor materialist-științifice în rândul tineretului școlar din 
județul Neamț,” Caiet metodic no. 5 (1980), 78-109.  
481 The priority theme for 1976-1980 was The Socio-Economic and Cultural Factors of Religious Phenomena and 
Problems of Atheist Education. As part of this national research project coordinated by the Academy, the Center 
for Sociology at the University of Bucharest carried out investigations in fifteen counties. When counting only 
the use of questionnaires, over 12,000 subjects were investigated. ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Cancelarie, 
inv. 3125, File 10/1976, “Programul de cercetare și de acțiuni principale în domeniul științelor sociale și politice, 
1976-1980,” f. 182. Ion Drăgan, Ion Mihail Popescu, and Ilie Bădescu, “Factori sociali ai fenomenului religios și 
cerințele educației materialist-științifice,” Era Socialistă 11, no. 11 (5 June 1982), 8-10, 44.  
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for social studies in the capital and in cities such as Timișoara, Iași, Sibiu, and Cluj. It also made 
it a degree requirement for sociology students to participate in such research.482   
To map the religious landscape in socialist Romania, the Council, the Center for 
Research on Youth Problems and the Academy posed several questions:  1) the size, distribution, 
and organizational structure of various confessions and the dynamics of religious life in the 
counties 2) the ways in which religiosity manifested itself through the practices, ideas, and 
affective experiences of different groups of people broken down by confession, age, gender, 
socio-economic categories, and geographic areas 3) how the social, emotional and psychological 
functions of religiosity allowed the resolution of personal difficulties and traumas 4) the role that 
the remaining contradictions of socialist life had in enabling the persistence of faith 5) the 
modernization of religious dogma and rituals, the evolution of popular religiosity in the twentieth 
century and the ways in which religious consciousness became intertwined with scientific 
knowledge or Marxist-Leninist ideology and lastly, 6) the practical problems with atheist work 
and proposals for improvement.  
In exploring these numerous dimensions of religious life, early field researchers relied 
primarily on complex survey questionnaires that asked believers to describe their religious 
practices (participation in various religious rituals at church and  religious practice at home, 
involvement in cultural-religious activities like choirs, orchestras or pilgrimages, financial 
support for churches), beliefs (about God, sin, divine punishment, and afterlife), and their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
482 Ion Mihail Popescu, Factori economico-sociali și culturali ai fenomenului religios. Probleme ale educației 
ateiste (Județul Tulcea): Raport prealabil de cercetare (Bucharest: Centrul de Sociologie, Universitatea 
București, 1978), 12. This research was carried out by students from the Faculty of History and Philosophy at the 
University of Bucharest between 15 June and 12 July 1978. It included 665 subjects between the ages of 15 and 
34. 
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emotions (suffering, humiliation, salvation, and piety).483 But the use of surveys and the 
privileging of believers’ perspectives were soon deemed to provide only a “limited” 
understanding of religiosity.484 As a result, by the late 1970s the Academy of Political and Social 
Sciences provided a more sophisticated research model by integrating various methods: complex 
survey questionnaires and unstructured interviews with believers; participant observation of 
individual and group behavior in religious spaces; and comparative-historical analyses of local 
religiosity based on church archives and historical publications. Rather than displacing, these 
new methods complemented previous ways of evaluating the activity of religious organizations 
and the atheist education programs of local organs – that is, the statistical and qualitative 
methods characteristic of political and cultural narratives from the Dej era.485 
The revival of the academic study of religion during the 1970s in Romania was part of 
the party-state’s growing reliance on social science expertise, sociology in particular.  After 
some timid steps under Dej in the early 1960s, the Ceaușescu regime rehabilitated, among others, 
the name of Dimitrie Gusti’s school in sociology, social psychology, and ethnology from the 
interwar years. Beyond rooting the party in “progressive” national heritage, the Bucharest 
School’s international fame served an important role in the regime’s efforts to reconstitute ties 
with western social science.486 In fact, most sociologists who rose to prominence in the late 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
483 One example is Culea, “Implicații ale analizei sociologice a fenomenului religiozității.”  
484 For a critique of the over-reliance on surveys, see Fred Mahler et al., Dezvoltarea conștiinței socialiste a tinerei 
generații (Bucharest: CCPT, 1979), 12.  
485 See Chapter 3. 
486 Zoltán Rostás, “O istorie nefardată a reabilitării sociologiei româneşti,” Revista Transilvania 25, no. 11-12 
(November-December 2012), 89-90. Zoltán Rostás, “The Second Marginalisation of the Bucharest Sociological 
School,” Acum 2011, vol. 5, nr. 1 (2011): 69-81, 75. Ștefan Bosomitu, “Notes and Remarks on the (Re-
)Institutionalization of Sociology in Communist Romania in the 1960s,” History of Communism in Europe no. 2 
(2011): 169-196. Cotoi, “Sociology and Ethnology.” 
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socialist period, including those studying religion, reaped the benefits of the party-state’s 
political interests, being encouraged to travel for conferences and extended research trips to the 
United States, West Germany and France.487 In addition to having access to Soviet and Eastern 
European scholarship on religion, Romanian social scientists also became familiar with empirical 
research and seminal theoretical works produced after 1953 behind the iron curtain.488 All of this 
suggests that, beyond the veneer of ideological discourse, the ideas and methods developed to 
study religion and atheism in late socialist Romania were of broader transnational inspiration. 
Indeed, as historian Călin Cotoi observed, in sociological field of the 1970s “the gambit of 
scientificity was played between historical materialism, Western structural-functionalism, 
empirical research, and fieldwork, but also interwar models of national science.”489 
Revisionist Marxism should be added to this list considering how it impacted both the 
study of religion and atheism in empirical sociology. A former Gustian, Miron Constantinescu 
contributed significantly to the re-establishment of sociology under Ceaușescu and to the relative 
departure from Stalinist dogmatism in the field during the 1960s and 1970s. In his capacity as the 
main patron of the discipline among the RCP elite, Constantinescu encouraged young 
researchers to rethink the orthodox categories of dialectical-materialism. Crucially, his contacts 
with the French-Romanian historian Georges Haupt and the Polish philosopher Adam Schaff led 
him personally to reexamine both the antidogmatic message of Marxist anthropology and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
487 Shafir, “Political Stagnation and Marxist Critique,” 446. 
488 For a critical overview of American, East European and Soviet scholarship after the Second World War, see e.g. 
Petre Datculescu, Educația materialist-științifică a tineretului: cercetări psiho-sociale (Bucharest: Editura 
Politică, 1980). Sociologists were also familiar with the results of the global polls on religion carried out by the 
Gallup Institute (Princeton, New Jersey).  
489 Cătălin Cotoi, “Sociology and Ethnology in Romania: the Avatars of Social Sciences in Socialist Romania,” in 
Sociology and Ethnography in East-Central and South-East Europe: Scientific Self-Description in State Socialist 
Countries ed. Ulf Brunnbauer, Claudia Kraft and Martin Schulze Wessel (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2011). 
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metaphysical origins of Marxism.490 As the president of the Academy of Socio-Political 
Sciences, his influence was pivotal in turning Romanian sociologists towards investigations that 
examined religion’s spiritual functions in individual life and towards arguments regarding the 
necessity of an atheist spiritual culture in socialism. 
 
“The Perfume of Religion” 
The unprecedented state support for the study of religiosity resulted from official views 
that regarded sociology to be central to socialist modernization and that were in this sense open 
to revisionist calls for ideology “to respect [social] reality.”491 The party-state’s expectations 
were that empirical analysis of “actually existing religiosity” could describe the gap between 
Marxist-Leninist ideology and social reality and simultaneously provide policy prescriptions on 
how to achieve convergence between the two. The tension between their deconstructive and 
constructive roles put sociologists of religion in a precarious position. First, their ability to 
identify incongruities between lived realities and the ideological vision of the party meant that 
they possessed “critical knowledge” that was inherently problematic and that the Romanian party 
state wished to keep away from the public especially as it returned towards Stalinism.492 Second, 
because of the ideological imperative to demonstrate progress towards the brighter communist 
future, these experts also had to fulfill the role of “myth-makers” and resort to triumphalist 
narratives about the success of atheist education and the decline of religiosity. Although both 
kinds of rhetoric were present in research reports, unsurprisingly those preserved for “internal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
490 Vladimir Tismăneanu, “From Arrogance to Irrelevance,” 144-145. 
491 Georg Lukács, Utam Marxhoz: Válogatott filozófiai tanulmányok (Budapest: Magvető, 1971), 598.  
492 “Introduction” to Sociology and Ethnography in East-Central and South-East Europe, 1-28.  
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use” were less confident about successes than those published in various journals or theoretical 
and methodological books. 
Ideological parameters certainly imposed limitations on scholarship. Yet, the amount of 
material sociologists and their research groups gathered around the country in the 1970s and 
1980s produced the most extensive map of religiosity in Romania thus far. Despite being patchy 
in geographical coverage and inconsistent in terms of methodology, this map brought the 
Romanian atheist establishment unparalleled information on popular faith and atheist 
convictions. Some of the findings confirmed previous suspicions about the nature of religion in 
socialism but also prompted atheists to re-assess understandings of the typology of believers and 
the direction of atheist propaganda. Although hardly exhaustive, a brief account of key findings 
provides insight into how Romanian atheists envisioned a future for their work and how they 
shaped mass culture in late socialism as a result. 
Quite unsurprisingly, most reports contained confident statements about the forward 
march of secularization. The religiosity of Romanians, when compared to the interwar period or 
to the state of popular faith in other countries, was insubstantial in terms of both spread and 
intensity.493 Whether understood as a representative of “divine authority” over human life or a 
“community of faith,” the church ceased to be “sole column of truth.” What shattered the social 
and spiritual authority of religious organizations was the party’s educational work and the 
triumph of the socialist economy, above all.494  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
493 Culea, “Implicații ale analizei sociologice,” 207. 
494 Popescu and Bădescu, Factori economico-sociali (județul Gorj), 44.  Ion Mihail Popescu and Alexandru 
Bărbăcioru, eds. Aspecte ale fenomenului religios și probleme ale educației ateiste a tineretului de pe teritoriul 
județului Caraș-Severin (Bucharest: Centrul de Sociologie, Universitatea București, 1981), 58-59.  
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Yet, besides rhetorical bows to the “achievements of socialism,” sociological findings 
described a contradictory but dynamic religious landscape that sparked calls for reform in atheist 
work in the first place. Despite the measures undertaken to curb church income, the fees for 
religious ceremonies and believers’ donations appeared to keep parish finances at a good level. 
But the economic health of a local parish was sometimes hard to determine as priests kept 
income off the record in order to pay for community events or restorations.495 As a result, reports 
made observations that were quite familiar to party leaders noting that, in many villages 
regardless of creed, the local church surpassed the house of culture in both material situation and 
audio-visual equipment.496 Priests likewise made religious cultural life vibrant by simplifying 
rituals or by organizing orchestra, choir, and theatric performances; excursions, soccer teams, 
and “Who knows, wins” games - adaptations from socialist methods of science popularization.497 
All of this prompted sociologists to conclude that, like elsewhere in the world, Romanian 
churches modernized successfully, adapting their rituals and forms of organization to the 
scientific-technological revolution of the present age.498 The Church, thus, continued to preserve 
considerable authority in the family and the micro-sphere of local communities, spaces that 
socialist ideology held to be traditionally conservative. One manifestation of this, findings noted, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
495 Popescu, Factori economico-sociali (județul Tulcea), 25. Popescu and Bădescu, 48. Several reports noted that the 
Law no. 177 adopted on August 4, 1948 regulating donations was too lax because it allowed donations based on 
the size of the parish and because it did not impose strict supervision of parish accounting. Popescu and 
Bărbăcioru, 81 and 141-144. 
496 Popescu, 23, 28-29, 33. 
497 Popescu and Bădescu, 62-65. Popescu and Bărbăcioru, 135-140, 154-155.  
498 Popescu and Bărbăcioru, 153. Ion Drăgan, Ion Mihail Popescu, Ilie Bădescu, ”Factori sociali ai fenomenului 
religios și cerințele educației materialist-științifice,” Era Socialistă 11, no. 11 (5 June 1982), 8-10, 44.  
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was that families dressed children in new clothing for religious holidays or various rituals but 
prevented them from wearing the same attire at school.499  
Particularly worrisome were new religious phenomena. “Sects” were growing in a 
particularly rapid manner. In Caraș-Severin, for instance, between 1974 and 1980 neo-Protestant 
and banned religious organizations registered a 13 percent and an exorbitant 858 percent 
increase, respectively. The drift away from “traditional creeds,” Orthodoxy in particular, resulted 
from believers’ critical attitude towards how majority churches compromised with the state, the 
explanation went.500  Occasionally, however, sociologists attributed such conversions to the 
“lack of talent and apostleship” among local Orthodox priests.501 But findings also pointed to 
youth’s growing beliefs in the occult – magic, astrology, and divination; the paranormal; or 
ufology. Atheist education, the conclusion was, had to address such faith in “supposedly 
transcendental forces.”502 
Since dogmatic assumptions about the power of scientific knowledge over religious 
belief had recently come into question, atheists naturally turned the bulk of their efforts towards 
assessing the actual impact of scientific-atheist education. Not surprisingly, their findings 
substantiated much of their suspicions about the ineffectiveness of enlightenment efforts. Indeed, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
499 Popescu and Bărbăcioru, 61-62, 66. Popescu and Bădescu, 26. Aurel Olaru and Gheorghe Dumitru, ”Cercetarea 
sociologică a formelor și mijloacelor educației materialist-științifice,” Era Socialistă 11, no. 4 (20 February 
1982), 26-27 
500 Popescu and Bărbăcioru, 132. 
501 Popescu and Bădescu, 51-52, 88.  
502 Popescu and Bădescu, Factori economico-sociali (județul Gorj), 114. Popescu and Bărbăcioru, Aspecte, 186. 
Datculescu, “Probleme actuale,” 215-216. For calls that atheist education address these “para-religious” 
phenomena, see Petre Datculescu, “Subcultura ocultismului,” Contemporanul 25 (1973). Octavian Chețan, 
“Tineretul și educația ateist-științifică,” Univers într-o carte vol. 5 (Bucharest: Editura Politică, 1976), 115, 122-
123. Laurențiu Pop and Bogdan Stugren, ”Educația materialist-științifică și formarea personalității,” Era 
Socialistă  5, no. 7 (July 1976), 35-37.  
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most reports noted the ease with which the lower clergy reconciled the contradiction between 
religion and atheism or religion and science. From findings in Caraș-Severin county, Ion Mihail 
Popescu503 repeated a conversation he had with a Baptist minister who, when asked whether he 
had proof of the existence of God, answered: “The Bible and atheism were the incontestable 
proofs.” “The Bible teaches us who God is and how He reveals Himself to people. If God did not 
exist, atheism would not have any sense. But atheism exists.”504  
Such arguments were made not only at the philosophical level but also in terms of moral 
values and the separate, yet ultimately complementary jurisdictions of communism and religion 
in human life. At a roundtable with local religious and party functionaries in the city of Reșița, 
for instance, a Roman-Catholic priest found ”no essential distinction” between Christian and the 
party’s ideology about life and the world “as long as both pursued the same goals: eternal peace, 
universal brotherhood, love of humanity, happiness, [and] justice.”505 In fact, he argued that a 
kind of labor distribution existed between the communist state and the Church, since comrades 
were in charge of administering this-worldly “horizontal” affairs while priests were responsible 
for “vertical” questions. As the two types of jurisdiction made the sign of “the Christian cross,” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
503 Ion Mihail Popescu (1935-1997) was a sociologist, who was a student in the Department of Philosophy at the 
University of Bucharest beginning 1954. In 1958, he became a victim of the wave of repression following the 
Hungarian Revolution.  According to Vladimir Tismăneanu, he was expelled and imprisoned until 1964 because 
he quoted the major works of the interwar philosopher Lucian Blaga and Tudor Vianu in a philosophy seminar. 
In the early 1970s, he completed his PhD thesis on Blaga’s philosophy of culture with Blaga’s son in law, Tudor 
Bugnariu. During the 1970s and 1980s, Popescu worked in the Center for Sociology at the University of 
Bucharest, where he coordinated national research on religion and atheism as part of the 1976-1980 plan 
assigned to the Academy of Social and Political Sciences. Vladimir Tismăneanu, “O viperă stalinistă: cine a fost 
Tamara Dobrin?" 27 March 2011, at https://tismaneanu.wordpress.com/2011/03/25/o-vipera-stalinista-sau-cine-
a-fost-tamara-dobrin/, last accessed 22 January 2015. Ștefan Costea, Sociologi români: mica enciclopedie 
(Bucharest: Editura Expert, 2001), 365. 
504 Popescu and Bărbăcioru, Aspecte ale fenomenului religios, 150. Report marked for “internal use.” This research 
was conducted by students from the Faculty of History and Philosophy at the University of Bucharest between 
15 June-12 July 1980 in 4 cities and 12 villages on 650 subjects.  
505 Ibid, 82-83.  
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the Catholic priest poignantly concluded: “the harmony between Church and State was both 
possible and necessary.”506 
Sociological research on the cosmologies of young people conducted by the Center for 
Research of Youth Problems across the country further revealed that an overwhelming number  
of youth saw no opposition between scientific and religious explanations of existence.507 As the 
head of the research project Petre Datculescu noted, young believers were fascinated with the 
enigmas of the universe – “the perfection of the macro-cosmos and of celestial mechanics; […] 
the bio-psychological complexity of the human being; [and] the genesis and evolution of living 
matter.” But this knowledge rarely solidified into convictions about the irreconcilability of 
science and religion. Instead, believers declared that there was a contradiction at the heart of 
scientific explanations; in their mind, evidence of the perfection and complexity of the universe 
was incompatible with claims about its “hazardous” origin. To illustrate the effects of this 
cognitive process, Datculescu relayed the answer of an anonymous interviewee. Amazed that 
“the stars rotated on perfectly established orbits without colliding,” one young believer was 
convinced that “this could not be the work of chance.” To demonstrate how science strengthened 
belief instead of weakening it, Datculescu cited another believer who declared: “We believe in 
eternal life. Science also demonstrates that old age is an illness. I read The Magazine, I read 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
506 Ibid, 122 and 127. A young woman who was a Baptist and a member of the Communist Youth Union formulated 
the same argument in a conversation with a party member. Ibid, 91-92. 
507 The survey was carried out in 11 counties (Timiș, Arad, Bihor, Cluj, Mureș, Brașov, Sibiu, Maramureș, Suceava, 
Dolj, and Prahova) and the capital on 300 young people between the ages of 14-30.  According to the report, for 
57 percent of subjects there was “no opposition between science and religion, science had a relative character”; 
for 19 percent “a contradiction existed sometimes, but religion was true”; 21 percent “could not formulate an 
opinion” and only 3 percent declared that science and religion were mutually exclusive. Petre Datculescu, 
Educația materialist-științifică a tineretului: cercetări psiho-sociale (Bucharest: Editura Politică, 1980), 83-83, 
and 126. In addition to the research project coordinated by the Center for the Study of Youth Problems in spring 
1976 (see f. 46.), in this book Datculescu also relied on information gathered in 1977-1979, which covered 10 
counties and involved 3,888 subjects (youth workers, pupils, and students between the ages of 14-30). See p. 
159. 
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Humanity at Crossroads, [and] The Beacon of Future. All convinced me to believe.” In an 
interesting twist then, even when familiar with scientific literature and receptive to the 
achievements of scientific explorations, young people managed to sublimate science in their 
religious worldviews. For Datculescu, such transformations in the youth’s mind pointed to “the 
deliberate undermining of reason” or, the outright “impermeability” of believers’ logic, part of 
which he attributed to the work of the lower clergy.508 As he noted, in explicit terms, these 
findings raised the stakes for adapting scientific education to such “levels of understanding.” But 
implicitly, Datculescu also raised the question whether convinced believers were the best targets 
for atheist work.  
A lot more worrisome, from the point of view of atheists, was when local party members 
reconciled communism with religion by professing their belief or by participating in various 
religious ceremonies. In Caraș-Severin county, for instance, “63 percent of party members did 
not doubt the existence of God” and 40 percent believed that religion would persist in the 
future.509 Conventional explanations attributed this phenomena to cadres’ old age, low levels of 
education, or inability to distinguish between state policy towards the church and the party’s 
ideological position towards religion.510 But such explanations proved insufficient if party 
members went as far as to join “sects.” When asked about the motivations behind their 
conversion, some cadres simply affirmed their belief that “the needs of the mind and spirit” or 
values such as “humanism, rectitude, [and] virtue” could be cultivated in “religious and party 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
508 Petre Datculescu, “Argumentul științific – argumentul cel mai convingător,” Scânteia 51:12355 (May 14, 1982), 
2. 
509 Popescu and Bărbăcioru, Aspecte, footnotes on p. 215 and 218. 
510 Popescu, Factori economico-sociali (județul Tulcea), 43. Popescu and Bădescu, Factori economico-sociali 
(județul Gorj), 113. Carried out in 15 June-10 July 1979, this investigation included 480 subjects between the 
ages of 16 and 37. Popescu and Bărbăcioru, Aspecte ale fenomenului religios, 64, 68, 164, and 213-215. 
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organizations alike.”511 But Ion Mihail Popescu also cited cases of party members who justified 
their conversion not with belief but with pragmatic arguments that amounted to “Pascal’s 
wager.” As one party member reasoned, 
 
In youth I have served the Romanian Communist Party with unbounded devotion. 
Now, at old age, when I have realized that I do not quite know whether God exists 
or not, I thought it wouldn’t be bad to follow the teachings of the Church. If He 
doesn’t exist, I did not lose anything because I have done good deeds when I 
didn’t believe in Him and I was a party activist. If He exists, I have all the 
chances for eternal life because, sincerely repenting my bad deeds from before, I 
have reformed myself. I have served you until now, let me serve the Baptists from 
now on!512 
 
Such findings suggested that Romanian socialist atheism failed even devoted communists on two 
planes:  in party education, as cadres continued to dissolve the ethical-philosophical boundaries 
between socialist and Christian humanism and in a much more substantial way, when 
communists faced old age and the prospect of death. Considering the Promethean aspirations of 
the Romanian atheist enterprise, Popescu’s formulation of the problem in terms of “Pascal’s 
wager” was profoundly suggestive: if, as Blaise Pascal argued, scientific reason could not prove 
or disprove the existence of God, then when the long-term party cadre rejected socialist 
teachings in favor of a religious institution’s, his act seemed rational and did not need to be based 
on religious belief. Along with Popescu’s, such research findings reminded atheists that the key 
problem in their endeavor was a spiritual-emotional one that did not necessarily have solutions. 
Even if atheism provided answers for how to fulfill the human desire for meaningful life in this 
world, the possibility of afterlife and divine judgment was still cause for existential worry even in 
the case of the unbeliever.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
511 Popescu and Bărbăcioru, 90-91. For a similar argument see also, 115-116. 
512 Ibid, 89-90. 
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Although this particular problem was not explored any further, sociological 
investigations did devote a lot of attention to the emotional elements of religious experience 
arguing that the strength of modern faith was rooted in its affective and spiritual dimensions.513 
Researchers most often emphasized the “therapeutic,” “compensatory” function of religious 
organizations - their capability to respond to “real” needs in an individual’s life by providing 
moral guidance and emotional relief from suffering during times of challenge.514 The thrust of 
such arguments was naturally that atheist education and party-state institutions overall failed to 
do the same. As Petre Datculescu suggested, this omission carried particularly high stakes in the 
case of the young and the ill who converted to sectarian belief because of traumatic life-events 
such as lengthy diseases, suffering from family or romantic relationships, from the death of a 
loved one, and even in the case of personal failures at school or in the work environment.515 
Indeed, confirming atheist fears, interview subjects inadvertently reported positive feelings after 
conversion, which ranged from the sense of being guided and protected to “spiritual 
contentment,” “moral stability,” and even “indescribable happiness.”516 Importantly, Datculescu 
noted, religion’s compensatory function appeared to work as young atheists exhibited 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
513 Drăgan, Popescu, Bădescu, “Factori sociali ai fenomenului religios,” 44. 
514 Popescu and Bădescu, Factori economico-sociali (județul Gorj), 47. Popescu and Bărbăcioru, Aspecte, 116-117, 
173, 180-185. Popescu, Factori economico-sociali (județul Tulcea), 41, 44-45. Petre Datculescu, ”Dezvoltarea 
atitudinilor materialist-științifice ale tineretului,” Caiet documentar no. 5 (1976), Special Issue: Educația 
materialist-științifică, 11. This is an article on the national research carried out by the Center for the Study of 
Youth Problems mentioned in f. 46. Aurel Olaru and Gheorghe Dumitru, ”Cercetarea sociologică a formelor și 
mijloacelor educației materialist-științifice,” Era Socialistă 11, no. 4 (20 February 1982) , 26-27. This research 
was conducted in Bacău county in July 1981 and involved 253 young subjects, among which workers, pupils, 
students, and intellectuals. Paul Șipurel, “Aspecte ale formării convingerilor materialist-științifice.”  
515 Datculescu, Educația materialist-științifică, 114. Petre Datculescu, “Probleme actuale ale formării tineretului în 
spiritul concepției materialist-dialectice,” Dezvoltarea conștiinței socialiste a tinerei generații (Bucharest, 1979).  
516 Ibid, 115, 125. 
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“significantly” higher levels of tension, anxiety, and depression than believers.517 Atheist experts 
also posited that it was in order to take advantage of moments of anguish in people’s personal 
lives that many sectarians turned to the helping professions, becoming medics, pharmacists, 
lawyers, and hospital directors.518 Atheists likewise observed that all churches embraced the 
socially marginal elements – the Romas, unmarried women, alcoholics, the unemployed, poor 
workers and peasants - providing economic aid, moral guidance, and community support to those 
who benefited less from the blessings of socialism.519 Far from being expressions of mere 
cynicism of religious charity and social welfare, these observations showed the abiding concern 
that religious organizations were turning the weaknesses of socialism to their own advantage. By 
extension, they also underscored that atheism needed to fulfill the “pastoral” functions in an 
individual’s everyday life - functions that traditionally belonged to religion.  
The urgency for this grew even more as atheists revealed that religion persisted not only 
because materialism left a spiritual void behind but also because socialist modernization helped 
“reproduce” religiosity. Indeed, several reports emphasized that, as collectivization and 
industrialization unleashed unprecedented labor mobility across the country, the religious 
landscape of Romania became more intermixed.  In Tulcea county, for instance, a great portion 
of neo-Protestant believers migrated from villages to the cities or the neighboring counties of 
Brăila, Constanța, and Galați.520 Similarly, Hungarian Calvinists from the Banat and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
517 Ibid, 136-137.  
518 Popescu, Factori economico-sociali (județul Tulcea), 41-42, and 82. 
519 Popescu and Bărbăcioru, Aspecte ale fenomenului religios, 111-112, 121, and 150. Popescu, Factori economico-
sociali (județul Tulcea), 24. Popescu and Bădescu, Factori economico-sociali (județul Gorj), 29, 64, 81 and 88-
89.  
520 Popescu, Factori economico-sociali (județul Tulcea), 18. 
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Transylvania moved to urban areas in southern counties such as Gorj.521 The problem was that, 
as clergymen often followed believers, new communities sprang up in confessionally more 
homogeneous areas. As a result of such demographic intermixing, sociological findings reported 
that religious life became better organized and more animated in cities, the very places that the 
party-state generally regarded to be embodiments of socialism.522  
More importantly, however, atheists pointed out that socialism provided a hospitable 
terrain for religion to thrive. Modernization disrupted individual life at a deeper psychological 
level, the argument went, by creating new circumstances and “negative” emotions on which faith 
could thrive. Based on their research in Bacău county, Aurel Olaru and Gheorghe Dumitru 
observed that the exodus of youth from rural to urban areas “often generated psychological 
conditions” favorable for religiosity because integration into the work environment and new 
living conditions in the city could be a harsh process.523 Calling on the nation-wide findings of 
the Center for the Study of Youth Problems, Petre Datculescu added that adapting to the rhythm 
of labor specific to a modern industrial society and the rapid socio-economic development of the 
country often caused tension in the professional and daily life of youth. This was aggravated 
further by the bureaucratism and unseemliness (neprincipialitate) of communist institutions that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
521 Popescu and Bădescu, Factori economico-sociali (județul Gorj), 68-69, 87. 470 families in the main cities of the 
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522 Given their missionary bent, neo-Protestant sects were particularly held responsible for the overall intensification 
of religious life. In fact, because the Orthodox Church was losing believers primarily to neo-Protestantism, in 
1975 Patriarch Justinian instructed all bishops to set up special programs of religious education for the youth in 
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did not provide adequate solutions for the “real life and work problems” of the young.524 For this 
reason, while summarizing the Academy’s research in 1970-1980, Ion Mihail Popescu and others 
noted that socialist transformation generated “secondary” processes favorable for the “neo-
sacralization” of society. Belief had social roots in the new society and would take a “long time” 
to wither away, the explanation went. After all, although to a much lesser extent than other 
civilizations, socialism also created its own social contradictions, as a result of which alienation 
remained a fact of everyday life.525 Paraphrasing Hegel, Ion Mihail Popescu summed this up as 
follows: “although the world is not upside down in the conditions of socialism, its heart still 
senses the perfume of religion.”526 
 As findings confirmed that the battle against religion was going to be a protracted affair, 
atheists increasingly concluded that the new task in their endeavor was to spiritually and 
emotionally strengthen atheism, humanizing socialist life in this manner. Given the 
compensatory functions of “religious myths, representations, and practices,” Datculescu argued, 
“atheist education based exclusively on the demystification of myths and the widening of 
scientific culture risk[ed] to remain without echo.” Instead, atheist work required above all the 
cultivation of “inter-human relations characterized by solidarity, mutual respect, friendliness, and 
mutual aid in difficult situations or moments in personal life.”527 Indeed, Aurel Olaru and 
Gheorghe Dimitriu added, to address suffering and negative emotions, atheist policy needed to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
524 Datculescu, ”Dezvoltarea atitudinilor materialist-științifice,” 13-14. 
525 Popescu, Bădescu, Drăgan, ”Factori economico-sociali, ” In fact, Popescu and Bădescu initially quoted research 
findings in Czechoslovakia to interpret their findings: Erika Kadlecova, “Czechoslovakia,” Western Religion: A 
Country by Country Sociological Inquiry ed. Hans Mol, Margaret Hetherton, and Margaret Henty (Paris: 
Mounton, 1972), 119-134. Popescu and Bădescu, Factori economico-sociali (județul Gorj), 108-109. 
526 Popescu and Bărbăcioru, Aspecte, 191. 
527 Datculescu, “Probleme actuale.” Culea, “Religie, mentalitate laică, ateism.” 
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perfect “psiho-social relations” among citizens in all areas of socialist life, whether in public 
institutions, mass organizations, the work environment, schools, places of leisure and living, or 
the more private domain of the family.528 In practical terms, this task of humanizing social 
relations was far from straightforward. First, sociological research motivated atheists to revise 
the categories by which a person was classified as a believer or, conversely, an atheist. Second, 
experts also had to return to old questions about the place of atheism in mass culture, especially 
in connection to socialist rituals. Inextricably linked, these two issues set the course for the ways 
in which the Ceaușescu regime would envision socialist spiritual culture in its late years.  
 
Rituals and the Believer 
 The objective of providing alternatives to religious holidays and life-cycle rites had re-
emerged in 1966, during the first atheist campaign of the Ceaușescu regime. As before, red-letter 
days like May 1 and December 30 (Republic Day) were meant to displace canonical holidays, 
Easter and Christmas in particular, and became increasingly elaborate as Ceaușescu’s personality 
cult intensified. But in the late 1960s, as Agitprop reports noted believers’ attraction to the 
pompous style of religious ceremonies, the Central Committee also directed the party’s rank-
and-file to popularize rites of passage for coming of age, communist weddings, etc. Local organs 
were likewise instructed to organize various cultural and sports events with the purpose of 
drawing believers away from Sunday mass, local religious festivals or pilgrimages.  
Importantly however, beyond instructions to intensify such efforts on the local level, the 
ritual question had a relatively low priority for atheist experts and top party organs alike. Indeed, 
when the Agitprop convened a forum with atheist propagandists in January 1969, one of the 	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participants complained that the church still retained monopoly over “the crucial moments in a 
person’s life” in part because communist weddings and funerals, implemented before in a rather 
“improvised” and sporadic manner, were not promoted at the central level. These issues required 
attention in the future, the conclusion was.529 During Executive Committee discussions on atheist 
education in February 1970, the head of the Secretariat Virgil Trofin similarly suggested that 
discouraging religious customs imposed the need to organize lay folk celebrations.530 
Notwithstanding such propositions, however, the question of rituals at this time remained quite 
ancillary in Central Committee discussions. It was what sociological findings revealed about the 
relationship between religious belief and the practice of rites that propelled the problem of 
socialist ritual reform to the center of party concerns. 
 Throughout the 1970s, the material gathered on the ground indicated that levels of 
observance for both life-cycle and seasonal rituals were “strikingly high” even in areas that 
researchers classified as being of “low religious intensity.” Thus, according the statistics 
provided by the Center of Sociology at the University of Bucharest, in Gorj county 66.8 percent 
of subjects turned to the church for baptisms, weddings, and funerals.531 In Tulcea, a county of 
“medium religious intensity,” most citizens practiced life-cycle rituals “which they considered 
either to be traditions that needed to be preserved or necessary religious acts.” This was true of 
all believers, regardless of nationality, levels of education, political loyalty or social category.532 
Figures for Caraș-Severin were even greater; in this county 84.7 percent of the rural population 
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and 46.8 percent of urban dwellers admitted going to church more or less regularly.533 But the 
fact that ritual practice was twice as high in rural areas than in cities was consistent with other 
nationwide findings.534 Restricted to “internal use,” these reports also agreed that observance of 
canonical holidays ran consistently high. Therefore, researchers devoted considerable care to 
assess the popularity of various ceremonies, parish feast days, and pilgrimages in comparison to 
the socialist festivals that local organs set up for such occasions. Popescu and Bărbăcioru noted 
for instance that, gathering from five counties, tens of thousands of believers celebrated the 
Dormition of the Mother of God at the six-hundred year old monastery of Tismana. Meanwhile, 
taking place 3 kilometers away, the socialist feast experienced difficult moments, “being a 
common fair where itinerant merchants praised their wares loudly.” “In such conditions,” 
Popescu and Bădescu observed, “the Festival of Gorj song, dance and folk costumes, held in the 
same location as the feast […] was applauded by only a small number of citizens.”535 To sum up, 
sociological findings revealed, first and foremost, that religious rituals continued to pose a 
challenge to the atheist project – a challenge that its various enlightenment measures, “cultured 
leisure” programs, red-letter days and rites of passage had not yet adequately addressed.  
What compounded the question of ritual reform was that experts identified profound 
contradictions between ritual observance and, conversely, people’s actual beliefs and motivations 
to practice. As it turned out, popular religiosity emerged as a profoundly contradictory landscape 
that defied previous, primarily political typologies of the believer. For instance, how did the 	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unbeliever who joined the Baptists on the grounds of something like Pascal’s wager fit 
definitions of the sectarian as the paradigmatic religious fanatic?  And was empirical sociology 
even capable of scientifically grasping “what in social reality corresponded to concepts like 
“atheist” and “intensely religious”? For, as Petru Berar pointed out, “atheist” was a philosophical 
category that empirical sociology only borrowed.536 In effect then, the argument went, 
developing a typology of belief that reflected the entire spectrum from religious belief to atheism 
in a manner corresponding to social reality constituted a decisive factor for the future success of 
atheist endeavors.  
In the early 1970s, national data gathered under the aegis of the Council for Socialist 
Education and Culture and the Center for the Study of Youth Problems already presented 
inconsistencies between ritual practice and the affirmation of religious belief. Haralamb Culea 
remarked, for instance, that whereas 76.9 percent of subjects practiced rituals, only 5.7 percent 
actually held religious convictions. As a result, he concluded the observance of rites was not an 
accurate indicator of faith; sociologists needed to see whether people associated such ceremonies 
with religious cosmologies and emotions.537 Petre Datculescu added to Culea’s observations, 
pointing out that only a small group of the youth “who participated in ceremonies, [and] religious 
holidays [actually] manifested beliefs of a religious nature; and some of those who almost never 
went to church did accept the possibility of a divine power.”538 At the end of the decade, 
researchers from the Center for Sociology at the University of Bucharest similarly observed that 
numerous young people participated at the consecration of churches not because of any religious 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
536 Petru Berar, “Semnificațiile secularizării. Teze și antiteze,” Revista de filosofie 20, no. 11 (November 1973), 
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537 Culea, ”Religie, mentalitate laică, ateism,” 167. 
538 Datculescu, ”Dezvoltarea atitudinilor,” 22. 
240 	  
	  	  
motivation but out of curiosity to see the bishop’s apparel, hear a sermon, and see how a ritual 
was conducted.539 On other occasions, high levels of religious practice were attributed to the 
social pressure of the family or the local community.540 Even when believers denounced their 
own priests, which sociologists immediately interpreted to be a sign of a “decline in the social 
prestige of the church,” they warned that popular anticlericalism should not be mistaken for the 
loss of belief.541  
By the late 1970s such contradictions between ritual practice, attitude towards religious 
organizations, and belief warranted separate sections in the Center’s reports and demonstrated 
that discussions about the typology of belief had undergone a radical shift.542  Experts agreed that 
confessional belonging was a poor indicator of religiosity, an approach that had been 
characteristic of the political narrative of religion. Instead, they embraced new criteria to assess 
degrees of conviction on a spectrum that went from active religiosity to atheism, the middle 
being occupied by a type that researchers varyingly described as “transitional,” “indifferent,” or 
“non-atheist.” A crucial trait of persons who belonged to this category was the disconnect 
between belief and religious practice: while they may have identified themselves as believers and 
practiced rituals, their commitment to religious worldviews, church dogmas was either not strong 
or not present at all.543  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
539 Popescu, Factori economico-sociali (județul Gorj), 50. Popescu and Bărbăcioru, Aspecte ale fenomenului religios 
(județul Caraș-Severin), 65. 
540 Popescu, Factori economico-sociali (județul Gorj), 51. Popescu and Bărbăcioru, 62. 
541 Ibid, 59 and 72. Popescu and Bărbăcioru, 64. 
542 See Popescu, Factori economico-sociali (județul Tulcea), 72-75. Popescu and Bădescu, Factori economico-
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543 Ibid, 187. Popescu and Bădescu, 110. 
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Since findings indicated this demographic category to be the mainstream, far outweighing 
either the convinced believer or the atheist, sociologists presented two main arguments to explain 
why “indifferent” believers were attracted to religious rituals. According to researchers at the 
Center for Sociology in Bucharest, one of the answers was that as religious organizations 
modernized, they increasingly focused the center of their activity on the existential and spiritual 
domains of human life. Instead of insisting on supernatural cosmologies foreign to the essence of 
the believer and the essence of nature, religious organizations acquired new functions in response 
to modern socio-economic and spiritual developments, the argument went. Churches transformed 
themselves into “meeting places” for youth or into places of “retreat and meditation, without 
purely religious meaning” for citizens facing difficult situations, economic setbacks, or moral 
troubles.544 More importantly, however, the Center’s national findings revealed that “tradition” 
was the most widespread motive for religious behavior. Citizens declared that religious 
ceremonies were necessary in human life. But such views, Popescu warned were not rooted in 
faith. “Indifferent believers” reinterpreted religious rituals as part of “cultural tradition” and 
customs.545  
The discovery of “indifference” as an important category on the Romanian religious 
landscape was particularly troubling. On the surface, the socialist press was quick to claim the 
declining numbers of convinced believers was proof of atheist efforts and that secularization 
understood as the weakening of religious worldviews and the institutional power of churches was 
well underway. But in reports presented to the restricted audience of party leaders, researchers 
were far less confident. The Center of Sociology warned top organs that the population 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
544 Ibid, 44-45. Popescu and Bărbăcioru, 59, 71 and 153. 
545 Ibid, 181-183. 
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exhibiting such “religiosity of transition” was just as likely to embrace religious conviction as a 
lay mentality.546 The process of secularization was not linear, these sociologists reminded, and as 
a result, atheist work had to focus primarily on this category of believer.  
If spiritual needs and the attachment to cultural traditions explained the religious behavior 
of the indifferent followers, atheists had to provide attractive lay ceremonies. For Datculescu, 
these needed to be infused with socialist humanism and had to be “well-grounded from a 
historical, ethnographic, folkloric, psychological and sociological perspective.”547 Popescu also 
imagined “sumptuous lay ceremonies” rooted in folklore. In practical terms, he added, this meant 
that atheists had “to uncover the lay pip of certain religious celebrations.” After all, “Christian 
holidays (Easter, Annunciation, Whitsunday, Dormition of the Mother of God, Christmas, and 
Epiphany, as well as religious celebrations tied to church patrons) constituted either lay 
celebrations tied to memorable events in people’s real lives - primarily harvest cycles  – or pagan 
festivities,” which church fathers and theologians subsequently endowed with new meanings. 
Atheists were to imitate such efforts, Popescu suggested, while naturally emphasizing the lay 
sense of such holidays.  
One implication of such arguments was that in order to return to the “original meanings” 
of such celebrations, research in folklore was imperative and had to encompass not only festival 
culture but customs around life-cycle rituals. 548 But in order for atheist propaganda to be 
successful with “the indifferent” believer in particular, the new folkloristic ceremonies also 
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547 Petre Datculescu, “Probleme actuale ale formãrii tineretului,” 216. 
548 Ibid, 205-207. For other arguments on the necessity to promote “lay traditions” see Petre Bartoș and Mihai 
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necessitated “sumptuous” spaces. Every locality needed houses of baptism and marriage, funeral 
homes and lay cemeteries that not only rivaled but surpassed those of local churches. The 
urgency for a suitable material culture was particularly high in the case of funereal rites. 
According to the findings of the Center for Sociology at the University of Bucharest, most 
cemeteries in the country had not been nationalized and, as a result, were church-owned. The 
dearth of funeral homes similarly meant that catafalques could be set up only in family homes or 
at the local parish. Without a proper sepulchral culture that provided rituals and a material 
environment, Popescu implied, a socialist country could not give meaning to individual life 
because it could not “love its dead and respect their memory.” Ultimately then, “it was like a 
sanctuary without an altar, or a heroic army without a flag.”549  
Over the course of the 1970s, sociological research around the country, most of which 
was carried out under the aegis of the Academy of Socio-Political Sciences, provided 
unprecedented information about popular religiosity in Romania. Sociologists also presented 
party leaders with a new category, “indifference,” from which to understand the individual 
believer and described diffuse forms of religiosity that encompassed, alongside the widespread 
practice of major creeds, quasi-scientific religious cosmologies and some fascination with “para-
religiosity.” This religious map bore ambivalent results for propaganda work. 
In line with the revisionist insistence on the role of expert knowledge in reforming 
socialism, the reports of the Center of Sociology in Bucharest repeated requests for institutional 
privileges for atheist propaganda and research. The Center proposed first, the creation of the 
National Commission for the Problems of Religion and Atheism and, second, the establishment 
of a National Institute for Research on Religion and Atheism at the Academy. Among others, 	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sociologists also suggested a national census of the religious population, the first since 1930.550 
But top party organs refrained from improving the status or resources of atheist experts. Indeed, 
the only new institution established at the turn of the decade was a small interdisciplinary 
laboratory at the Party Academy “Ștefan Gheorghiu.” Alongside the Center for the Study of 
Youth Problems and a similar laboratory at the Academy of Socio-Political Sciences, such 
institutions provided the framework for continued research during the 1980s.551 Nationwide 
investigations became uncommon, however, as the Party increasingly marginalized sociology 
and psychology as policy-relevant fields for socialist construction. Ceaușescu’s rapid 
industrialization program gradually led the way for the full-scale economic collapse of the late 
1980s, state funding increasingly unavailable and investigative research on “social reality”  
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politically undesirable.552 But the limiting and eventual supplanting of semi-official expertise by 
the late 1970s reflected, most of all, the regime’s unapologetic return to the Stalinist ethos and its 
subsequent intolerance of any centers of scientific knowledge that could detract from the party’s 
power and its leading role in society. Certainly, in a space where the party-state’s willingness to 
dispense political and financial support to those who mobilized national ideas, sociologists’ 
embrace of a professional standpoint and technical language did not help the cause of atheist 
expertise.  
The re-Stalinization drive built on sociological findings, nevertheless, ushering in two 
significant changes in atheist propaganda. On the one hand, the religiosity among the avant-
garde of socialist construction – party members and the youth – motivated leaders to instate an 
ideological hard line against believers as well. Thus, the Agitprop’s report for the Central 	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     The demise of psychology in 1982 became linked with the so-called “Transcendentalist Meditation Affair.” In 
1979 the Institute of Pedagogical and Psychological Research was directed by the National Council for Science 
and Technology, an institution under the control of Elena Ceaușescu, to investigate transcendental meditation 
technique associated with guru Maharishi Mahesh Yogi (1918-2008). In a report to the Council, Vlad Gheorghiu 
and Ion Ciofu, the Institute’s two experts in relaxation therapy, suggestology and psychophysiology, dismissed 
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construction. The technique became part of an experiment at the Institute only in 1981, at the insistence of the 
Ministry of Education. But in 1982, the regime used it as an attack against the Bucharest intelligentsia as well as 
academic psychology and pedagogy. As a result, the Institute was shut down. 300 psychologists, sociologists, 
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Transcendentală’ – o răfuială cu psihologia și psihologii,” in Viața cotidiană în comunism ed. Adrian Neculau 
(Iași: Polirom, 2004), 264-288. Doina Jela, Cătălin Strat, and Mihai Albu, eds. Afacerea “Meditația 
Transcendentală” (Bucharest: Humanitas, 2004).  
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Committee’s July conference in 1979 noted that in the previous four years (1974-1978) the party 
excluded over 2,200 citizens for converting to “sects.” 553 At the meeting, Ceaușescu himself 
demanded the removal of pedagogues from the education system unless they had clear 
“materialist convictions” while he also declared that the religiosity of party members and of the 
communist youth was unacceptable. 554   
More importantly, however, the question of ritual reform – that is, the task of providing 
socialist folkloristic ceremonies for holidays and milestone moments in individual life – moved 
to the center of the regime’s concerns. Informed by empirical investigations over the course of 
the decade, the Agitprop’s report for the Central Committee’s conference in July 1979 posited 
the problem of rituals as an urgent matter:        
 
Sociological investigations from several counties revealed that most citizens resorted to 
the services of the church, to cult practices during the holidays of Christmas, Easter, 
parish celebrations, and weddings, baptisms, funerals, and in some cases for the 
consecration of the home. The reason for this is that, even though winter celebrations for 
New Year, [and] spring celebrations for May 1 have been successfully organized, there 
was little done to promote a lay frame [to mark] the other moments in man’s life. 
Weddings are most often officiated in the customary rooms of people’s councils, without 
a full ceremony to substitute the religious one; there is no name-giving ceremony for the 
newly born to replace religious baptism, and when it comes to funerals, it has not become 
a custom everywhere for the organs of the party and state to organize lay ceremonies for 
the deceased party members.  
 
Agitprop rebuked the Council for Culture and Socialist Education, in particular, for not 
exploiting the “lay significance” of local folk traditions and ensuring the “spread and installation 
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of new traditions.” 555  But in light of the fact that in previous measures on atheist education 
(1970-1973) party directives on rituals barely extended over a sentence, Agitprop’s increased 
criticism was hardly routine but constituted rather a cue for change.   
 
Happiness Romanian Style: Socialist Spirituality and the “Song for Romania” Festival 
  
The Ceaușescu regime’s most significant attempt for socialist ritual reform was the 
biannual Song for Romania National Festival (Cântarea României) created in 1976 in the 
immediate aftermath of the first Congress of Political Education and Socialist Culture.556 The 
Festival was a mass competition “of work and free creation” that, among others, staged local 
folklore traditions. Its purpose was to produce a revolutionary national culture and thus provide a 
realm for the becoming of a “multi-laterally developed” socialist man, distinctly Romanian and 
atheist.  The festival’s national-Stalinist dimension was unmistakable in its militantly 
mobilizational character and in its celebration of collective – socialist and national – identity 
under a demiurgic leader over and above the private, subjective domain of the individual citizen. 
Programmatic articles hailed Ceaușescu and the Party for developing the “past spirituality” of the 
masses in line with the “needs of the future.” 557 The Bucharest cultural magazine The Week 	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(Săptămâna) praised the festival as “an impressive revolutionary agora,” “a previously unknown 
form of connecting the entire Romanian people to an enormous spiritual network.”558Song for 
Romania had an “all-embracing scale and lasting social impact,” anthropologist Vintilă 
Mihăilescu writes. “Folk culture (and its experts) never recovered after this vast social 
experiment.” This partly explains why, after twenty-five years, there are no real testimonies and 
barely any research on this phenomenon, “apart for some private nostalgia and a rather common 
public revulsion.” 559  
 Without a doubt, the concept for the festival was not entirely new. Showcasing peasant 
culture with the instrumental aid of folklorists or ethnologists has been an established strategy for 
imagining national identity in the modern era. Song for Romania had its own immediate 
historical antecedents in the festivities organized under King Carol II during the interwar years. 
On the other side of the political spectrum, the underground communist movement had also 
appropriated carols as key form of propaganda, being in dire pursuit of legitimacy.560  From the 
mid-1930s, Soviet mass culture provided its own twist on pre-existing morphologies, above all 
by infusing traditions with the (new) Stalinist symbols of socialist modernity - work, creativity, 
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progress, happiness and the image of a classless society. The laicization of folk culture as a form 
of atheist work had its origins in this very framework.561  
In Romania, national ideology brought strict proletcultism to heels by the 1960s.562 As 
peasant culture returned to the official stage through the rapidly expanding amateur artistic 
movement, folklore festivals and rituals on the Stalinist model burgeoned across the country.563 
Mihai Pop, the director of the Institute of Ethnology and Dialectology, noted in 1976 the revival 
of previous communal feasts. The Sheep Owners Gathering (Sâmbra Oilor) and the Ploughman 
(Tânjaua) in Maramureș county had apparently become “insignia of local pride.” There were 
examples for new communal gatherings as well. Thus, at the Round-Dance Festival in Prislop, 
amateur folk dancers and singers met from three counties in order to celebrate the foundation of  
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the first Moldovan state in line with the state’s cult of national genealogy.564 But perhaps one of 
the earliest and most visible examples of the official commitment to weld a national culture from 
a mixture of local folklore and Stalinist values was the appropriation of a fertility ritual 
traditionally tied to Christmas and New Year celebrations. Thus, “The Little Plow” (Plugușorul) 
became by the mid-1970s a widely publicized event at the Central Committee on December 31 
every year.565 Therefore, Song for Romania’s novelty was not so much morphological. Rather, 
its distinctiveness in the late socialist camp lay, first, in its scale and, second, in its intersection 
with party-state endeavors to reform atheist propaganda.566 
Indeed, if by the late 1970s breakneck urbanization was a priority for achieving socio-
economic modernization and homogeneity, then the festival was to fulfill the same goals in 
culture.567 As a vast educational, political-ideological and cultural-artistic event, Song for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
564 Mihai Pop, Obiceiuri tradiționale românești (Bucharest: Institutul de Cercetãri Etnologice și Dialectologice, 
1976), 199. The revival of folklore animated the organization of festivals as well as of dance and song groups 
among the minorities. Like most of their Romanian counterparts, these  still last and are iconic to this day. Zoltán 
Csaba Novák, András Tóth-Bartos, Lóránt Kálmán Kelemen, Újjászületés, Háromszékből Kovászna: Kovászna 
megye megszervezése és intézményesülése, 1968-1972 (Miercurea Ciuc: Pro Print, 2013), 162-169. Author’s 
interview with András Gergely, 19 November 2010. 
     Mihai Pop (1907-2000) was an ethnologist and former collaborator of Dimitrie Gusti. Over the course of the 
Ceaușescu years, he undertook several research trips to the United States and was a visiting professor at major 
universities in Chicago, Berkeley, Ann Arbor, Los Angeles, Marburg, and Paris. Having familiarized himself 
with cultural anthropology, he introduced the field to Romania after 1965 while he directed the Institute of 
Folklore, later re-named as the Institute of Dialectology and Folklore, in 1965-1974. See Rostás, Sala luminoasã, 
327-328. Iordan Datcu, Contribuții la etnologia românească (Bucharest: Editura Universal Dalsi, 2004), 179-
187. 
565 The suggestion to adapt this winter ritual as part of atheist propaganda came from Gheorghe Rãdulescu at the 
Executive Committee meeting on 10 February 1970, ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., inv. 2574, File 16/1970, f. 51. 
566 The fragmentation of socialist mass culture during the increased regime differentiation in the post-Stalin period 
meant that mass folklore festivals appeared in other socialist countries as well, e.g. the Flying Peacock (Röpülj 
Páva) in Hungary or the festivals that coalesced in the Baltic Singing Revolution. Unlike Song for Romania, 
however, these festivals detached from official culture and turned into powerful youth movements that fueled 
regime change. László Kürti, The Remote Borderland: Transylvania in the Hungarian Imagination (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 2001). Guntis Smidchens, The Power of Song: Nonviolent National Culture 
in the Baltic Singing Revolution (Portland: University of Washington Press, 2014). 
567 Kligman, The Politics of Duplicity, 34-35.  
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Romania included competitions in fields ranging from literature, the performing and plastic arts 
to music. Its mass phase took place in October-March followed by the county (March-April), the 
inter-county (April-May), and the republican phase and a final mass gala (end of May) in 
Bucharest. In particular, with the exception of toddlers and those incapacitated by old age or 
illness, the festival mobilized all citizens regardless of class background or occupation during its 
mass stage. Since it had to embrace the entire country, no county, city, village, educational and 
cultural institution, factory or cooperative was to be without an artistic ensemble or creation 
circle. Thus, as the Ceaușescu era came to a close, official statistics for the festivals final editions 
claimed that participation numbers, when counting only the performers and creators of various 
ages and professions, grew from the initial two million to five million – more than one-fifth of 
the country’s population at the time. These figures excluded audience numbers as well as the 
army of cultural managers, who planed and coordinated the festival under the strict supervision 
of Agitprop and the Council for Culture and Socialist Education.568  
Closely tied to the industrialization efforts of the Ceaușescu regime, urbanization and the 
systematization of villages promised modern, improved living standards to the average 
Romanian citizen. Yet, these processes also subjected the population to massive dislocation in 
the 1970s and 1980s. The population density of most cities increased radically while urban social 
and economic structures underwent rapid change. The herding of the peasantry from their 
familiar settings into state-designed uniform spaces of living brought about a break with 
traditional forms of life, setting off changes in the everyday mentality and existence of most 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
568 Mihăilescu warns that these numbers were often inflated as local party cells also competed against each other, “A 
New Festival for the New Man,” 64. See also, Dragoș Petrescu, “400.000 de spirite creatoare: Cântarea 
României sau stalinismul național în festival,” in Miturile comunismului românesc vol. II ed. Lucian Boia 
(Bucharest: Nemira, 1997), 115-126. ANDJHR, Fond CC of the CCES, inv. 663, File 70/1980-1985. Festivalul 
Național al Educației și Culturii Socialiste “Cântarea Romăniei, 1979-1981”: Regulament-cadru (Bucharest, 
1979), f. 85-87. 
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Romanians.569 At the same time, the rapid nature of the transformations meant that folkways 
predominanted the cultural life of most city-dwellers. Sociologists who studied popular 
religiosity in the 1970s had already signaled that the vast existential dislocation and the 
contradictions that urban environments entailed had to be addressed. Quoting Robert Bellah, 
anthropologist Gail Kligman echoed their argument, noting that there was a spiritual need for 
continuity, stability of orientation, and identity among the population if potential revolt was to be 
averted.570 This therapeutic and political imperative to embed radical change in familiar forms 
explains, broadly speaking, why the state turned to folklore more systematically than a decade 
earlier. Indeed, by the 1980s, the staging of peasant culture had come to outweigh any other field 
of artistic creation and interpretation in the Song for Romania Festival, its value being 
continuously buttressed by references to national authenticity, historicity, and specifity specific 
to national discourse of the era. 
Besides its scale, the distinctiveness of Song for Romania lay in the centrality of atheist 
education – a morphological innovation on the model of the Stalinist mass festival. The 
propagation of scientific and technological knowledge constituted one aspect of this atheist 
dimension. For the 1979-1981 mass phase, for instance, the local council of the Democratic 
Front for Socialist Unity reported extensively on measures undertaken to banish backward 
religious mentalities in Harghita county: the work of scientific-enlightenment brigades; the series 
of exhibits, film screenings, and public debates; special courses at people’s universities; or 
seasonal events such as “The Month of Scientific-Documentary Films,” “The Week of Science 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
569 Zoltán Novák, “Területrendezés a hetvenes-nyolcvanas évek Romániájában,” in Urbs: Magyar várostörténeti 
évkönyv 5 (Budapest, 2010), 153. 
570 Gail Kligman, Căluș, 149. 
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and Culture,” “Who Knows, Wins” competitions, etc. Similar actions were undertaken 
nationwide.571  
As the laicization of folk culture became a party-state objective in atheist work, the need 
for appropriate repertoires of seasonal and life-cycle rituals placed pressure on academic 
institutions and ethnological research. In the late 1960s, amidst growing emphasis on national 
specificity and unity in official rhetoric, the regime had commissioned the Institute of Ethnology 
and Dialectology in Bucharest to develop the first Ethnographic Atlas of Romania, the idea of 
which went back to the 1920s – the prominent folklorist Ovidiu Densușianu, in particular.572 As 
a result, by the early 1970s the Institute drew up extensive questionnaires on all aspects of 
village life and material culture, including seasonal celebrations and life-cycle rituals. Between 
1972 and 1982, with the help of curators at the major ethnographic museums in the country, the 
Institute’s ethnologists completed field research in approximately 600 villages and interviewed 
over 18,000 subjects.573 The regime’s support for the publication of the Atlas waned by that time. 
But the ethnographic material gathered during that decade came to inform the repertoires that the 
Institute was obliged to compile for over a hundred thousand song and dance ensembles in the 
Song for Romania Festival. The Institute’s experts also had to provide special assistance for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
571 ANDJHR, Fond County Council for the Democratic Front of Socialist Unity, inv. 65, File 2/1980, “Raport,” f. 
46-47. Mihãilescu, “A New Festival for the New Man,” 64-65. ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Secția Propagandă și 
Agitație, inv. 3291, File 11/1981, “Propunere privind organizarea unitară a acțiunii de stimulare a participării 
maselor la creația științifică și tehnică, cu concursul din cadrul Festivalului Cântarea României,” f. 21. 
572 Quote article in Revista de Etnografie și Folclor vol. 43-44 (1998), 6. 
573 Interview with Dr. Ion Cuceu (ethnographer, Director of the Romanian Academy’s Institute “Archive of 
Folklore,”) Cluj-Napoca, 7 April 2011. For the questionnaires, see Atlasul Etnografic al României no. 6 
(Bucharest: Institutul de Cercetări Etnologice și Dialectologice, 1979). I have also seen no. 7 and 8 published in 
1980. These were issues as ”bulletin’s for internal use.” The first volume of the Atlas on habitat was published in 
2004.  
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artistic instructors, direct the county committees of CCES, schools of folk art, theaters, houses of 
culture and mass organizations, the trade and youth unions, in particular. 574  
By the 1980s the intertwining of ritual reform and atheist Romanian spirituality in Song 
for Romania was unmistakable. The 1979 edition of the festival staged a rich array of seasonal 
folk customs as well as rites of passage connected the important moments of individual life - 
birth, coming of age, marriage, and death. Ion Meițoiu, a researcher at the Institute of 
Ethnological and Dialectological Research, singled out a couple of examples presented at the 
republican stage. The houses of culture from the villages of Dărmănești (Bacău county) and 
Tudora (Botoșani county) carnivalesque rituals around New Year’s celebrations specific to 
Northern Moldova. By comparison, the wedding of the dead performed by villagers from Vișeul 
de Sus evoked “traditional worldviews” specific to the Maramureș ethnographic region.575 
Under the banner of enhancing “past spirituality” according to the “needs of the future,” 
peasant ritual culture underwent major symbolic transformations in the festival. Because 
spectacular dances and dramatic skits lent themselves better to existence in mass culture, a 
process of pre-selection preceded the staging of rituals. Within their natural ritual milieu, folk 
customs – whether seasonal or life-cycle rituals – provided existential meaning and 
communicated both cosmological and social order for a community of kin, village or broader 
region. Subjected to a great deal of reinvention, these customs lost their original ritual functions 
and turned, among others, into forms of mass entertainment and consumption. Their time became 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
574 AMCPN, Corespondență, File 27823/1979, f. 72. ANDJHR, Fond County Committee of the Council for Socialist 
Education and Culture, inv. 663, File 83/1981-1987. CCES, “Recomandări de repertoriu pentru formațiile 
artistice de amatori,” f. 302-315. 
575 Ion Meițoiu, “Exigențe și opțiuni în valorificarea folclorului în manifestările spectaculoase din festivalul național 
Cântarea României,” Anuarul Institutului de Cerceări Etnologice și Dialectologice (Bucharest: Consiliul Culturii 
și Educației Socialiste, 1979), 91-92. 
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defined by the pre-planned duration of amateur performances. By conjuring up the continuity of 
the nation from past to future, they reorganized local community and space. As Mihai Pop noted, 
“inspired by old traditions that were revived or organized into new forms, or created anew from 
elements of old traditions, these traditions are not only of the locality – the village or valley in 
which they take place – like before; now they belong to the nation, the entire country.”576 After 
being stripped from their magical-religious meaning, these rituals lastly became suitable for the 
didactic purposes of the regime. In a national aesthetic frame, they preached Stalinist values: 
vitality, progress, beauty, and work, hailing the pursuit of collective values as a fulfillment of 
individual life. By making these values something that could be experienced in an emotional and 
aesthetic manner, these rituals were to allow individuals to constitute “spiritual” beliefs in 
accordance with regime objectives in secularization, nation-building, and socialist 
modernization.  
Party efforts to bring such ritual-spectacles off stage and turn them into new rituals for 
socialist citizens reached their peak after the mid-1980s. When the Central Committee gathered 
once more to evaluate atheist education in February 1986, Ceaușescu himself militated that the 
festival become a framework not only for the staging of laicized life-cycle rituals taken from 
folklore but a medium for their large-scale creation and implementation. On the margins of new 
research findings, Ceaușescu repeated the long-standing truism. There had been “little 
preoccupation to mark the important moments of people’s lives in a lay manner […] with new 
manifestations specific to our country.” He stated the stakes for atheism clearly:  
 
As long as pioneers continue to go to church when they get to a certain age means that we 
are not taking proper educational measures. […] We cannot give an order that they [the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
576 Mihai Pop, Obiceiuri tradiționale românești (Bucharest: Institutul de Cercetări Etnologice și Dialectologice, 
1979), 174-191. Quoted from p. 177. 
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children] should not go to church but let’s organize activities, particularly when they join 
the pioneers, whey […] they reach maturity, [and] enter into the Communist Youth 
Union, and on these occasions let us take measures, so that it’s not the church that 
declares the maturity of a young person. Let us sit down to consider foundational 
questions and [decide] how to act in this direction! Especially in the case of the youth, the 
children, it is not admissible that we should see them get married at the church with a 
priest after they have come of age and some even have their UTC or party membership 
card in their pockets! 
 
This meant, Ceaușescu concluded, “literature, art, television, radio, Song for Romania.”577 The 
new measures called, among others, on the Writer’s Union, the Union of Visual Artists (Uniunea 
Artiștilor Plastici), and ethographers to “stimulate the creation of literary and artistic works, 
[and] dramatic pieces” within the amateur artistic movement. The stated goal was to provide the 
ordinary Romanian citizen lay folkloric rites of passage, thus “aiding the formation of atheist 
convictions” and of the “multilaterally developed socialist man.” 578 All party-state organizations 
in culture and education were to support this process. Despite the already evident economic 
collapse, for instance, both the CCES and the Institute for Research in Ethnology and 
Dialectology were assigned new research projects to investigate and appropriate folklore for the 
new rituals.579  
The popular success of Song for Romania was unquestionable, historian Dragoș Petrescu 
writes. “Fascinated by the almost sacred space of the stage which until then they had not owned, 
numerous amateur artists participated sincerely in the spectacles.”580 Travelling abroad as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
577 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Cancelarie, File 13/1986, ”Stenograma ședinței Secretariatului Comitetului Central 
al P.C.R. din ziua de 21 februarie 1986,” f. 6-9. Emphasis added. 
578 ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Cancelarie, File 13/1986, “Propuneri de măsuri privind îmbunătățirea activității de 
educație materialist-științifică a oamenilor muncii,” f. 13-14v. 
579 AMCPN, File 39615/1987, Proces verbal D.P.C.N., f. 1-7. File 39619/1989, I.C.E.D.: Contracte de cercetare, f. 
[1-18]. 
580 Dragoș Petrescu, “400.000 de spirite creatoare,” 115-126. 
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ambassadors of Romanian song and dance provided further incentive to those that acquired fame. 
Idolized by audiences nationwide, many became “living legends” and had successful careers in 
the post-communist period. Besides some material benefits, the festival likewise produced social 
position and political recognition for numerous folk experts.581 
Despite the enthusiastic response of certain sections of the population, the socialist 
spiritual culture of Song for Romania was far more fragmented than it might have appeared. The 
centralized nature of the festival, the ubiquitous involvement of cultural institutions, and the 
endless performances enabled the extension of power to all actors, whether they participated 
willingly or under official pressure because of their status as experts. Indeed, elites, cultural 
managers, and citizens often challenged the rationale behind the festival or re-negotiated, even 
displaced, the ideological meanings it sought to instill. The “authenticity” of the new rituals and 
songs, for instance, turned into a point of contention between amateur folklorists who embraced 
the new folklore, ethnologists who tried to preserve “non-perverted forms”, and the group of 
Romanian anthropologists who, gathering around Mihai Pop wished to deconstruct notions of 
“national specificity.” 582 At the festival’s inception, numerous cultural managers also suggested 
that the event was “an aberration.” When asked why they did not manage to convince more 
workers to participate, the reporter Constantin Stănescu wrote in the party daily The Spark, 
activists often gave detracting answers: “Well, comrade, these people are doing their job, they 
are over their ears in work, when do they have the time to sing and dance?” As the economic 
crisis of the late 1970 deepened, livings standards declined, and the regime returned to a 	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(ethnographer, Director of the Romanian Academy’s Institute “Archive of Folklore,”) Cluj-Napoca, 1 and 7 
April 2011. 
582 Ibid, 76-77. Vintilă Mihăilescu, "Le monde enchanté de la culture populaire: une lecture du discours 
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heightened mobilizational ethos, Song for Romania expectedly met some unwillingness from a 
population already overwhelmed with increased production tasks and party meetings, not to 
mention the growing hardships of everyday life.583   
Song for Romania also enabled the displacement of ideological meaning sometimes in an 
unanticipated manner. Certain villages, for instance, seem to have had the kind of popular 
amateur talent demanded by the festival in short supply, as a result of which on occasion 
religious choirs participated with appropriately socialist song repertoires and went on to win 
national prizes.584 On other occasions, amateur performers emptied the festival of its atheist 
meaning. While presenting laicized “winter songs” on stage, performers sometimes sang the 
religious versions off-stage in front of judges and local party leaders at the sumptuous parties 
taking place following award ceremonies.585 Studies argued that the Transylvanian Hungarian 
nationality, in particular, transformed the ethno-folklorism of the Romanian state into 
opportunities for minority-building efforts. What contributed to this was the relative protection 
that certain Marxist intellectuals and high-ranking Hungarian members of the RCP – Ernő Gáll, 
Károly Király, János Fazekas, and Géza Domokos – provided until the late 1980s. 586  Also, 	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February 1977, “Hymn to Romania: Festival of Working Singers or Singing Workers," 2.  
 
584 A former judge at the festival’s county level mentioned Calvinist and Orthodox church choirs. Interview with Dr. 
Ion Cuceu (ethnographer, Director of the Romanian Academy’s Institute “Archive of Folklore,”) Cluj-Napoca, 1 
and 7 April 2011. 	  
585 Interview with Ioan Toșa (born 1942, curator at the Ethnographic Museum of Transylvania), Cluj-Napoca, 4 
April 2011. 
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naționale, 1948-1975” (PhD Thesis. Nicolae Iorga Institute of History, Romanian Academy of Sciences, 
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review Református Szemle in 1983-1989), Cluj-Napoca, 8 April 2011. 
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crucial processes in neighboring Hungary – literary populism, peasantism, and Transylvanism – 
coalesced to detach the dance-house movement from Hungarian official cultural policy, turning 
it into a youth movement that reverberated in a Transylvanian Hungarian public increasingly 
faced with the national assimilationist policies of the Ceaușescu regime. 587   
In effect, these examples indicated two interlinking processes at work. The arguments 
and practices of elites, activists, or performers involved in the festival suggested, on the one 
hand, that the actual meanings assigned to the official discourse of “Romanian spirituality” and 
the socialist rituals were unanchored and open. Staging new folkloric customs in front of 
cognizant audiences – mostly first generation urban-dwellers with close ties to the rural world 
and with experience of local customs – was an inherently fragile project because it allowed the 
re-affirmation of symbolic links between “traditions” and religious folklore. Contentions around 
“authenticity” within Romanian public space or across the ethnic divide ensured, on the other 
hand, reinforced the idea of the nation as the keystone of culture instead of Marxism-Leninism. 
By sanctioning the Stalinization and indigenization of atheism, the Ceaușescu regime put then 
processes in place that ultimately enabled different social sectors to empty “Romanian 
spirituality” and the new ritual culture of their socialist elements and contributed thus to the 
rupturing of official ideology. 
 The contributions of the Romanian semi-official establishment – propaganda cadres, 
philosophers, sociologists, and psychologists – to the reform of atheist education reveals the 
transformation of the socialist sacred during the later years of the Ceaușescu regime. Informed 
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by Marxist revisionist ideas, these experts departed from dogmatic understandings towards more 
nuanced approaches. Because religion constituted a spiritual response to the exigencies of the 
human condition, their argument went, Marxist-Leninist atheism needed to provide an alternative 
humanist spirituality if socialism was to ensure the ennoblement of the individual Romanian 
citizen. The theoretical insights and sociological evidence this elite provided had far reaching 
consequences. Cadre training and atheist education in the 1970s and 1980s became more 
systematic. Next to routine pronouncements about the inevitable forward march of 
secularization, research portrayed a dynamic religious landscape. Neo-Protestant sects grew at an 
alarming rate as believers turned away from traditional religious organizations in protest to the 
accommodation these churches reached with the party-state. Reports likewise noted the  
weakening social authority of churches and the decline of religious knowledge among the 
population. The demographic prevalence of indifferent believers and their attraction to religious 
rituals based on arguments of cultural tradition prompted experts to promote ritual reform in 
socialist culture.   
 Several points of clarification are in order here. Atheist experts sought to enchant 
socialist culture with spiritual meaning at a time when the Ceaușescu regime seemed open to 
creative, post-Stalinist currents in Marxist humanism. By the late 1970s, however, they and the 
revisions they produced about religion and atheism embarked on a specifically Romanian career. 
In contrast to reformed communist states, Romanian atheists never gained the political status or 
resources that their Soviet or Eastern European colleagues enjoyed no doubt because the 
reformist undertone of their discourse was deeply suspect to a historically Stalinist leadership. 
Also, their rhetoric of spirituality never reflected the regime’s move away from collective 
principles in the interest of subjective individual fulfillment. This latter distinction is evident in 
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the manner in which the ritual reform atheists helped bring about became ultimately part of the 
drive for cultural homogenization under the banner of the Song for Romania Festival. As re-
Stalinization helped nationalist discourse become monolithic in an unprecedented manner and 
thus pre-determined the delegitimization of Marxism, atheist ideals and the socialist sacred 
turned into empty shells. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Vying with Poland, contemporary Romania counts not only as one of the most religious 
countries in the former socialist sphere but also a place where religion is inextricable from ethno-
national politics and identity.504 It is worth noting that, despite charges of extreme collaboration 
with the communist regime and the Securitate, after 1989 the Romanian Orthodox Church has 
consistently been the most trusted public institution well above Parliament, the government, or 
the justice system.505 While in the past two decades, hundreds of churches in northwestern 
Europe metamorphosed into museums, coffee shops, and skateboard parks, thousands of newly 
constructed churches opened their gates in Romania.506 Even as austerity measures were put in 
place at the height of the global economic crisis, state and local government funds were plentiful 
enough to commence works on the Orthodox Cathedral of National Salvation. When finished, 
this new patriarchal cathedral in Bucharest will be the tallest Orthodox Christian Church in the 
world. It will not only precede the recently reconstructed Cathedral of Christ the Savior in 
Moscow but it will also tower over Ceausescu’s notorious People’s Palace which it faces.  
 This contemporary scene makes it tempting to draw some foregone conclusions.  At  
the outset, Romanian socialism appears to be yet another case where Marxist-Leninist  
atheism “failed.” The belated manner in which the Romanian party-state decided to put  
atheism at the center of its ideological program and the extent to which it nevertheless  
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circumscribed the work of experts certainly suggests that, overall, Romanian party elites were 
circumspect with the atheist project not the least because their problematic national credentials 
forced them to rely on the Orthodox Church and prefer Stalinist centralization.  
By underplaying the anti-religious commitments of the regime, however, the inherent risk 
is to miss the impact that enforced secularization had on churches’ social authority and 
infrastructure not to mention its effect on popular religious education and belief. Professional 
atheists upheld their programmatic pronouncements about the inevitable withering away of 
religion. However, the religious landscape they observed in the late Ceaușescu era belied 
secularization, revealing processes of religious change rather than evidence for the loss of faith. 
The demographic prevalence of “indifferent” believers and their attraction to rituals as forms of 
“cultural tradition” pointed to trends observed elsewhere for the socialist period: declining 
religious knowledge and the formation of religious affiliations around ideas of cultural heritage. 
In turn, the increasing importance of the family in religious socialization, noted with alarm by 
atheist experts, indicated the privatization of faith. Meanwhile, the exponential growth of neo-
Protestant organizations or the youth’s attraction to the occult – astrology, paranormal, and 
ufology – showed a departure from traditional religiosity towards either “modern” and extra-
institutional forms of piety.507  
Missing processes of religious change reinforces the assumption that we are dealing 
simply with a process of “interrupted continuity” between pre-socialist and post-socialist 
religiosity. The unprecedented ritualization through the “Song for Romania” Festival similarly 
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suggests that the heightened sacralization of socialist culture “paved the way for a resurgence of 
organized religion” notwithstanding the atheist drive of the party-state.508 The old Church 
Slavonic terms incorporated during the 1980s into Ceaușescu’s personality cult – glory (slava), 
founder (ctitor), and savior (izbăvitor) – warrant such arguments without doubt.509 Yet such  
interpretations fail to adequately account for how the communist period rephrased religion in 
important ways.  
This dissertation analyzed elite interactions with believers and the Central Committee 
from 1948, when transforming religiosity re-emerged as a party priority, to the end of the 
socialist era. I focused on natural scientists, sociologists, preservationists, folklorists and other 
experts in institutions of cultural administration and social research newly created to manage 
socialist sensibilities and conduct. Marginalized in different periods, these elites influenced the 
place of religion and atheism in Romanian society while competing for resources within the 
centralized structure of the Party-State. Their voices mattered because they interacted with 
believers for whom national and religious belonging coincided. Elites also provided specialized 
knowledge for party organs committed to achieve convergence between ideology and citizens’ 
subjectivity.  
Pursuing the history of the socialist sacred through expert knowledge required an 
interdisciplinary historiographical approach. Indeed, this dissertation bridged major  
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historiographical fields: studies of state power and religious organizations510; investigations of 
iconoclasm, church preservation, and the socialist production of space511; and works on 
subjectivity and atheist education. In these literatures, however, the conception of the sacred that 
undergirded official models of exemplary selfhood rarely received scrutiny. 
Arguing that the sacred provides a key analytic rubric for understanding the lineaments of 
socialist modernity, this dissertation reframed the mentioned historiographical perspectives and 
disciplinary methods. I defined the socialist sacred as an overarching structure that emerged at 
the intersection of normative patterns of discourse, morality, space, and ritual culture.512 In 
marshalling this category of the sacred, I drew on works that engraved atheist endeavors into the 
global experiment to forge modern selves.513 Based on such insights, I took seriously the 
communist endeavor to provide citizens’ with sacred values, spaces, and rituals while 
emphasizing how this project evolved in dialogue with lived religion. Departing from these 
studies, I insisted however that the late socialist sacred emerged primarily in response to global 
debates about Marxism and humanism that peaked during the 1960s.514 In so doing, this 
dissertation dislodged the Soviet Union from its hegemonic position in histories of socialist 
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secularization and explained how the global revival of Marxist humanism provided party-states 
the impetus for mobilizing new expertise to transform religiosity. Also, whereas previous works 
focused on a narrow category of atheist cadres, my analysis focused on experts whose 
ideological relationship to socialism was far more ambivalent: natural scientists, preservationists, 
sociologists, ethnographers and other elites. Divided along traditions of thought about science, 
national modernization, religion, and Marxism, these “bourgeois specialists” offer historians the 
opportunity to explore how competing elites shaped the culture of the socialist sacred in 
communist Romania. 
This dissertation problematized histories that privilege the opposition between religion 
and socialist secularism. I demonstrate that socialist civilizations belonged to a contradictory 
modernity, inherently defined by a tense yet interdependent relationship between rationalization 
and sacralization. By situating socialism in the broader history of modernity and 
(dis)enchantment, this work also acquires a pronounced global and comparative relevance. It 
permits us to think about the range of actors that shape normative regimes of emotion, spatiality, 
and rituals in different political environments. My research also historicizes religious change by 
illuminating people’s responses to theistic and nonreligious canopies that competed to provide 
overarching meaning to their lives. Lastly, since I combine approaches from cultural history, 
anthropology and sociology to analyze elite struggles over the sphere of the sacred, this 
dissertation provides a new interdisciplinary methodology for understanding how experts 
leverage intellectual authority to transform norms of subjectivity in autocratic regimes.515 
The evolution of atheist work during the “golden epoch” also qualifies the totalitarian  
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aspects of the Romanian party-state. Adopted in 1966, Ceaușescu’s pro-natalist policies are often 
cited to distinguish Romania in the socialist bloc by indicating the particularly invasive ways in 
which the late socialist regime “appropriated the private realm” of the family and the 
individual.516  And yet, the fact that the Central Committee did not instruct for the 
implementation of new life cycle rituals until 1986 or undertake the creation of the necessary 
material culture for baptisms, weddings, and funerals in a centralized manner provide examples 
for how it did not subordinate the private sphere to collective principles. For much of the 
socialist period, marking the important moments of human life remained the domain of religious 
organizations. In this sense then, the sociologist Ion Mihail Popescu was right. For all the 
popular support that Ceaușescu’s personality cult and virulent nationalism could muster, 
Romanian socialism did not attempt to provide meaning for individual life in crucial ways. In 
this sense, it remained "a sanctuary without an altar, or a heroic army without a flag."517 
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